Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Act Quickly, Occupy!

Socialist Organiser no. 543, 19 November 1992 · scan pp. 8–10 · about 1,206 words

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•he timing and form of industrial both questions of tactics, dependent upon the assessment of the shop tewards (or their equivalents in ›ther industries), of the bosses' strategy and the mood of the workforce. When the management of the Lee Jeans factory in Greenock announced the decision to shut dow he factory in January 1981, the esponse of shop steward Heler Monaghan (future leader of a sevenmonth long occupation) was to oppose immediate industrial action:

I asked the workers to keep on working for the next week because, if n other fights to save jobs, industri al action has been an immediate necessityIn shipping, for example, sit-ins on ships need to be speedily organised in response to the announcement of job losses, given the ease with which a seafarer's "workplace" can be moved out of the country. Hence the series of sit-ins on ships staged in the early 1980s in defence of jobs.

Similarly, in a more famous case, the NUM was quite correct to call an immediate strike — in the absence of a national ballot — in March 1984. Not to have done so would have

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nt closures UPATIO s a powerful tactic against closures and redundancies. Photo Rick Matthews. meant surrendering to the National Coal Board even before battle had commenced.

There workers have taken jobs, support from workers in other workplaces owned by the same employer has been of crucial importance.

Bosses often claim that the closure of one workplace is necessary to ensure the survival of others, thus seeking to isolate workers threatener with redundancy from workers in other factories.

Unfortunately, such tactics of "divide and rule" have often been successful. One reason the British Steel Corporation could shut down the Corby steelworks in 1979 was that workers in other BSC plants accepted the argument that closure Corby safeguarded their own jobs.

Similarly, the efforts of British Aluminium Company workers in the Neath Valley to save their jobs in 1981 were hindered by a lack of support from the company's plant in Falkirk.

Although relations between the workforces in the Neath Valley and Falkirk were not hostile, they had never developed beyond 'phone call and an exchange of letters. Consequently, the chances of companywide action in defence of jobs were much reduced.

One of the problems faced by workers fighting in defence of their jobs and seeking to win active support from other workers has often been the half-dead attitude of the leaders of their own trade unions.

After the Lee Jeans occupation, for example, Helen Monaghan criticised the National Union of Tailor and Garment Workers (NUTGW) for its inactivity: the NUTGW failed to make the sit-in official for six weeks, and then withdrew that status before the sit-in had ended.

Trade unionists who successfully fought in defence of jobs in the NHS in Wales in the early. 1980s were equally critical of their unions, citing "over-cautiousness" by union officers in some unions at and above regional level, in particular an emphasis not to break the law regarding sit-ins etc." The role of the leaders of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) in the closure of Corby in 1979 was even worse. They refused criticise the BSC's corporate plan which dictated the closure of Corby, having endorsed the plan as being "on the right lines" when it was first produced. They left Corby to fight alone.

While certainly not being a substitute for support from one's own union or from other workers employed by the same company, support from the community in which a workplace is situated and from which it draws its workforce has been vital to many campaigns in defence of jobs.

Right from the outset, for example, the Lee Jeans workers had the backing of their local community, as too did the trade unionists who took action in defence of jobs in the NHS in Wales in the early 1980s. Support from the mining communities was vital to maintaining the miners' strik of 1984/5 over a 12 month period. Community support is not by any means sufficient to secure victory. The experience of the miners' strike, unfortunately, proves this.

But, like exposing the weakness of the bosses' case for closure, community support for a fight can help boost the confidence of workers defending their jobs. When workers. find sympathy in the street and pub rather than lack of interest or hostili ty, it boosts their morale and stiffens their resolve.

The experiences of earlier struggles in defence of jobs contain many lessons as to how trade unionists should react after the announcement of plans to axe jobs: • challenge the bosses' case! • divert discussion away from redundancy terms; • win broader support from fellow trade unionists and from the surround ing community.

Experience points also to the need for major changes in the nature of the labour movement and in its entire This poster was produced by the Iliance which publishes the weekly socialist For more information, contact: SO, PO Box 823, London SE15 4NA. rights. Workers must strive to be better positioned to fight job losses befor they are announced; now, we simply react to the bosses' job-cutting agenda. • The experience of workers having to "go it alone" in a fight in defence o jobs without support from the workforces at other plants owned by the same company underlines the need to build strong combine committees which bring together shop stewards form all the company's workplaces. • The standoffish attitude usually di: played by union leaders to their members' rights to save jobs makes very urgent the need for greater accountability in the unions and for rank and file control over union leaders. • Most workplace closures and jobs losses are predictable well in advance: the BSC's corporate plan of the mid1970s, for example, was explicit that major job losses were coming.

Shadowing management's plans for job cuts and planning out a strategy in defence of jobs in advance of the announcement of redundancies -rather than trying to close the stable door after the horse has bolted — should be integral to the routine work of the trade unions. • Trade unions should be prepared where necessary to defy the Tories anti-union legislation. They should also campaign for its complete abolition and replacement by a Charter of Workers' Rights, including the right tr inspect management's books at any time they wish to do so. • Above all, the fight to stop redundancies must become part of a national, if not a European-wide, campaign for a shorter working week with no loss of pay. Struggles in individual workplaces can certainly achieve success. But they cannot create another three million jobs for the unemployed. • With so many workers in different industries threatened with redundancies — miners, railworkers, NHS workers, council workers and civil servants — now, more than ever, the fight to save jobs must combine struggles in individual workplaces with a national campaign for a shorter working week.

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Socialist Organiser No. 543 page 10

----- pull-quotes -----

TIMING The tim in datern of indus

SOLIDARITY W action in defence of their

DEALING WITH THE UNION OFFICIALS

LOCAL U PO SUPPORT

LEARNING THE LESSONS

approach to the question of workers* ORGANISER ANISE

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 543

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