Eastern Europe and the end of hope
Socialist Organiser1992 1992-11-12Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 12 →
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Colin Foster reviews Hungary: the rise and fall of feasible socialism, by Nigel Swain (Verso) N hope for socialism as an alternative igel Swain is a socialist. He used to to capitalism. Now he argues that the only possible socialism is a project of reforming and softening capitalism.
Yet those of us who fight for socialism as an alternative to capitalism should read this book. It is an honest, sober effort.
Swain regards the old regime in Hungary as "socialist" , although in crude and bureaucratic form. We in the Alliance for Workers' Liberty would say that it was a system of class exploitation no better than capitalism — "bureaucratic collectivism"
or (in my view) "state capitalism"
But that comment does not dispose of Swain's argument, which is that the failure of the centrally-planned economy in Hungary, and of the various attempts to reform it from the 1960s onwards, signals the unviability of any economy dominated by public ownership.
The centrally-planned economy encouraged waste by driving enterprises to reach targets of gross output, to the neglect of appropriateness and quality. Hungary's factories produced an excess of big plates and dishes, and few small ones, because that was the easiest way to meet a crockery output target defined by weight. If the target had been a number of items, then doubtless they would have produced an excess of small pieces.
Performance was assessed at fixed dates - month-ends, year-ends, and so on — and how could it have been otherwise? But that harmed quality further, as factories rushed to reach targets at the end of each period.
The system discouraged technical improvements; a factory boss who proposed a technological innovation to the central authorities could only expect a more demanding plan target next time round.
It encouraged investment in perverse forms: far more investment projects were started than the economy could afford, because every boss wanted to expand his empire, and then, inevitably, they were subject to cycles of delay and cancellation. They were finished very late, often so late that their technology was already out of date.
Meanwhile, old industrial capacity was never scrapped, for that would reduce someone's empire. And the whole lumbering system was dominated by big monopoly enterprises in heavy industry, because they were powerful in the bargaining that decided the plan.
After 1968 Hungary scrapped centralplanning, stopped telling factories how much to produce, let most prices move freely, and resolved to regulate the economy instead by taxes and credits.
The change cured none of the ills of the centrally-planned economy. The same lobbying and bargaining between enterprise bosses and central officials which had shaped the previous plans continued to shape the economy, only in the form of lobbying and bargaining over taxes. credits and subsidies.
A factory which made big profits marketplace was sure to have them taxed Homeless in Budapest away by anxious central officials; one which made big losses could always lobby for subsidies to cover them as a lesser evil than the disruption if the enterprise collapsed. "Final" profits were not correlated at all with "marketplace" profits.
The new economic system drew resources away from health care and other social provision, and legalised a growing "second economy" of private enterprise and second jobs. All the essential evils of the old centralised system remained, and new ones were added. structure to replace unelected bureaucrats workers' committees."
After new blows were struck to the floundering system by the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, almost all Hungary's intellectuals, even those who had been sincere Marxist and democratic critics of Stalinism, concluded that public ownership must be abandoned.
Neither national nor workplace democracy can usefully decide such economic details as how many plates, or ball bearings or whatever, of various sizes should be produced. Such decisions must be made either by central administrators or by the Hungary (so Swain argues) shows that deciding administratively leads to waste and stagnation. Making the administrators democratically accountable would not improve the quality of such decisions. The market must be allowed to decide, and that means it must be allowed to boost some enterprises and ruin others. Each enterprise must be able to have a separate fate, and that means it must be private. . "In order to impose 'hard budget constraints', a society requires the legal mechanism of private property"
I think Swain is right in criticising both the Stalinist command economy and the illusion that a workers' economy could be created just by revising the Stalinist planning structure to replace unelected bureaucrats by workers' committees.
Before Stalin's turn to forced-march industrialisation in 1928-9, no Marxist proposed such detailed centralised planning. Sometimes, as Swain points out, Marx and Engels were so cursory or sweeping as to imply that a new workers government would immediately be able to plan economically for all the needs of society; but their general principle was that "the working class have no ready-made utopias to introduce... They have no ideals to realise, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant"
A workers' government could take over the mighty mechanisms of planning and cooperation created by capitalism itself the banks and the credit system, taxation, state spending, giant corporations - and use them to social ends, while continuing to allow markets to regulate details and provide information. Only at a much later stage, with more preconditions than can be discussed here, would the wholesale erosion of markets be possible.
Swain may even be right to say that the problems of over-investment, an excessive drain on resources by bigger enterprises, inadequate scrapping of old capacity, and so on, would exist as tendencies under such a workers' government. But why are those problems decisive? Why are they worse than the terrible brutalities, inhumanities and irrationalities of private enterprise? Why are they worse than the exploitation of workers by private capitalists?
Under the influence, I suppose, of Hungarian radicals, Swain ends up comparing the squalid reality of the old regime in Hungary with an idealised model of the free market. He minimises or dismisses without direct evidence, as he acknowledges — the extent to which democracy zould curb the problems in public ownership, while blithely claiming that "personal private economic power is amenable to social democratic, reformist control, as the Swedish case illustrates"
A democratically-regulated economy with public ownership would not just be an improved version of Hungary's old regime, but its opposite. That old regime was not just a bit stiff and bureaucratic, but a regime of a privileged class exploiting the workers. All its reforms, all its initiatives, were secondary to and limited by the imperative of exploitation. The bureaucracy's defence of its privileges systematically, ruthlessly and consistently ruled out accountability, a free press, any rational approach to the international division of labour, or a labour movement with some sense of unity (rather than the mass of atomised, resentful individuals to which Stalinism reduced the populations of Eastern Europe.
Nothing that happened in Eastern Europe could be a fair test for democratic socialism. And, on the other side, there is no evidence that private ownership has the great benefits that Swain claims.
The economic irrationalities of the old regimes in Eastern Europe should not be minimised, but there is no proof at all that the new pro-market regimes will do any better — only the ardent expectations of intellectuals, looking across to the comforts of the middle class in Western Europe and hoping that privatisation will bring those joys to them. "What is wrong with Swain's approach is that he sees the issue capitalism versus socialism as a clash philosophies in the committee rooms of economic power."
What is essentially wrong with Swain's whole approach, I think, is that he sees the issue of capitalism vs. socialism as a clash of philosophies in the committee rooms of economic power, linked with different moral priorities; sadly, the social planners, with their grand plans for the good of the working class, have turned out to be naive, and there is nothing for it but to yield to the market-men and try to restrain them as best we can with "community action groups... community planning initiatives... extension of the involvement of workers in workplace decision-making....
From the point of view of the class struggle between workers and capitalists, the whole issue looks different.
Public ownership without working-class rule is certainly possible, as Eastern Europe shows. Working-class rule without public ownership is not. Public ownership of the major enterprises is not an option for the working class, but the only possible way it can rule. The "virtue" of public ownership is not that it is an ideal abstract model of economic regulation, but that it is a necessary form of the liberation of the working class, which in turn is necessary for the socialist emancipation of humanity from the domination of economic necessities.
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Organiser
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"Swain is right workers' economy cou be created just by revis the Stalinist planning