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Socialist Organiser1992 1992-10-29Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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T fly when the cokers ame one on the new, unreliered pose Sicheme to he most dramatic point in the strug- demand should have been extension of July, when the dockers came out on the new, unregistered ports. the miners began a new phase of their war ot attrition with the government — the phase ir which the balance, inch by painful inch, was turned against them.
When something has already happened and is now history, then it naturally seems in retrospect to have happened inevitably — and that all the pieces fell into place as they had to in the circumstances. But that is to substitute hindsight for an examination of the actual course of events. There was nothing inevitable about the isolation of the miners.
At a number of points dotted across the middle of 1984, great possibilities for broadening the struggle came into existence, before vanishing unrealised. The most important of these were the two dock strikes, but there were others. The leaders of the NUM tried again and again to link up with other workers and broaden the struggle. Again and again they appealed for solidarity, to the broad labour movement or to particular groups of workers.
On May 9 Arthur Scargill appealed to railworkers, then due to start an overtime ban on May 30: "If ever there was a time to join with this union. to come out on strike... now is the time".
In the event the NUR and ASLEF settled for a miserable 4.9% rise. Paul Foot later printed documents in the Daily Mirror showing that Thatcher had instructed the British Rail bosses to make whatever concessions were necessary to avoid a 'second front' with the railworkers.
The most dramatic point in the struggle to broaden the front came in July, when the dockers came out on strike on July 9. Mrs Thatcher must have remembered the fate of Edward Heath.
Dockers struck against the use of nondockers to unload iron ore for Scunthorpe steelworks at Immingham. The fire had jumped from the miners to the dockers.
On the docks, as in the mines, the basic issue was jobs. Here were ready-made fellow-fighters for the miners. And dockers had the power to close down Britain very quickly. Within weeks of a solid docks strike the Tories would either have to surrender or use troops — and that would have escalated the conflict further.
Competent leadership could have welded the dockers to the miners in a common fight for jobs. The dockers' leaders, whatever good intentions they may have had, bungled it.
The TGWU did not even formulate clear demands for the strike. The basic "Competent leadership could have welded the dockers to the miners in a common fight for jobs. The dockers' leaders, whatever good intention they may have bungled it."
When the strike was on, Socialist Urganiser called for the creation of joint action committees of dockers and miners. But the NUM did not make much initiative to link up with the dockers. It was difficult for the NUM. The leaders of the TGWU were protesting that their
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le great strike 1984-5 fails lispute was quite separate from the niners' , and would not have welcomed ny such initiative.
On July 19 anti-strike lorry drivers hreatened violence against dockers in Dover, where the strike was shaky anyvay, and the dispute collapsed. The ress that had been screaming against violent miners either gloried in the hreats against the strikers or reported his in a matter-of-fact way: the police lad no comment! Instead of organising lying pickets, the mighty TGWU crumsled.
As we have seen, solidarity also failed n the steel industry. The steel unions ad been unresponsive from the start. When the NUM and the rail unions pplied their blockade in June, Tommy 3rennan, convenor at Ravenscraig, said le would work with scab deliveries of oal and iron ore. Peter McKim in lanwern said the same. ISTC general ecretary Bill Sirs, according to the Financial Times (July 2), "sounded Imost like a British Steel spokesman" From late June British Steel started running huge convoys of scab lorries into Ravenscraig and, especially, from Port Talbot to Llanwern. Miners' picketing in Port Talbot soon tailed off, and was token at Ravenscraig. The steelworks kept running at full, indeed increased, production.
Having seen the miners on strike for four months, railworkers, dockers and steelworkers knew what was involved in a serious battle with the government -the risk of months of deprivation, legal threats, police violence. The prospect was especially daunting in the steelworks, where the workforce was a shattered remnant, reduced in numbers by a half since 1980.
In addition to all this there was the deadening effect of the Labour Party's role in the strike. The Party rank-and-file were with the miners. Labour Party activists, premises and equipment were involved in the miners' strike to a degree probably not seen in any dispute since the 1920s. The National Executive Committee backed the miners and called for a levy to support them. Conference condemned police and defied Kinnock's request to condemn pickets' violence.
But what most people saw, courtesy of TV, was the public weaseling of Kinnock, Hattersley and others. We should not underestimate the role played by this in dampening the spirits of the labour movement.
the miners. Conference condemned police violence and defied To rally around the miners and against Thatcher, the movement had to have the feeling of being a movement, the feeling that it could win, that its leaders. wanted to win and would fight. It had to have its leaders saying, with political boldness to match the boldness of the NUM's industrial challenge to Thatcher: 'There is an alternative to Thatcher'. The leaders had to say it, mean it and fight for it, and in the first place back those already engaged in the fight against Thatcher.
A politically confident movement could have boosted the industrial solidarity by countering the fears, depression and hopelessness that held back many workers from acting who sympathised with the miners. Kinnock and his team played a fatal role here: instead of creating a movement against the Tories around the miners, they made the emergence of such a movement impossible. They acted like acid corroding the links and sinews of the movement.
The leadership could have swayed it. A leadership which puts the issues squarely and is visibly prepared to fight to the end can rally the faint-hearted. In the charged atmosphere of summer 1984, there was a lot of potential militancy that could be rallied.
And the way the TGWU leadership ran the docks strike was a disaster. In July, and again in AugustSeptember, when there was a second docks strike, the TGWU did not even put forward any precise demands for the strike. It argued that the disputes had nothing at all to do with the miners. Nobody believed them, least of all the dockers whose solidarity with the miners had triggered the dispute. Many other dockers — men who could have been won to a fight which linked their own threatened jobs to the miners' fight for jobs — felt they were being manipulated.
For their failure to unite with miners, four years after the end of the miners' strike, the Tories went after the dockers, scrapping the National Dock Labour Scheme:
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At the start of the strike (editorial of March 29) Socialist Organiser had said bluntly: "The strike cannot be won in the pits". Solidarity was irreplaceable. And on April 4 John Mcllroy wrote: "It would be self-deluding to pretend that today's miners' strike is anything but an uphill struggle. The miners are divided. The price is now being paid for the weaknesses of the past period. Conditions are very different from those prevailing in the victorious struggles of the early '70s"
But Arthur Scargill, in an interview on June 15, made it clear that he had a lucid view of the odds. "Faced with the Coal Board's closure plan, the progressive elements in the NUM discussed two options. One, you accept the plan and allow pits to close. Alternatively you fight it. If you fight and you have lost, at least you fought it...
It is this combination of realism with willingness to stand on the line which raises Scargill - and the other NUM left-wingers - head and shoulders above the other leaders of the trade union movement. And Scargill consistently did what was necessary in the situation. *If I am the last person left rejecting the closure plan, then that will be my position. If I am right, I'll stick there. I don't know how some people can fudge and compromise on.!. a principle" (Financial Times, June 15).
"The Labour leadership could have swayed it. A leadership which puts ti issues squarely and is visibly prepared to fight to the end can rally the faint-hearted. In the charged atmosphere of summer 1984, there a lot of potential militancy that could be rallied."
And right from April 14 onwards Arthur Scargill appealed repeatedly and urgently for other workers to strike -both through their union leaders and over their heads.
He was not able to do more than make appeals. Scargill's great predecessor as NUM leader in the 1920s, A J Cook. was a leading figure in a cross-union rank-and-file movement, the so-called Minority Movement', as well as being the miners' president. He thus had an organisation to campaign for solidarity in other unions. Scargill had no such organisation: one major lesson from the strike must be the need to build a new Minority Movement.
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