Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The hawk in the dovecote

Socialist Organiser no. 531, 13 August 1992 · scan pp. 7–8 · about 1,391 words

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The Labour Party victory in Israel's General Election in June, has shifted political prospects in the Middle East. The new government has already frozen new building projects for Jewis settlements in the West Bank, and promises to end the ban on Israeli citizens talking to the PLO. George Bush's officials hope for an Israeli-Arab peace treaty in time for the US presidential elections in November.

How much of a shift in Israeli opinion do the elections show? Adam Keller reports.

tan early morning hour on between Israel and the Occupied Territories were sealed off, and the passage of Palestinians into Israel forbidden for the coming twenty-four hours: Israel was preparing for general elections. While the future of the Occupied Territories was a central issue in these elections, the Palestinian population had no part in this democratic process. Tight security measures were employed to prevent Israel's disenfranchised subjects from using knives or bombs to express their point of view.

Already the previous elections -those of 1988 - were held under the influence of the intifada, then one year old. And already at that time, it was becoming increasingly clear to the Israelis that military Rabin may represent a shift in opinion give the order "break the bones of the means would not eliminate the intifada; that negotiations of some kind would have to begin sooner or later. In effect, the leaders of Israel's two big parties - Labour and Likud - were competing for the position of chief Israeli negotiator.

The 1988 elections gave a small -but decisive - margin to Likud leader Yitzchak Shamir. For many of his voters Shamir was the tough negotiator, who would drive a hard bargain with the Arabs and obtain the best possible deal. And indeed, Shamir is a past master in the art of holding his ground. But unlike the pragmatists who voted for him, Shamir was a dedicated man, totally committed to preserving Israeli rule in the whole of "Greater Israel", and keeping each and every inch of territory captured by Israel in 1967.

Since any conceivable agreement with the Arabs would entail considerable territorial concessions Shamir intended to either avoid entering negotiations altogether, or prevent such negotiations from reaching any conclusion. Thus, in early 1990, Prime Minister Shamir wrecked James Baker's plan to start Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Cairo.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait gave Shamir an unexpected respite, as the world's attention shifted to the Gulf; but as soon as the war ended, Baker came back, with new plans for negotiations. Shamir made every effort to stall -but after six months of constant American pressure, he had no choice but to go to the Madrid Peace Conference. Thus, it was Shamir out of whom a historical concession was wrung - to start negotiations with a Palestinian delegation, unofficially representing the PLO. By doing so, he gave such talks legitimacy among the Israeli public.

but he was also the one to Palestinians" -Having started negotiations Shamir's policy was clear: to wage prolonged battles over every procedural detail, to obstruct wherever possible, while at the same time continuing with an increased pace the construction of new settlements. Indeed, after his elections defeat Shamir openly admitted this, in a statement which got worldwide headlines: "l would have let autonomy negotiations drag on for another ten years, and in the meantime half a million Jews would have settled in Judea, Samaria and Gaza."

In the months after Madrid, Shamir's policy got entangled in growing contradictions. Trying to please both the Americans and the settlers, he ended up losing both: because Shamir continued with settlement activities in the Occupied Territories, President Bush denied Israel the Housing Loan Guarantees; and because Shamir agreed in principle to negotiate on Palestinian autonomy, his extreme-right coalition partners broke away, forcing him to call new elections.

At the same time, discontent was growing among the Likud voters. Most of them had never really been staunch believers in the "Greater Israel" ideology. They started to feel more and more insecure in daily life - with any Israeli, at any time, being a potential target for a knife-wielding Palestinian. If anything, they wanted to get rid of the Gaza Strip, the poor and overcrowded part of the Occupied Territories from which most Palestinian assailants come. They did not regard settlements and settlers as a particularly worthy cause - certainly not one worth the sacrifice of ten billion dollars in loans. In short, Shamir was striving with all his might to perpetuate a status-quo which his voters found increasingly intolerable.

Hard-hit by the deteriorating economy, Likud supporters in the slum neighbourhoods felt bitter at ed only in improving their own living conditions. This phe. nomenon was dramatically underlined by the publication of the State Comptroller's report, detailing instances of widespread corruption among Likud officials.

A further factor undermining the Likud's electoral position was the deep dissatisfaction among the immigrants from the Soviet Union - the very same people whom Shamir had hoped to make use of in the fortification of Greater Israel. The immigrants failed to be impressed by the Likud's Russianlanguage propaganda, in which the Labour Party was called red, leftist, Bolshevik, and Leninist. Even more than native Israelis, the immigrants suffer from the deteriorating economy, with 40% of them unemployed - and they Palestinian resistance continues. The not immediately meet their demands blamed the party in power. As many pointed out when asked by media reporters: we know what it means to have a Likud government, we don't yet know about Labour. When elections came, Labour gathered four seats from the immigrants' votes; Likud -only one.

In its downfall the Likud dragged with it other groupings proclaiming the "Greater Israel" ideology. Like the Likud, the extreme right contested the elections in an extremely divided and fragmented condition, with numerous fiercely competing parties and splinter groups. Most of them failed to get any parliamentary representation.

The only right wing party to do well was Tzomet, headed by former army chief-of-staff Rafael Eytan. Like the others, Eytan advocates Greater Israel and an Iron Fist policy against the Palestinians. But unlike the Techiya, which made these issues the sole theme of its election campaign, Eytan downplayed them. He concentrated on such issues as electoral reform, a "clean" government and opposition to the stranglehold of the Orthodox parties upon Israeli politics - issues on which his programme was virtually indistinguishable from that of the left-wing Meretz alliance. Eytan's Tzomet Party registered a dramatic success, raising its representation from two to eight seats. Many of Eytan's new voters were, apparently, disaffected Likud voters who did not go as far as voting Labour.

Once the results announced, Eytan lost no time in joining the winning side. Already on elections night he pened negotiations with oubted victor, Labour leader Yitzchak Rabin and declared his willingness to serve as a minister in Rabin's government. -In the 1977 general elections, the then-ruling Israeli Labour Party was defeated and went into opposition. During the following decade, party leader Shimon Peres made enormous efforts to lead his party back to power, but repeatedly failed: the closest he got was a Labour partnership with the Likud in two consecutive governments. In the process, former hawk Peres started hatching complicated peace plans none of which came to anything, due to the Likud veto in the "National Unity" governments.

Inside the Labour Party, Peres" leadership was challenged by the more hawkish Yitzchak Rabin. Rabin's tough image in the Israeli public was considerably enhanced since the outbreak of the intifada, when Rabin - acting as Defence Minister in Shamir's government -gave the infamous order to "break the bones of Palestinian rioters."

In early 1992, Labour's 160,000 strong membership participated in primary elections to select a new party leader and the party's parliamentary candidates. The results were rather puzzling: Rabin was elected party leader, beating Peres by a considerable margin; but most of the top slots on the Labour slate went to prominent doves, whose views were far different from those of Rabin.

The answer to this seeming paradox soon became evident: many of the doves themselves supported Rabin, having become convinced that he was indeed the only one could lead the party to victoContinued on page 14

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How women invented solidarity NAAWU TRANSN°

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the Likud functionaries who, since the Likud came to power, succeed-

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