Tony Benn analyses Labour's defeat: Why we lost and how to w
Socialist Organiser1992 1992-06-25Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 7 →
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Tony Benn MP has written a memorandum to Labour's challenging the conventional explanations of Labour's General Election defeat. The text has been abridged.
INTRODUCTION This memorandum examines the political strategy which has been adopted since 1983 by an overwhelming majority of the NEC, th Shadow Cabinet, the PLP, major trade union leaders and endorsed most political commentators.
WHY WE LOST - AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW its examination of the most recent defeat we shall have to re-examine the basic thinking which led us to adopt the strategy which we have adopted.
For there is an alternative analysis which may explain our successive defeats more accurately, and that analysis merits our consideration.
1. The Labour Cabinet had, quite unnecessarily, capitulated to the IMF in 1976, and had to make damaging cuts in the public services which hit the wages and conditions of those who were our natural supporters, at a time when the Oil Revenues were beginning to appear in huge quantities that would have protected the currency without IMF support.
2. The then Prime Minister had threatened to resign as leader of the party during the discussions about the 1979 election manifesto a few weeks before polling day, thus claiming a personal veto over Conference policies he did not like, which made the pressure for greater party democracy necessary 3. The failure to accept the immense damage to the party [which] was done by those Labour MPs. representing 10% 80p Why Labour lost The reasons for Labour's election defeat on April 9 and what socialists must now: articles from Socialist Organiser by John O'Mahony, Tony Benn others 80p plus 32p postage from:
SO, PO Box 823, London SE15 of the entire PLP who formed the SDP and devoted the next few years to the destruction of the Labour Party, enjoying the full support of the media throughout. 4. The decision of the leader to resign, and of the PLP to go ahead and elect his sueeessor was a matter of weeks before the electoral college was established which was deliberately designed to prevent the party membership from having any say in the election of his successor.
5. The decision of some powerful trade union leaders, at about the same time, to back the electoral college on the understanding that it would not be used, a decision which was never made public.
6. The support given by the PLP to the Falklands War.
7. The denunciation of Labour's Manifesto policies on defence by its two previous Labour Prime Ministers, and other leading figures in the party, during the 1983 election campaign.
8. The failure to give proper support to the miners, the printworkers, the Lambeth and Liverpool councillors and others who were genuinely defending the interests of those they represented 9. The incessant attacks upon socialists in the party which gave the impression to the public that the party leadership believed that the party was absolutely riddled with extremists.
10. The abandonment of Labour's conference resolution calling for reductions in Defence expenditure, a policy which was highly relevant following the end of the Cold War, and which denir us the right to argue that our soci expenditure could, in part, be pai for from a Peace Dividend.
I1. The adoption of a full commitment to a European Union, and a common currency, combined with a determined opposition to a Referendum to allow the electors to have any say in the matter. 12. The acceptance of some Tor anti-trade union laws in the policy reviews and the refusal to permit strategy on capitulation to Tory policies.
recorded vote on the matter, when the NEC voted on the Policy 13. The undue reliance upon expensive polling and press campaigns to the virtual exclusion of any public demonstrations or there are many 14. The impression given that the Party would say anything to get into office, which greatly discouraged those who had joined the party out of a moral commitment to socialist transformation.
15. The negative campaign fought in 1992, which seemed to concentrate upon attacking Tory ministers personally, lacking any serious socialist analysis to explain that the recession was, in fact, an international capitalist phenomenon.
It is important that these points should be put on record since they were all made, at the time, by the Left minority on the NEC.
THE ATTACKS NOW BEING MADE UPON THE LABOUR PARTY The Tory and Liberal press. are no friends of ours, are n engaged in trying to persuar that:
a. Socialism is dead - at the very moment when unemployment is at all-time levels and Britain, and the capitalist world, is in the middle of a huge slump.
b. The trade union connection is a handicap when, in fact, it is our main link with our natural political constituency, and the party without the unions would go the way of the SDP.
c. We should continue with the strategy we have followed so far which has signally failed to gain us the victory, by marginalising the Left instead of trying to work with it.
If Labour is to win public support for the next election it must give serious consideration to the following strategyBuild itself up by campaigning, locally and nationally, for:
a. Full employment b. A big house-building gramme c. A free Health Service ter care for the disabled d. Life-long and equal education for everyone h (sic). Higher pensions and dignity for all retired men and womel i. A Minimum Wage, better benefits and a fair tax system j. Democratic reform, Civil Liberties and trade union rights k. Freedom for all local authorities to provide essential services L An end to all forms of discrim nation m. World peace, disarmament and development i. The protection of the planet and its wild-life from destruction o. The maintenance of the supremacy of the electors in choosing those who make the lav under which we live p. Socialist ideas and vance. PARTY ORGAN There must be a re-organisation the party and its work to achieve the following:
1. Greater devolution of power from headquarters to the constituencies.
2. The maintenance of the central role of Conference.
3. Stronger co-operation betwee the party and the trade unions building upon local links as well a national ones.
4. The acceptance that there are many schools of socialist thought and they must all be accepted as legitimate within the party.
5. Attempts to widen affiliations to the party so as to link us to other progressive organisations.
6. The development of genuine political education.
7. The re-establishment of Labour as a campaigning party ar not just its leaders as an alternati management team for the status quo.
8. The acceptance, by the new leadership, of the importance of the Left within the party, an end to the efforts that have been made to isolate and marginalise it, and serious attempts to harness its abilities in campaigning for victory, since Labour cannot be effective unless Left and Right can work together in mutual respect.
CONCLUSION This memorandum has been written to allow wider discussion about the future, within the movement, as we build up our strength, and start working for the election of a majority Labour Government which we all hope to see in office soon.
Tony Benn June 1992
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Why Labour lost A pamphlet from AWL
"[There must be] ..acceptance that
schools of socialis thought and they must all be accepted as legitimate within party."
R'S AIMS OBJECTIVES