Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The end of the Torv "miracle

Socialist Organiser no. 517, 19 March 1992 · scan pp. 14–15 · about 1,405 words

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Some economists- are warning that the 1980-style-recession, but a repeat of the 1930s style slump. What is happening? Why? And are the remedies currently being put about likely to save the situation?

1990 and 1991 were years of recession. Unemployment rose from 1.6 million in March of 1990 to 2.5 million in November 1991. Industrial production went from an index of 109.8 in the first quarter of 1990 to 106.8 in October 1991, investment goods output from index 121.7 to index 110.7.

This experience is only comparable with the two major post-war recessions, in 1974-75 (following the quadrupling of oil prices) and in 1980-81 (following the Thatcher-Howe "experiment" with monetarism). These deep recessions lasted for eighteen months and, in each case, unemployment rose by over one million.

The UK was certainly not alone in suffering a recession in 1990: other countries to do so included the US, Canada and Australia. In late 1991 those three countries, and France, Germany and Italy too, showed industrial production still lower than in late 1990.

Yet in the severity of its current recession to date, the UK is alone. How can we account for this severity? The difficulties can be traced to two sources: firstly, to the excesses of the latter part of Mr Lawson's tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and secondly, to the weak underlying condition of the British economy compared with other major capitalist economies.

The period 1984 to 1989 was indeed one of unprecedented boom in the UK. The Tories were not slow to boast of this. Thus in his 1988 Budget speech, Lawson asserted that the "country is now experiencing a miracle comparable in significance to that previously enjoyed by West Germany and still enjoyed by Japan". But this was no miracle, just a consumer-led boom, financed by a riot of borrowing, which rapidly led to a substantial deficit on the UK's balance of payments.

The major long-standing weakness of the UK economy is that, all other things being equal, imports into the UK grow faster than exports from it. There has been no adequate explanation for this phenomenon but its implication is that the sustainable rate of growth for the UK % growth -10 -20 '81 '8 '8485 anufacturing investment has slumped in the backlas Jun'87 88 89 90 91 92 Source: Datastream Unemployment is soaring (see left of calculation used before 1979. Right graph: British companies are now economy over the long-term is markedly below that of its major trading partners including particularly Germany and the US.

It is certainly possible-for a time-for the UK to manage higher rates of growth (and falling unemployment) if the economy starts off with a balance of payments surplus. The surplus in the early 1980s was particularly high, firstly, as a result of the 1980-81 recession and, secondly, as a result of North Sea oil. It was this which allowed the space for the boom of the late 1980s. But the boom sucked in imports at an unprecedented rate leading to a balance of payments deficit. In order to attract sufficient capital into the country to finance the deficit, interest rates had to be raised repeatedly to their current high levels.

Economists debate whether the deficit is sustainable; none believe that there is any scope for it to get worse.

The pessimistic view. is that the deficit needs to be reduced if not removed altogether. It can be reduced through a recession. A rough calculation suggests that removal of the deficit would require a fall of over 5% in GDP compared with what it would otherwise be. This would be associated with a rise of some 1.3 million in the number of unemployed.

The evidence suggests that the pessimistic view is the right one. In that the ring out 70% of their case, the severity of the UK recession can be understood as being the necessary adjustment to correct the financial deficits built up in the past five years. Some of this adjustment has now taken place. Even so, with the rest of the world in recession, the scale of the recession required in the UK is directly comparable with that of 1980 and 1981.

To follow the boom with a bust on this scale shows that all claims about "miracles" were so much hot air.

This national (Keynesian) perspective affords some insight into the likely efficacy of the calls currently being made to ease the recession. The principal call, from the Labour front bench, Tory backbenchers and much of industry, is for a reduction in interest rates.

It is true that the rise in interest rates has been the means by which this recession has been engineered but—as l have argued - the need for a severe recession lies much deeper. The Government may be able to arrange matters so as to effect a period of mild relief from the recession in time for an election. The best that could be hoped for, however, is a slowing of the rise in unemployment and a return to low levels of growth. (This indeed was the pattern of the early 1980s). The reason for this is that a reduction in interest rates sufficient to stimulate a marked recovery will lead inexorably to a rise in consumer spending and inevitably rising imports too. This will increase the deficit and will in turn increase the pressure for a rise in interest rates sufficient to finance the larger deficit.

undamental questions will have to be direction.

The national perspective would recognise that personal consumption must somehow be held in check if the next boom is not to run rapidly into the sands of a balance of payments deficit. The class perspective would recognise that a precondition for a boom is the restoration of profitability- with restrictions and cutbacks in wages. Either way, it is likely that future measures will be directed at reducing private wage and salary income as a proportion of total national income.

It is possible that oregoing Dividend pay-outs Dividends as % of earnings Britain States 3D Japan 1975 77 S1 83 85 87 89 91 latest and maybe 3.6 million keep rich shareholders argument underestimates the economic dangers which face the major capitalist economies. The danger lies in the weakness of important parts of the international banking system, particularly in the US, Japan and the UK.

Bank credit is the life-blood of capitalism and the danger is that in the present situation a reduction in bank credit can feed back on itself. US and UK banks are already suffering heavy losses and their principal customers are heavily in debt. Banks are therefore very reluctant to lend while many of their customers are at the moment very reluctant to borrow. The expansion of credit has virtually come to a halt., This, however, undermines the value of assets purchased on borrowed money, and their price thus tends to fall. This leads to the banks incurring losses which further undermines both their willingness and ability to extend new credit. There is a clear danger that the whole process will feed on itself; a downward spiral is possible.

We have not reached the point of a credit collapse yet. However, the US is certainly undergoing a "credit crunch" and its banking system is in a grievous Japanese banks have in the last year been weakened by the near 40% fall in the Tokyo stockmarket and by the fall in Japanese property prices.

This is usually a spectre invoked by Marxists: of a spiralling tinancial crisIs, underminıng capıtalısm worldwide and leading not merely to a sharp recession and slow growth but rather to a general slump. It is therefore of some note that those currently pointing to these dangers are monetarist economists of an almost invariably right-wing persuasion. Should we believe them?

My view is that these competing macroeconomic orthodoxies of Monetarism and Keynesianism are each adequate as perspectives from which to identify future trends, emergent problems and flaws in economic remedies proposed by others (ie. economists of the opposite persuasion). Where they are not to be believed is in the remedies (other than for short-term fixes) which they temselves advance for solving the problems.

On that basis, when Monetarists slump, take them seriously.

Scan page 15

ube unions must ballot for strike action now! lise

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THE POLITICAL ECONOIVIY

UK unemployment million - seasonally adjusted

Manufacturing investment

faced after the election. Both national and class perspectives point in similar

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