Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Capitalism it wasn't!

Socialist Organiser no. 514, 30 January 1992 · scan pp. 14–15 · about 2,193 words

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Paul Hampton contributes to the debate on Stalinism SO 512, Martin Thomas argued the case for understanding the Stalinist systems in terms of "state capitalism"", and it would have been a persuasive presentation, except that the existence of capitalism there was assumed throughout - whereas this was precisely what had to be proven.

Martin was absolutely right to argue that the truth about the class nature of Stalinism will be found in the concrete reality of those systems over the past 60 years, but it is certainly not the Marxist method to graft onto these societies the categories of capitalism (eg. wages, profits etc.) in the uncritical way that he does. In this sense, he commits the error which Engels warned against: namely of treating the materialist method as a finished stencil into which one accurately cuts the facts.

In our debate about Stalinism, we are at a prior stage in establishing a sociological definition, namely enquiring into hitherto unknown phenomena using general philosophical concepts of essence, law, form and contradiction which Marx called dialectics. In this area (alone), Chris Arthur (also SO 512) has the advantage over Martin in citing the control over the surplus product as the decisive theoretical tool in our understanding of class societies in history, including capitalism.

(Of course, this method does not preclude the possibility that some form of capitalism existed in the exUSSR, rather it starts without prejudging any particular outcome.) Yet Martin offers no clue to establishing the essence of capitalism, which we can then test empirically, but instead gives just forms (money, profit, commodities etc.) which have existed in many pre-capitalist societies. I therefore, offer a definition which retains its full force for 'western' capitalism today, and by which the reality of the USSR can be assessed.

"It is otherwise with Capital. The historical conditions for its existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. It arises only when the owner of the means of production and subsistence finds the free worker available on the market, as he seller of his own labour power. And this one historical prehistory: Kar Mars Capital vod. history. (Penguin 1990), p274.

The footnote to this passsage is equally pertinent:

The capitalist epoch is therefore characterised by the fact that labour power, in the eyes of the worker himself. takes on the form of a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently takes on the form of wage labour. On the other hand, it is only from this moment that the commodity form of the products of labour becomes universal. " Ibid p274.

So if we follow this method of enquiry (ie. the way in which the surplus is produced and appropriated), and the definition of capitalism that flows from it (labour power is a commodity, surplus takes the form of value, etc.), we are in a position to assess the reality of the USSR and whether capitalism has existed there for the last 60 years.

But already the proponents of "bureaucratic collectivism' and of "state capitalism' can agree on certain points when they follow this method. Our 1988 bridging document pointed to 3 important conclusions:

The "central political demonstration bureaucracy" (as Kuron and Modzelewski call it) are a ruling class because of their control over the surplus product.

• The property form (nationalisation) is not necessarily the best guide to the prevailing production relations in these societies.

• The class which generates this surplus product, but which does not dispose of it in its own interests, ie. the exploited working class, must make a social revolution against the bureaucracy.

L offer no further arguments in this respect].

However, when we look in more detail at the reality of the USSR and the experience of the last 2 years, the existence of capitalist relations of production looks pretty doubtful.

For example, the ruling class there was totally bound up with the state machine, to the extent that the people who really control surplus product were the militarv and the KGB, resting on the party-state of the CPSU. Hence, the smashing of the CPSU after the 1991 August coup really did mean the smashing of the central mechanism through which the svstem reproduced itself.

Moreover, on the face of it, this ruling class looks like other capitalist ruling class in history, not simply because of its property forms, but also because it lacks the internal competitive tensions associated with competition between capitals (though this ruling class is not without its contradictions.)

This is because the mode of exploitation under Stalinism is best described as direct and collective; direct because it proceeds largely on force/coercion, and collective because the power of the ruling class depends on their position in the bureaucracy, not on their holding of capital/wealth. Capitalism proceeds in a different form, through mechanisms such as ultimatedy backed by force. Ye commodity TROLOR Martin offers no explanation of these anomalies.

A further point which flows from this description of exploitation is the way in which the working class in the USSR received its subsistence. That the worker receives some money (a wage) is no great guide, particularly when many consumer durables were only available in the special shops, access to whien depended on your contacts Or membership of the ruling class.

In reality, the workers received much of their means of subsistence — job, flat, transport, education as a matter of administrative diktat, and in fact food and clothing depended upon non-monetary factors eg. queues, geographical location, contacts etc.

All of this, added to the very real constraints on labour mobility that existed, suggests that labour power did not take the commodity form under Stalinism.

The ex-East German working class today is finding out the way in which labour power becomes a commodity, through unemployment which was not previously a feature of these systems.

A final point about money needs to be made, since Marxists understand that under capitalism, abstract labour takes the concrete form of money, or to put it another way, the existence of money as a universal equivalent is the means by which the values of various commodities are equated, and hence we can speak of generalised commodity production. Yet surely what the *The mode of exploitation under Stalinism is best described as direct collective: it procee largely on the basis force/coercion, and power of the ruling class depends on th position in the bureaucracy.. current controversy over price "rises" , and their perceived necessity by the Yeltsin leadership if such perverse barbarism can be called necessity], shows is that what has passed relation to values tam, at all. and to constitute a capitalist system requires such a relationship.

My point is that certain things about the USSR need to be explained, and the claim that capitalism has existed there for 60 years raises more problems than it resolves. But what does 'bureaucratic collectivism' have to offer as an alternative?

On the face of it - not much, since, as the 1988 bridging document pointed out, socialists who have either used it as a label (like Shachtman) or adopted it as a theory by default (the post-Trotsky workers' statists) have hopelessly misconceived Stalinism's place in history, either as barbarism or as post-capitalism.

However, it is quite wrong for Martin Thomas to assert, in his critique of Tom Rigby (SO 509) that a 'bureaucratic collectivist' theory which claims that Stalinism is paprinie, just as me cirules o us wrong to rule out state capitalism, a priori.

Any serious bureaucratic collectivist' would accept, on the basis of the current collapse of Stalinism, and by assessing how it developed the productive forces and production relations, that it cannot be regarded as post-capitalist in any way. (In fact, a better line would have been to argue that bureaucratic collectivism implies Stalinism as worse than capitalism, though the criteria above would have been adduced to reject this claim too.)

In fact, "bureaucratic collectivism' starts from the reality of the struggle in the USSR in the 1920s, wherein the bureaucracy led by Stalin wrested control away firstly from the working class socialists in the Left Opposition and then proceeded to smash the incipient bourgeois elements (ie. kulaks) and therefore, in Trotsky's own words, to gain control over the surplus product after 1928.

That history took this course was by no means inevitable, but neither is it a variant that historical materialism must deny in principle, unless a crude stages theory has been swallowed.

It is not my intention to provide a full-blown, positive theory of (parallel) bureaucratic collectivism at this point, but instead to clear certain obstacles from the path of developing one.

The first of these 'bogeys' concerns the laws governing the origin, development and decline of Stalinism. Given that Stalinism has arisen, and indeed died entirely within the epoch of capitalism, it is inevitable that its specific laws will be shaped and even determined by capitalism, as Tom Rigby (SO 509) suggests. But this relationship does not exhaust the issue nor does it necessarily imply state capitalism, or even suggest analogous types of economic laws (like the law of value, tendency of the rate of profit to fall, etc.) which are unique to capitalism.

Indeed, it is a rigid and mechanistic conception of historical materialism to expect a theory of Stalinism to elaborate such laws, given our knowledge of other class societies in history. As a society based heavily on political forms of surplus extraction, and where the state and civil society were completely merged, such a request is both unreasonable and unnecessary. (There is, however, room for some debate on the specific command-planning mechanisms).

A second red herring concerns the nature of the direct producers under Stalinism, and whether they are workers with the revolutionary potential of the working class under capitalism.

In the absence of a genuine wage form, are they really closer to state slaves? Whatever the subtle differences, the point that really concerns us is whether workers under Stalinism have the properties of a universal class capable of making socialism. They shared the features of being direct producers, free' of means of production, working with modern machinery in a collective production process. They were exploited differently, but in the way suggested earlier. Therefore they had both the objective power and the interest to emancipate themselves. The concrete proof was Hungary in 1956 and Poland 1980-1, albeit negatively.

A third objection concerns where the bureaucratic ruling class comes from, where it grows organically in other societies. Yet this is to reduce the question of class formation to a question of personnel, rather than to expiain the mechanisms through which the new class constitutes itself. As I have already stressed the role of the state and the CPSU, and would add that all the organic Stalinist revolutions took place in countries with weak or decimated indigenous bourgeoisies, no more needs to be said. However, even a cursory look at the origins of the bourgeoisie proper between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, confirms its own diverse origins (merchant, yeoman, artisan, aristocrat etc.) to lay this one to rest.

A final objection concerns the current crisis, and whether its apparently 'peaceful' nature indicates no qualitative change in the relations of production. In faus, we know that the USSR has been in crisis since the late '50s and that this has centred around the problematic application of advanced technology to the labour process - or what might be called the generation of relative surplus.

This precipitated the piecemeal market reforms from the early 1960s to Gorbachev's perestroika, all of which proved an unsuccessful mechanism to reintroduce full-blown capitalism, though it has certainly paved the way.

My point though is that the violence of a revolution usually comes from the outgoing ruling class and yet in the USSR, it is precisely this ruling class which is trying to introduce capitalism as we speak.

This state-sponsored or 'Prussian road to capitalism has occurred precisely because the Stalinist relations, based as they were on naked terror, did not have the same feedback mechanism that exists under capitalism for organic relative surplus extraction. (This is what makes the crisis of Stalinism terminal, and different from a apitalist crisis of overproduction)

However, it would e a mistake to conclude that the process of creating capitalism in the USSR will be peaceful or uncontested in any definitive sense, since its effects (unemployment, starvation, shortages) will be meted out on a developing working class movement, which has already shown its capacity to resist.

Here the point about Stalinism and capitalism being parallel - and capitalism not being a lesser evil retains its full force. The development of capitalist relations of production politically, ideologically as well as economically, and it is in this respect that clarity over the transition affords Marxists the opportunity to intervene.

To reduce the next period in the ex-USSR to a change in the form of capitalism would be a serious mistake. An accurate description of the actual relations of Stalinism is the basis for our analysis and action in the period ahead.

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ЛИСАДИРЕНККОК I IACLA iquidation of the kulaks (more successful peasants]"

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