The robbel system
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-11-01Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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(HE DEUTSCHE MARK SWISS FRA International foreign exchange deals increased over the 1980s to $200 billion a Martin Thomas looks at the lesson of the recent flood of big financial scandals.
air exchange, supposedly, is no robbery. On that axiom rests the justification of the capitalist free market economy.
In the free market, so the argument runs, you get what you give. Somewhere you will find a buyer willing to pay you the full value of your services - but, unless you have exceptional luck, no more.
For at least three reasons the argument is a lie. In reality employers do not reckon wages by trying to calculate the extra production due to an extra worker. They pay as little as they can get away with. Women workers get less than day men for similar work. Workers domuch less than "consultants, paid "directors" who are no use at all.
More fundamentally, the wages paid to workers cannot add up to as much as the value they produce, or else there would be no profits.
Free-market economists try to explain profits as a sort of "wage" for the services contributed by capital. Their argument rests on the fiction that a millionaire, by converting his fortune into buildings, equipment, and so on, instead of spending it all by eating a hundred thousand dinners that same day, creates a new value in the same way that labour does, and deserves a "reward for abstinence"
The exchange between employers and workers may be legally free and equal, but economically and socially it is wage-slavery and exploitation.
LONDON INTERNA TONAG And, thirdly, fair exchange rests on the fiction that both buyer and seller have full information about the goods and services, and about the alternatives.
The fiction is not too oppressive when applied to the buying and selling of potatoes or soap. It is ludicrous when applied to the weightier dealings of the financial markets. And in modern Western capitalism, the way to get very rich, quickly, is not to exploit workers directly. That is painstaking, slow work.
The quick road to riches is to get an advantage, through superior information or skill, in the markets where shares and bonds and currencies (all relying for their value, ultimately, on production) are bought and sold. In those markets, hundreds of millions of pounds, representing wealth created by workers over many years, can be scooped up by a smart operator in minutes.
Their everyday business is hardly more than a legalised form of swindling. It is only logical that in the 1980s, a rip-roaring decade for them, more and more of them edged over into illegal swindles.
The first big scandal of the 1980s was the PCW affair, in 1982, in which two men stole £40 million from the Lloyds insurance market. Typically, they got off almost scot free. There was no legal action. They moved to America and set up business suc cessfully there.
The Kemp Mitchell affair, a bit later (the fraud was done in 1983, and the fraudsters banned from the Stock Exchange in November 1986), illustrated the same rule. Two men in a New York brokers pocketed at least $264,000 by putting bogus prices on bond deals done with a London broker.
When they were found out, the London broker paid back the $264,000 (a minimum estimate of the amount swindled, so it probably still left a tidy profit) and recruited the swindlers to work for it. By 1986 the London broker had gone bust. One of the swindlers commented: "It is one big joke, and out of the way as far as I am concerned."
The people for whom the swindlers were not just "one big joke" were the workers on whose backs these profits were made, and whose jobs were cut when firms went bust or were sliced up following takeover deals. * Junk bonds in which many big US corporations were bought by In the Johnson Matthey Bank case (September 1984), the bank went bust after being found to have handed out cheap loans in return for bribes. It was discreetly taken over by the Bank of England.
The big flood of scandals dates from November 1986, when Ivan Boesky, "king of the arbs" on Wall Street, was arrested. Boesky made his billions as an arbitrageur or "arb"), someone who looks for two dealers offering slightly different prices and makes a profit on the difference. He was caught for "insider dealing" , the illegal use of confidential information (about forthcoming takeover bids, for example, which would raise share prices) to steal an advantage.
Boesky did not go scot free. He paid a big fine and did a short spell in jail. But he came out still a rich man.
To reduce his punishment, Boesky "sang" , giving the authorities information about other people who had manipulated the markets. Three big exposures followed quickly.
In the same month, November 1986, Geoffrey Collier, a boss at Morgan Grenfell bank in London, was caught "insider dealing". He came out with a fine of £25,000 (small change compared to the £300,000 salary he had been getting) and no time in jail.
In December the British government started an investigation into the way Guinness had taken over Distillers in summer 1986. By April 1987, Guinness boss Ernest Saunders was in court, together with Gerald Ronson of the Heron group and others. They were charged with artificially boosting the Guinness share price by sham share dealings, which they did in order to make more attractive their offer to buy Distillers shares with Guinness shares.
oesky also gave the informaBlion which set the inveiat tors on the trail of Michael Milken, the "junk bond" billionaire.
"Junk bonds" are financial bits of paper which enable speculators to borrow vast amounts of money without having solid assets as security, by offering high interest rates. They made possible the "leveraged buy-outs" , in which many big US corporations were bought by relatively small-time spivs, using junk-bond money, and then chopped up and trimmed down to yield maximum short-term profits.
They are a tool for coining short-term profits at the expense of the long term - for the first thing that happens to every bought-out business is that research and development, training, long-term investment, and jobs, are cut. The added attraction is that a lot of the short-term profits spill out into fat fees for lawyers, bankers, consultants and financiers. Michael Milken took $550 million in a single year for fixing junk bond deals.
Since Milken effectively controlled a large chunk of the junk bond market single-handed, and controlled the information on which buyers and sellers depended, he had vast openings tor manipulation. He took them. After tour years or investigation, in April 1990 he finally broke down in tears and confessed in court to financial fraud. He is still appealing against his sentence, a fine of $500 million and ten years in jail.
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es nature of capitalism Michael Milken, once the most powerful American financier since JP Morgan, Only one big scandal developed irectly from the great stock market rash in October 1987 (though laybe the crash gave a boost to inestigations that would otherwise ave marked time. That was the ounty Nat West affair, which ime to court this year.
County Nat West, the merchant ank offshoot of National lestminster, was managing a sale shares for the employment agenBlue Arrow, designed to raise sh for it to take over another -ency, Manpower. The crash inrvened, and few shares sold. punty Nat West bosses arranged ke sales in order to keep up aparances and stop Blue Arrow's are price crashing.
he Polly Peck scandal, which broke in October 1990, also centred round manoeuvres to imp up the price of shares. Polly ick boss Asil Nadir pushed the ice of shares in his fruit and elecnics company up from half a nny in 1980 to 450p in early 1990. was the most successful company the 1980s on the London Stock change.
Big profits were announced, big ridends were paid out, the share _ces kept rising, and so people pt buying the shares, and some 60 nks kept lending money to Nadir. fact the announced profits were higher than could possibly be de from Nadir's fairly modest de in fruit from northern prus. But as long as the elaborate afidence trick kept going, and the tal of credit kept going upwards, dir was rich.
In October 1990 the banks finally alarmed and put Polly Peck into ninistration. Criminal charges now being laid against Nadir. he BCCI (Bank of Credit and -amerce International) scandal auly 1991 was also based on conmace trickery. Starting off with levered out of Gulf oil sheikhs, ank, founded by Pakistani ber Agha Hasan Abedi. fiddlaccounts to sing assets ing profits. show everand everThose ever-increasing figures for assets and profits allowed it to get more deposits, open more branches - and make more big pay-outs to its bosses. It also gained from being prepared to do dodgy business which other banks were more wary of, for customers ranging from Panama's drug-dealing General Noriega to Abu Nidal and the CIA.
The Salomons scandal, in August 1991, which resulted in the downfall of Wall Street's most powerful investment banker, John Gutfreund, was more like the Milken case. Gutfreund had used his commanding position in the US Treasury Bond market to manipulate information and siphon off extra profits.
The biggest so far of the financial scandals in Japan is rather like the Guinness, County Nat West, and BCCI cases - companies fiddling information in order to boost their own credit. In summer 1991 Nomura Securities, the world's biggest stockbrokers, and Japan's other big stockbroking companies, admitted to compensating favoured clients for their losses on share deals. They had done that in order to keep the prestige developed from those clients and thus to win other, payıng, clients.
A few top bosses discreetly resigned, and the new boss of Nomura, Yukio Aida, commented piously: "Too much of our energy was centred on pursuing profits. We were so successful that we became arrogant." Bswindles of the 1980- far the biggest of the and indeed of all time was, however, the United States "Savings and Loans" fiasco. At the end of the 1980s, most of the US's "savings and loans" businesses (the American equivalents of British building societies) went bust. The savings deposited with those *S&Ls" were guaranteed by the US federal government, and estimates of the cost to the American taxpayer of sorting out the mess are now running above $500 billion, or around $2000 for every child, woman and man in the US.
That swindle was essentially another confidence trick. It became possible when, in the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan's government loosened government controls on the S&L business. S&Ls could now offer higher and higher rates of interest.
Their income from people who had borrowed for mortgages for their homes was nowhere near enough to pay those high rates of interest to lenders. But that did not matter as long as the S&L bosses could keep a spiral of credit turning.
They pulled in millions in deposits, not just from small savers, and put them into speculative property development, which was then booming in the US. On the way they siphoned off large amounts for their own salaries, bonuses, expenses, and bribes.
Once the property market slumped, the whole scam came crashing down. The US federal government is now the unwilling owner of hundreds of abandoned or half-finished shopping malls, hotels, tourist resorts and so on, while most of the bosses and going unpunished.
The Leona Helmsley trial in summer 1989 likewise signalled the eagerness of the rich to raid the public purse. Helmsley, a hotel owner and property developer, was caught for tax evasion, and one of her former housekeepers told the court about Helmsley's maxim, a parallel to Ivan Boesky's "Greed is good": "We don't pay taxes. The little people pay taxes.
The Midland Bank's affairs in the 1930s have not yet become a spectacular scandal, but quite possibly they would have done if the bank were not so stacked out with top Establishment figures. Lord Armstrong, former head of the British civil service, and Kit McMahon, former deputy chair of the Bank of England, were among its bosses.
Midland was nearly ruined by buying the American bank Crocker in 1981. The deal, concluded in panic by the Midland, effectivels gave the sharp-witted Crocker boses licence to raid the Midland's credit as much as they liked for dubious property developments. In 1986 the Midland bailed out by selling Crocker at a huge loss to another US bank, Wells Fargo.
Meanwhile, from 1974 through to 1990, Midland had a Defence Equipment Finance Department inside its International Trade Service subsidiary working secretly and in close collaboration with MIS. Top Midland bosses claimed that they did not even know the department existed, although in 1983 its losses wiped out one-fifth of Midland's total profits.
The Financial Times has documented at least one major fraud involving Midland International Trade Services, where trade credits were organised for £50 million of exports from Turkey which did not exist. leaves a New York court after pleading guilty to fraud The main chread running however, is the pumping-up, siphoning-off, and manipulation of credit, all of which flourished in an era when credit was lavish and booming.
They are not blemishes and sores which grew on capitalism because of bad times. They are the product of good times for capitalism.
The 1980s were a good time for capitalism. The working class was mostly quiet, in most of the big capitalist countries; the Stalinist alternative to capitalism was crumbling. Economies were given a boost by a technological revolution, the spread of relatively cheap and small-scale computer technology. "The real scandal is this: capitalism at its most triumphant and starvation for millions, and a frenzy of multimillion-dollar The long process, developing since World War 2, of internationalisation of capital, lurched forward with the abolition of most controls by nation states on international flows of finance. The channels by which big businesses could get credit became much bigger, more varied, and more international.
International bank lending rose from $127 billion in 1983 to $624 billion in 1986. International bond issues grew from $44 billion in 1981 to $220 billion in 1986. International share issues expanded from $0.2 billion in 1984 to $17.7 billion in 1987. Foreign exchange dealing swelled to maybe $200 billion a day in 1987.
This was capitalism with its best foot forward, capitalism showing what it could do with a clear field and a following wind.
The real scandal is this: capitalism at its most triumphant and booming means homelessness, misery, poverty, and starvation for millions, and a frenzy of multimillion-dollar swindling for a few thousands.
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Organis
----- pull-quotes -----
made possible the leveraged buy-outs
relatively small-time spivs"
booming means homelessness, misery, poverty,
swindling for thousands".