The Bolsheviks and democracy
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-09-26Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 12 →
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After seven years of world war and the civil war, famine devastated Southern Russia in 1921. By the end of the year 36 million people were starving.
an McCalman's contribution to the debate on socialism and democracy (SO 498) seems to me to seriously miss the point at issue.
It is simply not tenable to argue, as lan does, that "Lenin's commitment to political pluralism was limited irrespective of the conditions which prevailed in Russia in the post-revolution years.
On the contrary, Lenin and the Bolsheviks' attitude to the question of political pluralism was shaped by events as they developed. The question has to be approached historically, as Trotsky put it:
"As far as the prohibition other Soviet parties is concerned, il did not flow from any 'theory' of Bolshevism but was a measure of defence of the dictatorship in a backward and devastated country, surrounded by enemies on all sides.
For the Bolsheviks it was clear from the beginning that this measure, later completed by the prohibition of factions inside the governing party itself, signalised a tremendous danger. However, the root of the danger lay not in the doctrine or the tactics but in the material weakness of the dictatorship, in the difficulties of its internal and international situation. If the revolution had triumphed, even if only in Germany, the need of prohibiting the other Soviet parties would have immediately fallen away. It is absolutely indisputable that the domination of a single party served as the juridical point of departure for the Stalinist totalitarian regime.
The reason for this development lies neither in Bolshevism nor in the prohibition of other parties as a temporary war measure, but in the number of defeats of the proletariat in Europe and Asia. (Trotsky, Stalinism and Bolshevism, 1937)
Victor Serge — who could hardly be described as an uncritical "Leninist" - was concerned to analyse the actual concrete situation facing the party and the Soviet state in the years of the civil war and immediately after.
Though his conclusions were not the same as Trotsky's, he too was opposed to reasoning in the abstract. (An error, I believe, that Ian falls into.)
"After many hesitations, and with unutterable anguish my Communist friends and I finally declared ourselves on the side of the Party. This is why. Kronstadt had right on its side. Kronstadt was the beginning of a fresh, liberating revolution for popular democracy: "The Third Revolution!' it was called by certain anarchists whose heads were stuffed with infantile illusions. However, the country was absolutely exhausted, and production practically at a standstill; there were reserves of any kind. not even reserves of stamina in the hearts of the masses. The working class elite that had been moulded in the strugagainst the old regime was literally decimated. The Party, swollen by the influx of power seekers, inspired little confidence Of the other parties, only minute nuclei existed, whose character was highly questionable.
It seemed clear that these groupings could come back to life in a matter of weeks, but only by incorporating embittered, malcontent and inflammatory elements in their thousands, no longer, as in 1917, enthusiasts for the young revolution. Soviet democracy lacked leadership, institutions and inspiration; at its back there were only masses of starving and desperate men. The popular counter-revolution translated the demand for freelyelected Soviets into one for Soviets without Communists'. If the Bolshevik dictatorship fell, it was only a short step to chaos, and through chaos to a peasant rising, the massacre of the Communists, the return of the emigres, and in the end, through the sheer force of events, another dictatorship, this time anti-proletarian. Dispatches from Stockholm and Tallinn testified that the emigres had these very perspectives in mind; dispatches which, incidentally, strengthened the Bolshevik leaders intention of subduing Kronstadt speedily and at whatever cost. We were not reasoning in the abstract. We knew that in European Russia alone there were at least fifty centres of peasant insurrection.
(Victor Serge, Memoirs of a revolutionary)
Contrary to lan's implication, it is possible to dig up numerous quotations from Lenin and Trotsky in the first period of the revolution where they stress the need for mass democracy from below, initative from the masses, etc. and assume, as a matter of course, the existence of a multiplicity of parties.
I will provide just one quote. This is taken not from the early period, but from March 1921 and from a speech Lenin made during the 10th Party Congress, the one that decided to temporarily ban factions within the party itself.
*The choice before us, is nor whether to allow these parties to grow — they are inevitably engendered by petty bourgeois economic relations. The only choice before us, and a limited one at that, is between the forms of concentration and coordination of these parties' activities. " (Lenin, Collected Works Volume 32)
As Marcel Liebman has commented: "The formulation is vague and far from satisfactory, but it certainly does not suggest a desire to eliminate the opposition parties once and for all. One cannot discern any totalitarian or monolithic scheme here." (Leninism under Lenin)
There is no substantial continuity between Leninism and Stalinist totalitarianism. Only shared forms.
Ian protests that the Bolsheviks functioned as the "arbiters" of loyalty to the workers' state and thus decided which parties could and could not function. This seems to me to be a topsy-turvy way of looking at the issue.
In reality, the Bolsheviks were engaged in a bloody life and death struggle to save workers' power from defeat and collapse. There was no god on high or referee who could function as "arbiter" between the different hostile classes. Either the Bolsheviks rose to the occasion, and thus became to a certain extent "arbiters" of where other parties stood in the class struggle or they surrendered.
And if the Bolsheviks had surrendered, we can be sure that they had plenty of enemies only too ing to function as "arbiters" ban them in turn.
Nowhere does lan confront the issues he raises from a historical, concrete, materialist point of view. For instance, if lan believes that Trotsky's perspective of "In reality Bolsheviks engaged in bloody life and death struggle save workers' power from defeat and collapse."
reform of the CPSU was wrong in the late '20s and early 30s, he should at least sketch out an alternative. Perhaps lan will, but those attempts that have been made along these lines, such as Anton Ciliga in The Russian Enigma are not very convincing at all.
What's more, Trotsky was not alone in his estimation. NonBolshevik leftists like the Mensheviks Dan and Abromovitch believed that a perspective of overthrowing the Communist Party could only lead to bloody counterrevolution. They, too were aware of the dangers of reasoning abstract.
Ian is on firmer ground when he alludes to the restoration of the ban on the Mensheviks in early "21. I, for one, would find it difficult to justify everything the Bolsheviks did in this case. But Ian's approach to the question lacks subtlety. He argues: "f these other parties constituted a threat to the 'workers' state' then surely they should, according to John's criteria of loyalhave been banned during the civil war and not after it."
Two points can be made about this. Firstly, if the inverted commas mean anything, then lan should explain why Russia ceased to be a workers' state in the last days of the civil war. Secondly, a more dialectical approach is needed.
The war might have been over but the working class was in a terrible state. Many of the best cadre had died in the civil war, others had been drawn into the party or into positions in the state machine -where they were outnumbered by careerists, time-servers, ex-Czarist officials, etc.
Industrial production has collapsed to less than one-fifth of its pre-war level. The famine and starvation had slackened, but this simply spurred on economistic protests from the more impatient sectors of less politically conscious workers and peasants. The revolution was on the retreat, this is undeniable.
Ian should discuss this actual concrete situation rather than pointing to supposed logical inconsistencies in John O'Mahony's approach.
It would be helpful if lan could clarify what he means by "a full blooded commitment to representative democracy" and spell out how the Bolsheviks could have demonstrated such a committment.
Perhaps they should have allowed the constituent assembly to take the power in January 1918? Then the Bolsheviks could have testified to their "full blooded" commitment to democracy by being slaughtered by the right wing of the SRs, the Cadet party, the monarchists and he Dan "Volunteer Army" whose programme consisted of the single point, "All power to the constituent assembly"
After all, looked at in terms of formal majorities and minorities, it was only the bulk of the working class who supported the soviets while the majority of the peasant masses and all the classes of the old order were for, the constituent When discussing democracy the key question is surely "what kind of democracy?". Which class is to rule? The workers or the bourgeoisie? Is the old state machine that excludes and separates the majority of the population from power to be destroyed? Judged in these terms infant workers' Russia was without doubt the most "full blooded" democracy in human history. If lan thinks otherwise he should spell out why.
Finally, I think there is one additional point that needs to be drawn out.
It strikes me that underlying all of lan's argument is the loss of a sense of proportion in politics. Does Ian really believe that, irrespective of all other considerations and conditions, socialists can give a cast iron pledge in advance, for all circumstances, not to take any measures that from a formal point of view could be considered "anti-democratic"?
No we cannot. The reason for this is that the other side, the class enemy, will make no such pledges.
The capitalists tolerate the Marxists to the extent that we are not a threat. The trade union and democratic liberties that our movement has won over decades, indeed centuries, stay in place because, as the Americans put it, "you can't dig coal with bayonets" . But none of the rights the working class movement enjoys in the capitalist democracies are protected by some "arbiter" standing above the hostile classes.
As Rosa Luxemburg — an ardent supporter of the Russian revolution, but a comradely critic of the Bolsheviks — put it: "It is sheer insanity to believe that capitalists would good humouredly obey the socialist verdict of a parliament or of a national assembly, that they would calmly renounce property, profit, the right to exploit. They will turn the country into a smoking heap of rubble rather than volun tarily give up wage slavery. " (Rosa Luxemburg, Speech on the Spartacus Programme, 1918)
No amount of philosophical theorising about "the fundamental dilemma facing socialists" over how to reconcile various intentions will get us away from this brutal reality. To argue otherwise is to accept the bourgeoisie's own myths about themselves.
It's a nice myth, nonetheless.
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Socialist Organiser No. 500 page 13