Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The economic crisis behind the cou

Socialist Organiser no. 497, 29 August 1991 · scan pp. 10–13 · about 5,118 words

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STALIN'S SYSTEM COLLAPSE!

Iser he survey article on these pages - written by Marilyn Vogt-Downey, and abridger from the US socialist magazine 'Bulletin in Defence of Marxism' covers events in the USSR this spring, up to the beginning of June.

The next two-and-a-half months, fron early June to the coup on 19 August, were dominated by three developments.

• The controversy about the "Yavlinsky plan", drawn up together with economists from Harvard University in the USA, which proposed a rapid drive for market economics in the USSR, eased by financial aid from the West.

• Talks about the new "Nine plus One" or "Union Treaty" - a formula for transferring most powers from the Kremlin to the republics which had the broad support of nine of the 15 republics.

• Boris Yeltsin's increased power after being elected as president of the Russian Federation.

The crucial dates were: 12 June: Yeltsin wins the election for president of Russia with 58% of the vote. The people of Leningrad vote to change its name back to St Petersburg.

17 June: Gorbachev's prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, rejects the Yavlinsky plan and demands that powers held by Gorbachev be transferred to him (Pavlov). Yazov, Kryuchkov, and Pugo - who are to be his co-conspirators on 19 August - back him; Kryuchkov deSprivatiation of ta reared ix years of policy edicts aimed privatisation of state-owned property, and attracting infusions of foreign capital and technology to reverse the economic stagnation caused by decades of Stalinist totalitarian rule, have worsened the Soviet Union's economic crises.

The heads of eight republics along with maverick "radical" Yeltsin joined Gorbachev in the April 23 secret "dacha" meeting to support Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov's "anti-crisis" plan.

Most notable was that three of its five points were calls to workers to end their strikes and threats against workers' anti-bureaucratic organisation. This shows who the bureaucrats think the enemy is.

While the first three points promised a new constitution, new elections, review of the new price increases and of the 5 per cent sales tax, point three also stated: *Towards the aim of stabilizing the state of the people's economy in the country, the participants of the meeting called for the introduction of a special regime of work in basic branches of industry, in enterprises producing consumer goods and in railroad transport.

*When necessary, organs of power in the republics will adopt additional measures to guarantee the normal workings of the people's economy."

Point four added to this "the leaders of the Union and of the republics appeal to the miners and all workers to end their economic and political strikes and. direct their efforts toward making up for the lost work time in the shortest term possible.

Point five commenced with "Considering the exceptionally sharp crisis situation in the country, the leadership of the Union and of the Republics considers intolerable attempts to achieve political aims by means of inciting civil disobedience, strikes or calls for overturning the existing, legally elected nounces foreign interference in the Soviet economy.

21 June: Gorbachev forces Pavlov withdraw his demand.

26 June: "Black Beret" troops (undi Pugo) seize the telephone exchange in Vilnius, Lithuania. Gorbachev de-l nounces the action.

15-17 July: Gorbachev attends the "G7" meeting of top capitalist powers in London; attempts to get support for the Yavlinsky plan and is fobbed off.

20 July: Yeltsin signs a decree banning all party political activity in workplaces, and also the activity of all other groups except trade unions, and then only by agreement with management.

25 July: Communist Party Central Committee approves a draft platform scrapping "Marxism-Leninism". Gorbachev denounces Yeltsin's decree (bi it will go into effect nonetheless from August).

29 July: Yeltsin signs a treaty with Lithuania recognising its independence.

11 August: Yeltsin announces a plan for "governors-general" to be appointed by him as local rulers in the various regions of Russia.

13 August: Pavlov denounces the republics, especially Russia, for wrecking attempts at economic reform.

19 August: The day before the Unio Treaty is due to be signed by five republics, Pavlov, Pugo, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Yanayev and Lukyanov launch their coup.

organs of state Strikes and protests While these pleas and threats aimed at the striking workers can unite the bureaucrats, they are unlikely to have much impact on the workers. Strikes in vital industrial sectors, including the energy industries were made illegal by the Supreme Soviet following the coal miners' strike of the summer of 1989. This has made no difference to the workers, as has been shown by the strike wave that hit the country in early March when hundreds of thousands of coal miners in Ukraine, Siberia and Vorkuta stopped working. Their main demands were political: the resignation of Gorbachev and the dismissal of the Supreme Soviet.

The Donbass miners in Ukraine, according to the Financial Times of March 25, were demanding the resignation of the Ukrainian Republic's leadership and an independent Ukraine. The miners were also demanding the expulsion of Communist Party organisations from the enterprises, from the security police, and from the Ministry of the Interior. Among their other demands were a 100 per cent pay increase, the lifting of censorship of the mass media - that has been progressively more pronounced since the Kremlin's invasion of Lithuania in January - a law indexing wages to prices, decent housing, more and better food, etc.

As in most parts of the Soviet Union, food is rationed in the mining regions. Miners in the Kuznetzk Basin in Siberia and in Vorkuta can receive only 10 eggs, about 5 pounds of meat, and two and a half pounds of flour and sugar each month, according to the Financial Times of March 1. Sometimes even that much is unavailable.

Before March ended, and on the eve of the new round of price increases on April 2, the strike had been joined by coal miners in southern Rostov, gold miners in Chita in the far north, and 10 mines in Chelyabinsk.

Metal workers, rail workers and aviation workers had pledged support.

Neither the much-publicised March 17 referendum on the maintenance of the Soviet Union nor an offer of a large pay increase made by the government in the first days of April stopped the strikes.

In April, new events fueled popular unrest and the strike waves spread. The lifting of price controls over products sold in the state stores incited widespread anger. Among the first workers to resist were those in Minsk, capital of the Belorussian Republic.

The price increases caused strikes and demonstrations that shut down Minsk throughout much of April. Workers from the giant tractor factory and the electricalmechanical works led the protests that were joined by numerous other industrial and transport sectors. They were demanding that the central government and the Belorussian government resign, an emergency session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet to enact more democratic laws, new elections based on broader democratic rights, and nationalisation of the property of the Belorussian and central Soviet Communist Party — with proceeds to go to help the victims of Chernobyl and to improve health and education. They were also demanding Belorussian sovereignty, according to Moskovskiye Novosti.

Meanwhile, on April 9 in the Georgian Republic, where the nationalist movement has been in control of the parliament since the November elections, the parliament voted unanimously for a declaration of independence. In fact 14 of 15 republican parliaments — all except that of Kirghiz — have asserted that their laws take precedence over those of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Georgia did not participate in the March 17 referendum to preserve the Union sponsored by the Kremlin to try to bolster its thin pretensions to authority. However, 90 per cent of the registered voters turned out on March 31 for Georgia's own plebiscite with nearly 99 per cent answering "yes" to the question "Do you agree that the state of independence of Georgia should be restored. on the basis of the independence act of May 26, 1918?"

tries In April 10, Gorbachev called for a O ban on strikes and demonstrations during working hours for one year. While he withdrew that call the next day, the Supreme Soviet in a closed session outlawed strikes again on April 16. On April 17, independent trade unions from the Russian Federation announced that they were going to meet in Moscow to call for a Russian-wide one-hour strike in solidarity with the coal miners' demands. On April 23, Prime Minister Pavlov, unveiling his new "anti-crisis" plan, announced it included a ban on strikes and rallies during working hours.

Nevertheless, the Russian Independent Trade Union Federation went ahead with its call for a one-hour strike with the date set for April 26. An estimated 50 million workers throughout Russia took part. Walkouts spread throughout the Russian and non-Russian regions.

It was in this context that Gorbachev and Yeltsin decided to make their peace. Their economic plans had never been very different. Yeltsin claimed to be for accelerated steps towards more thoroughgoing market measures. However he, like Gorbachev, has been unable to implement such measures because they are vastly unpopular.

Nor was there substantially their economic The Russian Federation was granted jurisdiction over the coal mines in its territory. However, the Russian parliament on October 31, 1990, had passed a law on economic sovereignty that declared its control not only over the coal, but over all the natural resources in Russian regions. When Gorbachev had annulled this law neither the Russian parliament, nor Yeltsin, offered much resistance. So nothing much had come of the disputes.

What was important about the agreement between the two leaders was that the Kremlin agreed to publicly collaborate with Yeltsin in the hopes that he could use his wider popularity to end the strikes. Yeltsin had shown himself capable of attracting support among the discontented masses because he alone, of the prominent political figures, seemed to stand up to the bureaucracy's hated privileges. He seemed opposed to the encrusted bureaucratic apparatus; he defended and made overtures to some of the national independence movements and had opposed the dispatch of Kremlin troops to Vilnius, Lithuania, in January; and, of course, he had called for Gorbachev's resignation, which added to his broad appeal.

His support coalesced in January around the "Democratic Russia" movement claiming over 1.3 million adherents. It pulled together a cross-section of political currents from the Milton Friedman-minded reformers like Gavrill Popov, mayor of Moscow, to pro-Marxist activists in the Socialist Party of Russia, to mass independent workers"

movements involved in the strikes.

Following the "dacha" meeting, Yeltsin travelled to Siberia to meet with the striking coal miners to promise them that the mines would be transferred from Kremlin to Russian jurisdiction and to tell them that they would get a share of the foreign currency from the sale of the coal for their own use. While some miners apparently applauded Yeltsin's deal, others - in Siberia, Vorkuta and in the Ukraine — were very sceptical.

By May 7, one-third of the Kuzbass mines were still idle. By May. 10 however, it appeared that the coal miners' strikes had ended. The Russian Republic now has jurisdiction over the coal mines in Russia, the Kazakhstan government now has jurisdiction over the coal mines in Karaganda, and the government in Ukraine has had jurisdiction over the coal mines in the Donbass region since January. Such divided jurisdiction over the coal mines under present conditions only serves to diffuse the unified miners' movement. Such a state of affairs will not serve to improve the living or working conditions of the coal miners. However, it does take the heat off the Kremlin for the time being.

The strikes in Belorussia had been called off at the end of April in anticipation of a meeting of the republic's Supreme Soviet called for May 21.

marketisation"

In the meantime, the ruling apparatchiks are in a bind. Their goal was the introduction of market mechanisms and controlled privatisation - which would be more attractive to foreign capital while at the same time remove them from direct responsibility for the economic crises.

However, even limited steps toward these goals have only worsened the day-to-day lives of the masses with whom they are massively unpopular. Gorbachev advocates fundamentally what Yeltsin does. Neither has been able to implement the market scheme, however, despite the extensive personal power their legislatures have bestowed upon them.

In policies

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Crowds cheer Edouard Shevardnadze, leader of the Movemer creating havoc as the government tries first one empirical manoeuvre and then another.

For example, on January 1, 1991, by government decree, the price of fuel and energy doubled, as did the price of lumber and lumber products. The price of metal went up 50 per cent, and machine tools 40 per cent. This had disastrous effects throughout an economy where enterprises have been put on a system of self-accounting and subsidies and state orders have been cut. Enterprises must survive on their own. But if the prices they must pay for supplies and fuel double, while their income remains the same, the enterprises are obviously in trouble. They must raise the prices they charge for the goods they produce. This has an obvious inflationary effect.

To meet increased demands for funds, the government prints more money. For example, to meet the demands of the striking coal miners (their demands were never really met), the government increased the money supply by 55 percent. This practice, plus decreed price increases, plus the shortage of consumer goods have led to what Soviet economists called a "ruble overhang" , or more money than there were goods to purchase.

A visitor notices, for example, that people in the Soviet Union must have considerable cash in their pockets on any given occasion to be prepared to buy some item in short supply that may suddenly turn up. Brown vinyl women's winter boots from Yugoslavia can unexpectedly turn up in Leningrad during the hottest day in July. Dozens of people suddenly line up to buy the boots which are selling for a hefty 120 rubles a pair — almost half the average monthly pay.

One bureaucratic solution for eliminating this "ruble overhang" was announced to the population on the evening news on January 22. As of midnight that day, 50- and 100-ruble notes would no longer be legal currency! People had three days to redeem money held in such denominations, but they were only allowed to redeem the equivalent of one month's pay. Imagine what this meant to pensioners who had saved money in large bills or working people who kept large bills around in case they came across winter boots in mid-July!

To make up for the hardships the April 2 price rise would cause, the government promised to increase wages 60 rubles per month and increase pensions. However, this was no for Democratic Reform, in Moscow on Monday help to the unemployed who got no such compensation. TASS called the price increases of April 2 "the most unpopular of all the decisions taken by the Soviet leadership since 1985," a statement not to be taken lightly.

By May 1, the Council of State Prices issued a report showing that these price rises had moved more than half the population below the poverty line. The extra 60 rubles per month compensated for only about one-third of the price increases. The minimum monthly income a person needed to survive had doubled - from 97 to roughly 200 rubles a month.

military A report issued by four imperialist financial institutions — the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation of European Cooperation and Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - in December said Soviet economic output had fallen four per cent in 1990, something unprecedented in a major industrialised country in the postwar period and more descriptive of the economic downturns in the capitalist world of the Great Depression era. The USSR's GNP dropped 3.5% 1986-90. By mid-December, shortages of basic food products had prompted pleas from Soviet government. officials for international reliet. Around $4 billion was contributed in food and other forms of aid from 13 countries: even India, where more than half the population goes to bed hungry each night, sent food!

In mid-April, in the midst of the strike wave, TASS published statistics showing a further economic decline in the first quarter of 1991: the GNP was down eight percent, exports and imports were down 30 per cent, and labour productivity. was down nine per cent. The IMF in its much-awaited April report announced that it was refusing any credit to the USSR until it saw reforms designed to change its "rotten structure"

The "9 plus 1" accords that Gorbachev and Yeltsin put forward after the secret dacha meeting on April 23 is a desperate attempt to show imperialism that the bureaucracy is in fact in control and united. In addition to taking a strong stand against strikes and worker protests, the "anti-crisis" plan includes the following proposals:

LALE • It promises by June 1 a bill guaranteeing foreign capital that its profits can be repatriated. Without a convertible ruble this will be tricky. No specific plan was proposed, however. • It also promises to go further toward guaranteeing the protection of private investments. • It projects backing up the value of the ruble by guaranteeing it with state buildings, land and other properties. • In addition, it projects swapping Soviet energy resources for farm technology "within a pan-European plan"

Gorbachev's October plan had put forth similar proposals. The "500 days" plan adopted by the Russian parliament and promoted by Yeltsin had similar inducements to foreign capital.

Some people profit Not everyone in the USSR is Neering Ner the new tenomic conditions. Not only are the blackmarketeers now able to set up legal operations, those in the right position can set up illegal "redistribution" networks that channel goods intended for state stores into private distribution Towards capitalism or workers' liberty?

Org networks where prices are much higher. It is also important to note that although there have been shortages of goods in the state stores where prices were subsidised, there were often plentiful supplies of food in the private markets at prices most people could not afford.

There are of course some individuals who can afford these high prices and others still who have their own private distribution centres with much more copious supplies.

Among those who qualified as a candidate to run against Boris Yeltsin in the June 12 elections for president of the Russian Republic was Aman Tuleev, chairman of the Kemerovo regional soviet in the heart of the Siberian coal mining region. His platform asserted that Yeltsin betrayed the workers" cause by signing the agreement with Gorbachev in support of the "anti-crisis" plan.

An approach like this surely represents the sentiments of many worker activists in Russia. Whether or not it finds expression in the voting, it is certain to promote the growth of the new layer of leadership — representing the workers' point of view - that is vital if there is to be economic and political renewal in the USSR.

It is here, not with the capitalist economics experts from Harvard, that a progressive solution to the current crisis of the Soviet Union will be found.

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STALIN'S SYSTEM COLLAPSES Those who do not learn from history are condemned to relive it Martin Thomas he nearest parallel in recent history to the US after is failed coup is Portugal after March 1975, though in Portugal some of the processes now under way in the USSR appeared 'in reverse" or "upside down"

Portugal had a fascist regime, long since cooled down to become stifling and cumbersome rather than terrorist, and a big African empire, the military costs of which greativ overstretched the dim metropolis. It was the last European power to let go or colonies in Africa: from the early 1960s -ugh to 1974 it fought a long, losing war inst guerrillas seeking independence m _na, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

Iptil 1974 the old regime was overmown from the top by an army coup. In the USSR, by 1985, the KGB had become keenly aware of the need to modernise, and pushed Gorbachev forward; in Portugal, by 1974, the officer corps had become convinced of the need for independence in Africa and democracy at home.

Strikes, factory occupations, anu demonstrations followed the April coup. The more conservative generals became alarmed. On 11 March 1975 they tried a counter-coup. It failed even more quickly than the Soviet coup: most of the army, and even of the officers, blocked it.

The counter-coup radically discredited and disorganised the old ruling elite, much as the 19 August attempt has discredited the "Communist Party" elite in the USSR. General Spinola, who had been the front man for the April 1974 coup, fled the country; some 45 leading capitalists were jailed.

Workers seized the factories — sometimes the owners had fled the country - and demanded nationalisation. By early summer some 75 per cent of industry was nationalised, as well as all the banks and insurance companies. Elected workers' committees held varying degrees of workers' control in the workplaces.

Farm workers seized the land and set up cooperatives. "Neighbourhood commissions" grew up in working class areas. Later in the summer a radical rank-and-file soldiers' movement was organised.

big element of what will happen in the USSR now - the self-assertion of the USS's various different nationalities — had no equivalent in Portugal in 1975. In some other respects what is likely to happen in the USSR now will be an upside-down version, so to speak, of what happened in Portugal.

In Portugal workers took their workplaces out of the empire of private profiteers to put them under the state. In the USSR, what has happened already - in some coalfields for example — and is likely to happen more in coming months, is workers taking their enterprises out of the empire of state command and putting them under the market.

In Portugal, workers had illusions in a state which for some months was dominated by leftist junior army officers; in the USSR, they have illusions in the market.

The revolutionary effervescence in Portugal was stopped by another counter-coup on 25 November 1975. The ruling class had deep reserves: even after the overthrow of the regime that had served it for decades in April 1974, and even after most of the military top brass and most of the country's top capitalists had fled or been jailed in March 1975, there were people able to regroup and restore control.

That experience has lessons for the Soviet nations. Much of the old top brass there may soon find themselves jailed or in disgrace. But the old ruling bureaucracy still has resources. The people around Yeltsin are only a faction of that bureaucracy, linked up with sections of the middle class who aspire to power and profit.

Despite all the differences, the experiences of the left in Portugal may have lessons for radicals in the USSR. Revolution in Portugal in 1975. Armed Forces Movement activists The greatest failing of the revolutionary left groups in summer 1975 was that they tagged along with the Armed Forces Movement - the leftist junior army officers, converted by their experiences in Portugal's African wars to a populist state-socialism vaguely modelled on Cuba or Vietnam or Algeria, who dominated the government between March and November 1975.

In August almost all the revolutionary left groups hitched up with Portugal's strong and very Stalinist Communist Party for joint "defence" of the current (fifth) Provisional Government, one in which the more leftist officers had particular weight. Then they excluded the CP from the alliance (on the stated grounds that it had held discussions with the Socialist Party leaders!) and formed a new "revolutionary united front" without the CP which proclaimed as its basis the programme for the "People-Armed Forces Movement" alliance put out by the most radical of the leftist officers, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, and demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly (elected soon after March, with a CP-SP majority) in favour of that vaguely-defined mix of leftist military rule and local direct democracy. (In Britain, incidentally, Socialist Worker supported all of this, with enthusiasm and without any criticism. It was trying to make links with the biggest of the Portuguese revolutionary left groups, the PRP-BR.)

yahe policy of the Portuguese revolutionary left must have helped to disarm the Portuguese working class by leaving it dependent and reliant on the left military leaders like Saraiva de Carvalho. In November 1975 the counter-coup leaders were able to gain stable rule at astonishingly little cost. Once they had isolated and disbanded Saraiva de Carvalho's military unit, resistance collapsed.

The revolutionary left's policy also helped to divide the working class. The Portuguese Socialist Party was, as the revolutionary left said, the Portuguese party of NATO. It united with rightists in the more conservative north of the country in a campaign of violent attacks on CP and trade union offices in the summer of 1975.

It also had a significant working class base; and many workers and middle-class people must have been pushed, or kept, behind it by the revolutionary left's disdain for formal democracy and sectarianism towards the Socialist Party.

Yeltsin's faction and the nationalist movements outside Russia are, as it were, the USSR equivalents of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement. Yeltsin's courage after 19 August does not undo the comparison: Saraiva de Carvalho, after all, was not a calculating careerist, but a man genuinely radicalised by his own lights, who fought the established order after November 1975 and paid for it with a long spell in jail.

Western socialists know that Yeltsin advocates western-style capitalism, and we know what that means. Radicals and worker militants in the USSR, however, probably see the dangers of support for Yeltsin as unclearly as Portuguese and western socialists saw the dangers of support for Saraivo de Carvalho in 1975.

In 1975 some Marxists outside Portugal -though none, as far as I know, in the country - made the flipside mistake of almost uncritical rallying to the Socialist Party because of its words about democracy. The equivalent mistake in relation to the USSR — again much more likely to be made by radicals outside the country than those on the spot — would be to shun the pro-Yeltsin workers' movement in a sectarian way and relate instead to neo-Stalinist groups who utter words with which we can agree about the inhumanity of the market and the need for economic planning.

Everybody was "for democracy" in Portugal in 1975, and everybody is "for democracy" in the USSR today. But what does it mean?

Yeltsin's decrees banning all party-political activity in workplaces, and suppressing the Communist Party, are acclaimed in the name of "democracy", rather as in 1975, the left said the Constituent Assembly should be disbanded because it was bourgeois and should be replaced by local Popular Assemblies. In both cases a half-truth ends up aggrandising an elite, Yeltsin's faction or the military leftists. -n Eastern Europe, already, democratic and anti-Stalinist sentiment has been Sused to justify measures against the old trade unions, formerly government stooge organisations, but now forced to base themselves on the working class and often displaying some militancy. Popular democratic movements, like the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, Walesa's Solidarnose in Poland, and most markedly the Croatian Democratic Union in Croatia, have sought to suppress rival political forces by claiming to represent "all the people" Leftist movements of any sort are vulnerable to attack as "red" , "Bolshevik", somehow tainted with the old regime.

A recent study of Hungary found that there was strong support in the working class for social-democratic or socialistic values. It had found almost no expression in elections because the old Stalinist party, now calling itself social-democratic, is discredited, and the new social-democratic parties are wrecked by internal conflicts: very many workers. abstained.

There are probably similar attitudes in the Soviet working class. The future of that working class depends on whether it can throw up leaders capable of uniting the workers' aspirations for democracy and freedom and their desire for security and human cooperation.

The crucial idea for radicals in the USSR today, as for revolutionaries in Portugal in 1975, is that the liberation of the working class must be the task of the workers themselves, led by their own democraticallycontrolled organisations and not by populist "strong men" whether state-socialist like Saraiva de Carvalho or market-capitalist like Yeltsin.

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"A lot about prejudice" Book Mick Ackersley reviews "1 Question of Character" by Thomas C Reeves, and "Kennedy v. Khrushchev" by Michael R Beschless.

We'll sell Jack Jack like soapflakes' said Joseph Kennedy, ex-ambassador to the Court of St. James, ex-bootlegger, all round scoundrel. Who was he selling Jack to? The American people.

Jack was his son, John F. Kennedy, a US senator. It was 1960 and Jack was running for president of the USA, the dominant power in the world. It was early in the history of modern media beauty contest politics. But already politics and showbusiness were engrafted and cross-bred.

So how was Jack presented? "Jack' was politically conservative; he was a physical wreck kept going by drugs since World War 2, when he had lost his

Organi

$50 each.

When he took the White House, John F Kennedy, the conservativeliberal, athletic. crippled Ignominious war hero, satyriasis-affected faithful nusband, captured the imagination of the liberal intellectuals and large sections of the leit (Tribune in Britain, for example). The enthusiasts named his White House after the mythical King Arthur's capital, *Camelot on the Potomac"

Weeks after coming to power, Kennedy let the CIA invade Cuba. When the black civil rights movement was rising, he let himself be blackmailed by J Edgar Hoover, the irremovable head of the FBI (he had "the files" on his supposed political masters), into allowing the FBI to harass Martin Luther King.

In October 1962 he took the world to the brink of war when the Russians put missiles on Cuba. In fact the missiles were no special threat to the US, but Kennedy the ignominious war hero had an image to keep up. The world came very close to destruction as a result. Khrushchev finally backed down and let Kennedy have his victory.

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