Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The unions: d but not out

Socialist Organiser no. 488, 6 June 1991 · scan pp. 11–12 · about 1,774 words

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policy it was the powerhouse for a massive haemorrhage of Conservative support.

Events demonstrated that large numbers were prepared to take to the streets to show their resistance, and that larger still numbers were prepared to withhold payment. It was clear that discontent over the disintegration of the economy was targetted on Thatcher herself, and that her determination and strength were now perceived as barriers to overdue change.

The bosses had decided, despite the risks, to back the European card: who could be less fitted to lead them in this new tricky venture than this Europhobe who had clearly already failed them economically?

In the Eastbourne by-election in October, the Tories lost their 25th safest seat, a seat they had held since 1906. A few weeks later at Bradford the Tory vote was cut by 23%. The party came out of the conference season 13% behind Labour in the polls. The Financial Times said: "Margaret Thatcher's government is in worse trouble than at any time since she became Prime Minister in 1979."

Through 1990, company were running at three times the level of 1989. It is now clear that the economy had gone into recession as early as June. By October 24 the Guardian was firmly stating: *The UK economy has plunged into deep recession as high interest rates and a strong pound take their toll of output, exports and jobs and inyestment."

Unemployment was increasing at over 50,000 a month, its fastest rate for nine years, and was forecast to hit two million (ie. 3 million) in 1991. Despite all the activity and exhortation, average earnings were now increasing at an annual rate of over 10%, and with the decline in productivity unit labour costs were increasing at a dangerous 12% -way out of sync with the UK's competitiveness.

The well-known City analysts Phillips and Drew reported: "ERM entry has not provided any downwards check to inflation expectations. It is now widely assumed that the government has been provoked into accession."

If UK capital was to make a success of its entry into the ERM and its pegging to the Deutschmark -which many felt over-valued the pound - then inflation would have to come down to German levels. Yet in the fall of 1991 inflation was running at 3% in Germany - and touching 11% (and eight year high) in the UK.

Finally, and ominously, it was reported that profits had taken their steepest quarterly dive since 1981.

Whilst the government was still sticking to its forecast of 1% growth in 1991, economists were predicting contraction. It looked very much as if the economy was set for a re-run of 1979-81, and gloom deepened at the news that the US economy had contracted nearly 2% in October.

All of this was the key to the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe, the ghost of 1979-81, in early November. The Financial Times now stated baldly: The best course would be for Mrs Thatcher to resign voluntarily during the next few months. If she declines to do so, she should be under no illusions about the risks."

Thatcher's downfall had finally come. Her nemesis after 11 bitter years was not just the economic situation, focused on the poll tax, but the resistance of those who, despite everything, were still prepared he unions as the primary organisations of the working class were, in terms of their organisation, activities and philosophy, a barrier to increased profitability and speed-up.

Thatcher aimed to reduce their coverage, particularly in key industries, and cut off union growth in the new service and finance-based sectors. This would help to reduce the power of the unions and this objective would be spearheaded by the sustained large-scale unemployment macroeconomic policy would create.

It would be followed through by restrictive legislation hitting union organisation and methods.

Thatcher did not perceive the upro ting of trade unionism as a realistic political objective, but she wished the residual trade unionism which would remain to be remoulded in the image of market rationality.

The weaker unions of the ThatCherite era would identify with their employer not with a wider external movement and they would adjust their behaviour to the ups and downs of the To the attempt to stimulate and strengthen the already existing. "business union" tendencies, Thatcher added a specific emphasis on wages. There would be no incomes policy but wages would be moulded by the wider changes in the labour market induced by unemployment, changing patterns in the labour force - more part-time, temporary, flexible workers — and by a specific government campaign to undermine national bargaining pushing wage determination down to where the profit-productivity earnings equation was more visible and to eradicate bargaining on the basis of the "going rate", inflation and comparativity and replace it by replacing these criteria by a simple relation of wages to profitability.

Finally, in the interest of a free market and the undermining of their political and social legitimacy, union leaders would be excluded from the political process.

The record of government success here is a mixed one. Trade union coverage has been seriously weakened. The membership of TUC-affiliated unions — unions which effect a minimal class consciousness — is down from over 12 million in 1979 to just over 8 million in 1990 and such unions: now represent around 38% of the labour force, far short of a full majority.

This decline has not, as many argues been cyclical. It has been structural and that is far more serious. Membership did not recover in 1983-88 as the economy came out of the recession. While the number of employed workers leaving the unions has been minimal and while employer derecognition has been on a small scale — although it is now increasing - membership loss has not simply been due to unemployment. It has also been due to failure to recruit in the new expanding industries as the union strongholds contracted with the old in dustries.

Density in the UK is still far higher than it is in the US, Japan or France, and still higher than that in Germany.

Nonetheless, its decline has been a success for Mrs Thatcher.

So, in relation to the 1960s and "70s, has been her achievement in putting on the statute book six major pieces of legislation and a host of ancillary measures which have bred cases in the courts and influenced the behaviour of trade unionists.

The employment legislation has restricted the purposes of trade unions and limited their achievements. The 1989 Dock strike provides the most recent graphic case study of how it can be utilised strategically by the employers.

We can get some measure of Thatcher's success by comparing her handling of this difficult area with Wilson's attempts to use legislation to batter the unions with In Place of Strife and Ted Heath's attempt to domesticate militancy with the 1971 Industrial Relations Act.

A further reverse for the unions their exclusion from political influence. Even at their zenith in terms of political involvement netween 1974-79, the union leaders only exercised influence on governmental decision-making, not power. Actually if you look at the statistics from 1979 you will find that the number of meetings and contacts with government ministers, though scaled down, remains surprisingly high — set agains the popular stereotype of total exclusion from the corridors of power.

But the contacts are more and more at a junior level and what those contacts achieve compared with the '60s and "70s is trite and derisory.

On the other hand, the government's intention that their policy of putting the union tops out in the cold would be emulated downstairs by the bosses in industry putting their stewards out in the cold, met with onl partial success.

The limited fashion for macho management in the early 1980s seems. to have waned and over most sectors of industry employers sought to introduce changes in work organisation and new technology through, not over the heads, of their own union representatives.

While business unionism has had its successes, leading to the expulsion of the EETPU from the TUC - the first major prolonged split in the movement in the post-war period - and has influenced the AEU and other unions (as well as the TUC itself, of course), levelopments such as "no strike" deals have been limited and it has had to be paid for.

Despite the reversals the unions have suffered, wages outstripped inflation in 1982-89 and demonstrated tremendous resilience in the face of political offensive and sustained unemployment.

Of course averages tell far from the whole story. Differentials have increa ed. The gap between the highly paid and the low-paid has stretched. The the top 20% of households increased to 39% in 1987 compared with 34% in 1979.

The proportion of income going to the bottom 20% declined from 10% in 1979 to 8% in 1987. This growth in the incomes of the better off was, of course, one of the keys to Thatcher's electoral success.

But economists have recently noted the adverse economic effects of the growth of a lower-paid insecure strata down at the bottom of the working class in terms of lowered morale, motivation and aspiration.

The Tories have won the big set-piece confrontations. The Stockport Messenger dispute, the miners' strike, Wapping, Sealink and the Docks dispute. Strikes have declined in the 1980s, although not to the levels of immediate post-war period.

The unions have been reduced in size, internal differences have been amplified, the power of the TUC, albeit generally used against the unions, has diminished, the sense of movement is weaker.

But decentralisation and a new political and economic framework have not broken the unions — although the dangers of this are growing. A surge of initiatives intended to incorporate a weakened working class from greater share ownership to the flexible firm, with a core of secure, highly paid workers and a periphery of super-exploited labour, are shown on closer examination to have had a far more limited impact than you would believe from the headlines.

A range of struggles — the rail dispute, the dock strike, the NALGO action in local government, the ambulance dispute - still erupt. Some, like the NALGO strike and the movement for a 35-hour week, are both offensive and successful.

However, despite the underlying strength of the organised working class we would have to grant Thatcher a degree of success with her range of policies intended to weaken the unions.

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Organiser PECTIVE

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"The decline has not, as many argue. been cyclical. It has been structural and that is far serious.* proportion of income in the hands of

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