The fall of Thatcher
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-06-06Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 10 →
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GAINST AGAINST TUC TUC TUL PO AGAINST TAX John My 1989 the contradictions Bof the Thatcherite project were coming home to roost.
Increasing real wages for sections of the working class, increased home ownership, a governmentstimulated credit boom - these had enabled Mrs Thatcher to paste together a coalition of just enough voters to ensure electoral success in 1987.
But the problems of the UK economy had not been resolved. The UK was still unable to compete effectively with the important capitalist economies, it was facing rising inflation and a dangerous balance of payments deficit.
Mrs Thatcher, the opinion polls slawson, swaslicies as Chancellor had allowed demand to grow three times as fast as potential output. The price now had to be paid. The advantages his policies had brought in terms of election success were now disadvantages in terms of economic success.
The deep seated contradiction between the electoral plane and the economic sphere were now becomHurd - pro-European Tag POR The poll tax massively unpopular ing serious factors in the Something had to be done to cool the overheated economy. Devaluation of the pound was intended to make exports cheaper and encourage increased investment. But there was no guarantee that it would succeed and it could also increase inflation and pressure for wage rises.
Thatcher again began to look to a Irise in unemployment to curb earnings growth - still increasing at more than 9%. But the major weapon deployed, based upon rejection of credit controls or wage restraint, was once again high interest rates to jack up the cost of credit and press down the increase in wages.
But these policies provoked unpopularity and unrest. As house prices fell, people with high mortgages were unable to pay or to sell. Repossessions and debt soared. Inflation made matters worse by moving closer to increases in earnings and overhauled them, eating into living standards.
The poll tax was for many the biggest economic blow and its unfairness further fuelled resentment and made it the most hated fiscal measure since Pitt introduced income tax in the 1790s. It provided a catalyst and focus for resistance to AGAINS Conservative policies. 1989 saw a spate of strikes and wages remained buoyant.
The problem was that the medicine prescribed by Thatcher to get the economy back on its feet had failed before. This time it was not only failing to do its job, it was enraging the patient and endangering the Tory Party. For the first time Labour, led by a man everybody was cetain could be beaten by a backward baboon, went into a significant sustained lead in the polls.
This not only soared to 20% but was confirmed in practice by success in local government and European elections.
This, in turn, strengthened the serious differences within the Conservative leadership. Nigel Lawson, Geotfrey Howe and Douglas Hurd looked increasingly to the EC and integration into the European Monetary System. Internal divisions led to the resignation of Lawson in autumn 1989, arguing that Thatcher was dominating economic policy, advised by the guru Alan Walters., The rats were deserting the sinking ship and Thatcherism was moving into terminal crisis. The reliance on high interest rates was not only alienating key sections of Thatcher's support, the beneficiaries of her policies on taxes, house ownership and wages, but sections of capital.
The poll tax was opposed across the board and was raising again the spectre of civil disobedience and social instability not sniffed since the miners' strike.
In the Mid-Staffordshire by-election in March 1990 the Tory vote was down 18% and Labour's vote up by 24%.
After 11 years of Thatcherism, Britain had the highest inflation, the lowest growth and the largest balance of payments deficit in Europe. The protests against the poll tax demonstrated the highest level of civil resistance since the miners' strike of the mid eighties.
In desperation, as their attempts to improve the economy worsened their electoral position, and endangered their continued ability to improve the position of capital, the Tories turned to the EC.
Thatcher, however, was determined to maintain freedom to manoeuvre for herself politically and for capital economically. She aimed to continue to balance between the EC and the USA, seeing such freedom as the best strategy for the UK's finance and servicesdominated economy, and wishing "The bosses had could be less fitted to lead them in this new tricky venture: than this Europhobe.
to avoid future economic conflict with the US.
Looking at the situation, Thatcher was basically impressed by the existing power of the City, rivalling New York and Tokyo, by the shrunken base of home manufacturing, by the fact that the UK was the home of more transnational capitalists than any other country bar the USA. She was most impressed by the dangers of greater EC integration. She was not yet convinced that there was a need to undertake what she saw as a high risk strategy.
She was a great believer in the power of her determination and gut convictions. Together with her notorious luck they had pulled her up by her bootstraps before. They would do so once more.
In her bunker, Thatcher was also genuinely concerned at the social market tendencies of the EC's leading states and even more of the apparatus based upon the Commissions itself, and feared that the UK might be manoeuvred into a political straightjacket.
The Thatcher formula remained an economic internationalistpolitical nationalist one. She feared that closer integration would privilege the immense relative power of German manufacturing industry, that this would be reflected politically, and that with both the UK and Germany interlinked in the same bloc, the US would deal on the political level more intimately with the most powerful partner, so that Germany would become the USA's new subaltern.
Political anti-Germanism, crass nationalism, was a factor here, could be seen from Nicholas Ridley's outbursts which provoked his resignation in July 1990. However, many of those who went along with Thatcher's basic position questioned her tactics. Was it. not better to influence and restrain progess from a comfortable, sheltered position within the EC tent rather than pissing stridently but ineffectually into it from the darkness outside?
As the EC countries moved towards closer integration with agreement on a tariff-free market by 1992, and proposals -for monetary co-ordination and a single currency, Thatcher either opposed progress or dragged her feet. She refused to put the pound into the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European monetary system an agreement between C members to maintain their currencies in relation to each other within certain limits.
However, the most important sections of capital gradually came to favour speedy entry into the ERM as essential to their interests. The biggest sections of industrial capital, supported by the trade union leaderships, saw the advantage of a larger protected home market and exchange rate stability.
The City became increasingly fearful of losing out to Frankfurt and Paris as the counting house of Europe. The majority of capitalists, economists and politicians came to favour entry for fear that otherwise British capitalism would be left isolated with no adequate base.
As.she political and economic situation deteriorated a majority of the Cabinet moved to support entry into the ERM. They did so in the hope that, as the fixed exchange rate ruled out devaluation, employers would push for, and workers would accept, wage cuts as a price for maintaining employment. But perhaps their main fear in the face of electoral unpopularity and growing capitalist support for entry was that this issue could head a decisive move to Labour, who were strong supporters of entry. Thatcher therefore, for once, stole Kinnock's clothes.
Pushed by Major, Lawson's successor as Chancellor, and Douglas Hurd, she agreed on the eve of the 1990 Tory party conference to join the ERM. This was combined with a small cut in interest rates. Thatcher's acquiescence was grudging and half-hearted. This did not make for continued effective leadership.
And she was likely to continue as a barrier to further necessary European integration.
That this was in fact the throw of a desperate woman, with her back to the wall, was demonstrated in the following weeks. Surveys showed that the poll tax remained the most hated tax this century, and that in the context of wider economic
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Socialist Organiser No. 488 page 11
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POLL 904 TAX THA
decided, despite the risks, to back the European card: who