John Mcllroy starts a new series: The failure of
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-05-23Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 10 →
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In March 1991, several months after her fall, Mrs Thatcher told a US interviewer that her "greatest disappointment" was her failure to control the economy.
That was, if she had thought about it, an admission of total failure for, in the end, the economy was the main part of the story.
If many would sum up Britain's lost decade of Thatcherism in the formula •Electoral success, economic failure" , the former was merely a means to an end, an end the Conservatives failed utterly to achieve.
Thatcherism was based on the belief that the market works better than the state. The job of government was to use the state to restore a free market. This would be achieved by an attenuation of state intervention and financial subsidy to industry, a return of publicly owned industries to the private sector, an application of market forces to the remaining public sector and, above all, by the opening up of UK capital to the pressures of world competition through the removal of exchange controls on the movement of capital.
An essential weapon in restoring "Mrs Thatcher told a US interviewer that her 'greatest disappointment"
was her failure to control the economy" the market and choking inflation the touchstone of the success of economic policy - was the control of the money supply through higher interest rates and reductions in state expenditure. As borrowing became more expensive firms would be unable to afford it and would be forced to become more competitive, and industrial capital which did well out of Thatcherism were those that were internationally based and those like defence on the one hand, and agriculture on the other, which enjoyed state protection.
The recession of 1979 was the worst since the early thirties, and was catastrophic. Output in manufacturing fell by almost 20%, investment stopped and unemployment moved towards the 3 million mark. Output remained below the level of the government-imposed 3 day week of 1974 until 1985.
It was only in 1987 that it approached once more the levels of 1979.
The recession has its roots in world economic downturn and KEEP Disused pit in South Wales. reorganising production, shedding labour and assaulting the unions to force down wages and intensify exploitation.
The "monopoly power" of the unions would require a specific reduction through legislation.
Capital would re-emerge slimmer, fitter, more profitable, with weakened trade unionism and a new culture of thrusting independence and entrepreneurialism. The government would encourage this and it would, in turn, intensify the replacement of the swollen welfare state by a residual safety net apparatus.
Before examining the overall economic record, that is the tallure, of Thatcherism it is useful to say a word or two about what are sometimes seen as the success stories of Thatcherism - her policies towards the unions, public expenditure and the welfare state -policies that were seen as intrinsic to economic regeneration. major rise in oil prices in 1979, which deflated international demand and increased industrial costs.
The situation in the UK was seriously exacerbated by the impact on the "weakest link" in the advanced capitalist economies of Thatcher's policies of high interest rates, strict monetary targets and a strong pound - its value against the dollar pushed up by hot money attracted by the high interest rates and the increase in oil prices.
Thatcher's policy was to finance the balance of payments deficit caused by the collapse of manufacturing with the surplus in the oil balance and the inflow from the 1984-85 miners' strike ment generated by the removal of exchange controls. However, as the world economy came out of the recession - recovery stimulated by reflation in the USA and the general capitalist upturn, not by monetarism - there were new problems.
The oil balance, as the price of oil fell, and the continuing deficit in the manufacturing balance, as imports were pulled in by the recovery, produced a serious overall deficit.
Trade in manufactured goods saw a f5 billion surplus in 1979 transformed into a £5 billion deficit by 1985.
The consequent expansion of industry which took place between 1985 and 1989 with manufacturing growing at 8% a year was based on the general world upturn, accelerated by a governmentorchestrated expansion in personal consumption.
This was fuelled by the total deregulation of the financial institutions, the removal of credit controls, easy credit and a vast increase in lending and debt.
The increase in investment remained below that in other coun tries - investment per capita was 60% of that in Japan and 80% of that in Germany - and failed to redress the destruction of the early eighties, Inflation, which had been controlled by the shake-out and by sustained unemployment, now began to accelerate once more, rising from 3% in 1986 to 9% by 1989.
Inflation, emphasised by Thatcher as the key index by which to measure successful economic management, was 10% when Thatcher entered Downing Street and 10% when she exited.
By 1988 the failure of her economic policy was apparent on all other indices as well. The government quoted figures to show that from 1981-88 productivity was growing at around 6% in manufacturing and 4.5% overall:
But as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development pointed out, this was a once-and-for-all gain produced by the destruction of two million jobs in 1979-82, rather than a long-term transformation produced by changes in culture, organisation and technology.
Comparison with the UK's international competitors was the crucial index and output per head in manufacturing in Britain was by 1986 only 60% of that in Italy, 56% of that in Japan and France, 48% of that in Germany and only 37% of that in the USA.
Company profits as a share of GDP recovered from a low of 11% in 1981 to 19% in 1985. However, by 1989 they were again plummeting downwards towards 12%.
By that time the , "Lawson boom" with its financial deregulation tax cuts and easy credit had created excess. demand which the UK's weakened manufacturing in-
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massive flight of overseas invest- DANGER DEMOLITION COAL ENG DOLE