The anti-union laws - a balance
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-05-10Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 10 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 10
At Frickley, Yorkshire, during the 1984-5 miners" strike. But the Tor et us begin by reminding ourselves of the purposes mand the most important provisions of the mass of legislation enacted by the Tories since 1979.
In a nutshell, the Thatcherite argument was that unions possessed too much economic power and that the legal "privileges" the state had granted the unions - the statutory immunities from common law liabilities developed by the judges - were a crucial factor in artificially boosting union power.
The importance placed by the Tories upon legislative changes as a key to economic change can be gauged from a glance at the writings of Mrs Thatcher's intellectual guru FA Hayek.
He asserted forcefully that the dismantling of the immunities (enacted in prototype in the 1870s and extended and refurbished in 1906), the protections which insulated the unions from a judgemade law which recognised no formal or practical right to strike, and without which unions would be unable to mount any lawful industrial action, was crucial to the police didn't agree! Photo: John Harris strategy of the new Conservatism.
He claimed: "These legalised powers of the unions have become the biggest obstacle to raising the living standards of the working class as a whole. They are the prime source of unemployment. They are the main reason for the decline of the British economy in general."
Armed with the power of these privileges, the New Right argued, the unions were able to exercise continual pressure on the state for further privileges. The pro-union legislation of the 1970s exacted at the point of a gun from Labour governments had strengthened the monopoly power of the closed shop, extending coercive rights to union recognition, buttressed the licence to strike and picket, and addressed new financial burdens in employment protection rights such as unfair dismissal and anti-discrimination legislation.
All of this interfered with management prerogative and the efficient operation of the market. It bred restrictive practices and artificially high wages which in turn stoked inflation and cramped profitability.
Normal Fowler, the Secretary of State for Employment in the mid'80s, put is all very simply: "Trade unions have used their power in OUR RIGHT en DICk PICK UR P OUR Have a her upport vol!
HAS March 1988: TUC-organised demonstration fol ways which adversely affected labour costs, productivity, and jobs. Trade unions tended to push up the earnings of people they represented; excessive pay increases hit jobs.
A move towards greater market regulation was therefore in this view essential to restore a healthy capitalist economy. An erosion and a re-moulding of residual union power was essential to economic regeneration. As Norman Tebbit's Green Paper, Trade Union Immunities stated starkly in 1981: "The government believes that improvements in industrial relations are essential to an economic recovery."
Everything, of course, could not be done at once and it would be impossible in the 1980s to return to the market conditions of the 1840s, advocated by Hayek. Nonetheless, the law and the economy should be swivelled to a far greater degree in that direction.
A recasting of employment law would represent an important contribution to this objective. It would facilitate a renewal and revitalisation of management prerogative to hire and fire, stimulate a move from collective agreements to individual contracts and enable the bosses to operate the labour process as the market dictated, free from union controls and the fear of industrial action.
Wages plugged into individual. performance would find their real market level, banking down on unemployment and boxing off inflation. More rational and limited trade unions, covering a smaller proportion of the workforce and dedicated to capitalist economics would palpate to the pulse of "their" employers' product market, and profitability. This was the Thatcherite dream.
The legal offensive he consequent legal offensive I to attain these objectives vad opened up on a very broad front. To undermine union organisation, diminish its social legitimacy and liberate the supply of labour, the existing legal procedures facilitating union recognition were abolished.
The protections for the closed shop were first eroded by the provisions in the 1980 and 1982 Acts requiring ballots with 80% majorities, and then summarily terminated by the 1988 Act which simply made the Health Service dismissal on the grounds of nonmembership of a union automatically unfair.
To confine trade unionism to the enterprise and weaken its bargaining power, the right to take secondary action was circumscribed Picketing was limited to the pickets' own workplace. The central definition of a trade dispute - the formula which gave industrial action protection from the judge-made laws - was carefully trimmed in 1982. To attract protection disputes had not merely to relate to basic employment issues - they had to be wholly or mainly about these To attract protection disputes now had to be between employers and their workers; wider disputes between worker and worker were no longer protected and support for disputes outside the UK minimally SO.
*Thatcher got most extensive antisaw it used and it stick."
If what trade unionists could lawfully do in the area of industrial action was restrictively redefined, so was the key question of responsibility for breaches of the law.
Centrally, the Tatt Vale Judgement making unions as legal perlaw, rather than as hitherto their officers, was re-enacted. This meant, crucially, that injunctions for violation of the legislation would be issued against the union itself and the failure of members to obey them would lead to sequestration of their assets.
This was intended to enhance caution amongst union functionaries, stimulate a greater concentration of power in the hands of the leadership, and generate a greater degree of control over rank and file action.
To aid these tendencies, weaken the strike weapon and reduce wages, the law was relaxed to make it easier to sack strike leaders. Social security reform in general, the limitation of payments to strikers, specifically, were introduced with the same objectives. And these concerns also produc• legal intervention in internal union government. To mobilise what were stereotyped as "responsible" passive members against the militant activists, and to make industrial action more formal, predictable and pasteurised, again weakening wage pressures, detailed ballotting systems were introduced. These were also applied to internal union elections with the objective of strengthening moderate leadership.
As with the other reforms, they were intended to provide a fertile field for judicial developments and extension. If Parliament started the attack on the unions the intention was that the judges would take it a stage futher.
Even more ambitious was the introduction of ballotting on the maintenance of unions' political funds, aimed at stimulating and formalising political differentiation within the unions and a withdrawal of support from the Labour Party.
The government saw national wage bargaining arrangements as inflationary. They wanted to relate wage determination more directly to specific profit centres and push it down to a level where it could be more simply adjusted to market changes and more transparently related to performance.
Institutional support for the inflationary extension of terms and conditions established by collective bargaining were kicked out from under the unions through the abolition of schedule Il of the 1975 Employment Protection Act and the Fair Wages Resolution 1946. Young people were removed from the protection of wage councils.
Labour market deregulation was also pursued through a gradual diminution of individual employment protection rights intended to open the workforce to harsher discipline and strengthen differentiation within the working class between core workers and peripheral workers.
For example, all those without two years continuous employment and working 16 hours or more a week were excluded from the unfair dismissal provisions, lubricating an extension of short-term contracts and the growth of part-time temMounted police ride into the picket lines at Wapping in 1986. Photo: John Harris
Scan page 11
workforce less insulated practice limited the scope of infrom management control, more in- dustrial action brought to the surOCCUPI more scared, HOTC CA- face and strengthened divisions ploitable. within the movement, contributed The redundancy payments fund to the isolation of those who were was abolished and the redundancy prepared to fight Thatcherism, and played an important role in a series consultation provisIOns WELC attenuated. The maternity leave pro- of defeats we have suffered in nosevisions of Labour's legislation were to-nose confrontation with the turned into a tortuous obstacle Tories over the last decade. course their utilisation. The landmarks from the Eddie Protections regulating the hours Shah-NGA stand off, the and conditions and Dimbleby-NUJ set-to, the miners' young workers were repealed. existing common law rather than strike (although here it was the preTribunal procedure was made far the legislation which was crucial), less user-friendly, with pre-hearing assessments, and greater COStS the slogging match with Murdoch awarded against workers, over Wapping, to the more recent culminating in the introduction of 1988 seafarers' dispute and the in£150 deposits before you could br- dustrial action involving railworkers and dockers in 1989 Ing a case should remain fresh and rankling in Not to be overlooked were expenditure cuts. Whilst the law on health the memory.
So, too, should the sorry saga of and safety, for example, remained operation was the development and disintegration limited in the 19oUS Dy of TUC policy intended to defeat restrictions, as was the work of the the legislation - an illuminating Equal Opportunities Commission essay in Conserative political sucEquality. 210 LIC Commission for Racial cess. This began, you may remember, with the wait and see policy of The success story 1979-81, as the TUC kept a low profile, hoped that the 1980 Act was a hese are the bare bones of the once-and-for-all measure and assault on the prayed and prayed and prayed for a unions. How successful has it Tory U-turn. It developed into the been? The average punter would second phase of armed opposition say very successful indeed — a small as the Wembley principles giving cameo of how Thatcher got some the General Council power to call a general strike to support unions things right through vision, plannWig, firm political will and the rub falling foul of the legislation were adopted in the spring of 1982. of the green. There is some justification in this the wake of Thatcher's second elec- The events of late 1983 when, in view. acting against the background of previous tion victory, Len Murray and his failures; the bungling over In Place cronies developed the "new of Strife in 1969, the fiasco over the realism", sought an accommodation with Thatcherism and, in conIndustrial Relations Act.
Success was far from ensured. sequence, refused to use the Wembley principles to seek solidariYet Thatcher got the most extensive ty action in support of the NGA, anti-union legislation this century produced the third phase of armed onto the statute books. She saw it used and saw it stick. As we know to our cost, the legislation has in retreat. It was now clearer than ever that N PERSPECTIVE one group of workers or even one union could not, standing alone, successfully defeat the legislation. And whilst the TUC was still armed with the Wembley principles - and the argument that in the NGA dispute the time had not been ripe to use them - it was now highly unlikely that any unified action would ever be launched from above.
The state of the movement by the mid-'80s meant that a movement from below such as that which had freed the Pentonville Five was also very unlikely.
The TUC's role in the miners' strike and the dispute between the general council and the EETPU over TUC policy on the boycott of state funds for ballots symbolised the fourth phase - the disintegration of any unified policy of active opposition.
Faced with the 1984 Act, the TUC had already left it to individual unions to decide whether or not to comply with the re"quirements for ballots on industrial action, union elections and political funds. It now bowed the knee to the AEU and EETPU and allowed them to make TUC policy by defying it in practice and dropped opposition to state funds for ballots.
By the time of the Wapping dispute, nobody even talked of using the Wembley principles to help the The battle against the legislation not only represents a direct defeat for the TUC. Its failure in this area strengthened internal dissension over wider strategy and weakened TUC authority generally, within and beyond the movement, undermining its role as a co-ordinator and broker for its affiliated unions so patiently built up in the '60s and "70s.
By the time the measures which were to become the 1988 Act were announced, TUC policy was already in its titth phase + total acceptance in practice with even verbal opposition now the most mealy-mouthed bleating in comparison with the gloriotis, if empty, rhetoric of earlier days. By the time the 1988 Bill was law, TUC opposition to it focused on talks with the CBI and lobbying Tory MPs.
For the unions, the proof of the pudding was in the eating. After the strategic defiance up to and including sequestration mounted by the NGA and the NUM the Wapping dispute reached a watershed. After that experience, where sequestration was the product of the industrial action running out of the hands of the leadership in a dispute marked by "responsibility", public relations and "learning the lessons. of the miners' strike" , no union was prepared to fight the law to the hilt.
In these terms, therefore, the employment legislation has been a success. Its influence on a recent major dispute such as the Dock strike in 1989 clearly illustrates this. This was a good example of a "new model" dispute with leadership strategy predicated almost completely upon the need to avoid a collision with the law to the clear detriment of winning.
As the bill abolishing the Dock Labour Board Scheme, a bill which would strengthen the power of the employers by allowing dismissal, began its race through parliament, the T&G leadership insisted that no industrial action should -even be prepared. They felt, with good legal justification, that it was essential to first of all negotiate to breakdown point with the employers over what would replace the scheme.
This was to ensure that the courts would later accept that this was an industrial dispute with employers -and thus protected - and not a political dispute with the government over legislation - which would not be.
The TaG were successful in this.
Organiser as Mr Justice Miller refused the employers an injunction. But Ron Todd, complying with the spirit as well as the letter of the law, then. promised the court that no action would occur until the employers had appealed.
Enter judicial intervention with the Appeal Court granting the employers an injunction on the amazing grounds that dockers had never had the right to strike. Then, still further delays whilst the union took the case to the House of Lords. When they won there was still, of course, the need for a new ballot, as under the legislation the initial vote was time barred.
The dates tell the sorry story in a dispute where speed was of the essence. The results of the strike ballot were announced on 19 May yet it was more than a month later, on 21 June, that the House of Lords' decision "freed" the union to take action. The Bill received the Royal Assent on 3 July, five days before the national strike began.
This legally induced series of delays led to demoralisation, and disorientation in the ranks and divisions within the union expressed in conflicts over the unofficial strikes.
The delays bought time for the employers to develop dissension, talk up the buy outs, and hammer home that dismissal with no redundancy pay would await those who turned them down. Of course, there were pre-existing weaknesses and divisions. But this dispute demonstrated how useful a weapon the law, essentially the tear of sequestration, is for the employers in this kind of conflict and how it can dovetail with the interests of union leaders who are hesitant in fighting a particular battle, to produce total defeat.
John Mellroy is the author of Trade Unions in Britain Today and of a-fortheoming book on the trade union laws. Part 2 next week.
Scan page 12
Organiser
----- pull-quotes -----
union legislation this century onto the statute books. She
sons, and thus their funds and assets, liable for breaches of the