Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The market brings chaos

Socialist Organiser no. 485, 10 May 1991 · scan pp. 8–9 · about 1,127 words

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Since the 1960s the Soviet relatively stagnant and consistently outstripped by the more dynamic parts of the West.

The Soviet-style economies have proved successful at the backbreaking work of building an economic infrastructure — pulling backward economies into the modern industrial age. But they falter when societies need a mass of thinking, educated technicians and ever more complex economic relations.

Thought-police clash with thinking, and bureaucratic planning clashes with control over complicated economic systems.

The USSR was not only a bureaucratically planned economy, but also a badly bureaucratically planned economy.

That was the background to Gorbachev's drive for reform from mid-1985, a drive that was to destabilise the whole system. Under the blanket of state control, Gorbachev expanded market mechanisms. The aim was to improve performance by incentive and fear of failure. Unemployment was to be pushed up, as was the managers' leeway. The market was to oil the machine:

Glasnost, more freedom, was used to sell Perestroika, more hardship. The Gorbachevites believed that even Glasnost would have a spin off for them: limited criticism could be used to pressurise bureaucrats who were crooked or inefficient. There were wellpublicised trials of officials caught with their hand in the till.

In the West the bulk of the left rallied to "Gorby". Here was the real hope for socialism, or so they thought. Here was a man who could purge socialism of some of its more vile aspects (utter lack of freedom, political police) and keep the essenSadam CoRD tial "socialist" components (nationalisation, overbearing state).

Stories about the lack of economic want in the USSR continued to pass as good coin. The Western media loved the Gorbachev show. And the capitalist politicians struck arms agreements with Shevardnadze.

Detente replaced the Cold War, and then was itself replaced by recognition that the USSR could not compete as an equal of the US.

At home, Gorbachev became increasingly unpopular. Glasnost had allowed some discussion to begin in earnest. Discontent was directed at the nomenclatura and the system they run.

The economic situation worsened. The bureaucratic control over the economy relaxed and yet there was not enough of the market to regulate the economy. No firms went bust. Prices were artificial.

Nationalist movements developed. The old. CP die-hards looked on in concern. The Gorbachevites used the mounting problems to push further ahead.

They chopped away at leadership level, cutting away old Brezhnevites. Chaos was used as a battering ram against those who wanted to bury their heads to avoid the crisis.

The Party itself began to feel the pressure. Yeltsin split.

Lower down the ladder, Gorbachev had problems with smaller bureaucrats who disliked the market because it disturbs their ways and promises nothing except increased scrutiny and insecurity And who was to finance reform? Who was to supply the investment? The West applauded Gorbachev; the peace maker and the reformer who admitted, implicitly at least, that 'socialism' was a mess, but was not prepared to buy out the Ussk. It will take vast amounts of Western money to prop up the USSR. The Soviet economy is much bigger and more decrepit than the old GDR. West Germany still has its belly full with eastern Germany, the US economy is hardly in shape to throw cash at the USSR, and Gorbachev failed to get Japan to open its wallet on his recent visit to Tokyo.

orbachev's reform programme had been pioneered years before in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary:

But reform in Moscow destabilised the Eastern European regimes by removing the guarantee of force behind them.

In Stalin's days the leaders had been installed by foreign tanks; if out of step they were purged and perhaps killed by Moscow. Now, in 1989, it was the people who moved to purge their governments.

Years of martial law had failed to wipe out the Polish workers' movement, Solidarnosc: in 1988, it rose again, forcing the bureaucrats to retreat. In 1989, the oppositions in Czechoslovakia and East Germany began by demanding their own Gorbachevs and Glasnosts and the downfall of their own Ligachevs.

At the end of '89, mass democratic movements spread with fantastic rapidity through Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Hundreds of thousands ran to the banner of western-style democracy.

The regimes fell away very quickly. Gorbachev had refused to step in and back up his clients. There was to be no repeat of Hungary '56 or The East European regimes had been installed by a foreign power at the point of a gun. They had less legitimacy, their rule was less solid, than that of the USSR's ruling The spin off from Czechoslovakia and the GDR was three fold. Over Christmas "89 the Causescu nightmare in Romania ended with a bloody revolution. Even Stalinist states with autonomy from the USSR - like Romania -had felt the cold wind.

Second, the nationalist movements inside the USSR were boosted. If the Soviet empire could crumble outside the USSR, then why not inside? The scene was set for the break-up of the USSR.

And, thirdly, the Western left became rather confused. If these societies were post-capitalist, why did the workers prefer VWs to the charming Trabant motor car?

The confidence of the weak Stalinist ruling classes had been dealt a savage blow.

The big lie of their economic superiority to capitalism had been very publicly repudiated. The populations refused to live in the old way.

In Czechoslovakia and Poland, pro-capitalist governments promised cheap labour and markets to the west in return for investment. Many old Stalinist functionaries bailed out, converting state property into private property or beginning their own businesses. In Hungary every regional Party chief was also a private capitalist.

But the scale of the problem is awesome. In Hungary 2,700 large enterprises are to be privatised by 1992. Poland shed a million state-sector jobs last year in the run-up to the privatisation of 7,000 enterprises.

Who will buy these enterprises? In Poland the state has had great difficulty in privatising the first exchange rouble notes about to be made worthless handful of enterprises. People are poor, and anyway believe that shares will be given away free in the coming year. The west is reluctant:

ment is not flowing in either to tions.

economies. marketisation.

workers in the run-up to massive privatisation.

All the East European governments, no matter what their lineage, are heading for the market.

The problems of marketisat greatest in the USS Not only is the scale of the tion produced mass miners' stri reorganisation of the industry The IMF-Wa Bank report commissioned for Soviet government at the end 1990 was quite blunt.

The solution was wholes

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t can offer a way out

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"Reform Moscow in destabilised the East European regimes by removing the guarantee of force behind them"

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