Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The rise and fall of 'Selsdon man' The rehabilitation of the market

Socialist Organiser no. 483, 18 April 1991 · scan pp. 11–12 · about 1,186 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 11 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 11

Revolution represented in some ways he next stage of Conservative La throwback in its rehabilitation of the role of market forces although the real exemplar for the change of direction was the model of France and Germanty. The failure of Wilson's attempts to come to terms with Britain's economic decline - by policies in essence extending Macmillan's initiatives of the early '60s — led the Conservatives to question whether the problem could be favourably resolved within the framework of the postwar settlement.

This was particularly so as the Wilson government's attempts at incomes policy and legal regulation in In Place of Strife had actually made things worse.

Far from drawing the fangs of the unions, they had rendered them more ferocious. They had contributed to the emergence of left wing leadership in the biggest unions the TGWU and the AEU, stimulated a qualitative increase in union membership, produced the highest levels of industrial conflict since the 1920s and led to the reemergence of the political strike in response to the proposed legislation in 1969. The protests against the Vietnam war and the renewal of struggle in the Six Counties demonstrated that what was developing was a general social Perhaps the first drummer of the New Right was Enoch Powell who from 1968 represented not only nationalism and racism but a developing critique of planning and state intervention and support for a greater role for the market, denationalisation, reductions in public expenditure and a protomonetarism.

While Ted Heath, Conservative leader from 1965, and Prime Minister 1970-74, distanced himself from Powell, his policies in the first two years of his administration represented a clear change of tack within the confines of the post-war settlement, by pushing against these confines in key areas.

Whereas Macmillan and Wilson had attempted to use the state, albeit in a halting and limited way, to rationalise and galvanise manufacturing industry, Heath saw the way to make it more competitive via the market.

Heath was determined to renounce Britain's attempt to pose as an independent small great power based on the USA and the Commonwealth, and threw the lot of British capital in with the EEC.

Industrial capital would be opened up to more intense competition from European firms and become more efficient and welded into a new economic bloc - capabie of competing with the USA - with the City at its financial centre.

In consequence, there would be an internal move towards the market. In line with their manitesto commitments, Heath's Tories abolished Wilson's Prices and Incomes Board and state intervention was further alleviated by the winding up of the other instruments of planning such as the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation and the Ministry of Technology.

Modernisation would now proceed through the survival of the fittest, the capitalist begging bowl would go unanswered and there would be no state aid for lame ducks.

The unions would be subject to a new and detailed legal framework which would outlaw or restrict effective forms of industrial action and the closed shop, but they would in return receive certain legal advantages and would be accepted as junior partners in the regulation of the economy and the enterprise. The "social partners" approach of Germany, with "strong" but "responsible" unions linked closely with employers at industry level and the results then projected into the political process, appealed strongly to Heath. He had no wish to delegitimise unions like his successors.

He wanted unions to be more legitimate, but to behave in a fashion more consonant with the objectives of the market. He saw a role for the state and for public expenditure. He had no desire to severely weaken the welfare state although "efficiency" was the new watchword.

Heath's policies were put together by the Conservative leadership at a conference at Selsdon Park in 1970.

The Party's first attempt to push out the parameters of the post-war consensus was ill-fated and shortlived. It failed because it was too limited, too civilised and too lacking in statecraft.

It foundered on resistance from a working class which Heath assaulted frontally without a preliminary civil war to undermine its confidence and sap its strength, nourished by a quarter of a century of a political and economic framework conducive to union Like Thatcher, Heath was prepared initially to sit out long strikes. The 13 week struggle with the Post Office workers might be compared to the 1980 steel strike.

But Heath had not carried out adequate preparations for the 1972 Miners' Strike. Heath failed to understand that it was very difficult, perhaps impossible, to change the working class without changing the processes of capitalist accumulation which had built up the muscle of the working class. Unlike Thatcher, he was not prepared to break from the past by using unemployment as a weapon.

Unlike Thatcher, he was not prepared to use the full force of a strong state. The police backdown at Saltley Gates may be compared with Orgreave in the 1984 strike.

By 1972, the "no aid for lame ducks" policy had been pierced by the collapse of Rolls-Royce the previous year and the struggle of workers at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders to resist closure.

Heath had tried to impose an extended legal framework in one fell swoop through the massive 1971 Industrial Relations Act. Thatcher was to use a far more cunning step by step approach.

The tactical ineptitude of dratting the legislation so as to open up the possibility of jailing trade unionists rather than sequestrating a union's assets produced the nightmare of the summer of 1972 when five dockers were incarcerated at Pentonville " jail, prompting widespread strike action and a call by the TUC for a one day General Strike.

The legislation provoked the biggest crisis of state legitimacy and the highpoint of working class action since 1926.

Heath beat a retreat, did a U-turn, went back on his manifesto committment and imposed an incomes policy on a movemen underlying strength had not diminished. His attemps to reflate the economy and go for growth collided with an unfavourable international picture. Against the background of the oil crisis, wage restraint produced a second battle with the NUM and in early 1974 a "who rules the country?" election.

He lost narrowly but with a catastrophic 37.8% of the vote whch in the October 1974 election plummeted to an all time low of 35.8%.

The Conservatives'_first attempt to move to the right had produced in turn a lurch towards a quasi corporatism and eventual humiliation. Heath was widely seen as having betrayed Selsdon Man, then botched his alternative to it and brought the Conservative Party to its lowest point since the 1840s.

Like Peel, he had failed to negotiate the cataracts of change. The Conservatives had now lost four out of the previous five elections culminating in their lowest vote this century. Change was urgent and the road to Thatcherism now open.

Vic Turner, one of the five dockers in July 1972 and then freed essure of mass strike

Scan page 12

Irganis

----- pull-quotes -----

"Heath, unlike Thatcher, was not prepared to break with the past by using unemploymer as a weapon"

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 483

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →