Georgia's rights and minority rights
Socialist Organiser1991 1991-03-14Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 7 →
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Stan Crooke concludes his series on the breakup of the Soviet Union n terms of its population mix and level of national hostillities, the Soviet republic of Georgia (which no longer regards itself as a "Soviet Socialist Republic") is in many ways typical of the USSR as a whole.
Its population is a mixture of Georgians, Armenians, Abkhazians, Russians, Azeris and Ossetians. Within the republic's borders lie the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Adzhar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region.
Georgia was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1921 at Stalin's initiative. (It was one of the earliest examples of Stalin's Great-Russian chauvinist attitude towards the national question). Since Gorbachev came to power, Georgia has been to the fore amongst the republics pressing for independence.
In June 1990 the Georgian government declared all state structures which had been set up, and all treaties which had been signed after February 1921 (the date of its annexation) to be devoid of any legal standing. The Georgian Communist has backed this decision, condeming as "illegal" the occupation and annexation of 1921.
In October last year a National Congress was created in Georgia in defiance of Soviet law, and in January 1991 the Georgian parliament voted to establish its own army and to lease all loss-making collective and state farms to private farmers.
But Georgia's re-assertion of its former statehood has been accompanied by an increasingly intolerant attitude towards national minorities. As the Soviet socialist Boris Kagarlitsky writes in his most recent book, Farewell Perestroika:
*The Georgian opposition (now the Georgian government), while striving for sovereignty and even autonomy for itself, and decisively and uncompromisingly in favour of democratic rights for its own people, could find nothing good to be said for the national minorities either living now or formerly in the republic, and, on this question, had no desire to make the slightest concession."
One example of this was the attitude of the Georgian nationalists towards the Meskhetian Turks who suffered a bout of pogroms in Uzbekistan in 1989. The Meskhetian Turks had been forcibly uprooted from Georgia by Stalin at the close of the last war and "resettled" in Uzbekistan. Many wanted to return to Georgia, especially in order to avoid the danger of further pogroms. But the Georgian political leaders refused to countenance the idea of their return.
Another example is the current debate on who should be recognised as a Georgian citizen and be granted full voting rights. According to members of the Georgian government, only those who can prove that their ancestors lived in Georgia prior to 1921 (ironically, the same "cut-off date" which applied to citizenship rights in Kuwait under the Emir) should be recognised as Georgian citizens. Such a decision would obviously disenfranchise a substantial proportion of the population.
Whilst Georgia has moved along the road towards independence from Moscow, it has not been prepared to accord to national minorities within its borders the rights which it demands for itself.
In summer 1989 fighting erupted between Georgians and Abkhazians who were demanding their own national rights. Weapons were seized from police stations and armed militia formed by both sides. The armed forces involved in the conflict numbered several hundred people on either side.
More recently, and more violent, have been the clashes between the Georgian authorities and the South Ossetians. In September last year the South Ossetian Soviet Republic was proclaimed, and elections for the parliament of the new republic were held three months later in December 1990.
The Georgian Procuration Office warned the election organisers of "criminal liability" should the elections go ahead. The Georgian Supreme soviet not only retused to recognise the declaration of the South Ossetian Soviet Republic, but also declared the abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region (which existed under the Soviet constitution) after the Whilst Georgia has moved along the road towards independence from Moscow, it has not been prepared to accord to national minorities within its borders the rights which it demands for itself".
December elections.
Fighting erupted in the same month, especially in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, where the centre of the town was in the hands of the Georgian militia whilst the rest of the town was controlled by South Ossetians. Despite (or because of) the imposition of a state of emergency by the Georgian authorities, armed clashes continued throughout the month of January.
According to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chair of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, "Ossetian separatists are trying to sever the heart, the historic centre of material and spiritual culture, from Georgia. Using the right to self-determination as a pretext, they are creating the so-called South Ossetian Soviet His argument was that only a "nation or a people who have lived in their own land throughout their history" had the right to self-determination. The South Ossetians did not fulfil this criterion and could therefore only claim "the status of a narrow and specific administrative-territorial entity"
Moreover, the re-establishment of Georgian independence involved "the liquidation of the results of annexation, primarily the restoration of the integrity of Georgian territory". A separate South Ossetia would cut across this territorial integrity, and could therefore not be tolerated. In other words: national rights for Georgia meant no national rights for anyone else.
But the nationalist unrest in South Ossetia is also being used to put pressure on the Georgian government and its moves towards independence. According to Torez Kulumbegov, chair of the South Ossetian Soviet of People's Deputies, South Ossetia wants to remain in the Soviet Union, and is willing to remain a part of Georgia — if Georgia is willing to remain a part of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev's response to the unrest in South Ossetia has been to demand that the South Ossetians take back their declaration of a South Ossetian Soviet Republic, and that the Georgians take back their declaration of the dissolution of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region. This would mean that the South Ossetians moved back square one, but that the Georgians would have to make a major climbMoreover, the draft union treaty currently being discussed in the Soviet Union would allow small territories such as South Ossetia to remain part of the Soviet Union even if the republic of which they are currently a part resolved to break away from the Soviet Union. In efAvailable for postage from SE15 4NA away from the Soviet Union as they might fragment if they attempted to do so.
Thus, as is the case elsewhere in the USSR, a republic is in the process of breaking away from the centre, whilst national minorities in that republic are in the process of breaking away from the republic. At the same time, the demands of the minorities are being exploited by the centre in order to prevent the republic itself breaking away.
However complicated this may sound, it is a measure of the chaos into which the Soviet Union is sinking as the economy continues to haemorrhage and the structure of the state continues to fracture along national lines.
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Leon Trotsky on pacifism and war Focialist Organiser No.479 page 8 this excerpt Leon Trotsky describes how the "soft left" of his day, the middle-class pacifists, collapsed in World War 1.
Trotsky's arguments shed light on why the "soft left" today so unanimously slid away from their pacifist and liberal principles into support for George Bush's bloody Gulf war.
Then as now, the war had been preceded by a long period of armed peace" between the big powers. Then as now, the "soft left" placed its faith in disarmament conferences, international law, and a league of nations (today, the United Nations) to make that armed peace" everlasting.
Then as now, the capitalist powers were not in the least Actions all the basics of twentieth-century life there - until it started.
They were against the US-led armies going beyond Kuwait, and crossing the border into Iraq — until they crossed.
They supported Gorbachev's initiative for peace. They promised that they would insist on it being taken seriously, not just rubbished. They wanted to see the war end "as soon as possible"
Saddam accepted Gorbachev's plan, and indeed a stricter version of it, committing Irag to withdraw from Kuwait within 21 days. The "soft left" supported Gorbachev's plan - until the US trashed it and went in to massacre Iraq's fleeing soldiers.
If the conflict were really about Kuwait, and if any serious conflict between capitalist governments can ever be solved by diplomacy, then the Gulf crisis could have been resolved by diplomacy on the basis of the Moscow plan. But the US's The 'reluctan
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fect, such a measure would make it more difficult for republics to break
bourgeolsial More on the crisis of Stalinism