Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The break-up of the Soviet Union

Socialist Organiser no. 476, 21 February 1991 · scan pp. 12–13 · about 1,454 words

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in March this year a referendum is due to be held in the Soviet Union on the future of the Soviet state. Against a background of rising nationalist conflict, the ballot paper in the referendum will ask the question: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renovated federation of equal sovereign republics, with the rights and liberties of individuals of all nationalities fully guaranteed?"

Whether the hundred million roubles which the referendum will cost will prove to be money well spent is open to debate: the fifteen republics which make up the Soviet Union are already voting with their feet. By the close of 1990 all Soviet republics (with the exception of Kirghizia) had adopted declarations of sovereignty or independence. Many of the republics now regard themselves as in a "transitional period" to complete independence.

The three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), two of the three republics in the Transcaucasus (Armenia and Georgia), and the Western border republic of Moldova (formerly called Moldavia) are the republics most advanced along the road of secession.

Other republics are heading in the same direction, even if they are not as far advanced. In October 1990, for example, the Ukrainian and Russian republics declared that central Soviet legislation would have no force on their territories unless ratified by their own parliaments. And even the normally quiescent Kirghiz republic has announced that it is dropping the word "socialist" from its official title of "Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Is the tendencies towards secession and Aed in strength, the more conservative heightened national conflict have gainwing of the Stalinist apparatus has become increasingly outspoken in its calls for a crackdown and the restoration of old-style "law and order".

Speaking on Soviet television last December, Vladimir Kryuchkov warned: The threat of the Soviet Union's collapse has emerged, a national chauvinism is being fuelled, and mass disorder and violence are being provoked. Today the question is: will our great state exist or not? There is no doubt that every reasonable honest Soviet citizen will answer yes."

Just in case there were any honest Soviet citizens around who thought otherwise, less than a month after Kryuchkov's televised broadcast Soviet troops moved into action in the Baltic republics.

The traditionally Moscow-loyal Communist Parties (CPs) in the different republics are either unable or unwilling to stem the secessional tide. In six republics the CPs are now the opposition parties in the local parliaments: Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, and the three Baltic states.

In the case of Georgia and a number of other republics, the CPs have allied themselves with the local nationalist parties. The Georgian CP advocates "the establishment of Georgia's full state independence" Georgian membership of the United Nations, and the establishment of Georgian police and national security forces, whilst the Ukrainian CP has likewise espoused the nationalist cause and backed the creation of the republic's own armed forces.

But the clash between the different republics and the Soviet central government and the breaking away of the former from "Such examples show the futility of attempting to divide the world into bad nations and good nations."

the latter is only one aspect of the "national question" (in reality: a whole series of national questions) in the Soviet Union. Within the separate republics themselves there are a whole number of unresolved national questions, many of, which have led to bloody ethnic clashes in recent years.

Few of the republics show any degree of uniformity in terms of the national composition of their populations. For example: 36% of the population in Kazakhstan are Kazakhs, 41% are Russians; 48% of the population in Kirghizia are Kirghiz, 26% are Russians, and 12% are Uzbeks; 54% of the population in Latvia are Latvian, 33% are Russian; 64% of the population in Moldova are Moldovian, 14% are Ukrainian, 13% are Russian and 4% are Gagauz Turks.

Even apart from the 20 million Russians who live in various republics outside of the Russian republic itself, there are compact national minorities in different republics throughout the Soviet Union: Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia, Tatars and Bashkiri in the Russian republic, Meshketian Turks in Uzbekistan, Poles in Lithuania and Armenians in Azerbaidzhan. In a number of cases such national minorities were forcibly uprooted from their homeland by Stalin at the close of the Second World War and dumped in another republic.

ust as the republics are in the process of secession from Moscow, so too in many cases such national minorities are attempting to secede from the republics in which they live.

In Moldova the Gagauz Turks have declared their independence, whilst the Russian-speaking minority has set up the Transdniestrian Republic. In Georgia the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians have likewise both sought to establish their own republics. In Russia the Tatars have declared an independent Tatarstan, in Ukraine the population of the Crimean peninsula has voted for independence in a referendum, and in Azerbaidzhan the Armenian population of the Nagorny Karabakh region has been demanding transfer of sovereignty over the region to Armenia since the mid-1980s.

Apart from broader questions of principle, such examples show up the futility of attempting to divide the world up into "bad oppressor nations" and "good oppressed nations". Are Georgians, for example, a "good oppressed nation" because of their unwilling incorporation into the Soviet Union, or a "bad oppressor nation" because of the treatment suffered by the Abkhazian and South Ossetian minorities?

Such national minorities have legitimate fears and grievances. Armenians in Nagorny Karabakh, for example, have long suffered discrimination by the Azeri republican government, whilst Russians in Moldova and Estonia now fear discrimination and employment problems due to Moldovian and Estonian having been effectively raised to the official state language in the two republics, respectivelyHowever, there is a further complicating factor in this myriad of competing ethnic rivalries: there is evidence to suggest that unrest amongst national minorities (especially Russian national minorities) in different republics is being encouraged by the hardline Stalinists in an attempt to hinder the progress of the republics towards secession from the central government.

This is clearly the case in the Baltic republics, where so-called "Committees of National Salvation" (consisting of pro-Moscow CP members and army and KGB chiefs) have been set up to oppose secession, and radio broadcasts in Russian have appealed to local Russians to mobilise opposition to the nationalist governments. Pravda recently has been performing a similar function. In December it ran a series of articles containing appeals from "representatives" of Russian minorities in different republics, and also from pro-Moscow CPs in some republics, calling for central government intervention to end the persecution faced by Russian minority populations.

he influence of hardline Stalinism is likewise apparent in some (though certainly not all cases where national minorities have declared their own independent republics. Because of its identification with Stalinism, the word "socialism" generally has a thoroughly negative connotation in the Soviet Union. But the Russians in Moldova have established a Transdniestrian Soviet Socialist Republic, whilst the Tatar parliament has declared independence from the Russian republic on the grounds that "Tatarstan has not given up its socialist road, whereas the draft constitution of Russia makes no mention of socialism"

The new draft union treaty proposed by Gorbachev (who has become increasingly hostile to the growing republican separatism - he has warned of central government "coming to resemble something like an amoeba") to the Congress of People's Deputies last December also encourages national minorities to break away from republics which are themselves breaking away from the Soviet Union.

The contents of the proposed treaty would allow for Russian speakers in the Baltic states to maintain direct links with the centre, even if the Baltic states became fully independent. The same holds true for the South Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia, or Gagauz Turks and Russians in Moldova. According to the chairperson of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities: "People who have no statehood will be able to take part in the union treaty. They can be represented by their national associations or other organisations."

The manipulation of national minorities by the more conservative forces in Soviet society does not undermine their right to secede from the republics in which they live, any more than the oppression of such minorities by different republics undermines the right of those republics to secede from the central government.

What is clear, however, is that without a dramatic resolution of the hundred and one different national questions in the Soviet Union, the break-up of the Soviet Union into its "constituent" republics will not put an end to national oppression but rather create or reinforce a new set of antagonistic and oppressive national relationships.

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