Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The Gulf War: issues 1 for Labour ad at wa

Socialist Organiser no. 472, 23 January 1991 · scan p. 7 · about 796 words

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Arab nationalism Saddam Hussein has tried to appeal over the heads of the Arab governments to a common Arab nationalism. He appeals not only against the foreign intruders, but also against the ultra-backward Arab feudal regimes in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. And all across the Arab world - and especially on the West Bank -there are answering voices, sometimes hunderous.

Arabs all across the jigsaw of Arab states see Saddam Hussein as the champion of a common Arab nationalism against both the foreigners and their Arab feudal allies. Saddam hopes to play the role that Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt played in the '50s, when he successfully defied British, French and Israeli invasion in response to his nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and came to personify a pan-Arab national revolt against imperialism.

The Nasserists appealed to the general Arab belief that there is an Arab nation, and to the yarning for the unity of that Arab nation. In fact there is the ethnic and cultural raw material of an Arab nation, but not the essential economic knittingtogether. Since the various old colonial units - from Syria to Morocco - have become independent, they have tended to go their own ways, paying only lip service to Arab unity.

Various attempts have been made to create unity between states — the most serious between Egypt and Syria in the '50s — but they have been short-lived.

The Arabs are like the Germans or the Italians in the middle of the 19th century - split up into many states - though no-one can tell for sure what the direction of movement will be, towards unity or towards separate identities.

Nasserist pan-Arab nationalism tried to be secular and anti-imperialist, and to overthrow the old order of sheikhdoms and monarchies, artificially carved out perialism. it con mitted itself to the destruction of Israel. Some of the old regimes were destroyed. But Nasserism failed. There was no Arab unity, no destruction of Israel, no general revolution against the feudalists. Mass enthusiasm for Nasserism turned into disappointment, and into the vast reactionary wave of Islamic fundamentalism which has developed since the 1970s.

Saddam Hussein is trying to recreate pan-Arab nationalism in the service of the Iraqi state. He also appeals to the Muslim fundamentalists, thus creating a darker ideological mix than Nasserism ever was. Evidently Arab nationalism -like German or Italian nationalism in the last century - can have different forms.

Cynical, self-serving and demagogic as it is, Saddam Hussein's Nasserist posturing has immense implications for the USallied enterprise in the Gulf. His chances of survival are much less than Nasser's in 1956. But even if he is crushed, his demagogy can set the ground alight under the feet of the invaders and of their Arab allies. Saddam as a martyr may plague them more than Saddam alive.

The war is likely to destabilise at least some of the US's Arab allies, and thus to make US-British withdrawal after the war very difficult and to condemn the region to long years of further wars. However loathsome Saddam Hussein and his regime are, this is a strong reason why the Arabs should have been left without foreign interference to sort out their own affairs. Iraq faces huge firepower Iraqi sub-imperialism one of the crimes of tl e US i of Kuwait. The Saddam Hussein regime is among the most butcherous in the world.

Some 10,000 Iraqi emigres living in Kuwait were rounded up and sent back to Iraq for slaughter. Kuwait has been ransacked and pillaged, its people abused and oppressed.

The US and the West built up Iraq as a sub-imperialist power to replace their subverted sub- imperialist client state in Iran after the Shah fell. Without that Western support Saddam would not have survived the failure of his hopes for a quick victory when he invaded Iran in 1980.

Now the sub-imperialist wants to be a fully-fledged regional power. The erstwhile client and his backers have fallen out. The conflict over Kuwait is a clash between US imperialism (and its allies) and an ambitious sub-imperialism. It is a quarrel between thieves.

Not his demagogy about Arab unity, nor even a real leadership of most of the divided Arab people, would make Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist military regime other than a bitter enemy of socialists and democrats, especially Arab socialists and democrats.

The socialist who gives any credence to Saddam Hussein is no longer a socialist.

Iraq is a sub-imperialist power, competing with its former sponsor, the US. Even if the Arabs could be united around the 17 million strong Iraqi state (there are 200 million Arabs, 50 million of them in Egypt), it would be like the Prusunification of Germany in 1871; socialists and democrats Turn to page 10

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