Israeli reactions to the Gulf crisis
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-09-13Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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3y Adam Keller For the new rightist, -internationally-unpopular Israeli government - with huge problems at home — Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait seemed at first sight a most convenient present from heaven, simply falling into its lap.
Already at the first Iraqi threats against Kuwait, in the middle of July, former Foreign Minister Moshe Arens - at present holding the Detence portiolio — paid a quick visit to Washington, "to warn the Americans" , as he now claims.
Shortly after Iraqi tanks rolled into Kuwait, Arens' successor at the Foreign Ministry, David Levy, made out for Bonn, expatiating with Chancellor Kohl on the Gulf crisis's proving "how marginal the Palestinian problem is for the situation in the Middle East". However, for all its greediness to seize upon the Gulf crisis for propagandic purposes, the government finds itself suddenly faced with a whole set of serious long-term problems.
In the first days after the invasion of Kuwait, the Israeli government tried to get itself included in the American mobilisation of 'the free world" against Iraq; these offers were, politely but firmly, rejected by Washington. Any Israeli involvement in the confrontation with Iraq would play into Saddam Hussein's hands and make it more difficult for Arab regimes to cooperate with the Americans.
Israel, which for many years touted itself as "America's strategic ally", found itself in the hour of crisis to be America's embarrassment, to be kept out of sight. It turns out that, with the disappearance of the "Soviet threat" US policies on the Middle East require Arab allies. The main thing required of the Israeli ally is to keep a low profile; the Israeli government generally keeps these instructions, though there are occasional slips of tongue, such as the sentence inserted in Yitzchak Shamir's August 22 speech to an audience of visiting Jewish delegations: 'We don't want war. We will try to prevent or pre-empt a war...
In April 1990 Saddam Hussein first made his threat that, if attacked, he would destroy half of Israel by poison gas. At the time the country was deeply involved in Shimon Peres' desperate efforts to form a government. The distant Iraqi thunder caused a feeling of unease, but did not seem a matter for immediate concern; public attention soon shifted elsewhere. Half a year later the Gulf crisis made the possibility of war with Iraq a concrete, close possibility - and gas masks a public issue.
The 1951 Civil Defence Act entitles all Israeli citizens and residents to get gas masks free of charge. However, the military experts have always opposed the distribution of masks to the general population. Originally the reason given was that the masks may be damaged in citizens' homes before they are needed, and should therefore be distributed only in times of For many Israelis the present situation already seems to qualify. The defence experts, however, now argue that gas masks being distributed would cause panic and escalate regional tensions. Many Israelis have started to search for private means of self-preservation. There is a run on the few shops where gas masks are being sold, and after Israeli television mentioned the possibility of countering the effects of poison gas by breathing through a cloth soaked in baking soda, the sales of this product immediately rose tenfold.
Minister David Levy - a populist politician throughout his career — took up the cause of "the maskless". At the time of writing, the question is surrounded with unprecedented secrecy. It seems more and more likely that in this - like in so many issues in Israel - the Palestinian problem is involved.
peace movement is to serve in Lebanon, or Another factor reducing this right-wing government's inclination to seek provocations is the personality of Moshe Arens. Unlike most Israeli Defence Ministers Arens is not an ex-general seeking to round out his military career. Arens, a life-long civilian, could serve as a prototype of the militaryindustrial-complex theory, investing most of his energy in procuring juicy deals for the giant Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), with which he has decades-long ties'. Whatever the long-term drawbacks of having such a Defence Minister, in the present situation he might be less inclined than others to seek glory on the battlefield.
Though Shamir and Arens are certainly less eager for war than Ariel Sharon would have been, had he held one of the key positions, it is needless to say that the peculiarities of the two do not at all provide a guarantee against Israeli involvement in a Gulf war. The decisive factor might be the internal developments in Jordan, the country constituting a fragile buffer between Israel and Iraq.
It was none other than Ratz Knesset member Yossi Sarid who -on the very day of the Kuwait invasion — stated publicly: "Israel must declare that the entry of Iraqi forces into Jordan will constitute a casus belli". A few days later Sarid's suggestion was followed by Defence Minister Arens, who proclaimed it to be the official government policy.? The Labor Party, of course, fell in.
Thus, for the first time since June 1982, an atmosphere of "national consensus" was created in Israel. As a result, non-monarchist Israelis find themselves praying fervently for the personal and political survival of King Hussein of Jordan.
In his 38 years on the Jordanian throne, King Hussein earned a justified reputation as a past master at the art of survival, but the present crisis may be the toughest he ever encountered. Already before the Gulf crisis there were violent outbreaks among the king's Palestinian subjects, as well as among the Jordanian ones.
The relatively free elections resulted in an enormous increase of power of the Muslim fundamentalists, and Jordan's economy, already in deep crisis, is due for another heavy blow from the mounting American pressure to close Jordan's port of Aqaba to the profitable Iraqi carrying trade, which directly and indirectly provides tens of thousands of jobs in Jordan.
The hundreds of thousands of pennyless Egyptian workers, stuck in Jordan on their way from Kuwait and Iraq back to Egypt, only add to the already existing instability. And the wide support among the Jordanian population for Saddam Hussein's neo-Pan-Arabic rhetoric, is another factor threatening King Hussein's position - possibly weakening him to the point of not being able to resist the entry of Iraqi troops.
According to the Arens-Sarid consensus, in that case the entry of the Israeli army would be an automatic result. A third army may then enter the fray as well - that of Syria, a long-standing enemy of both Israel and Iraq, and a country which has long maintained a claim over the territory of Jordan.
With the Israeli army entering Jordanian territory, more and more Israeli right-wingers will suddenly
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preparing itself Yesh G'vul ac- tivists, who as reserve soldiers refused