What US imperialism meant in Vietnam
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-08-16Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 9 →
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and admired Vann) deplored the US military's extreme ignorance of Vietnamese history. Even a cursory study should have shown the US war planners that Vietnam was a tough nut to crack, a country that had beaten the militarily superior French by careful tactics and strategy.
The guerrillas' decision to fight to the end was made before the Americans arrived, and they stuck to it right despite appalling losses, despite the B52 bombing raids that so terrorised their soldiers that amny committed suicide, and despite the napalm. The Vietnamese were armed with something the Americans lacked — a cause they believed in. Their commitment to the cause of national self-determination was a crucial weapon, perhaps the most crucial weapon they had. They were prepared to accept one of the greatest losses of life in wartime, in relation to population, of any modern country, rather than surrender, The bombs, the napalm, and the land mines killed many, many Vietnamese, but they only reinforced the Vietnamese will to fight. Every bomb dropped made recruits for the "Viet Cong"
The North Vietnamese Army, the NVA, only came in to the war in: 1965, when US troop numbers in Vietnam began to build up towards half a million and the US started bombing North Vietnam. The "Viet Cong" recruited from and lived off the peasantry in the areas they controlled.
They could survive in no other way. They could get large supplies of arms only by capturing them from the Cong" cessful.
When Mekong iThe basic American strategy altered from or of attrition. All manner of firepower bombing, naplam, defoliants bullets, grenades, unleashed rillas were very poorly tars and machine gui and they had no wea helicopters or aircraft enemy. In that the *Viet were spectacularly suCVann arrived ir the Delta in 1962, the guerarmed. Moris were few, pons against or armoured personnel carriers.
But the US had been arming Diem's forces since 1962. The guerrillas got their arms by overrunning the outposts of Diem's army.
Despite all the "advice" of the Americans, Diem's army was unable to deal with the NLF. The real role of the army (ARVN) was to keep Diem in power. Diem did not want to risk losing his army supporters in battle. Army commanders were instructed to stay out of trouble, to avoid engagements, and above all to avoid casualties.
Diem wanted a war that looked good on paper, so commanders began faking operations. To keep *body counts" high, they used indiscriminate aerial bombing raids, wiping out whole villages.
Vann opposed those attacks for pragmatic reasons: he believed that they alienated the civilian population from the South Vietnamese regime, and drove them into the arms of the "Viet Cong". But the South Vietnamese commanders swore the villagers were "Viet Cong" sympathisers, and the American military believed them.
By the time of the watershed battle of Ap Bac, in 1963, Vann had realised two things. The ARVN would not fight, and the "Viet Cong" were overcoming their fear of American firepower. They were learning to stand and fight.
With incredible courage, the "Viet Cong" had learned how to withstand their fear of the deathdealing helicopters and armoured personnel carriers. With rifles alone, they shot down three helicopters at Ap Bac, and prevented others from landing. A lone "Viet Cong" commander stood up against the terrifying armoured personnel carriers, throwing grenades at the beasts, while his men shot round after round in support.
The gesture seemed futile: the APCs were invulnerable to grenade and bullet. But the ARVN troops in the APCs panicked against an enemy so determined. They withdrew in confusion.
Vann concluded that the only answer was to deny the "Viet Cong" the protection of the peasants who sheltered them, by winning over the peasants politically. Perhaps aid could achieve what bullets could not.
The peasants were at the mercy of poor harvests and disease. American aid could provide drilled wells for clean, safe water; build latrines on solid ground; erect medical dispensaries and schools; provide seed, chemical fertiliser, and fatter pigs.
Millions of dollars were spent. But they ended up in the hands of local officials, who practised corruption on a huge scale. Military strategy also wrecked the pacification efforts. Bombing raids terrorised and killed peasants, making many refugees. Others were herded into "strategic hamlets" , barbedwire camps where their lot was miserable. The US failed to win any hearts and minds.
The basic American strategy in Vietnam never altered from one of attrition. All manner of firepower - bombs, napalm, defoliants, bullets, grenades, shells - was unleashed on Vietnam. The "Viet Cong" constructed a network of deep tunnels, with underground schools, hospitals and living In early 1973, after a final huge US bombing blitz against North Vietnam around Christmas 1972, a peace agreement was signed, and most of the Americans withdrew. Two years later, in June 1975, the North Vietnamese and the NLF made a final push, and the last Americans fled They left a wrecked country behind them. The US had never been fundamentally interested in the welfare of the Vietnamese people, but only in the importance of Vietnam as a "domino" in world power politics. To pursue their power politics, they allied with a corrupt, parasitic, and unpopular ruling class in South Vietnam, and that alliance made any talk of freedom and social reform under US auspices pure hypocrisy Vietnam today not democratic country. It has Stalinist regime, and its people for the most part live in poverty. regime's Fault. The US blockad tor Vietnam has crippled the country economically. War damage, which made two million homeless and wasted and poisoned huge areas of Vietnam, has never been paid for by the US.
And the low standard of living and the Stalinist nature the regime do not mean that the American intervention was right or justified. It was a naked aggression against the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.
America hoped to maintain a client government in South Vietnam, a government it would prop up with money and guns in return for favours. The Vietnamese were right to drive them out. The US wrecked their homeland and murdered their people, and still refuses to pay its share of the bill.
The Americans have been mean in defeat, wanting to deny the Vietnamese not only restitution and aid. but also their incredible victory. At the end of the war, an American colonel remarked to his Vietnamese counterpart: "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield"
*That may be so" the Vietnamese replied. *But it is also in relevant" I
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The mutants fight back