Socialist Organiser

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Why Iraq went to wal

Socialist Organiser no. 457, 16 August 1990 · scan p. 6 · about 1,447 words

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To tuo Oil. The Gulf has two thirds of the world's supply Troops out of the Gi Bradley V Perot thon. Bat note of ars have sometimes revolution. But nothing much progressive is likely to come out of the escalating conflict in the Gulf.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was a gamble, motivated by the deterioration of the Iraqi economy, and his regime's need to assert its regional dominance. It has fixed him into a political and military endgame that could have horrific consequences.

Saddam is not mad. So far, he has confounded Western observers by turning around what seemed a very untavourable situation in the region. Initially, aside from Jordan, there seemed to be little support for Iraq in the Arab world. Long-time ally Egypt opposed Iraq in the sharpest terms. Now many Arab rulers are nervous of clear pro-Iraqi sentiment among their own populations.

Saddam has portrayed himself as the Gamal Abdul Nasser of the 1990s, and, it would seem, to great effect. He has linked the question of peace to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (and the Syrian occupation of part of Lebanon), a powerful emotional issue in the Arab and Muslim world.

Demonstrations in support of Saddam have occurred in several countries, most notably, and most alarmingly, among the Palestinians themselves. The dispatch of American troops, now planned to number a quarter of a million, has driven huge numbers of Arabs, for the moment at least, into his arms.

Instead of lining up against him, the Arab world has polarised. Very few Arab regimes are happy with appearing to be the ally of the US or, even worse, Israel. Even Syria, which is ruled by a rival branch of the same party, the Ba'ath, which rules Iraq, may find that its current forthright anti-Iraqi stand is not tenable for very long.

The conflict shows all the signs of escalating into all-out war. There is little room for the parties involved to de-escalate it, least of all for Saddam himself. Iraq may invade Saudi Arabia, or America may invade Kuwait at least, possibly Iraq itself. As Saddam plays harder and harder on the role of Israel, and threatens more and more violent action "War became an effective indeed vital, mechanism for political contro The slogan of national unity became a wa) of terrorising people'.

against the "Zionist entity", Israel may be forced, or seize the opportunity, to launch an attack on Iraq. The stakes could be very high indeed.

The Iraqi action has "destabilis= ed" the whole region, but in a way that leaves little scope for progressive, let alone socialist, possibilities. The regimes which will suffer most from angry populations, including maybe Saddam's political forces more inclined to the stand to be replaced by Islamic fundamentalist kind of "anti-imperialism".

The pretext for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was a dispute over oil prices. With that was combined an old Iraqi claim that Kuwait never deserved to be a separate country in the first place. But the reasons lie far deeper.

The immediate background is the highly militarised character of the Iraqi regime. Saddam survived eight years of war with Khomeini - a feat which most observers expected to be impossible — by transforming Iraqi society according to the necessities of wartime mobilisation. The war became an effective, indeed vital, mechanism for political control. The slogan of national unity became a means of terrorising the people.

By no means all Iraqis support the regime. Very large parts of the population are more Or less unanimously opposed to it specifically the Kurds, who make up about a third of the population. They have suffered appallingly under Saddam's regime. Their villages have been nerve-gassed, Kurdish areas have been "Arabised" (that is, had the Kurds forcibly moved out of them. The Shi'ite Muslims, who according to some estimates are a majority in Iraq, also oppose Saddam.

The Ba'ath party has been able to suppress this opposition through an extensive machinery terror. About a million people, out of a population of fifteen million, are members of the party, which functions like a typical "Stalinist" totalitarian, state-party. Ba'athist Iraq is the Middle East's first totalitarian degree of control only dreamed of by "socialist" dictators in the 'sixties.

Opposition, though widespread has been crushed. Enough people have a stake in the regime to terrorise those who are against it. And the war became the medium through which the Ba'athists' totalitarian monopoly on political life was achieved.

The regime learned to put war mobilisation to its own use. War had its drawbacks, especially the money it cost; but the Ba'athists have found no substitute for its political role. Thus Saddam has spent the last six months or so threatening war with Israel; now he has invaded Kuwait and declared effective war on the United States instead.

This move ties in with the regime's long-term regional ambitions. The attack on Iran in September 1980, judged to be at a moment when that longstanding rival would be too weak to resist (since the Khomeini regime had still barely consolidated after the 1979 Revolution) was intended to establish Iraq as the dominant power in the Gulf and the Arab world.

Saddam wanted to be the new Nasser, the modern-day equivalent of the man who after the Suez crisis of 1956 made Egypt the centre of the Arab world politically and militarily. Egypt lost that position in the "seventies, partly because of the severe effects of unresolved war with Israel (which forced Egypt to sign a peace treaty in 1979), and partly because of the rise of oil states after 1973.

Despite their awesome financial power, none of the oil states had or has the military clout to take Egypt's place, most of them being sparsely populated and socially backward. Iraq, through its geopolitical position, could hope to fill the gap; and, unlike Egypt, it is itself an oil-rich state.| Iraq's failure to beat Iran put paid to those ambitions. Most commentators believed that Saddam was finished. But he rode the tide, survived, and now is trying again.

Iraq, however, is in a weak posi tion economically. It borrowed huge amounts of cash from the Gulf states to finance the war with Iran, and with oil prices low it has not been able to pay off the loans and restore its economy. Thus Saddam's ambitions are given urgency and even desperation. It might be now or never.

The disarray of the Arab world gives further force to those ambitions. The last wave of Arab nationalism, in the 1950s and early '60s, dominated by Nasser, promised immense economic advances and a military settlement of the Palestinian questions. But the nationalists failed. They failed on every account.

Aside from the oil states, their economies sank deeper and deeper into stagnation, and Israel proved too powerful a nut to crack. So the Readinana, maties of tbe 50 from Egyptians, retreated both their anti-Israel rhetoric, and their became one of the United State t firmest friends in the region.

A few states kept up the rhetoric, especially Syria and Libya although it has proved over anc over again to be just rhetoric. For the rest, there was a long-term drift towards a negotiated solution of the Palestinian conflict, With the initial success of the inrifada, the PLO, which had been torn by disputes concerning the relative weight to be given to diplomacy and armed struggle, united behind a diplomatic offensive aimed at getting US support for a "two states" solution.

All that diplomacy has come to nothing in the face of Israeli intransigence. The headway the PLO seemed to be making with the US came to nothing, too. Across the Arab world there is the feeling that they have been wasting their time, and the only possible solution lies in force of arms.

If Palestinian kids with stones can fight the Israelis, why not the regular Arab armies? Those armies, especially the Egyptian and Iraqi ones, are enormous. Iraq has about a million men bearing arms.

As old-fashioned secular nationalism has bashed its head on the rocks of Israeli military superiority and political belligerence,| Islamic fundamentalism has grown stronger and stronger. In most Arab countries, Legless veteran of the Iran/Irad and in non-Ara non-Arab Iran too, fu damentalists are :

They are the They are the single largest or position in the Egyptian parli ment. In Syria, tl to lay siege to on Hama, in 1983, to quell a tu lamental upri uprising. Saud Arabia, as early a talists rocked th regime. the Palestinians, than ever befor particularly Gaza. In Leban what the broad! national moveme forced Israel to withdraw. And Iraq itself the Shi

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