Troops out of the Gulf!
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-08-16Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 4 →
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EDIITIORITAL August 1990 may prove to A have been a major turning point in world history - and not only because the following are all real and immediate possibilities: • the devastation of Israel by Iraqi chemical weapons; • Israeli nuclear bombs exploding in Iraq; massive destruction of the oil fields on a scale which plunges the world economy into its worst -catastrophe for decades; - and the driving out of the Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank as part of an Israel-Irag war.
The USA, supported by the old imperial powers which controlled the various Arab states. until the 1950s, has occupied part of Arabia, in a series of classic gun-boat imperialist moves. There is talk of an immediate US troop build-up to 250,000 men.
For now they land on the Arabian peninsula at the invitation of the government of Saudi Arabia, and with the agreement and token support of other Arab governments. But that may quickly change.
The area they are occupying is one of the most important places on earth, because its oil is essential to the US, European and Japanese economies. In the best scenario it 1s unlikely that the occupation forces will leave quickly. If their presence provokes active popular resistance — as it probably will — and undermines the position of the unpopular feudal rulers of Saudi Arabia who invited them in, then they will stay, despite popular resistance and maybe guerrilla warfare against them, or else abandon this economically vital area to conditions worse than those they have landed troops to repair.
They could find themselves in a sort of Vietnam war situation -and with vital immediate economic interests at stake, as they never were in Indochina. Whatever happens, it is very unlikely that this is just an episodic intervention like the US landings in Lebanon in 1958 and 1983, or the brief British reoccupation of Kuwait to face down a threatened Iraqi invasion in 1961.
The US has acted in response to Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, under cover of a nearly unanimous United Nations vote to impose mandatory sanctions on Iraq.
It acts not to defend "democracy" - there was no democracy in Kuwait! - or to defend a small oppressed people - it has never done anything for the Kurds who have been massacred by successive Baghdad regimes for decades, or for the Palestinian Arabs demanding a state of their own where they are the big majority, in the West Bank and Gaza. The has acted in its own direct economic self-interest, to stop the Iraqi state cornering anything up to 50 per cent of the world's oil reserves, The US has been able to act with such decision, speed and determination because the USSR has collapsed into the chaos and uncertainties of perestroika and the attempt to reintroduce capitalism. The USSR's system of alliances - in which its ties with Iraq were important - has collapsed too, leaving a vacuum.
The US has been able to bound forward as it has done because it beat the USSR in the Cold War. The old-style US imperialist braggadocio is the first fruit of that victory and of the US rulers' new feeling of strength (combined with the vulnerability that has always been one of the midwives of such imperialist adventures).
Far from history having reached its end in a stable bourgeois world order, as the gloating , bourgeois pundits have been claiming, we seem to have run into a time bend!
The impressive strength of the UN majority has essentially the same source - the collapse of the will of the rulers of the USSR and its allied states to oppose the US. Genuine horror at Saddam Hussein's aggression, and concern lest Iraq get into a position to have a stranglehold on the world economy, was part of it, but not the decisive part. Among those who joined the UN condemnation of the Iraqi takeover in Kuwait were some of the most vile and repressive governments on earth.
Last week, as the US troops were gathering strength in Saudi Arabia, details of the latest Chinese massacre in Tibet became known in the West. And that is just one example.
Power politics, and the shift in the world balance in favour of the US, determined the UN vote. The US is already using it as a figleaf, as it used the freak UN vote on Korea in 1950 (the USSR had temporarily withdrawn, China was excluded) as a cover for its own great-power concerns. The American-British blockade of Iraq is already outside the terms of the UN resolution on sanction - though in fact the logic of sanctions iș a blockade, and then war.
The UN's near-unanimity cannot last long, esepcially if it comes to. war. No, we are not witnessing a first stage in the creation of an effective world government, but an accidental relation of forces which has allowed the US and its allies to use the authority of the UN to dress up their own interests.
When World War 2 ended the US emerged as the colossus of the capitalist world. It imposed its own "peace" and order on that world, a Pax Americana. It systematically worked to end the old British, French, Dutch and Belgian empire trading blocs. American hegemony, the old imperial powers' comparative decrepitude, and the unquenchable revolts of some of the colonial peoples, worked in the two decades after the war to dismantle the old capitalist empires.
The US intervention in Vietnam, with all its immense consequences, was not old-style colonial imperialism, but essentially a product of the competition of the US with the Stalinist empires.
The Pax Americana Mark 1, after 1945, saw the restructuring of the non-Stalinist part of the world under US hegemony on a basis reminiscent of the earlier period of 19th century British hegemony. The post-Cold-War Pax Americana Mark 2 for which Bush is now bidding is set to include an element, and an economically essential one, of old-style colonial imperialism. That is the logic of what is now happening in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
The US intervention in Saudi. Arabia is more like 19th century colonialism than the "imperialism of free trade" which characterised the '50s, '60s, and '70s. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates are not typical Third World states, and it is hard to imagine the US or any other power reimposing 19th century colonialism in other ex-colonial areas. But Arabia is an important area in and of itself. And another trend is relevant here.
The US is in relative decline. That decline unleashes a jousting for position among other capitalist big powers. The collapse of Stalinism intensifies that ousting.
Since at least the early "70s pressures have been growing towards protectionism and curbs on trade. So far the big powers have resisted those pressures with considerable success — but how much longer? How much longer if the Gulf crisis sparks a new world slump? And, in a world of intensified competition, how will the other big powers react if the US corners the world's greatest oil stocks for itself? Won't they want their own colonial or semi-colonial preserves?
We do not and cannot know. We know the events in Saudi Arabia look like major new — and very old developments in world politics.
None of the considerations above justify the invasion of Kuwait. The Saddam Hussein regime is among the most butcherous in the world. Already 10,000 Iraqi emigres living in Kuwait have been rounded up and sent back to Iraq for slaughter.
The Iraqi regime has been nourished by the West over the last decade, and built up to counter Iran. Without Western support Hussein would not have survived the failure of Iraqi hopes for a quick victory when he invaded Irai in 1980.
The US and the West built up Iraq as a sub-imperialist power to replace their subverted sub-imperialist client state in Iran after the Shah fell. Now the sub-imperialist wants to be a fully-fledged regional power. The erstwhile client and his backers have fallen out. The present conflict is therefore between US imperialism (and British imperialism) and an ambitious sub-imperialism. It is a quarrel between thieves.
But there is more to it. The Iraqi ruling class pursues Iraqi aggrandisement. Yet Saddam Hussein is now trying to appeal over the heads of the Arab governments to a common Arab nationalism.
He appeals not only against the foreign intruders, but also against the ultra-backward Arab feudal regimes in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. And all across the Arab world - and especially on the West Bank - there have been answering voices, sometimes thunderous. -If fighting breaks out, then more and more Arabs all across the jigsaw of Arab states will join those who see Saddam Hussein as the champion of a common Arab nationalism against both the foreigners and their Arab feudal allies. Hussein hopes to play the role that Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt played in the '50s, when he successfully defied British, French and Israeli invasion in response to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and came to personity a pan-Arab national revolt against imperialism.
The Nasserists appealed to the general Arab belief that there is an Arab nation, and the yearning for the unity of that Arab nation. In fact there is the ethnic and cultural raw material of an Arab nation, but not the essential economic knittingtogether. Since the various old colonial units — from Syria to Morocco - have become independent, they have tended to go their own ways, paying only lip service to Arab unity.
Various attempts have been made to create unity between states - the most serious between Egypt and Syria in the '50s — but they have been short-lived.
The Arabs are like the Germans or Italians in the middle of the 19th century - split up into many states - though no-one can tell for sure what the direction of movement will be, towards unity or towards separate identities.
Nasserist pan-Arab nationalism tried to be secular and anti-imperialist, and to overthrow the old order of sheikhdoms and monarchies, artificially carved out and protected by British imperialism. It committed itself to the destruction of Israel.
Some of the old regimes were destroyed. But Nasserism failed. There was no Arab unity, no destruction of Israel, no general revolution against the feudalists.
The disappointment, in the "70s, of the mass enthusiasm for Arab nationalism of the Nasser sort, helped generate the vast reactionary wave of Muslim fundamentalism.
Saddam Hussein is trying to resurrect Nasser-style pan-Arab nationalism in the service of the Iraqi state, or anyway around it. He also appeals to the Muslim fundamentalists, thus creating a darker ideological mix than Nasserism ever was. Evidently Arab nationalism -like German or Italian nationalism in the last century - can have ditferent forms.
Cynical, self-serving and demagogic as it is, Saddam Hussein's Nasserist posturing has immense implications for the US British enterprise. His chances of survival are much less than Nasser's in 1956 (the US used its economic power to force Britain and France to give up). But nis aemagogy van set the ground alight under the feet of the invaders in Saudi Arabia and. maybe under the feet of their Arab allies.
The US invasion is likely to bet the roof down on the heads of su at least of its allies — and thus to make US withdrawal very diffice: However loathsome Saddam F sein and his regime is, this is a strong reason why the Arabs sho be left without foreign interf to sort out their own affairs. The aspiration to Arab unity is a legitimate aspiration, however = access the chances of achieving it Troops out of the Gulf!
Iraq out of Kum For a socialist federation of Middle East, with the right to determination of all minority tions! Including Israel!