Black workers and the Communist Party
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-08-02Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 6
The South African Communist Party relaunched itself as a legal body last weekend. Anne Mack and Mark Dupont explain how its influence has grown inside the workers' movement and why it can now count in ranks world famous militants like Moses After his arrest in June became a symbol, a ln ing embodiment, of the spirit of resistance of South Africa's independent black workers' movement.
Moses was clearly identified with the left wing of that movement. He spoke of the need to link together the class struggle of the workers with the democratic movement. He was one of the first mass leaders in South Africa to talk openly and clearly about the need for working class power to become the objective of the mass movement.
Moses was trying to sketch out an independent class politics for this movement. In one interview, in 1985, Moses put the issue very clearly: in fact, too clearly for some of his associates in the metalworkers' union: "At present the FOSATU shoj stewards' councils, and also MAWU, are discussing the politica set-up. We are looking at the crisis and the solutions to the crisis. The general feeling is that the workers must have their own party and their own freedom charter...
"The Charter [the Freedom Charter of the ANC] is a capitalist document. We need a workers' charter that will say clearly who will control the farms, presently owned by the capitalists, who will control the factories, the mines, and so on There must be a change of the whole society. Through the shop steward councils people are oppos ed to this idea that there will be two stages towards liberation: that we must clean up capitalism first, then socialism. It's a waste of time, a waste of energy, and a waste of people's blood.
Moses argues something very different today. He is now a member of the ANC and of the leadership of the Communist Party. party whose leader Joe Slovo said recently that socialism was unlikely in South Africa, not just in his lifetime, but in his son's! Due, it seems, to the backwardness of the most industrially advanced country on the African continent.
Despite what some ultra-lefts may say, Moses has not simply 'sold out'. His personal political evolution encapsulates the evolution of a large section of the independent workers' movement over the last few years.
To understand Moses' development we need to understand the tale of how the 'populists' triumphed over the 'workerists' in the trade unions.
The 'populists' could be roughly defined as identifying with the nationalist political tradition of the ANC, represented in South Africa by the United Democratic Front. The 'populists' tended to favour a high profile' political style of trade unionism. Arguing that the workers must participate in wider community struggles, they tried to build alliances with all progressive groups committed to fighting apartheid.
The "workerists', on the other hand, though committed to the wider struggle against apartheid were wary of alliances with nonworker-controlled organisations in which the distinct voice of the working class might be submerged. They stressed the need for patient organising, educating and building on the shop floor.
Five years ago the "populists" were a weak and isolated faction in the workers' movement. Today ney are dominant. Although, "officially" the distinction no longer exists! But populist ideas alone should not be given too much credit. The ANC has a large apparatus. It has funds. It has managed to portray itself as the symbol of a whole history of black resistance.
Even those factors are not enough to explain the rise to dominance of 'populism'. The left allowed itself to lose out. The weaknesses of the left gave the populists their advantage.
The trade union left — who were strongest in the old FOSATU federation - tended to reduce all political questions to questions of organisation. In the FOSATU framework, once the working class was well enough organised and a strong enough base created, then working-class politics would dominate almost automatically.
The FOSATU left had a political agenda, and functioned in part like a political tendency. But they had one crucial weakness. They had a two-stage theory of first building a strong trade union movement and then moving into politics. This meant in practice that the building of political organisation and the development of socialist ideas outside the immediate process of production were postponed to a later period. In the early 1980s there was a political vacuum in the country, but FOSATU let slip a favourable opportunity to prepare workers politically for the tumultuous times to come.
The ideas of the FOSATU left took root in a relatively small but crucial cadre of union activists and shop stewards. The populists, however, were able both to appeal directly to the rank and file over the heads of the FOSATU left, and to exploit the lack of a wider political perspective on the state within the FOSATU left.
Township revolt So, when the townships exploded in 1984. it was the populists, basing themselves on the ANC, who appeared to have all the answers to the big political questions ot power.
The unions didn't know how to respond to the massive uprising. In part they were held back by a sectarian attitude to community organisations which were not proper' working-class organisations like unions. They were influenced by syndicalism -philosophy which reduces the whole of working-class politics to trade union action. In the absence of a clear lead from the left in the union, the working-class struggles in the black townships - and they were working-class struggles, over issues like rents — were quickly subsumed and generalised into a vague and unspecified populist protest against apartheid in general.
Right from the of the township revolt, the workerists allowed the populists to define the political issues. Very quickly this powerful, spontaneous revolt in the townships was fastened into the populist mould. There was no real living link between the issues around which workers and youth were mobilising rents, fares, racist schooling - and the maximum goals attached to them,. 'Free Our leaders!" 'End apartheid!' "Ungovernability!, People's power', etc.
The seeds of defeat and demoralisation had already been sown..
In part this happened because the trade union left had missed an earlier opportunity. The FOSATU left made political gains in 1980, when alone in the movement they recognised the importance of state 'registration' or recognition of the unions, and exploited to the full the new legal rights associated with recognition. They broke from the perspective long dominant in the ANC and, for different reasons, in the syndicalist wing of the trade union movement - that all dealings with the state should be boycotted on principle. But those gains were not followed through politically.
There was no attempt to make further political demands on the state vital to the interests of the unions - for example, for the right to strike - or to extend such demands to non-trade-union issues like rent, local government and education. Lawyers were used - effectively in many cases — to widen the scope for legal action in the courts. Sometimes pressure was put on employers so that they in turn would put pressure on the state. But direct political demands on the state were not posed.
Even state recognition of ine unions had come from the top down, as a state strategy for incorporation rather than as a demand from below. The FOSATU left had a golden opportunity in the early 1980s to break decisively from the ANC's idea that because the state was so rotten and could not be reformed, therefore no demands for reform could or should come from below. They had an opportunity to transfer to the political realm the lessons learned in the economic, to extend the method of patient organisation through pressing winnable demands on the enemy and linking ultimate goals with immediate "small' reforms.
A missed opportunity The FOSATU left missed this opportunity - partly because of the social weight of the populist view of the state, and partly because the syndicalism which informed the FOSATU left did not give it the political equipment to develop a working-class alternative.
In 1982 the general secretary of FOSATU, Joe Foster, made a speech about the need for a working-class political movement. He did not clarify what this meant programmatically or organisationally, and in any event his ideas were not followed through. The trade union left chose the road of 'union unity' and 'disciplined alliances' with the popular movement instead of building its own political wing.
The populists were against a workers' party. They were committed to broad national movements organised in Congresses rather than party politics; and the ANC saw the South African Communist Party as the sole representative of working-class interests. They could not be confronted sufficiently by a trade union left which was influenced by its own anti-party ideas stemming from syndicalism.
A workers' party — even a small and weak one - launched out of FOSATU in the early '80s, and armed with a creative approach to the township struggles, could have radically altered the course of events. It was not to be, COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, was formed in late 1985 by the unification of FOSATU with some populist-led and other unions. This was a massive step forward. But it gave the populists a weight and influence within the unions that they did not deserve.
In its first year, COSATU was held back by submerged political disagreements and infighting. While the populists organised, mobilised and conspired, the workerists retreated to the shop floor. They kept their heads down.
The left hoped that their stronger industrial unions would allow them to absorb the populists. That didn't happen. COSATU was formed in the midst of the fire and fury of the township revolt. That propelled it into a political tumult for which the trade union left was ill-prepared.
What was the trade union left's view on disinvestment? On sanctions? The ANC? Buthelezi? The "homelands'? Black councils? For better or worse, the populists had a position, while the trade union left was groping in the dark.
Even as COSATU was formed, the township revolt was showing the first signs of decline. Confusion and demoralisation began to set in as the vigilantes - the murderous Black Hundreds of the South African counter-revolutionstarted to gain ground.
The workers' voice The ANC's slogan of 1985 had been 'Make the townships ungovernable' This was plainly failing. Anarchy; not working-class power, had replaced the collaborators of the state, but there was little alternative on offer from COSATU "Some activists from the trade union left were able to play a very important role as the working class wing of 'people's power, attempting to ensure that "people's power' was democratically grounded i the people and not a cove under which one or another factor served own interests....
Some trade unionists did try to deal with these problems. Alec Erwin, the national education officer of FOSATU and then COSATU, Prand ormationally potis to build in the townships the kind of democratic structures built in the unions. Moses Mayekiso, general secretary of MAWU (and now of NUMSA), set out to build democratic and accountable structures in practice, in Alexandra township, near Johannesburg. There were other instances of trade union involvement in community organisation, though Alexandra was arguably a model.
The ANC also responded to the decline in the township revolt by raising the slogans of 'people's power' and 'people's education' in place of 'ungovernability' . It presented this as a further step on a triumphant road to liberation, rather than as a response to the problems of 'ungovernability'.
Some activists from the trade union left were able to play a very important role as the working-class wing of 'people's power' , attempting to ensure that 'people's power' was democratically grounded in the people and not a cover under which one or another factor served its own