The end of a good working relationship
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-04-19Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 11 →
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By Sleeper The decision by Ford of Britain to cut back investment at its Bridgend (South Wales) plant and to transfer a new £225 million engine assembly line to Cologne brings to mind one of the most shameful episodes in recent British trade union history.
Back in November 1987, the German union IG Metall approached its British opposite numbers, hoping to discuss the situation in Ford throughout Europe. IG Metall was particularly anxious to draw up a joint union code to oppose Ford's ability to transfer production round Europe like pawns on a chessboard.
The right-wing-controlled AEU and EETPU were, apparently, quite interested in such a discussion, but progress was stymied by the MSF and TGWU. These "left-wing" unions argued that they had a "good working relationship" with the management of Ford of Europe, and therefore had no need of talks with the likes of IG Metall.
The confidence of the MSF and GWU was boosted by Ford's decision to concentrate its European engine production on Bridgend rather than Cologne. IG Metall was, naturally, unhappy about this, and hoped to persuade the British unions to support its campaign to get some of the Bridgend investment diverted to the Cologne plant.
Then, in January 1988, came Ford's shock decision to transfer production of its most profitable model, the Sierra, from Dagenham to Genk in Belgium. -It became apparent that Ford's policy was to concentrate production of particular models on single sites in Europe. The loss of the Sierra put the very existence of the sprawling and antiquated Essex plant into question./ Thinking that the proposed Sierra transfer might have woken up the TGWU and MSF leaders to the need for European union cooperation, IG Metall got back in contact, with a tentative offer of a united campaign to keep the Sierra at Dagenham in exchange for some support for their efforts on behalf of the Cologne engine plant.
Again they were rebuffed. Instead, the TGWU's National Automotive Officer, Jack Adams, was busy sending signals to management to the effect that his union would offer concessions (like threeshift working) to match anything the Belgian unions could offer at Genk. Ford was not impressed, and the Sierra transfer went ahead.
Ford shop stewards have long maintained loose, sporadic international links. But these are inevitably limited by lack of official support.
To this day no Europe-wide strategy to deal with transfers and to defend conditions exists at official level.
Ford's commitment to its British plants has nothing to do with any "good working relationships" with the British unions. It has everything to do with the fact that, by comparison with the rest of the continent, Britain is a low-wage economy. The huge profits of Ford of Europe (£436 million after tax in 1988) are largely the result of cheap labour and high showroom prices in Britain. But this is shaky ground for the British unions: Ford's greed for short-term profits in Europe (to offset their disastrous losses in the US) is increasingly being outweighed by their concern for long-term stability.
The growing signs of militancy among British Ford workers (like the unofficial strikes in January of this year have confirmed Ford bosses like Bill Heydon in their view that continental production must not be vulnerable to the knock-on effects of British strikes.
An additional factor that the British unions can, perhaps, be forgiven for not taking into account. (though links with the research departments of the European unions might have helped) has been the new EC regulations on catalytic converters. The CVH engine made at Bridgend is relatively easily converted, and the new rules have given it an unexpected lease of life. Thus Ford was not going to build both the CVH and the new engine at Bridgend — which would have meant 70 per cent of its European engines being built at the Welsh plant.
Had the British unions taken up IG Metall's offer in November 1987, there is no guarantee that Bridgend, rather than Cologne, would have got the new engine line. Any Europe-wide union agreement would involve some give and take.
But at least the British unions would now be in a position to exert some control over Ford's European wheeling and dealing, instead of depending on that mythical "good working relationship" with the management.