Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The first years of Thatchel

Socialist Organiser no. 444, 19 April 1990 · scan p. 8 · about 916 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 8

From page The trade union bureaucrats thus remained in control. Their alienation from the Labour leadership after 1976-9 was sufficient to allow the left a few victories. But as soon as they decided that the left's victories had gone far enough, and wanted to clamp down, they were able to do so. The demoralisation of industrial militancy by the slump and by defeats made it easier for them to do so.

This was far from inevitable. In early 1980s there was a long, bitter steelworkers' strike. The Wales TUC called for a general strike. February 1981 a miners' strike forced the Tories to back down over pit closures. A long campaign of industrial action by Health Service workers in 1982 won widespread solidarity. New Broad Lefts were emerging in the unions. The CPSA Broad Left, dominated by Militant, controlled that union's National Executive between May 1982 and May 1983. The telecom engineers' Broad Left won control of their union in June 1983.

The problem was political. The major political forces in the union rank-and-file groups and the Broad Lefts were the SWP and Militant. The SWP spent the entire period arguing that the ferment in the Labour Party was a fuss about nothing. It was just left-wing talk that could have no possible base in the working class (because of the *downturn'). The SWP did not start orienting to the Labour Party, sending open letters to Militant and selling papers outside ward meetings, until 1985 - long after the big ferment had died down.

Militant was in the Labour Party. But they were just passive passengers in the RFMC. In unions like the CPSA they were iust left contenders for votes and offices. When they were witch-hunted in 1982-3, they organised a campaign.

But they refused to unite with the rest of the left, so that we ended up with two parallel campaigns, one run by Militant the other run by the rest of the left; and their main effort was the unprincipled and foolish use of the capitalist courts against the Labour leadership. • Political vagueness The Labour left remained politically vague and vulnerable to demagogy and manipulation. Its faith in the "Alternative Economic Strategy' of 1972-74 gradually dwindled, but it found nothing to replace it. • The failure of the Marxists It was inevitable of course, that the broad Labour Left should start off politically vague. What could have changed things - and consolidated at least substantial minority round a class-struggle programme - was the intervention of Marxists. That was lacking The SWP abstained and indeed denounced the whole struggle as a waste of time. Militant contented themselves with dead propaganda and recruitment. Since they were the biggest apparently Marxist force huge free publicity from the 1982-3 witch-hunt, they were very successful in recruitment, turning themselves from a dim and obscure sect into the biggest force on the far left in Britain. The strengthening of Militant was, however, no help to the struggle.

Activists from the IMG dabbled marginally in the Labour Party, but, continuing their trajectory from 'Socialist Unity', they did not enter at all seriously until 1982, very late on in the struggle.

SO did what it could. But its resources, its circulation, its influence were too small to tip the balance.

The debacle of the government left The failure of the was not just a failure to consolidate Labour Left. The Marxist groups section of the broad also failed with the radical or 'hard' section of the Labour Left.

That 'hard' left, or at least a sizeable chunk of it, could have become the intermediary through which the Marxists consolidated a section of the broad Labour Left. Instead, it became a force channelling activists who could have become Marxists towards the Labour mainstream. It did that through its course in local government.

By May 1979 the 'hard' left already controlled two Labour councils. In Lothian and Lambeth.

June the SCLV organised 225-strong conference of London Labour activists on local government. Lambeth leader Ted Knight argued for rate rises as the answer to Tory government cutsincils to argued Labour councils mobilise for confrontation.

The debate continued vehemently through the next two years. Where were the Marxist groups? Most of them took no part at all. The 'Chartists' - first within SO, and then, after they split, through Labour Briefing - were on the wrong side. They provided Marxist-sounding. rationalisations of the rate-rise In November 1979 60,000 people joined an anti-cuts march in London in work time. In October 1980 the Labour Party conference voted to back direct action against the cuts. But the potential was squandered.

Barely three weeks after the June 1979 conference where he had argued so vehemently for rate rises as necessary for a strategy to fight cuts, Ted Knight proposed four and half per cent cuts in Lambeth! He was forced to reverse them by a rebellion from the local Labour Parties and trade unions. In January 1980 a Lothian Labour Party aggregate voted for 'no cuts, no rate rises' there.

At budget-making in spring 1980 both Lambeth and Lothian went for big rate rises (49 per cent in Lambeth). In November Lambeth imposed a supplementary rate, about £50 from the average ratepayer. A backlash against rate rises spread on Lambeth's council estates. In April 1981 Lambeth council, panicked by that backlash, violence. But this kind of violence - of the racing a Major General Sir Ronald Fulden said "It was a hatpin'. An offensive weapon perhaps?

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 444

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →