Can the USSR survive?
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-04-05Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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Stan Such of what we have M to say about national conflicts and nationalist unrest in the Soviet Union has been along the following lines:
Under Gorbachev there has been a relative liberalisation' (ie. the policies of glasnost which has created the space in which latent national antagonisms and national demands which had remained repressed under Stalin and his immediate successors have now come out into the open.
This is certainly one aspect of the current flourishing of nationalism/ national demands in the Soviet Union. The clearest example is the campaigning for the right of return' by the various ethnic groups forcibly deported from their homelands at the close of the Second World War (Crimean Tartars, Meskhetian Turks and, to a lesser extent, Volga Germans). Similarly, ethnic conflict between the Armenians and the Azeris has a history stretching back into the last century and beyond.
However, there are other aspects to nationalist unrest in the Soviet Union as well, aspects which deserve more attention in our coverage and analysis of current developments., In particular, there is the role of the local non-Russian bureaucracies in the various republics of deliberately 'stirring up' national antagonisms in order to try to establish some kind of popular social base for themselves. For example:
• At the close of 1986 serious rioting broke out in Alma-Ata in Kazakhstan after Brezhnev's protege Kunyaev was replaced by a Russian as First Secretary of the Kazakhstan CP. Local Kazakh bureaucrats supported this nationalist unrest.
• In Armenia the republic's CP have supported the agitation in favour of sovereignty over Nagorny Karabakh being transferred from Azerbaidzhan to Armenia (and apparently began to agitate in favour of this demand just when they faced dismissal from office, in the way that Kunyaev had been dismissed). Similarly, in Nagorny Karabakh itself, members of the local CP bureaucracy have played a central role in mobilisations demanding transferance of sovereignty.
• In the subsequent antiArmenian pogroms in Azerbaidzhan - first in Sumgait, then, more recently, in Baku — local Azeri bureaucrats wree clearly involved, just as they have been involved in more peaceful nationalist protests over the months against the demand for transferance of sovereignty over Nagorny Karabakh.
• In the Baltic states the situation is more complicated in a number of ways. But here too the local CPs have split (or declared their independence of the Soviet CP) and sections of the local CP bureaucracies have aligned themselves with the local Baltic nationalist movements.
To point to the role played by, the local bureaucracies in encouraging nationalist passions is not to reduce all national conflicts in the Soviet Union to a "plot" by the local bureaucrats to promote divisions in the working class and safeguard their own positions.
This is sometimes a view expressed by the SWP, especially in its coverage of the recent massacre in Baku. It was certainly the view expressed by members of the RCP at a recent 'Critique' dayschool in London. But, even rejecting such excessively conspiratorial views of history, the role of the local bureaucracies in encouraging nationalist-based unrest is clear enough, and can be attributed to two basic factors.
Firstly, there is the drive on the part of the local bureaucracies to strengthen their local standing by trying to shift the blame for appalling social and economic conditions in their republics away from themselves and place it at the door of the centre in Moscow. (This applies only in a very modified form to the Baltic states, where it is not so much a question of shifting the blame for bad local conditions, but rather a question of arguing how much better conditions would be if the republics could govern their own affairs independently of In the Central Asian republics and the republics in the Caucasus, "Gorbachev's policies have created the space within which the local bureaucracies can manoeuvre to strengthen their position... to build a base for themselves independently of Moscow in a way wi would have been inconceivable under Stalin, or even under Brezhnev"
where there is a high level of national conflict, economic policies have resulted in major ecological havoc. Real unemployment (as opposed to the traditional form of unemployment in the Soviet Union) has long been a serious problem. Housing problems in the peripheral republics are generally even worse than in the central republics. The forced dependence of certain of these republics on monocultures has merely made matters even worse.
Given that the economic policies which have created such problems are determined at the centre, it makes sense, from the point of view of the local bureaucracies, to point the finger of guilt at Moscow, even if (in fact, all the more so because) they themselves have hitherto been only too willing to implement such policies.
Secondly, Gorbachev's policies have created the space within which the local bureaucracies can manoeuvre to try to strengthen their positions. Just as his policies have given greater autonomy' and "freedom' to individual enterprises (eg. the introduction of costaccounting), to private enterprise (eg. the promotion of cooperatives), or to individual farmers (eg. the new agricultural reforms), so too his policies have created openings for the local bureaucracies to build a base for themselves independently of Moscow in a way conceivable under Stalin, or even which would have been inunder Brezhnev.
This, in turn, raises the question of how far the central bureaucracy would be prepared to allow such developments to proceed. Hitherto we have struck an extremely cautious note. In reality, though, there is a sound basis for such speculation.
The more Slavophile sections of the central Russian bureaucracy would certainly support such a retreat to the "laager' '. In the current round of republican elections one of the Russian-nationalist organisations participating in them is standing on a platform of ending all subsidies to non-Slav republics and allowing them to go their own way (ie effectively secession from above) in order that money, and the purity of the Russian character can be saved, Whilst Gorbachev would not endorse such a crude Slavophilia, his faction must certainly recognise the economic arguments in favour of re-drawing of borders. Talking of the Central Asian republics, for example, Kagarlitsky writes: *They are costing the Soviet Union so much that, according to some experts here, it would be better to grant them independence...The Soviet state simply has no more resources to develop these regions by the old means. The government simply can't create more industrial jobs in Central Asia, especially since there are still not enough of the national cadres, and ethnic Russians are afraid to move there because of the growing local nationalism."
Not all non-Slav republics are economic black holes in the manner of the Central Asian ones. Again, the obvious example would be the Baltic states. But an armed intervention into the latter to prevent secession would, apart from questions of military feasibility in the aftermath of Afghanistan, prove a political disaster.
It would therefore be wrong to assume that the central bureaucracy is opposed in principle to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the creation of a mini-'Soviet Union" (Russia, Siberia, White Russia, and, if they can hang on to it, Ukraine). What the central trol the process of that break-up, to prevent any subsequent conflicts flowing over into a mini-'Soviet Union'. (Just as, by way of a rough analogy, the British state is not opposed to British withdrawal from Northern Ireland in principle, but is concerned about the conditions under which that might take place).
Thus the national question in the Soviet Union should not be seen merely in terms of the loosening of repression leading to an upsurge of latent nationalist hostility. Also, perhaps equally important, are the role of the local bureaucracies in stirring up nationalism, and arguably, the readiness of the central bureaucracy to see a controlled break-up of the Soviet Union (following on from the way it has allowed the collapse of the puppet regimes in Eastern Europe).
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