The USSR under Gorbacl
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-03-15Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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The immediate background to the crisis of Stalinism was the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Quite soon, Gorbachev launched his twin policies of perestroika and glasnost. Essentially, perestroika meant economic decentralisation and the introduction of some market mechanisms, while glasnost was the unfreezing of the political system. Along with them went a post-Cold War attitude to the West on defence The Western bourgeoisie and a lot of the Western left thought Gorbachev was wonderful. Perhaps the most forthrightly favourable leftwing assessment of Gorbachev was Tariq All's *Gorbachev represents a progressive, reformist current within the Soviet elite, whose programme, if successful, would represent an enormous gain for socialists and democrats on a world scale. The scale of Gorbachev's operation is, in fact, reminiscent of the efforts of...
Abraham Lincoln. In order to preserve the Union, Lincoln had to push through a second American revolution based on the abolition of slavery. In order to preserve the Soviet Union, Gorbachev needs to complete the political revolution (which is already under way), but one based on the abolition of the whole nomenklatura system.
('Revolution from Above, xiti.)
In this view, Gorbachev is a revolutionary if 'from above' taking the bureacracy by storm from within. It is preposterous, but widely held.
In fact, a closer parallel than Lincoln would be F W de Klerk in South Africa: a reforming autocrat, forced to introduce quite wide ranging reforms because of the terrible problems faced by the ruling class he represents. Like de Klerk, Gorbachev faces a right wing 'traditionalist' opposition, and factions of the ruling class that would like to go further, faster. But like de Klerk, he is reforming the system because of and in the interests of the ruling group.
Like all reforming dictators, he is faced with a dilemma: if reform is not introduced, the system could suffocate itself and die. But once you loosen the chains, the prisoners want more and more. In two spheres, the prisoners have got completely out of control - sections of the working class, especially miners, have erupted in revolt; and the oppressed national minorities now threaten Gorbachev and the bureaucracy with catstrophe.
Undoubtedly, the economic situation in the USSR is very serious. The system is one OI bureaucratic planning'; but the phrase doesn't capture the extent of the USSR's economic paralysis.
Soviet figures are unreliable, but the general outline is clear. In 1951-55 the average growth in na tional income was 11.2%. 1966-7, it was 7.75%. By 1981-85, 11 had fallen to 3.5%.
Other basic indicators tell similar story. According to Aganbegyan, life expectancy did not rise from 1966 to 1986, and is much lower than in Western Europe. Infant mortality rose from 22.9 per 1000 in 1971 to 26 per 1,000 in 1985 (much higher than Britain 10.8). Quite contrary to the Stalinoid mythology of groups like Militant, Soviet expenditure on health is lower chan in Britain — less than 4% of GNP (6% in Britain 9% in France, 10.5% in the USA).
Labour productivity is notoriously bad and getting worse: the rate of increase in industry fell from 5.7% a year in 1966-70 to 3.2% in 1981-85; in agriculture from 6.6% to 2.6% and in construction from 3.9% to 1.6%. On average, it takes two Soviet workers to produce what one US worker produces in industry and in agriculture four.
Goods are of poor quality. Soviet computer technology is backward - a big, big problem in the 1990s.
In an average Soviet factory, work goes in cycles. Most of the time, everyone dawdles. Work is held up because supplies haven't arrived, or because machinery has broken down. Then comes the end of the month. The manager panics because the factory hasn't met its plan target. The target is reached by 'storming' - working frantically, striving to turn out goods any old how, without checking, with parts missing.
So a good proportion of what is produced is rubbish. And the bureaucratic chaos spreads throughout society. In the 1930s a sort of 'storming' produced results. Millions of workers were hurled into digging coal, building power stations, and producing steel. Even today, forced march methods can produce results in military and space sectors. But as a general regime for a modern economy, which needs to be flexible in response to changing technology and people's needs, "storming' is disastrous.
Worse: the bureaucrats are incompetent. A large proportion of them are elderly men, with little economics has meant so far is increased pressure on the workers to produce more.
education, who got cheir jobs by toadying. The ordinary factories can't produce fridges, so the Defence Ministry produces them. Housing is scarce, so each factory corners its own chunk of housing. Each factory and each ministry tries to secure its own sources of supply by producing the supplies it needs itself, so there is wasteful duplication. The black market is huge.
Gorbachev wants to shake up the economy and the managers. He Is moving in five main directions.
* A drive for discipline, against corruption and alcoholism.
* Giving the rules of profit and loss, supply and demand, more scope in the economy.
* Exposing corrupt bureaucrats to the threat of public exposure and losing their jobs.
* Stacking top jobs with his own supporters.
* Withdrawing from Afghanistan and negotiating arms cuts with the US to reduce the terrible drain on the USSR from military spending (although events in Azerbaijan are causing problems here.
On paper, he has gone a long way towards turning the USSR into a market economy. Since January 1986, 60% of industrial enterprises have been 'self-financing': they are supposed to keep profits and decide for themselves what to do with them - when and how to invest.
Since January 1987, individual ministries and some large enter€ 10 Azeris burn down Soviet-Iranian border fence prises have been able to do business with the West. Since May 1987, a new law has greatly increased the scope for co-operative enterprises. Private enterprise is being given more room. The USSR's first private hospital opened in May 1987.
In January 1990, McDonald's opened in Moscow, symbolising a new attitude to foreign investment (still very restricted).
Pro-Gorbachev economists talk about taking all industries except the most basic, large ones out of the central plan; having banks operate commercially; increasing wage differentials; "shaking out' some 15 million workers from inefficient enterprises; and raising the prices of goods to gear the price system to supply and demand.
Since March 1988, groups of agricultural workers can make commercial contracts with a collective farm. Limits on private plots have been lifted. Collective farms can do business directly with the west.
But the results of all this have so far been meagre. Not only have growth rates been unimpressive, it is doubtful how far the market has become any sort of counterweight to bureacratic command and inertia. Economic measures similar to Gorbachev's have been tried in the Eastern bloc before. In agriculture they have sometimes worked. In industry they have been unsuccessful. They were tried in the USSR in the 1960s. Again and again they have been thwarted by inertia.
The 'self-financing' enterprises, for example, say that 80% of their profits still go to their central ministries. The officials in the ministries don't want to let the money out of their hands.
In practice, what Gorbachev's economics has meant so far is increased pressure on the workers to produce more, increased wage ditferentials, and increased insecurity.
In the political front glasnost was an attempt to unblock the arteries of public opinion, encourage a more critical attitude (especially among managers), and take the sting out of criticism of lack of democracy.
It has had significant effects. Most dramatically, there were elections of the 'parliament' in which dissidents like Andrei Sakharov were elected, and prominant CPSU officials were annihilated. Debates in Parliament are televised.
It is a very long way short of parliamentary democracy. Gorbachev is able to get very authoritarian policies through, such as the ban on strikes following last summer's miner's strikes; the opposition remains feeble.
But the elections reflected a genuine opening up of public life. Dissidents do now get a platform. There has been quite a flowering of critical opinion in the arts: longbanned books, films and plays are now permitted. Newspapers discuss political issues with a new openness (although hardly enough to justify Tariq Ali's comment that the USSR is the only place in the world with "absolute freedom of speech'!). Old Bolsheviks have been rehabilitated - but not Trotsky of course.
Divisions within the bureaucracy are clear and public. Often this is discussed in terms of a three-way split: Gorbachev in the middle, Ligachev representing the conservatives, and ousted Moscow Party boss Bori: Yeltsin representing the radicals. jut this is too crude a picture. The e is, of course, a conservative wing, and Ligachev is one of them. But the radical wing is by no means easy to define. Yeltsin is not even a socialist, and has some sympathy, at least, with the growing anti-semitic movement Pamyat. Yeltsin owes his popularity to the determination with which he launched his popular campaign against the old Mafia-style Party apparatus in Moscow., He is a very effective populist. But he represents little beyond that.
Essentially these divisions are within the ruling bureaucracy. There may be deeper divisions within the CPSU itself, and such divisions elsewhere have proved important. But it is important to remmeber that the left' of the bureaucracy is a fraction of the ruling class. Socialists and the workers' movement need to retain their complete independence from them.
Gorbachev's move at the Central Committee in February to abandon the CPU's monopoly of politics must be a calculated gamble. The reform, he hopes, will calm the situation and give the CPSU sufficient credit to enable it to win supremacy in free political competition. Otherwise the CPSU's political monopoly will be eroded anyway, de facto if not de jure, and the system will collapse in an uncontrolled way
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"What Gorbachev's Gorbachev
"'The 'left' of the bureaucracy is a fraction of the ruling class. Socialists and the workers' movement need retain their comp