The politics of Nelson Mandela
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-02-08Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 7 →
6 Nov 2026, after a reader report: the machine split had cut this article into three (its opening under 'What is happening in South Africa?' and 'Who's who' on page 7, the rest run together with Duncan Chapel's James Patrick Cannon centenary piece on page 9) and credited it to him. Transcribed from the scan of pages 7-8. The standfirst names the writer, Bob Fine; no 'By' line is printed. The drop capital has no opening quotation mark, 'Mandel's presidential address', 'Mandela, was not unaware', 'lawful models' and 'never fail' are as printed; the two pull-quotes, which repeat the text, are left out.
Proofed text: read against the scan word by word; spelling, punctuation and wording are as printed.
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Bob Fine, author of the forthcoming Pluto book, ‘Beyond Apartheid, Labour and Liberation in South Africa’, looks at Nelson Mandela’s life and struggle.
The struggle is my life”, wrote Nelson Mandela in a letter from the underground on 26 June 1961. “I will continue fighting until the end of my days.”
On 5 August 1962 he was captured after a tip off by an informer to the police. He was charged with inciting African workers to strike in 1961 and with illegally leaving the country. He was sentenced to five years’ hard labour.
In October 1963 Mandela was brought to court from prison to join other underground leaders arrested at a farm in Rivonia. Eight men, including Mandela, were sentenced to life imprisonment for sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the government by violent means. They were taken to Robben Island to serve their sentences. Twenty-seven years later Mandela is still in gaol.
From his prison cell Mandela became an embodiment of black resistance against apartheid.
Who is Mandela? What was his political role in the liberation struggle? Who was the man behind the image?
He was the son of a chief in rural Transkei. He received a privileged education (compared to most blacks) at a methodist school and Fort Hare College, where his political life began.
He is said to have rebelled against his family’s attempt to arrange a marriage and returned to Johannesburg, where he studied law at Witwatersrand and then practised law with the current leader of the ANC, Oliver Tambo.
He was a middle class African who rebelled against the condition of ‘the African nation’.
Mandela joined the ANC in 1944 as a member of the radical Youth League. The ANC was a highly conservative organisation at this time, dominated by chiefs, legalistic in the extreme, thoroughly alienated from the working class.
During the war, for instance, they opposed all industrial action by black workers on the general grounds that they were illegal and would hamper the war effort. This was also the general position taken by the South African Communist Party. Doctor Xuma, the head of the ANC, took little interest even in the mineworkers’ strike of 1946.
The Youth League, of which Mandela was soon a leading member, was in favour of mass mobilisation and campaigns, but its political direction was African Nationalist rather than socialist. Its 1944 manifesto, which Mandela helped to write, declared that it was “imperative for the African to view his problems and those of his country through the perspective of Race.”
It spoke of the “national cause” of Africans, the need to impart to the ANC “a truly national character”, a belief in “the divine destiny of nations”, a rejection of “foreign leadership and ideologies” and the unity of all Africans. It sought co-operation with Indian and Coloured national organisations. It saw South Africa as a country of four nationalities and claimed the right of “African self-determination”.
It drew back, however, from the racism which it associated with Marcus Garvey’s slogans of “Africa for the Africans” and “Hurl the white man into the sea”. It described itself as offering a “moderate” nationalism which was “not against the European as a human being — but irrevocably opposed to white domination”.
There was little or no class perspective in the Youth League’s Africanism. Mandela himself voted for the expulsion of Communists, even though the position of the CP in its support for the South African war effort and its opposition to industrial or community activism during the war hardly displayed a deep class loyalty.
The defeat of the African miners’ strike in 1946 was a terrible blow for the movement as a whole but especially so for the black working class.
On the side of the rulers, it paved the way for more militant forms of nationalism, expressed in the Youth League’s take-over of the ANC, the 1949 Programme of Action, and a closer alliance between African, Asian and Coloured nationalist groups and the Communist Party.
The Programme of Action claimed the “right of self-determination” for African people and the use of “boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-co-operation” to realise it. No independent working
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class voice was to be heard in this programme.
The CP increasingly subordinated itself to nationalism, particularly after it disbanded itself following the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act. The trade union movement was at a low ebb.
“No easy walk to freedom”. This was the title of Mandel’s presidential address to the Transvaal ANC in 1953. The phrase was borrowed from Nehru.
Mandela had been “volunteer-in-chief” of the Defiance Campaign, a campaign in which 8500 people openly defied the government’s race laws and suffered the penalty.
Mandela wrote of it: “Defiance was a step of great political significance. It released strong social forces...it was an effective way of getting the masses to function politically...a powerful method of voicing our indignation...one of the best ways of exerting pressure on the government...It inspired and aroused our people from a conquered and servile community of yesmen to a militant and uncompromising band of comrades-in-arms.”
The campaign relied on self-sacrifice and was already winding down when the government introduced whipping and five years’ imprisonment for acts of defiance. At this point the stream of volunteers dried up.
The campaign had great impact in arousing a moral conscience against apartheid, but it did not succeed in securing the repeal of any of the six or seven “unjust laws” it was aimed at. More important, it offered little to the urban working class beyond the role of admiring onlookers.
For black workers, violation of the law was an everyday necessity and their concern was to avoid the clutches of the police. Many must have been bemused as the volunteers offered themselves up to the police.
The non-violence of the Defiance Campaign was also a problem for workers. When in opposition to the recommendations of the ANC violent riots broke out in the Eastern Cape and a number of Africans were shot dead, the response of the ANC was to deny any responsibility.
As a leading Trotskyist of the time, Baruch Hirson commented: “The philosophy of passive resistance is one that flows from a middle class leadership which places no reliance on the masses...It is a glorification of leaders and elevates them as political martyrs...It stems from the religious philosophy that there can be a moral re-awakening of the rulers and it calls in effect for negotiations and concessions that exclude the broad mass of the people.”
Mandela, was not unaware of the problems. He wrote: “A political movement must keep in touch with reality...Long speeches, the shaking of fists, the banging of tables and strongly worded resolutions...do not bring about mass actions and can do a great deal of harm.”
He also advocated the need to “fight unreservedly for the recognition of African trade unions” and called upon the ANC to “make the greatest possible contact with working people.” Workers, however, were not seen as an independent force but as one element of the people’s struggle.
“Freedom in our lifetime” was the slogan Mandela attached to the Freedom Charter approved by the 1955 Congress of the People. This provided the formal basis of the popular alliance between African, Asian, Coloured and white parties to the Congress Alliance.
In his review of the Charter, Mandela emphasised its multiracialism: “For the first time in the history of our country the democratic forces irrespective of race, ideological conviction, party affiliation or religious belief have renounced and discarded racialism”. It was a great step forward in this respect, but Mandela underplayed the degree of racialism still present in an alliance based on racial groups and oriented to a future society based on “equal status...for all national groups and races”.
The formal character of the Alliance as a coalition between races also obscured its class composition, that it was an alliance across classes. Mandela, however, stressed approvingly its non-socialist nature: “It is by no means a blueprint for a socialist state but a programme for the unification of various classes and groupings among the people on a democratic basis...Its declaration ‘The People Shall Govern’ visualises the transfer of power not to any single social class but to all the people of this country.”
To all the classes, he argued, the struggle for democratic rights offered definite advantages. What was important was unity, “the united front”.
Alliance and unity were certainly necessary, but on whose terms? What was really at issue in the coming years was the class leadership of the movement; was it to be by workers or by the radical petty bourgeoisie? Although Mandela saw that “the workers are the principal force upon which the democratic movement must rely”, the strategies, tactics and goals of the movement were in no way determined by the working class.
A clear illustration came in the Election Strike of 1958. Mandela argued — totally correctly in my view — that boycott is an “effective and powerful weapon” but not a principle.
He wrote: “Some people regard the boycott as a matter of principle which must be applied invariably at all times...This is a serious mistake, for the boycott is in no way a matter of principle but a tactical weapon”. Some people, Mandela continued, “regard participation in the system of separate racial representation in any shape or form” as impermissible.
This “inflexible principle” was also an error. It was vital to distinguish between “participation in elections by the people who accept racial discrimination...and participation...in order to exploit them in the interests of the liberatory struggle.”
In principle, Mandela was absolutely right. Unfortunately, the occasion was not.
Instead of pursuing demands for a pound a day and the end to the pass laws coming from within the ranks of the unions and instead of pursuing the militant anti-pass campaigns of the women’s federation, Mandela called for participation in the white elections in favour of the United Party and against the Nationalists on the grounds that defeat of the Nationalists was the top priority.
The campaign backfired badly and the strike in support of the United Party was a flop. In the event, the Nationalists galloped home while the UP drifted ever more to the right.
The failure of the Election Strike fuelled a new burst of Africanism and boycottism in the form of the Pan African Congress, which split off from the ANC.
In 1960 Mandela offered his testimony at the Treason Trial. The government had arrested 156 political leaders following the adoption of the Freedom Charter, charging them with participation in a treasonable conspiracy, inspired by international communism, to overthrow the state by violent means.
The trial dragged on for over four years, the last of the defendants being acquitted in 1961. It served its purpose, however, in exhausting the financial and mental energies of the movement at a crucial time.
The court gave considerable space for political statements. Mandela reasserted his commitment to universal adult franchise, his distance from Communism and his non-racialism: “we are not anti-white, we are against white supremacy”.
After his release, Mandela was heavily involved in the mass actions which followed the Sharpeville shooting. This was a tumultuous time in South African history, when tens of thousands of workers went on strike and took to the streets.
The Congress Alliance was not prepared for this level of working class militancy. It either left it to its own resources or made inappropriate calls for Days of Mourning and Stay-at-Homes, which drew workers back from initiatives already taken. In 1961, for example, Mandela was still approaching the United Party, offering support to their opposition to the declaration of a Republic.
When the ANC finally called a general strike, it was far too late, the workers exhausted by their heroic efforts. It was also probably on the wrong issue. What was the Declaration of a Republic, the abolition of any position for Britain’s Queen, to most blacks?
Mandela celebrated the response still forthcoming in the strike of May 1961; denounced the massive mobilisation of the state to quell it; attacked the opportunism of the PAC and pondered the question of the movement’s non-violence: “is it politically correct to continue preaching peace and non-violence when dealing with a government whose barbaric practices have brought suffering and misery to Africans?”
The truth is that non-violence was never an option for the mass of black workers.
Mandela went underground to organise the May Stay-at-Home. From there he issued the ANC calls for “a countrywide campaign of non-co-operation with the government”.
The plan, he said, was to “make government impossible”. But the workers had already suffered a defeat. The strikes were over. Pass burning had turned into queues for new passes. The government itself had severed the possibility of co-operation.
The ANC turned to armed struggle in the form of a sabotage organisation, Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). Although it broke through the bounds of pacifism and legality, its guerrillaist orientation cut against the mass organisation of workers. Instead, reliance was to be placed on small groups of armed men infiltrating into the country.
Mandela, known as the Black Pimpernel, was picked up and tried for incitement to strike illegally. At the trial in which he defended himself, he challenged the validity of the court.
He was “a black man in a white court” and could not expect a fair and proper trial. He was not “morally bound to obey laws made by a Parliament in which I have no representation”.
His case was democratic: “equality before the law means the right to participate in the making of the laws by which one is governed, a constitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the population.” He appealed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The will of the people, he said, is the basis of the authority of government.
Mandela gave his African nationalism a radical democratic content: “all people, irrespective of the national groups to which they belong...whose home is South Africa and who believe in the principles of democracy and equality...should be treated as Africans”. The problem in South Africa was “the conflict between conscience and law”.
The government set the scene for violence and this could do “only one thing and that is breed counter-violence”. These were the terrible choices he and his people faced.
Mandela was convicted only to reappear on sabotage charges at the Rivonia trial. Here he declared that “violence by the African people had become inevitable” and that “without violence there would be no way open to the African people...All lawful models of expressing opposition...had been closed by legislation. There was no choice, it was a question of ‘submit or fight’.”
Violence was to be kept to the minimum, sabotage against property not terrorism against persons.
The object as far as he was concerned was not communism or a classless society, but rather the attainment of democratic rights: “I regard the British Parliament,” he said, “as the most democratic institution in the world and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration.”
Mandela never explored the particular form in which “the turn to armed struggle” was conducted in South Africa: its alienation from workers and mass struggles, its exclusivity, its cult of violence as the way forward. He never was able to investigate the reasons for the terrible defeats in the 1960s at the hands of the South African security forces nor of its connection with the annihilation of mass struggle in this period.
He never really understood working class politics or the class reasons for the defeats of the movement suffered at the point of his imprisonment. It was not for ten years or more that black workers found their feet again in the strikes of 1973.
In the wake of this movement Mandela has returned to the centre of the political stage.