Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Negotiations? Yes: but who and how?

Socialist Organiser no. 433, 8 February 1990 · scan pp. 6–7 · Bob Fine · about 1,714 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →

6 Nov 2026: transcribed from the scans of pages 6 and 7, printed 'By Bob Fine'. The machine split had filed the end of this article (page 7) under a record named from its opening words, run together with the Who's who box and part of The politics of Nelson Mandela. 'that idenity' (in the pull-quote, left out), 'discusion' and 'it own political identity' are as printed; the photo caption is left out.

Proofed text: read against the scan word by word; spelling, punctuation and wording are as printed.

Scan page 6

Let us hope that there are no hitches at the eleventh hour. After 25 years in gaol, Nelson Mandela has become a personal symbol of the struggle for freedom. His release will be a triumph for freedom against oppression.

It is not clear what Winnie Mandela means when she declares that her husband will refuse to be released unless certain conditions like the lifting of the state of emergency are met. Refusal to be free is an odd negotiating position, unless release is made conditional on other actions on the part of the prisoner.

Doubtless the South African government is pushing Mandela to perform the role the British made for Kenyatta in Kenya — to travel fast the road from the Mau Mau cell block to the defence of ruling interests. It would seem that to his credit Mandela personally is holding out against the worst of these pressures. The future, however, does not depend on the qualities of the leader alone but on the movement he represents.

In its own terms, De Klerk’s was a brilliant speech. He is to PW Botha what Gorbachev is to Brezhnev: the replacement of dead brain matter by movement and thought. His speech took everyone by surprise.

Just before it, the left wing Weekly Mail went to press on the note that the legalisation of the ANC was not on the cards. What we got was the legalisation of the Communist Party and the PAC as well, the promised release of all ‘political prisoners’ (though rather narrowly defined as those imprisoned purely by virtue of their membership of a banned political organisation), and the suspension of the widely used death penalty.

De Klerk said that he would debate the Communist Party any day, describing them — loosely translated — as ‘pathetic’.

Treurnicht, the leader of the ultra-right Conservative Party, seemed lost for words, having little else to say other than that his role was to ‘defend the interests of the white race’ (exactly!).

Eugene Terre Blanche, the AWB nazi, was heard to say ‘God, don’t tell me that. No, oh no, it can’t be true’ but god was not listening.

Zac De Beer, the leader of the Democratic Party, said that he didn’t want to make any cheap party political points at a historic moment like this, but that his party had called in vain for these reforms for many years.

Maggie Thatcher naturally led the call to declare De Klerk regime rehabilitated — she is under the delusion that she is as responsible for the reform of apartheid as she is for the revolution in Eastern Europe — and she was soon joined by President Kaunda of Zambia. They had been pre-empted by the new leaders of Poland and Hungary, who, eager for trade, had already hosted Pik Botha, the South African foreign minister.

Most of the ANC-SACP leaders are talking the language of negotiation. Jo Slovo and Alfred Nzo were appropriately in Moscow to hear the news; they seem to have buried the hatchet after last year’s rift with Gorbachev, when the SACP held their conference in Havana.

They now agree with the Soviet Central Committee that it is time for negotiations in South Africa. The only stumbling blocks are more symbolic than effective: the suspension/abandonment of the armed struggle by the ANC (which in practical terms has been largely inactive for some time now) and the lifting of what is left of the state of emergency (non-emergency laws in South Africa are sufficient to do the dirty job).

Jo Slovo is celebrating the failure of the South African government to split the ANC from the SACP, and apologising for the one or two ‘mistakes’ he made in forty years of loyalty to whoever ruled the Kremlin.

The extreme nationalist left (the PAC, some hard-line Stalinists, some of the Black Consciousness movement and at least one comment from Winnie Mandela) is busy re-affirming that apartheid ‘cannot be reformed’, it can only be ‘eliminated’ and that accordingly De Klerk’s reforms are ‘irrelevant and meaningless’.

Winnie Mandela is quoted as saying that the unbanning of the ANC, SACP and PAC ‘in the prevailing South African climate is simply a recipe for further problems’. From the hard-line wing of the SACP, Pallo Jordan re-affirmed a commitment to people’s war and popular insurrection.

It is certainly right to point out that De Klerk is no Santa Claus and that he has his own reasons behind the bearing of gifts — not least the desire to modernise South Africa. This is no reason, however, simply to reject the legal road he is mapping out. The fetish of illegality is no less debilitating than the fetish of legality.

We must learn to distinguish between the boycottism of the ultra-nationalists and the admission of socialist politics into the democratic movement. We must avoid a simple denunciation of ‘fake reforms’ (a bad old habit of the South African left) and explore instead the potentialities opened up by liberalisation from above.

For years and years most socialists in South Africa have identified socialism with the extreme wing of nationalism; this is a crucial moment to break that identity. Legalisation of the liberation movement provides a tremendous opportunity for the re-construction of socialist politics in South Africa. The boycottism of the radical nationalists offers nothing but a dead-end.

Legalisation will allow the movement to test its strength and popularity with the people. It will allow the growth of democracy both within the parties of the movement and between the parties and those they seek to represent. It will allow for the normalisation of politics in the form of political competition and class differentiation, including the development of a working class political voice or voices.

It will allow for the maturing of a class rather than nationalist view of the state, as not merely an untouchable imposition on the part of foreigners, but as a capitalist power whose overthrow cannot be conceived in isolation from the struggle for reforms.

There is a chance to break from a deeply felt political culture whose article of faith has rested on the strictest counter-position of reform and revolution. There is a chance to link the class struggle for reforms in the here and now to the larger goals of the movement and a more open political discusion of what these larger goals comprise.

There is a chance to bridge the fetishised separation of the economic and the political, so that the lessons of the trade unions may be carried over to the political sphere rather than being isolated in an economic cocoon.

What the unions showed in their response to labour reforms, is that some reforms from above are real gains. If properly responded to, they may serve as a springboard for the movement, as the reform of labour laws was a springboard for the construction of COSATU in the first half of the 1980s, rather than as the trap set by their architects.

Legality also offers a terrain for workers to examine the record of the Communist Party and other avowedly socialist groupings, and think through the strategic and tactical meaning of democratic socialism in the South African context. The grip of the SACP was closely related to its pivotal role in the armed struggle.

It is absolutely vital for the South African left not to follow the phrase-mongering of those who denounce all negotiations and all forms of political accommodation in principle. It is a recipe for the marginalisation of the left and for socialist politics continuing to operate merely as a militant wing of nationalism.

The main foundations of socialist politics in South Africa undoubtedly lie at present in the trade unions. The trade unions will certainly unite with the political wing of the liberation movement around the battle for certain basic democratic rights. The trade union left will then find itself either trailing the ANC leaders (but wanting a share of the cake as worker leaders), or developing its own identity and concerns within the larger unity.

The key issues are: first adherence to and extension of the democratic demands of the movement (trade union activists have a

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good foundation for becoming what socialists should be, namely, the most consistent democrats within the movement); second, the re-coupling of democratic demands to demands over the immediate social and economic misery of the people (trade unionists are well placed to remember that democracy is not just an end in itself, but also a means to the material betterment of the lives of the people); third, the building of a democratic socialist party or parties which combine commitment to the democratic movement as a whole with the furtherance of the particular political interests of the working class (just as trade unions seek to represent their particular economic interests).

As in Eastern Europe, the working class does not yet have it own political identity. The potentialities which I have outlined are no more than that.

The worst sectarian folly would be for the left to turn its back on the whole process of negotiation and leave it in the hands of the established political forces. It would be equally folly to reserve negotiations for the established political leaders talking to and with each other at the centre. We should obviously support broad rather than narrow representation, public rather than private dealings, accountability rather than the fait accompli behind closed doors.

The major point, however, is to deepen and extend the art of ‘negotiation’ among black people generally, to democratise the whole process of negotiation, to turn negotiation into a weapon of the working class.

The use of this weapon is an experience with established roots among black workers in the trade union movement. This form of class struggle will inevitably include a minimal degree of defensive violence to protect individuals and groups in the movement, but it would be of an entirely different social nature from what is now called the ‘armed struggle’. It would contrast with the idealisation of violence and its dissociation from the political class struggle.

Involving the youth ‘comrades’ in this form of working class self-organisation will doubtless be difficult, but there is no alternative other than either their physical suppression (by the right) or celebration of their elemental rawness (on the left).

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 433

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