USSR: what next?
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-02-08Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 5 →
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Siberian miners on strike. Interview next week Chinese dissident faces trial From page 1 power against their rival bureaucrats, to mass opinion against the conservative opposition which is very strong, and maybe has a majority, in the Central Committee.
They may have failed to intimidate their opponents. As we go to press on Tuesday evening, 6th, nothing has been resolved in the Central Committee. It was due to end on Tuesday but will go on for at least another day. Resolutions are being redrafted to accommodate the opposition, and that suggests that Gorbachev has had to give ground.
That there is bitter opposition to Gorbachev is hardly surprising. So far glasnost and perestroika have deepened the multiform crisis of Soviet society, and solved nothing.
Shortages are getting worse. National conflicts are growing. The Baltic republics are on the point of secession. The occupying army which massacred the people of Baku has stopped outright civil war there, but solved nothing. The Azeri blockade of Armenia continues.
Gorbachev's response is to press ahead faster along his road of reform. His opponents want to batten down the hatches.
They can fairly accuse Gorbachev of creating anarchy and chaos and of having lost them an empire in Eastern Europe. What they cannot do is offer viable alternative policies.
"Gorbachevism" did not spring into existence suddenly, full-grown, out of one man's mind. Gorbachev and his policies are products of the social forces and contradictions created over more than quarter of a century of abject failure to reform the Soviet Union's economic structure.
During that period its performance compared to the major capitalist countries with which the USSR has been competing on the world stage has grown more and more feeble.
The USSR depends almost entirely on the West for advanced technology. Productivity in its industry is 40 per cent, and in agriculture only 25 per cent, of US levels. Almost its only exports competitive on the world market are raw materials like oil and gas.
Gorbachev knows he can't go back. As he told Siberian miners on the eve of the Central Committee, "if the party is not renewed, it will recede into the background.
«Others advise us to give up innovations, tighten controls, hold everything tight and return to the old ways. But this is not the way for us. It will keep us forever in the past."
That is Gorbachev's strength against the reactionaries. His other strength, paradoxically, is that things have gone so far beyond what the Stalinist system has been built to handle that if the one-time reflex Stalinist response - massive and unrestrained violence - is atMao Yongzhan, a 19 year-old Y student detained in Shanghai since June 1989, is about to be put on trial on 'counterrevolutionary charges, according to Amenesty International.
Yao Yongzhan, a student leader in the Economic Management Department at Fudan University in Shanghai, was arrested at Shanghai airport on 11 June 1989 as he was about to leave for Hong Kong, a week after the massacre of Tiananamen Square. The Shanghai newspaper Liberation Daily reported at the time that he was arrested because he was the leader of an illegal organisatempted, then probably it will provoke millions into outright revolt rather than quell them.
Despite their alarm and their condemnation of Gorbachev, the conservatives also know that Gorbachev is no traitor to the ruling class which he and they serve and lead. They know he is making a determined effort to allow that class to survive while the USSR it has led to such a crisis is modernised.
The conservatives who vote against Gorbachev, or even to dismiss him, will be those who are convinced that despite his intentions, what he is doing and now proposes to do will not save the Stalinist nomenklatura but expedite its destruction; even a blind policy of sitting tight would be better.
On the face of it, it would seem that any proposal to abandon the Stalinist political monopoly will immediately or soon send the disintegrating debris of the old ruling party after its spawn and satraps in Eastern Europe. The measure of the gamble that Gorbachev feels forced to take is found in that fact. He knows the danger for his class: only recently he pronounced himself against a multi-party system for the Soviet Union.
The breakup of the party must be the most likely outcome. And since the centralised Stalinist party has so far been the main force holding the USSR together, without it the chances of national chaos and the breakup of the USSR must increase.
But national chaos is already developing. The CPSU has begun to break up, along the lines of the nationalities of the USSR with the success of the Lithuanians in giving their party independence from the Kremlin, and along the lines of political factions within the party, which is actually a cartel of the ruling bureaucrats and in no sense a real party.
What Gorbachev proposes is to recognise these facts. He has concluded that the organisation he leads can best face up to them by "accepting" them in order to master them. He has seen that the rigid satrap Stalinist parties in Eastern Europe which would not move were eventually moved by the masses.
He is in the business of fostering change. He wants to make the party and the class he represents boldly ride the tides of transformation and thus survive in modernised form.
Here too, there is no alternative, or rather the only alternative is massive repression, and abandonment of the drive to modernise the USSR. Going backwards economically and socially is no solution, and massive repression is unlikely to succeed in a country where the soldiers, too, have begun to think for themselves, to find a voice, and to organise a trade union Ardy i a he early is for reusine to order soldiers to fire on rioting hungry Russian workers).
Explicit freedom for political parties in the USSR will accelerate tion', that is the Autonomous Student Union formed in Shanghai during the Spring 1989 protests. He was formally charged in late July 1989 with counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation.
Yao Yongzhan's trial seems to be imminent. Yao Yongzhan is detained in Shanghai No 1 Detention Centre and is said to be in fairly good health.
Yao Yongzhan was born in Shanghai on 16 February 1970. He came to Hong Kong in 1982 to join his mother, with a one-way exit fermit issued by the Shanghai police. Though he later returned to Shangai to continue his studies there, he apparently has had Hong Kong resident status since then. the erosion of the ruling party. The bureaucracy will not just melt away overnight — it has not melted away in any East European country, not even Poland - but nevertheless, the irreducible core and pillar of the Stalinist system is the political monopoly, with all that goes with it and was necessary to maintain it.
When it goes, the whole situation is changed. It is a different game entirely.
Gorbachev knows that the monopoly is in effect already gone in the Soviet Union, and his programme now is to win the political struggle for the bureaucracy. Are his chances any better than those of the former state-monopoly parties in Eastern Europe?
The USSR bureaucracy is more like the Romanian than the other East European elites, in that it is nobody's stooge, but an independent force. The USSR bureaucracy has the advantage over the Romanians that it is led not by a madman with dynastic ambitions but by an intelligent reformer.
Like the Romanian bureaucracy, the Russian will not fall like a stone into the abyss. It will fight consciously and tenaciously for its position.
Gorbachev is fighting. His difference with the conservative Stalinists is about how to fight. He wants to ride the whirlwind.
The mass demonstration on 4 February was licensed and perhaps organised by the Gorbachevites, but the people are not theirs to turn on and off like a tap. The mobilisation will continue. Very soon it may be against Gorbachev himself.
The obvious parallel to Gorbachev's use of the masses as a whip against the conservatives is Mao's use of the youth in China in the '60s: the difference is that Mao had the Chinese Army as a force to control the youth and as a scaffolding within which to reconstruct the party he had smashed.
Nothing like that scaffolding now exists in the USSR. Reliance on the Army is likely to increase if chaos develops, but the Army itself may not hold.
Gorbachev's personal tragedy is that his struggle to break out of the impasse in which the bureaucracy has landed the USSR - a brave, heroic, from the point of view of his class, adventurist struggle - is once again serving to agitate, stir up and mobilise the people who will destroy the bureaucracy he is trying to modernise and save.
In his frantic struggle against so many immense difficulties, he is himself forced to undermine and destroy parts of the bureaucracy. The abandonment of the Stalinist monopoly of power will almost certainly bring it a long stride nearer its final disintegration and destruction.
wards capitals:
For Wakers libery?
London and New York now have an estimated 75,000 homeless apiece.
Some sleep on the streets, most in disused buildings or in hostels. It's difficult for them to get jobs, beyond occasional casual work, without a home address; impossible for them to find homes without getting a job which gives them some money for a deposit and initial rent; and often impossible for them to get social security.
Begging, theft, or prostitution may be their only ways to get an income.
This pool of misery is increasing, not diminishing. It is a natural, logical and normal result of the "hidden hand" of free market economics.
The capitalist free market means that labour power is bought and sold like apples or armchairs. As with apples or armchairs, the fluctuations of supply and demand will leave unsold stocks. It's worse with labour power, because the "unsold stock" of unemployed helps the bosses to impose speed-up on employed workers and thus reduce demand for workers.
Unsold armchairs are stockpiled; unsold apples are trashed; and "unsold" workers?
In a pure market they are trashed like so much rotten fruit. In fact the capitalists want and need at least a small stockpile of unemployed people kept fit for work.
Help from their families, or from social security, keeps some "unsold" workers on a stockpile ready for use. But now the stockpile is much bigger than the bosses need. Social security and local authority housing have been cut. More and more people have no family willing to help them.
The free market takes its toll.
Those Tories who bother to think about the problem at all argue that homelessness is caused by lack of a free market in Remove restrictions on private landlords, they say, and the free market will balance supply and demand. The Tories' new housing law is inspired by this philosophy.
But most homeless people produce no market demand for housing, because they have no money. Supply and demand will be perfectly balanced, and those homeless people will still be homeless.
And the free market does not produce cheap housing. In crowded city centres it produces a polarisation between high-rent offices and luxury homes, and slums where landlords achieve similar returns by overcrowding.
Eastern Towards capitalism 60p plus 15p posta from PO Box 823, London SE15 4NA
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EASTERN EUROPE
stocks of stocks of homeless THE HIDDEN HAND