Un Asked Sanctions
Socialist Organiser1990 1990-02-01Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 10 →
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Communist invaders of South Korea. General MacArthur announced last night. political backbone to the student radicalisations of the late 1960s, and it would have been, shall we say imprudent, for International Socialists, the forerunners of the SWP, to have stood out against this sentiment. They limited themselves to timid criticisms of the NLF thereby abandoning the logic of their own position over Korea.
Or was there a difference between Korea and Vietnam?
Opposition to both sides in the Korean war would have to rest on the idea that there was no real "Korean' dimension to the war; that it was a 'proxy war" fought out in reality between the dominant world imperialisms, the USA and the USSR. If it was really such an inter-imperialist war, socialists could no more give support to one side than they could during the First or Second World Wars. The argument would be that the Korean War was no more about Korea than the First World War had been about the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.
In such a "proxy war", the national rights of the Koreans, the argument would go, would be essentially a red herring; or, even if we were to accept their national rights as an issue, it would not justify giving support to the Stalinist armies: we would look to a different agency — a 'third force' - to secure these national rights, namely the working class.
There is an interesting and perhaps signficant parallel to this ahe Trotside ed bement soortf after the outbreak of World War II. The part of the movement led by Max Shachtman argued that it was not possible to support China against Japan, because China's war was inextricably bound up with that of the imperialist allies in general, and with US imperialism in particular.
As far as 1 can make out, this argument was a spin off from the Shachtmanites' argument about the USSR itself: that whatever the specific case for 'defence of the USSR' (the Shachtmanites still considered the USSR more progressive than the West), in the war it was a catspaw of Anglo-American imperialism and thus could not be supported. Son мирима Ironically, this was an early version of the theory that divides the world into two camps, with the difference that both camps were considered reactionary. It is wrong to fade out all specific questions, all concrete issues, in wars, in the name of general opposition to imperialism.
It was necessary for socialists in China to assert vigorously the national rights of China against Japan, fight the bourgeois nationalists and Stalinists for the leadership of the national movement, whilst making propaganda about the imperialist nature of the war as a whole.
The Shachtmanites" practical attitude to the USSR in World War II may have been vindicated by the obviously imperialist character of absolute sense: its progressiveness would not cancel concern for democracy"
the USSR's victory, but their ment was utterly contrived.
Both in Korea and Vietnam, it was necessary to fight against the US and warn about the superpower ambitions of the USSR.
It is, of course, possible to advocate the right of a nation to self-determination without giving any support to the particular nationalist movement fighting for it: Socialist Organiser, for example, is for the right of Azerbaijan to self-determination, but we have no sympathy for the anti-Armenian chauvinism of the Azeri Popular Front. We were for the right of Afghanistan to self-determination, but not on the side of the Mujaheddin.
But were the 'indigenous Stalinists' in Korea or Vietnam comparable to the reactionaries in Azerbaijan and Afghanistan?
The Vietnamese Stalinists already - by 1950 - had the blood of many Trotskyist working class leaders on their hands. Nobody could be in any doubt that when they came to power they would impose a bureaucratic vice on the workers and peasants of Vietnam, deny the right to independent organisation, stifle all democratic activity; Socialist Organiser's predecessors considered the consolidation of the Stalinist regime in Vietnam to be a defeat for the working class.
But the Vietnamese Stalinists did not mobilise the masses with the promise of totalitarian dictatorship. The masses supported them because they promised to bring land reform, economic improvement and national freedom. And, up to a point, social programme of the Stalinists was progressive.
It was not progressive in an absolute sense: its progressiveness would not cancel out concern for democracy; it was not progressive in any greater qualitative sense than that in which most bourgeois nationalist movements promise, and to some extent sometimes deliver, social improvements. But it was certainly progressive compared to the regreasive and socially reactionary programme of, for example, the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan.
We could not have the same attitude to the NLF in Vietnam as we have to the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan without renouncing the possibility of socialists winning influence among the Vietnamese masses. The SWP, in so far as their policy was based on such considerations, recognised this. A different line on Korea would have to argue that the subordination of the national liberation movement in Korea to the Russian bureaucracy was geelatirely greater than in But Ho Chi Minh was not independent of Moscow. The argument is difficult to square logically.
In reality, there was a question of Korean national liberation in the war; there was a national liberation movement, as deserving of support, and with the same qualifications, as in Vietnam. But there is no way Tony Cliff's line on Korea can be squared with his line on Vietnam.
Outlook is once again more concerned with the "balance" of the two world "camps" than with the right of the working class in Eastern Europe to organise. To get any closer to socialism the working class has to smash Stalinism. In doing so the working class will smash the "anti-imperialist bloc"
Unless the working class immediately seize power, imperialism (according to Outlook theory) will have won. But we say the workers are right to smash Stalinism, even if they are not in a position to seize power immediately. The workers are plainly not taking a regressive step, even if capitalism results. It is Outlook's theory which is wrong, not the East European workers. Outlook supports the Eastern Bloc workers despite not because of its theory.
The descent into farce becomes even more pronounced when you turn to the section of Outlook's pamphlet on China.
According to them, the pro-democracy movement in China was nothing to do with democracy. The workers and students who sacrificed their lives did not do so for democracy, for freedom, for an end to state terror, for the smashing of the bureaucracy which holds the power of life and death over them. No, on the contrary, those workers and students died in their thousands to defend the bureaucratic state.
"The workers were expressing their allegiance to the gains of the evolution, to the relative equality ob security, and gains in terms of living standards, health care, etc., which the proletarian and peasant masses of China have experience since the revolution."
Outlook continually accuse us of not caring whether capitalism is restored in the Eastern Bloc. In this they are wrong: we do care. We care very much. But there is a third choice — workers' power.
Outlook says that because we reject the ideas of the USFI we have become disorientated. In fact we have put the working class back in its central place. It is Outlook who are disorientated when they say that the working class has a better option in Stalinism than capitalism. There is only one better option, and that is socialist revolution. Stalinism is not a half-way step, and Outlook should not attempt tc delude the workers that it is. To dc so is to push the workers back down the very blind alley they are trying to escape from.
This curious pamphlet is badly written and confusing in a way which suggests the authors don't know what they want to say. In practical politics Socialist Outlook want the same as we do in the Stalinist states - a working class democratic socialism. You wouldn't think so if you were to take their threadbare theorising at face value. Most of the time they themselves don't take their theorising at face value - which is what lines them up most of the time on the right side on questions concernworking class struggle against Stalinism.
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