8 FOR A WORKERS' EUROPE EAST AND V Should Solidarnosc go for power?
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-11-16Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 8
Zbigniew Kowalewski a leader of the left wing of presents a point of view on the current crisis in Poland.
1988, the bureaucratic regime, still not 'normalised', and incapable of finding an answer to an interminable and deepening economic crisis, was shaken by the failure of the referendum on economic reform and by two waves of strikes, the most powerful since 1982.
that point the big bosses of the regime, Jaruzelski, Rakowski and Kiszczak, understood the huge power of Walesa as the only person capable of stopping the strikes and the decisive importance of getting the suppport of the Solidarnosc leadership for the pro-capitalist plan of restructuring the economy.
They understood also that it was impossible to destroy the independent workers' movement. That movement could only be controlled by a workers' bureaucracy coming from its own ranks. It was vital for the survival of the regime that they should negotiate with Walesa on what his colleagues were proposing to him anyway: a Polish version of the Moncloa pact the 'social contract in Spain following the fall of Franco].
But, scarcely two months after the signing of the agreement, and even hero it had bonal system ce, the new institutional system OI bureaucratic power - that of *35 per cent democracy" constructed at the "round table" talks, was smashed to bits.
In a way that was completely unforeseen by the political top brass on all sides, the masses transformed the electoral farce of 4 June 1989 into a victorious plebiscite against the regime. Almost all the candidates of the bureaucracy failed. Almost all the candidates of the Solidarnosc civic committee were elected.
Without an ad hoc and grossly unconstitutional adjustment of the electoral law between the first and the second round of the election, it was impossible even to fill the parliamentary seats guaranteed to the bureaucrats by the "round table" agreement.
The bureaucracy became a lame duck.
This victory was not won by those who abstained, despite the fact that they represented 38 per cent of the electorate, including a percentage, impossible to measure, due to the political boycott. It was won by those who, against the wishes of the civic committee, the Solidarnosc leadership, and Walesa, and despite the appeals for a boycott, farcical « Played the game of this right to the end.
The calls for a boycott were made by radicalised dissidents opposed to Walesa's line and the legitimation of the "round table" agreement, including the Polish Socialist PartyDemocratic Revolution (PPS-RD). This is the first left political party to exist not only in Poland, but in the whole of the countries governed by represents a gain for the international and Polish workers' movement. But it failed this central political test, the first it met.
In itself, the mistake - obvious only after the event — was not too serious. What was decisive, on the other hand, after 4 June, was to get a strategy of transition underway: from the moral overthrow of the bureaucratic regime to its material overthrow. No dissident current tried to do that. Neither then nor later was any central political slogan put forward.
One slogan flowed logicalHaly from the popular victory - of 4 June: 'Down with Jaruzelski, a Solidarnose government, free elections immediately"
No-one can deny that, in order to assert their victory, the masses needed such a slogan. But the Solidarnosc leaders were no less frightened by their victory than the bureaucracy by its defeat. They set about dismantling the result of 4 June.
"Don't celebrate because you have broken through the framework of the 'round table, look what is happening, in Tiananmen Square, retreat! that was what Walesa's circle said. Alongside that message they launched a salvage operation for the regime tacit acceptance of the change in the electoral law between the first and second rounds, manoeuvres inside the Solidarnosc civic committee parliamentary group allowing Jaruzelski to be elected president of the republic, then manoeuvres aimed at getting Kiszczak elected as prime minister. Democracy - even 35% democracy — has its obligations!
All this shameful circus, often broadcast live by television, was followed by the masses, and even the most disoriented workers and those who had most illusions realised that they had been had.
Their response to the circus was simple and elementary. Once again, they turned to their only weapon, the economic strike - in a comoletely dispersed manner, it's true, but, given the absence of a leadership able to bring about a minimum of coordination and direction, at least they effectively eluded the control of the Solidarnose leadership and remained deaf to Walesa's appeals.
At the same time, the results of the elections had repercussions inside Parliament. The MPs of the United Peasants' Party (ZSL) had almost all been eliminated at the first round, and owed their election at the second round to the backing of supporters of a bitter rival of their party, the Solidarnosc union of private farmers, which is linked to the workers' union of the same name.
Some of the candidates of another PUWP satellite party, the Democratic Party (SD), and certain candidates of the PUP itself, also owed their election on the second round to Solidarnosc supporters' votes. So the ZSL and SD MPs, taken hostage by their voters, prefered to drop their old protector, the PUWP, and desert to Solidarnosc. In a parliament where the "round table" agreement should have given the government coalition guaranteed large majority, General Kiszczak could not find a majority to allow him to form a government.
So Poland proved itself ungovernable in the framework of the •round table" agreement. Such was the effect of the shock wave of 4 June.
But even in this situation, the radical dissidents in the workers' movement put forward no governmental slogan. They continued in Mazowiecki and Walesa embrace...the IMF their logic of boycott, syndicalist pressures.
In this incredible political vacuum, more and more disturbing for even the most determined supporters of salvaging the regime, it was Adam Michnik who flew a kite. The president is yours, he said, so why not a prime minister from us?
His own comrades in Walesa's circle rebuffed him immediately, with Karol Modzelewski and Tadeusz Mazowiecki in the forefront. In the end it was Walesa who, on 7 August, took a bold step and provoked an earthquake. Without any consultation with his circle, who were too divided and paralysed, he demanded that Solidarnosc should take the responsibility of forming a coalition government with the two satellite parties of the PUWP.
His initial approach, which was rapidly abandoned, even included the exclusion of the PUP from the government.
Today Walesa explains: "My own plan was different from what has happened.
"On the political level, I wanted there to be a pause on the basis of the 'round table' agreement. There should be a pause, and we should busy ourselves with economic and social affairs.
*But, by misfortune, we won the elections. That's when everything got messed up. The victory imposed certain things. We had to go further" (Le Figaro, 26 September).
It is very clear that he had to demand the government in order to avoid being discredited in the eyes of the workers. On 4 September, Walesa publicly denounced Mazowiecki's soft attitude (in his view) to the PUWP. Walesa's spokesperson, the senator Lech Kaczynski, explains that Walesa's biggest worry is the reaction of public opinion to the participation of the PUWP in the government.
For their part, the Solidarnosc leaders of the Wola industrial region, round Warsaw, report their opinions of their working-class base in the following terms (in the paper Gazeta of 12 September):
"As early as July, people were asking us trade unionists why Solidarnosc didn't take power.
Today, everyone agrees that Michnik was right to put forward the idea of them having the president and us the prime minister. It was necessary to take the government, but without entering into a coalition with the PUWP.
We want it to be our government, not a coalition government. People have swallowed, with some difficulty, the business about giving the PUP the Interior Ministry, but now we are giving too much to the Communists. It is disgusting and the workers don't like it".
But, once again, no political force tried to express the pressure of the masses and put forward the slogan of a Solidarnosc government without bureaucratic ministers.
The loss of government leadership by the PUWP, an event without precedent, is a new and harsh defeat for the bureaucratic regime. And defeat for one means success for another, unless it is a matter of joint catastrophe, which it is not here. Thus it is a success for the workers, though obviously a very partial, fragile and contradictory one.
The Mazowiecki government will probably be taken hostage by the bureaucracy, whose strategy in relation to it is expressed by the slogan: you have the prime minister, we'll have the president and the state Jaruzelski is transforming the position of president, given immense powers by the "round table" , into a de facto second government, the real controller not only of the PUWP ministries in the Mazowiecki government, which include the Interior and Defence ministries, but also of the state Like the previous governments, the Mazowiecki government contains informal representatives of the interests of the IMF and of capital in general. It is clearly a government of collaboration with the bureaucracy and with the world bourgeoisie. Its policy will aim to exploit fully its honeymoon period and the workers' illusions to disarm the mass movement. It may even become the main obstacle on the road of the mass movement. Without being a "trade union government", , it does risk making Solidarnosc a "government trade union". All that said, we must also see the other side of the coin. This government opens up more space for political democracy. Its legitimacy depends to a considerable if not decisive degree on the independent workers' movement. It is exposed to the social and political pressures of the Solidarnosc trade union, of the working class and of the masses, pressures which will tie its hands much more than the hands of the bureaucratic governments were tied. That is, indeed, the decisive aspect of the new situation.