The Birmingham-Oxford strike, 1982
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-11-11Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 64 →
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"Our executive is supposed to be so left wing. We've even got a President who sup ports the dreaded 'Militant' tendency.
"But they're all piss and wind as far as I can see. They never wanted this strike, and they've given us no real support up to now."
That was the comment of a CPSA picke in Birmingham to Socialist Organiser (2 December 1982) during their three-month strike over jobs in October-December 1982.
The CPSA executive for 1982-3 had a Broad Left majority. But that Broad Left executive tried three times to end the strike with a compromise — twice failing, eventually succeeding. They did nothing to help spread the struggle. Kevin Roddy, a Militant supporter and then President of the union, made one of the attempts to end the strike in person.
The basic argument of Militant and their co-thinkers was that this was the wrong time and wrong issue for a fight. Better keep the union's powder dry for the 'big one' - the 1983 pay fight.
In this way they subordinated the class struggle to pre-ordained schemas worked out by a pre-ordained leadership. Instead of seeing the job of socialists as starting from and helping to develop the real strug. gies of the rank and file, they demanded that the rank and file fit into the schedules of the socialists.
80 DHSS workers in Oxford, nearty 1000 in Birmingham, struck to demand incréas ed staffing. The background was increased pressure on the workers from two direc. tions: both from the lengthening dole queues (meaning more work), and from the Tory government's determination to cut civil service numbers.
On October 27 Kevin Roddy problems, Oxford a deal which gave Oxford and Birmingham (between them) 52 extra posts temporarily - in return for CPSA nationally ending its overtime ban and ban on casuals, and promising no strikes on cuts of staffing. The deal was rejected unanimous ly in Oxford and 427-26 in Birmingham.
On November 19 the CPSA NEC again recommended the same deal - only slightly changed. Rejection was unanimous again in Oxford, 520-23 in Birmingham. The CPSA NEC began to do something, calling a one-day national strike on December 3.
But at the CPSA Broad Left conference on November 21, a motion to condemn the NEC for recommending acceptance was defeated. The motion, moved by Socialist Organiser supporter Penny Barnett and backed by the Oxford strikers, also called for extending the struggle to an ail out national strike.
On December 9 a national meeting of CPSA DHSS delegates voted for a proposal from Oxford to recommend an all. out national strike from January 17. A CPSA special conference was planned for January 12. The strength of the struggle was making itself felt despite the Broad Left.
But then the government retreated slightly - and the NEC used the Christmas break to sink the struggle.
Just before Christmas the NEC voted unanimously to accept a new offer, increasing the temporary extra posts to 100 and withdrawing the demand that the CPSA end the overtime ban and promised no strike action. The NEC cancelled the strike call and the special conference and ordered the strikers back to work.
Evidence was that top TUC and Labour. Party leaders were central in engineering this deal. The CPSA Broad Left leaders went along quietly. Workers Party's industrial work in the 1970s? Actually, it isn't such an esoteric matter as you might think; as one leading SWP theoretician put it in 1982: "Ours has been the only serious attempt since the 1920s to build a national rank and file movement in Britain (perhaps in the world). There are important lessons to be drawn from its failure."
That might be a slightly exaggerated and factionally too smug and self-flattering view (it ignores, for instance, the experience of the Socialist Labour League's industrial work in the late '50s and '60s) but it is certainly true that a lot of important lessons can be learned from the SWP and its ill-fated 'National Rank and File Movement' In the 1950s and '60s the SWP (then called the International Socialists) had been a very loose discussion club with little or no working class implantation. But in the mid-1960s and early "70s the IS began to tighten itself up and simultaneously made a vigorous turn to the industrial working class. To their credit, the IS at least recognised the central importance of the industrial struggle — unlike many 'revolutionaries' at the time who looked for 'new mass vanguards' and 'red bases' amongst students, vegetarians and people with stripped pine kitchen units. These are the people who now publish Socialist Action and those who now control Briefing.
IS's biggest 'turn to the class' came in response to the enormous wave of industrial militancy that blew up around the Health government's Industrial Relations Act and it: succession of incomes policies. Dockers, engineers, health service workers and, of course, the miners, took militant and often overtly political action in the face of the Tories' attacks.
Between 1972 and 1974 over 200 occupations of factories, offices, shops and shipyards took place. Finally, in February 1974, the miners forced Heath to call a general election ('Who rules Britain?' was Heath's unofficial slogan) which the Tories ignominiously lost.
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The experience of the struggles of the ear: '70s also taught many militants a lot about the inadequacy (and sometimes downright treachery) of the trade union bureaucracy. The main 'left-wing' grouping in the unions at the time, the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU) was cor pletely dominated by the Communist Party and was almost entirely preoccupied with winning official positions and acting as a cheerleader for the left-wing of the bureaucracy.
It seemed like the ideal time to launch a rank and file movement that would link up militants across the industries and organise independently of the officials where necessary. In March 1974, IS called the first *National Rank and File Delegate Conference' with the avowed aim of taking 'the first step' in building a national rank and file movement. It was a limited success in terms of numbers: the organisers claimed that about 450 delegates registered (although the only vote counted showed a total of 271, witt abstentions uncounted). However, even at this early stage, many of the weaknesses that ultimately led to the failure of the whole project were apparent. One non-IS delegate wrote at the time:
«Taken all in all it was very much an IS conference, despite an elaborate pretence that it wasn't. Rank and file papers not controlled by IS were not invited to sponsor the conference, and therefore had no voice in the Organising Committee which, so far, remains unelected and is obviously selected by the IS leadership.
In other words it was basically a 'front' -or as the IS/SWP guru Tony Cliff described it, a 'conveyor belt' whose main intention was to draw militant trade unionists into IS. At about this time Cliff and the IS leadership were developing a grandiose plan to transform IS into the Socialist Workers Party, which would eventually displace Labour as the main political party of the British working class.
The ambiguous, unprincipled and fundamentally sectarian nature of the relationAt the same time the world recession caused unemployment to soar, climbing above 1.5 million in 1977. This was not the environment in which the NRFM could flourish..." (Alex Callinicos, 1982).
This is, at best, a lame and mechanistic ex. cuse for the failure of the project. There is no mechanical relationship between working class militancy and boom or slump. How the class reacts to these circumstances is determined in large part by its own immediate experiences (which in the mid-'70s were of unprecedented levels of militancy and success) and by the state of its organisations.
For example, the slump at the end of the '20s pushed the British working class down very badly, because of its defeats in the General Strike of 1926 and after. But in the USA the same slump had the effect - after the initial shock had worn off - of helping to spark the working class for the first time into a magnificent and successful drive to create mass industrial trade unions.
Callinicos' 'explanation' for the collapse ( the NRFM is no more than an excuse for th IS's failure to give coherent political answer: to the difficulties posed by the Wilson government and the Social Contract ('pure' militancy was no longer adequate — if, indeed, it ever had been). It is also a restrospective 'justification' for the fact that the IS leadership dropped the movement because it was not delivering the hoped-for level of recruits — in other words, the worst kind of cheapskate opportunism. So the NRFM was quietly dropped and the IS/SWF moved on to another wheeze — the 'Right tr Work' campaign.
In fact, rank and file groups and papers (most, but not all, controlled by IS/SWP) continued to exist and even flourish in a number of industries (notably engineering) throughout the '70s: what was lacking was any overall national movement.
There was, in fact, a third National Rank and File Conference held - after more than three-year gap - in November 1977. This came in response to a series of militant revolts against the Social Contract — notably at British Leyland, Heathrow, Port Talbot steel works and in the fire service.
The 1977 conference was actually bigger than either of the 1974 conferences, but again the sectarianism of the SWP led the initiative up a blind alley: this time in the form of a crazily substitutionist call for a 'day of action' (organised by the NRFM!) support of the firefighters on 7 December. Predictably, the strike call was a total flop and, once again, the NRFM was quietly dropped, its corpse to be formally buried i But this failure was not inevitable. As noted above, it stemmed from the narrow sectarianism and inadequate politics of the IS/SWP. If, for instance, the proposal for a "day of action' had been put as a demand on the TUC, all evidence is that an impressive campaign could have been built around it. But then, the SWP always has had difficulty working out how to deal with union leaderships: at times (as in the SWP-controlled 'Engineers Charter' in the early 1980s) they seemed to argue against having any leadership and even against shop stewards having time off the job and access to telephones!
The mechanistic 'explanations' now pedall ed by the SWP leaders for the failure of the NRFM parallel their similar 'explanation' fo the SWP's decision to turn its back upon almost any serious union work in the 1980s.
According to the politics of Tony Cliff's 'downturn theory' , no rank and file movement could be built, no major victories were possible and nothing much at all could be done beyond 'brick-by-brick' building at shop floor level (around issues like health and safety) until an economic 'upturn' came along — a position remarkably similar to that of Len Murray in the early '80s.
This premature acceptance of defeat, crazy depressive pessimism, led to some