Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

The Minority Movement

Socialist Organiser nos. 421–423: New Problems, New Struggles, 11 November 1989 · scan pp. 55–59 · about 5,371 words

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In a workplace we may find one in a hundred (at present) who accept completely the need for a socialist revolution and are prepared to devote a large part of their life to working for it. That' an important beginning - but not enough if we want to do more than just make propaganda for socialism. There will be many more people who may not be fully convinced socialists, but will agree to work with us on most immediate issues like militant struggle over wages and conditions, union democracy, combatting racism and This is the familiar stuff of everyday local work for every socialis in the trade unions. But it needs to be more than local. Otherwise the national union leadership always has the advantage over the So we need a national organisation pulling together the militants across industry. The best example history has yet provided of such an organisation is the Minority Movement of the 1920s, which at it! peak led one million workers. It was formed in a period similar to today, after a series of setbacks for the working class. The engineering workers had been heavily defeated in a lock-out in 1921-2. Trade union membership was falling. But the thenrevolutionary Communist Party did not give up and give in sexism. We need to organise these militants.

local groups of activists. went out to organise the rank and file.

Brian Pearce tells the story of that movement.

Excerpts from 'Some past rank and file movements' and 'Early years of the CPGB' The regrouping of the militant forces took place under the guidance of the Communist Party, working mainly through what was called the British Bureau of the Red International of Labour Unions, headed by Tom Mann.

The RILU fully understood at this time that there could be no question of forming new unions in Britain, nor was there much to be gained by campaigning for affiliation of existing unions to the RILU. The South Wales Miners' Federation, where the 'Reform Committee' elements were strong, declared for affiliation in 1921, but retracted when threatened with expulsion from the Trades Union Congress.

Under the guidance of the RILU, communists began working, industry by industry, to rally the workers on the basis of specific programmes related both to the problems of the given industry and to the actual structure of the trade union machine.

In sharp contrast to the attitude taken up in a later phase (1929-31), the fact that many workers had left the unions, either through fear of victimisation in a period of slump or out of disgust with the betrayals by the bureaucrats, or for other reasons, was not seen as the end of the trade union epoch, justifying militants in turning their backs on the unions. On the contrary, 'Back to the unions!' was one of the slogans of the British Bureau of the RILU, coupled with "Stop the retreat!' which was a call to end the policy of surrender to the employers offensive. All Power, the Bureau's paper, had a circulation by the end of 1922 of 12,000.

Rank and file organisations, known as 'minority movements' - from a complaint by some bureaucrat regarding 'the minority of troublemakers' - were brought into being anew among the miners, the engineers, the transport workers and other sections, and these were eventually, in 1924, gathered together into the National Minority Movement.

The founding conference n August 1924 the first annual conference of the National Minority Movement was held, with 200,000 workers represented.

The conference called for the setting up of factory committees, as a stage towards industrial unionism and an instrument of workers' control, and for further work to develop the trades councils as local centres of militant leadership.

Of particular importance, however, was the resolution calling for a strengthening of the powers of the TUC General Council in order to enable this body to lead the entire mass of trade unionists in a common struggle such as a general strike. The Vem struggles Page 51

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resolution warned:

"It must not be imagined that the increase of the powers of the General Council will have the tendency to make it less reactionary. On the contrary, the tendency will be for it to become even more so. When the employing class realise that the General Council is really the head of the Trade Union movement, much more capitalist 'influence' will be brought to bear on it...The reactionaries desire a General Council which will check and dissipate all advances by the workers. We of the minority movement desire a General Council which will bring into being a bold and audacious General Staff of the Trade Union movement. We can guard against the General Council becoming a machine of the capitalists, and can really evolve from the General Council a Workers' General Staff only by, in the first place and fundamentally, developing a revolutionary class consciousness amongst the Trade Union membership, and in the second place, by so altering the constitution of the General Council as to ensure that those elected thereon have the closest contact with the workers."

The call for increased powers for the General Council had been an element in Communist policy since 1922, and from the beginning the necessity of associating such an increase of power with an increase of control from below had been stressed. The communist fraction at Trades Union Congresses worked steadily in this direction; e.g. it was they who secured that the General Council's annual report should be issued to delegates seven days prior to Congress, instead of, as previously, when they took their seats.

The successes achieved by the National Minority Movement in connection with the strike wave of 1924, which was on a bigger scale than that of 1923, stimulated a reaction on the part of the trade union bureaucracy. This took two forms. The bureaucracy as a whole, hitherto lukewarm, compared with the 'politicians' , on the question of excluding communists from the Labour Party, quite suddenly became galvanised into support for MacDonald on this issue — hence the decision of the 1924 Conference of the Labour Party attempting to close the door on individual membership by Communists. Part of the bureaucracy, however, while in no way linking up with the Minority Movement, began to adapt themselves to the increasingly Left mood of the workers by striking Left-wing attitudes, more particularly on international questions such as relations with the USSR. The initial response of the Communists was to welcome this latter development as a reflection of the more militant mood among the workers, while guarding against the attribution of too much practical significance to it. Thus, Campbell, in the Communist Review of September 1924: "It would be suicidal policy, however, for the Communist party and the Minority Movement to place too much reliance on what we have called the official Left wing" . The transformation, of the trade union movement was still the main thing; "The formation of workshop committees will provide a necessary means of counteracting the bureaucracy." And Dutt, in the Labour Monthly of October 1924: "'A Left wing in the working class movement must be based upon the class struggle, or it becomes only a manoeuvre to confuse the workers". The editorial in the Communist Review of November 1924 was far from starry-eyed about the 54 New problems, New struggles new 'Lefts'.

On the trade union field we find the Left wing in the main representative of the smaller unions, e.g., Purcell, Bromley, Hicks. In previous years such unions played a very small part. But the increased activity of the masses has made it possible for them to gain prominence and ultimately position (in the General Council) by expressing Left' sentiments on a number of popular subjects, eg. Soviet Russia...

In the initiative of the newly • emergent Lefts among the Stop leadership of the trade unions, the Trades Union i Congress of 1924 decided to send a delegation to the USSR. The delegation visited Russia in November-December 1924 and issued its report in February 1925. A paean of praise for the Stalinist regime, this report was written by the delegation's expert advisers Harold Grenfell, AR McDonnell and George Young, and the Labour Research Department's Monthly Circular for March 1925 remarked of it that 'the Report is in no sense to be taken as work of critical Marxism, or even as something written from the normal trade union outlook. But just for this reason it is likely to have a special appeal to middle-class readers". Another important aspect of the report can best be illustrated by means of an excerpt from the article 'Stalin: Slanders and Truth' , by C. Allen, in the Communist Review of January 1950:

The trade union delegation that visited Russia in November 1924 recognised the bourgeois character of Trotsky.

Trotsky, who only joined the party just in time to take a prominent part in the October Revolution represents liberal nonconformity (in other words, capitalism - C.A.) as against die-hard communism'. (Russia, Official Report of the British Trades Union Delegation, London, 1925, p. 15).

The group of British trade union leaders who issued this report — Purcell, Hicks, Bromley, Swales — about the same time began to make speeches in favour of unity between the trade unions of the USSR and of Britain as a step towards international trade union unity. Very rapidly thereafter the entire work of the British Communist Party came to be redirected so as to concentrate on support for this group of trade union leaders in their work for Anglo-Russian unity, any demands and activities which might antagonise them being abandoned or played down. This change of orientation did not bring about Anglo-Russian unity or any other good thing — it led through the betrayal of the General Strike to the Arcos Raid.

The keynote for the new period was sounded in the editorial in the Communist Review of March 1925; 'The immediate task before the whole trade union movement in this country is the realisation of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee" • Lozovsky, leader of the Red International of Labour Unions, wrote, in The World's Trade Union Movement (English edition, April 1925) that "the plan of the Right wing is falling through. The British representatives and particularly Purcell, have already gone far beyond the line marked out for them by the Right-wing leaders of the Amsterdam International" , and, while noting that the Trades Union Congress had rejected the communist-sponsored • 'unambiguous' resolution on international trade union unity, had 'made up for that' by endorsing Purcell's proposal that the General Council try to bring the various trends together: this was, comparatively speaking, a step forward. The speeches of Tomsky, leader of the Soviet trade unions, which were published in English, radiated confidence in Purcell and Co. R P Dutt's Notes of the Month in the Labour Monthly of May 1925 were devoted to the question of the working class movement's attitude in the sphere of foreign relations, especially, Anglo-Russian relations, and throughout the succeeding twelve months that journal was dominated by the question of Anglo-Russian trade union unity and allied matters.

The implications of this switch of attention quickly showed themselves. In the article by P Braun on 'Problems of the Labour Movement', in the Labour Monthly for June, international trade union unity and the need for increased powers for the General Council were put in the forefront, factory committees being mentioned almost as an afterthought — and they were to be set up 'with the backing of the General Council'. At the second annual conference of the National Minority Movement, in August, stress was laid on the granting of full powers to the General Council, with only a brief and vague reference to "obligation... to use that power to fight more effectively the battles of the workers", contrasting with the careful indication of the need to develop the control from below, lest the General Council use any increase in its powers to betray the workers, which had been a feature of the previous year's decisions. Dutt's Notes of the Month in the Labour Monthly for September left nothing to chance, stressing the need for increased powers for the General Council without a • formal warning or qualification. The helpless trailing behind Purcell and Co. to which the Communist Party was now reduced found pitiful expression in Dutt's Notes of the Month in the Labour Montly for November, where he tried to explain away the fact that Purcell and Co., those great Left-wingers, the darlings of the Kremlin, had not lifted a finger to prevent the excluding of the Communists from the Labour Party when this was reaffirmed at the Liverpool conference in 1925. They had "failed even to attempt to put up a fight"; the trouble was that they lacked "self-confidence" and "to overcome this weakness" was "an essential task for the future". Wagging his finger, Dutt told these future betrayers of the General Strike that they had... "acted very foolishly". At the enlarged plenum of the Comintern executive in February 1926, George Hardy could cheerfully answer foreign comrades who wondered whether the campaign for 'All Power to the General Council', unlinked with a struggle for democratising the unions, and with factory commitees still 'music of the future', might not prove misconceived, by saying: "Should they use that power

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wrongly, it only means that we have got another additional task before us of forcing them in the right direction, which direction they must ultimately take."

This political misorientation was the reason why, in spite of Red Friday and all that followed, the fiasco of the General Strike could nevertheless occur. It is heart-rending to observe how strongly the tide was running in favour of the Communist Party in the latter part of 1925 and in the opening months of 1926, when one knows what was to come. The arrest of some of the communist leaders in October 1925 evoked a wave of protest and indignation that dwarfed the reaction to the "Campbell case' of the previous year. In spite of the anti-communist decision just passed at Liverpool, the Miners' Federation headed the list of protesting organisations. While Wally Hannington was in jail he was elected to the executive committee of the London Trades Council. Every weekend great marches to Wandsworth prison took place, to cheer up the 'class-war prisoners' with revolutionary songs. The Annual Register for 1925 records how the widespread agitation for the release of the Twelve culminated "in a great demonstration at the Queen's Hall, London, at which some Labour MPs ostentatiously used language which they held to be seditious in order to provoke the Home Secretary to have them arrested". A petition for the release of the prisoners secured 300,000 signatures Among those who stood bail for the Twelve during their trial were Lady Warwick and G B Shaw. MacDonald was provoked by all this to write to The Times asking, "What good is it our fighting Bolshevism if it is to be manufactured by the Government?' The leaders of the CPGB both underestimated the workers and overestimated the Left' trade union leaders. "Not one of us as we emerged from Wandsworth [three weeks before the strike began - BP] thought there would be such an event" as the General Strike, writes J T Murphy, who was one of the Twelve, in his autobiography. And, on the impact of the sell-out by Purcell and his associates, the editorial in the Communist Review of August 1926 expected treason of Thomas'' Throughout the international communist movement the calling off of the strike came as "a surprise and a shock"

The wrong path n the early phase of the Minority Movement great stress was laid on the need to make trades councils directly representative of the workshops instead of merely consisting of delegates from trade union branches which were often remote and unrepresentative, to secure the restoration of the trades councils' representation in the Trades Union Congress, and in every way to strengthen the element of rank and file control in trade union structure, so as to ensure that the unions functioned for the purpose they had originally been formed to serve.

"The task of the Minority Movement was to make the unity of the trade union movement a real one, to build up the shop and local organisation which should be able to control from below this great mass machine, to fight at every step the apostles of 'civil peace' ", and uniting the workers, organised and unorganised, on the widest possible front in their everyday economic struggles, build up such a rank and file movement as should make impossible a repetition of 'Black Friday'."

Unfortunately, although the Minority Movement became an influential centre of propaganda and a ginger group which injected new life into many trade union branches and trades councils, and thereby forced the trade union leaders to put themselves at the head of strikes and to make various "Left' gestures, as in 1917-20, it did little in practice to establish the workshop and factory committees of which so much was said. In the main it proved able only to spread the idea and urge it upon the official leadership.

The root of the trouble here was probably that the transformation of the Communist Party on to a factory-group basis "was only begun in earnest towards the end of 1924" and by 1 May 1925 there were only 68 communist factory groups, embracing a mere 10 per cent of the party membership. By the time that the political driving force in the Minority Movement had organised itself sufficiently to begin setting up new kinds of mass organisations in the factories, the Anglo-Russian Unity Committee had come into existence, and the Stalinist leadership of the world communist movement had decreed that nothing be done that might disturb the goodwill of the 'Left' bureaucrats. At the party congress in May 1925 a Sheffield delegate observed:

"A J Cook's speech at the recent miners' conference was completely out of tone with the speeches he had previously been making lie. before he had been elected to the secretaryship of the Miners' Federation, with Minority Movement support]. After we have praised and said nice things about these Left-wing leaders, what will the masses say about the Communist Party when these leaders fail them? We must give the necessary qualifications to our support of these Left-wingers.''' A Glasgow delegate warned of the need to be suspicious of certain trade union leaders who were acquiring an easy reputation for 'Leftness' through prominence in the movement for international trade union unity. Pollitt replied that there was "just a little danger of overstressing this point...The Russian trade union leaders are interested, leaders who have proved their worth to the working class movement and in whom we have complete confidence."

The end of this road was the betrayal of the General Strike, with the Communist Party and the Minority Movement unable to do anything against it but protest and call upon the traitor leaders to mend their ways. It revealed "the weakness of a Left which could only make propaganda, and which was not so firmly organised in the factories and localities that it could take the lead in action." A hint of realisation that the movement had been shunted onto the wrong path in 1925-26 appeared in Wal Hannington's pamphlet What's Wrong in the Engineering Industry? published by the National Minority Movement in 1927, where he wrote, after urging the need for a change of leaders in the unions:

"To those who say 'We have seen leaders turn before and what guarantee is there that they will not continue to do so?' we reply, the Minority Movement must be strong enough inside the unions not only to make leaders, but to break them, if and when they reject the policy upon which they were elected."

But Stalinist policy remained unchanged right down to the end of 1927, and the decision not to resist the TUC General Council's ultimatum to trades councils to disaffiliate from the Minority Movement virtually killed it.

"So died the Minority Movement, much as the General Strike had died. Ernest Bevin and his colleagues had called off the General Strike to avoid open warfare with the government; Harry Pollitt called off the Minority Movement to avoid open warfare with the TUC and many executives of trade unions."

Ultra-left decline Thanks to the policy imposed upon it by Moscow from the spring of 1925 onwards, the Minority Movement had done just enough to incure the resentment of the bureaucracy without acquiring the power to fight back effectively. The bureaucracy was able very thoroughly to combine its proscription and bans with the employers' victimisation of militants in that black period of the British working class movement which followed the General Strike, and so to stamp out the Minority Movement for most practical purposes. For all its weaknesses and opportunist errors, the Minority Movement of 1924-7 had been a genuine expression of a trend in the working class, with real roots in the masses and a relationship to the traditional organisations of British Labour.

Between the end of 1927 (Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party) and the middle of 1929 (Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International) a change of policy was put through in the international communist movement which caused British Stalinists in their industrial work to take off into realms of fantasy and adventure, not to mention crime and treason to the working class. This episode is largely responsible for the attitude of reserve and suspicion towards anything calling jiself is 'rank and file movement' which sometimes met among old trade unionists who are by no means bureaucrats.

The original Minority Movement based itself on affiliation by trade union branches, district committees, etc; individual membership was treated as transitional until the individual concerned had won his branch to affiliate. It was careful to emphasise that it was not an anti-union movement but on the contrary expected its supporters to work for 100 percent trade unionism wherever they had influence, and could point to many an achievement in this respect. One of the last expositions of the movement's purpose before the entry into what the Stalinist jargon called 'the third period' is found in a pamphlet by Fred Thompson New problems, New

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called Maintenance for Dockers, published by the Transport Workers' Minority Movement in 1928.

•The Minority Movement is an organisation of militant trade unionists who, realising the extent to which the present leadership have committed themselves and the unions unreservedly to class collaboration, have banded themselves together to restore the original purpose and fighting spirit on which the trade unions were founded, to secure a new leadership with a policy based upon a realisation of the class struggle, and a complete reorganisation of the trade unions on lines that will admit of this policy being given effect to."

From mid-1929 onward for a period of over two years, this approach was replaced by a totally different one. Not merely was the Minority Movement in its new guise uninterested in winning 100 per cent trade unionism, it declared the trade unions to be cracking up and on their way out, and a good thing too. Not merely did it turn away from the task of winning trade union branches for militant policies, it deliberately sought to exclude branch officers from strike committees and rank and file ad hoc committees of all kinds.

Special 'red' trade unions were created and then launched by their communist leaders into 'prestige' strikes, the need for which was not understood by the members (though these affairs looked impressive in the periodical reports to Moscow), so that militancy was discredited among those sections of the workers closest to the Minority Movement.

It was of this period in Stalinist industrial policy that Trotsky wrote (in Communism and Syndicalism, 1929) that:

...the struggle for the party's influence in the trade unions finds its objective verification in whether or not the unions thrive, whether or not the number of their members increases, as well as in their relations with the broadest masses. If the party buys its influence in the trade unions only at the price of a narrowingdown and factionalising of the latter — converting them into auxiliaries of the party for momentary aims and preventing them from becoming genuine mass organisations — then the relations between the party and the class are wrong."

The Communist Party was showing "an adolescent tendency to make itself master of the working class in the briefest time, by means of stage-play, inventions, superficial agitation, etc. "; nothing good would come of "political hysteria which does not take conditions into account, which confuses today with yesterday or tomorrow"

Characteristic of the 1929-31 period was a growing disparity between slogans and achievements. During the Bradford woollen strike of 1930, for instance, the Minority Movement shouted to bewildered workers about the struggle for power' — but proved incapable of setting up a single independent mill committee. While the Red International of Labour Unions demanded that the mqyement become "a real mass organisation based on dues-paying collective and individual membership" , setting itself up as an alternative trade union centre to the lUC, the tactics of frenzy were in lac resulting in the isolation and even expul sion of those groups which had retained some mass influence from the General Strike period (eg. the expulsion of the Mardy lodge from the South Wales age 56 New problems, New struggles.: Miners' Federation).

Arthur Horner 1 himself eventually spoke out within the party against what was happening: "Artificial strike committees, really Minority Movement groups, were set up as alternatives to the lodges, without mass contact, resulting only in our isolation...The revolutionary movement was effectively bankrupt from every angle." For this statement he was, of course, reprimanded and removed from the leadership of the Miners' Minority Movement. The shouting to the workers to come and be led, with a general strike as 'the next step' , grew louder and shriller, especially as the international Stalinist leadership kept impatiently contrasting the poor showing of the Minority Movement with what was happening in Germany (where the Nazis were now a forsooth, "all mass movements are con- substantial and growing force) - there, ducted under the leadership of the party"

Those who criticised the suicidal tactics of the 'third period' were dismissed as "Trotskyist yellow-bellies' , just as those who had criticised the opportunist errors of the previous phase had been "Trotskyist wild men' • After the damage had been done, and without, of course, any acknowledgement to those who had been right at the time, Wilhelm Pieck admitted on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in his speech of July 26, 1935, at the Seventh Congress of the CI, the justice of these criticisms:

"The most glaring example of sectarianism in the trade union movement us unle By 1926 the Tories had laid careful plans to deal with the General Strike. The timidity of the trade union leaders helped their plans along.

A 'Triple Alliance' of miners, transport and rail workers had been agreed during the war and was revived in the early 1920s. The government was afraid of the threat posed by such a mighty trade union force.

But in April 1921 the rail and transport unions deserted striking miners - on what became known as 'Black Friday' - and after that the unions were on the retreat. Not until 1925 was there a big turnaround on the industrial front.

The Tories were ready for confrontation when it occurred. In 1925 they established the OMS - Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies - to break any major strikes. It consisted of middle-class Tories, students (then an overwhelmingly conservative group) and the pre-Mosley fascists. On the eve of the General Strike it had 100,000 members.

88 Voluntary Service Committees were set up. A Special Constabulary was creater to enlarge the police force. The armed forces were mobilised to guard the docks, railways and telephone exchanges.

Troops armed with gas were moved to the capital and the industrial centres.

Faced with all this, the TUC did little to prepare. The Samuel Commission Report, published in March 1926, proposed to cut wages of the miners, though not by as much as the mine owners wanted. It also, more tentatively, suggested longer work. ing hours.

The miners' union rejected these proposals, but the TUC continued to negotiate. JH Thomas, who was by then a Labour MP, commented: "When the ver. batim reports are written I suppose my usual critics will say that Thomas was almost grovelling, and it is true.... have never begged and pleaded like i begged was provided in Great Britain, where in the face of the sharp attacks of the Right members of the General Council and the vacillations of the Left trade union leaders the communists adopted [in fact had pressed upon them by the Executive Committee of the CI - BP] such clumsy and sectarian tactics that the Minority Movement actually fell to pieces.

"Adopting the course of independently leading the economic struggles, the communists, as a result of former Right mistakes and the inadequate organisational consolidation of the Minority Movement, transferred their main work from the trade union groups to individual members and from the trade unions to the unorganised workers, and set up their scanty forces against the whole trade union movement.

'These mistakes were aggravated by the fact that the communists regarded the Minority Movement as the nucleus of new trade unions and discontinued recruiting workers to the trade unions, issuing appeals to join the ranks of the Minority Movement. It must be borne in mind that these mistakes were committed by our comrades in a country where the reformist trade unions possess the oldest traditions. Under such circumstances the communists were found to become entirely isolated from the trade union movement, and the Minority Movement collapsed. It is only with great difficulty that our British comrades, having realised their mistakes and correspondingly altered their trade union policy, are managing to regain their influence in the trade union movement."

and pleaded today..."

Thomas, who played a particularly treacherous role during the General Stril later reassured the bosses: "I have never disguised that in a challenge to the Con-. stitution, God help up unless the government won," insisting that the General Strike was no such challenge.

The Labour and TUC leadership was completely outwitted by the Tory govern. ment and the mine owners.

The left trade union leaders, meanwhile, were involved in an 'Anglo-Russian Committee, , set up to build support for the beleaguered USSR. For the young Communist Party, which was of course central. ly involved, it was seen as a good oppor. tunity to spread their influence.

Unfortunately, the pro-Russian stance of left union leaders (the 1920s equivalents of Ron Todd) was really a cheap way of get. ting radical credentials on faraway issues while they were selling out the workers at home. The CP's alliance with them on the Anglo-Russian Committee could not be allowed to outweigh the organisation of the rank and file in the General Strike.

Yet that is what happened. The labour leaders sold out the General Strike, abandoning the miners despite growing suppor for the strike. The left leaders were, at best, acquiescent. And the CP did not criticise the left too sharply for fear of splitting the Anglo-Russian Committee. It is that disastrous policy that Brian Pearce examines in this article.

The General Strike was a very serious defeat. The TUC General Council called it off without any guarantees for the miners. As Charles Duke of the Municipal Workers said: "Every day that the strike proceeded, the control and authority of that dispute was passing out of the hands of responsible Executives into the hands of men who had no authority, no control, no responsiblity, and was wrecking the movement from one end to the other."

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John Burns, one of the dockers' leaders, at Tam Hill, 1889

----- pull-quotes -----

'All power to the General Council'

declared: "This treachery, unexpected and fatal, was greater than the certain and

won." government

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