The long boom
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-11-11Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 48 →
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pages of their lively journal, the stewards were able to develop membership to an exceptionally high level, approaching 100%...the questions they were able to take up in 1937 were wider also in terms of the numbers involved. The matters dealt with included an increase for capstan setters in one department, the provision of inadequate sanitation in another, a number of problems relating to the cable shop, the factory holiday rota, apprentices' wages, a wage increase in the milling shop and two sectional piecework disputes." (Engineers at War)
However, factories like this were the exception. Prior to the war, raising grievances remained a dangerous business. But there were major achievements in the '30s, such as the key strike at Hawkers Brockworth factory in 1935 which laid the 'basis' for a national aircraft shop stewards movement. This in turn established the Aircraft Shop Stewards National Council, with its own paper, New Propellor. The flames were rekindled. What was done in the '30s provided a platform for a new take-off when war commenced.
16 Mere The war had ensured that shop stewards representing their members would be once more an essential feature of industrial relations.
But the influence of the CP made it probable that it would be on the basis of sectional organisation limited to industrial struggles and with powerful tendencies towards collaboration with the employers and government in the "national interest'.
The long boom was now to turn that probability into reality. In the 20 years after the war, the number and organisation of shop stewards increased continuously. In 1947 the AEU recorded 19,000 stewards. By 1962 it was about 32,000. In 1961 the total number of stewards in the UK was estimated at 90,000. Research for the Donovan Commission seven years later put the figure at 175,000.
That research recorded the shop steward from engineering into the distributive and service occupations. 45% of the stewards were still in the metal industries, but 36% were outside manufacturing, including 12% in transport and communications.
The shop steward in the early '60s was a representative identifying closely with his or her work group, and bargaining directly on their behalf. The steward bargained over a whole range of problems affecting the control of work - its organisation, the degree of effort, the level of overtime. S/he was particularly powerful where bargaining was over money, as, for example, with piecework systems.
In those circumstances, s/he was able to develop a whole range of custom-andpractice controls, which acted for the benefit of the work group and could be exploited on its behalf in the high-demand market conditions of the long boom.
Full employment swung the bargaining power to the shop floor. In short, sharp,
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During the mass strike wave to free the Pentonville Five, 1972 ALL TREi: Unc Mre:
IC. T.:: _ T 23: unofficial strikes small groups could jack up their earnings. In what was called 'wage drift' ,, increases at the local level outstripped the national agreements which continued in the post-war period.
Shop stewards gained some autonomy both from the union and from higher management. As national agreements were increasingly irrelevant, so was the outside structure of the union. Joint committees of stewards with strong support from the membership were able to establish their own funds, produce their own publicity, and link up across plants.
"Our evidence is that more than two-thirds of shop stewards have at their place of work a committee in which they meet with management to discuss and settle problems, and that two-thirds of these committees are multi-union. Where that is so, the committees are not easily made responsible to a trade union authority outside the factory." (Donovan report).
'In effect the shop steward organisation at Ford was thus involved in an attempt to establish standards for the rest of labour informally on a 'custom and practice' basis and in the face of disapproval of top management — even if it met with frequent concessions from lower level supervision." (Turner, Clack and Roberts, Labour Relations in the Motor Industry "In short, it appears to me in the light of the undisputed facts disclosed in this inquiry that there is a private union within a union enjoying immediate and continuous touch with the men in the shop, answerable to no superiors and in no way officially or constitutionally linked with the union hierarchy." (Report of court of inquiry into dispute at Briggs Motor Bodies Ltd, 1957)
Union officialdom, employers, and the state were alike hostile to strong independent workplace organisation. Lord Carron, president of the AEU, said of shop stewards in 1960: "These men are werewolves who are rushing madly towards industrial ruin and howling delightedly at the foam on their muzzles which they accept as their only guiding light."
A 1960 TUC report on shop stewards showed the same attitude less graphically. "Unions should be more vigilant, and if after a warning a steward repeats actions contrary to rules and agreements, his credentials (which are his opportunities to do good, or in a few cases to do harm) should be withdrawn."
In the same year, a TUC cil member denounced combine committees as "a challenge to established union arrangements", , attempting "to usurp the policy-making functions of unions"
Sometimes — as at Ford in 1962 -management were able to push through a hard line and weaken shop floor organisation, demonstrating the inadequacies of sectionalism. More often they successfully accommodated the stewards' challenge.
By the mid-'60s, however, with the UK's economic situation getting worse, "disorder" in industrial relations was increasingly seen as a key obstacle to the preferred solution - wage-cutting through incomes policy. Attention focused on the steward, notably in the Donovan report. Donovan pointed out that "for the most part, the steward is viewed by others and views himself as an accepted, reasonable, and even moderating influence, more of a lubricant than an irritant.
Their strategy was to strengthen this side of the steward's role. Employers and unions should work together, the report argued, 'to recognise, define and control the part played by shop stewards in our collective bargaining system."
Shop floor organisation was inevitable - and it could be helpful. The point was to control and influence it. The steward could be civilised and drawn away from his or her members by the creation of written agreements, to codify and pin down 'custom and practice' , which the stewards would then have to enforce. The replacement of piecework by measured time systems, work study, and job evaluation, could undermine the power of the section steward and formalise and rationalise the link between work and payment.
Written procedures would legitimise management's decisions because they had been taken after discussion and negotiation. They would draw the steward into more "rational' argument, and also pull bargaining up from the machine row to the committee room.
Formalised bargaining at plant or company level would lead to a centralisation of power at committee level and a loss of power at section level. The development of full-time stewards; the managementrun closed shop with deduction of dues at source; the extension of facilities for stewards; time off for training in industrial relations - these would encourage more rational' behaviour, and distance the stewards from their membership By the end of the '60s trade union leaders, too, had replaced their earlier hostility to workplace organisation by an attempt to incorporate it.
Jack Jones, on becoming TGWU general secretary, declared support for "a system where not a few trade union officials control the situation but a dedicated, well-trained and intelligent body of trade union members is represented by hundreds of thousands of lay representatives."
The election of Hugh Scanlon as president of the AUEW further symbolised a takeover by a generation who believed in the shop steward system, from those nurtured in pre-war defeats.
Even the GWU leadership came to terms with decentralisation - shocked by its loss of members to the TGWU in Ford, and by the revolt of its members against the union in the 1970 Pilkington strike, when strikers tried to set up a breakaway union. National and regional industrial conferences to involve workplace representatives were introduced in 1969, and a majority of lay representation on the Executive provided for by 1975.
The union leaders were, of course, not trying to strengthen the stewards. They were trying to neuter and integrate them. A more controlled steward system means a less controlled, more powerful union leadership.
The shake-up in industrial relations, the 15 years of incomes policy under both Labour and Tory governments from 1964 to 1979, and the large-scale increases in union membership — all led to a further increase in the number of stewards, to their progress into new areas, and changes in their organisation.
In 1973 the Commission on Industrial excess, of 250,000 and perhaps in Relations claimed that "there were well in proaching 300,000 shop stewards 1971." One study in Sheffield found that the introduction of productivity bargaining in 1968-9 doubled the number of stewards on the Engineering District list.
But the main developments were in the public sector. In the late '60s authorities began introducing incentive schemes for manual workers in local government and hospitals. Agreements recognised stewards for the first time in local government in 1969 and in the Health Service in 1971. NUPE, the largest public sector union, recognised stewards for the first time in 1970, and by 1981 claimed 23,000. Steward systems were introduced on the docks, on ships, and in schools. Workplace representatives in textiles and shops began to call themselves stewards in 1977. NALGO introduced a shop steward system.
An increasing hierarchy and professionalism of stewards went along with this growth. Brown, Ebsworth and Terry estimated that in 1976 there were around 5,000 full-time stewards covering manual workers in manufacturing. Their study showed that in manufacturing, 62% of all workplaces employing more than 500 Continued on page 49 New problems, New struggles Page 47
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T&G steward, BL Longbridge _hese days, talk of 'workers' control' in industry tends to sound like empty, ultra-left sloganising. Even the idea of a 'shop stewards' movement' wielding any real power seems like wishful thinking.
But throughout the 1970s, in a whole range of industries, shop stewards did exercise real power (up to and including a veto on management decisions - known as 'mutuality') that at times verged upon a limited, localised form of workers' control.
The best known and most powerful shop stewards' organisation in the 1970s was in British Leyland — the massive, nationalised car and truck manufacturer now carved up, privatised and re-named Austin Rover Group.
The story of the British Leyland shop stewards' movement contains valuable lessons for a generation of trade union activists who have known only the defeats and humiliations of the Thatcher years. In the event of Labour winning the next general election, and a return to 'consensus' politics and industrial 'partnership' between unions and management the lessons of the '70s and the whole 'BL experience' will need to be recalled with painful clarity.
The story of the rise and fall of the British Leyland shop stewards' movement very much parallels the story of the Communist Party's post-war industrial work.
The Communist Party was immensely powerful in British Leyland, and especially in the Longbridge plant which at its height in the early '70s was one of the biggest in Europe, employing well over 20,000 manual workers. The plant had been gradually unionised after World War II and CP members played a central role in this dangerous task, breaking the paternalistic grip of Herbert Austin.
The first convenor, Dick Ethridge, was a CP member and in those days it seemed a natural step for active, militant trade unionists in the plant to join the Party. By the 1960s, the Party had a factory branch numbering around 50, and sales of the Daily Worker (later Morning Star) inside the plant (not on the gates) were in the hundreds. Management once tried to prevent sales by seizing a bundle of Workers, and were forced to back down by immediate strike action.
The CP's influence went far beyond its formal membership and permeated the entire Joint Shop Stewards' Committee (JSSC), numbering around 500 stewards from the AEU, TGWU, Vehicle Builders, Electricians and the multitude of smaller white and blue collar manufacturing unions like the Sheet Metal Workers.
Apart from a few bastions of right-wing (or "apolitical') trade unionism, the shop stewards' movement at Longbridge was dominated by the ideas of the CP, even though the Party never had a majority of card-carrying members on the JSSC.
When, in the late 1960s and early '70s, the old British Motor Corporation merged with Standard-Triumph and Leyland to form the giant British Leyland Motor Corporation, the influence of the Longbridge-based CP stewards spread throughout the whole combine. The only problems, Socialist Denham 1980
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Organiser s00 p3 •247 Na32 1 n. 10. 1980 Criments and sorter Ford Metro sockings lead Edwardes lory assaut on can union rights read the Tories' pay the Tighn hit-man More on BL centre pages Organiser's front page when and five others were sacked organised opposition was the much smaller number of Trotskyist and semiTrotskyist stewards grouped around the Socialist Labour League in the Cowley Morris plant.
When the big battles against PM Edward Heath and the Industrial Relations Act erupted in the early '70s, the Austin JSSC banner would be there on all the demos, and an impressive Longbridge turn-out could be guaranteed for the CPinspired Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU).
By now, Ethridge had retired and handed the convenor's-job to his protege, Derek Robinson. Ethridge is still remembered with affection by 'old hands' and even people with no political sympathy for the CP concede that he was a "bloody good convenor, etc. Feelings about Robinson tend to be more mixed. The reason for this is that in Ethridge's day the CP's role was essentially to be the best and most conscientious union organisers at shop floor level - a task they combined with low-key Stalinist propaganda. When Robinson took over in the early "70s he was immediately faced with a series of crises that demanded political answers and exposed the underlying weaknesses of the CP's approach.
First, there was the whole question of the abolition of piece-work and the introduction of measured day work (MDW). The shop stewards' movement throughout the motor industry had been built around the piece-work system: stewards determined manning levels, arranged work patterns, negotiated the 'price for the job' and, ultimately, their effectiveness could be judged by the weekly wage packet.
Piece-work had many a socialist point of view, but it did at least ensure that stewards were directly accountable to their members and it gave the union a central role in determining the link between work and payment.
Robinson and the CP supported the introduction of MDW, dismissing the widespread shop-floor opposition as 'short-sighted', "money-militancy' and (the ultimate put-down in those days) the work of 'a bunch of Trots'. What Robinson and co. didn't understand was the vital part piece-work played in keeping the stewards' movement in touch with the membership.
This bureaucratic arrogance and high-handed dismissal of shop-floor opinion was to characterise the CP's approach throughout the "70s, and finally led to Robinson's downfall.
Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that for a whole period of time (approximately between 1971 and 1978) it seemed that Robinson and the CP had been right — the workforce enjoyed the security that came with MDW whilst retaining the mutuality and shop-floor organisation that had been built up under piece-work. It seemed like the best of both worlds.
Meanwhile, a much bigger crisis was looming: the company was going onto the rocks as a result of years of underinvestment and over-generous payments to shareholders.
The Wilson government decided to nationalise the firm, but the price for the workforce was to be acceptance of the Ryder Report. In essence, Ryder recommended bailing out the company but insisted upon far-reaching "rationalisation' of work practices, with the aim of achieving speed-up of production and a 'slimming down' of the workforce, though this last point was not spelt out in any detail.
Ryder recognised that these proposals stood little chance of success without the cooperation of the shop stewards' movement -and thus was born 'participation'. '. This was a comprehensive scheme to involve stewards, convenors and officials in joint committees with management at almost every level of the company from the shop-floor to national level - except that Ryder made it clear that management would retain the final say and full decision-making power.
The shop-floor overwhelmingly saw "participation' for what it was: a scheme designed to take stewards off the shopfloor and draw them into an unequal "partnership' with management.
Robinson and the CP went for "participation' in a big way. As with Measured Day Work, shop-floor opposition was dismissed as an unprinciplea allance 0l 'money-militants' , right-wingers and the hated 'Trots'. Robinson (in an infamous pamphlet of 1975, written jointly with CP 'theoretician' Jon Bloomfield) went so far as to describe participation as "a step towards workers' control"
Now that the company had been nationalised, so the Robinson/CP line went, the workforce had a duty to pull their
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The stewards in the seventies weight and make a go of it. Robinson and the Longbridge Works Committee clamped down on unofficial strikes ('downers') and insisted that the disputes procedure was kept to at all times: 'Continuous production' became the gospel propounded by the CP and by Leyland management alike.
When, in 1977, toolmakers throughout Leyland struck for a wage claim that in practice challenged phase 2 of the Labour government's Social Contract, Robinson and the CP joined forces with the AUEW Executive and the bosses in denouncing the toolmakers and breaking their strike.
The behaviour of Robinson and the CP was not the result of individual treachery or corruption (though that was often how it was regarded on the shop-floor): it stemmed from a fundamentally bureaucratic political philosophy that equated nationalisation with socialism and regarded the spontaneous actions of the shop-floor with suspicion and hostiliThe result of all this for the shop stewards' movement throughout British Leyland (and in Longbridge especially) was nothing short of disastrous. Stewards were seen as little more than the bosses' policemen and an enormous gulf of distrust and cynicism opened up between the plant-based union organisation and the membership.
The rest of the story is tragic history: at the end of 1977 Labour appointed a nasty little union-basher called Michael Edwardes as chairman of British Leyland. Edwardes immediately announced a "plan' that would involve 40,000 redundancies and the closure of 13 plants. Shop meetings throughout Longbridge voted to oppose the 'Edwardes plan' and yet at the official presentation of the plan, the Longbridge senior stewards (along with most other BL union representatives) gave Edwardes a standing ovation!
Edwardes must have realised then (if he didn't already know) that the majority of senior stewards in British Leyland were severely out of touch with their members. He dispensed with the soft-soap Ryder approach, drove a coach and horses through participation and, finally, thanked Derek Robinson for his past cooperation by sacking him on a trumped-up charge in 1979.
The Robinson sacking (in which the Duffy/Boyd leadership of the AEU played a disgraceful role) was a traumatic blow to union organisation in Longbridge and throughout British Leyland, from which it has only begun to recover in recent years.
But the virtual collapse of the British Leyland shop stewards' movement was not inevitable: it happened because the tremendous strength built up under piecework was frittered away in participation committees; because stewards lost their roots in the shop-floor and became petty bureaucrats; most of all, it happened because the dominant politics of the movement (ie. the CP) had no answer to the financial crisis of the company beyond giving full support to everything that flowed from the Ryder Report. In the mid-'70s they had the strength and (for a while) the shop-floor support to fight for real workers' control: what they lacked was a coherent political perspective.
That's why the good militants of the 'SOs and '60s turned into the bosses' policemen of the '70s. It's a tragic story, but one we can learn from. Ihe future depends on us learning from it. From page workers had full-time convenors. engineering the figure was 69%, and the public sector 21%.
Clegg estimates that there were 10,000 full-time stewards in 1973:
Increasingly, decisions were taken not by the individual stewards and their members on a section, or by a group of stewards in a department, but by senior, often full-time stewards and the stewards' committee at the level of the workplace — or even of the company. Full-time stewards often held no sectional responsibilities, and no longer shared by the same degree the insecurities and work experience of their members.
Involvement in higher union bodies and participation schemes meant that life became one long round of meetings and courses, with perks attached. This was likely to estrange them from, and weaken, workplace organisation.
Some observers saw the success of Labour's Social Contract (1974-5), in its ability to secure growing control of the official unions over workplace organisation. While union leaders were involved in the Social Contract at the top, workplace leaders were incorporated at the bottom.
It was not as simple as that. The strategies of the state and the employers did have a tremendous degree of success. By 1980 much of the structure of workplace trade unionism was management-moulded, managementsponsored. The bosses had developed the understanding that the workplace organisation, just like the wider union, could be used against rather than for the worker — could be used by capital for its own purposes.
Donovan's insight into the ambivalence of the steward's role, and the strategy of the 1974 Labour government derived from it, yielded tremendous dividends to capital. This is central. But it has to be seen against the political background.
Strong roots in the membership had allowed the stewards to organise the early "70s wave of struggles. But, paradoxically, the favourable economic situation was both an aid and a hindrance. On the one hand it gave the workplace leaders the muscle to go forward. On the other hand, the ability to do so and to go round the union leaders (or force them reluctantly to trail behind) reinforced the limitations of the workplace leaders' political tradition, to ensure that no adequate alternative political leadership was thrown up. They never felt the need for it, and unlike the '20s there was no strong revolutionary party able to win the key layer of stewards to consistent revolutionary politics.
As issues arose, the activists turned not to trying to control the Labour Party, or lo supporting a new party, but to industrial means, to direct action, alone. Despite the efforts of revolutionary groups, no viable, even embryonic, rank and file organisation, not even a smaliscale pallid reflection of the Minority Movement, was established.
It was the ability of the state and the employers to use these crucial political weaknesses against the rank and file leaders which was in the end to undermine their basic strength.
By the late '70s, it had become clear that militancy within normal bounds, plus Labour voting according to tradition, could produce no more than Wilson attacking the unions instead of Heath. As it became clear that the economic situation in the late '70s really was worse than that of the early '70s, then all the movement's limitations came to the surface.
The delusion that "industrial militancy is enough" was dispelled. Vast layers of the militant labour movement had always been vulnerable to appeals to support 'the national interest" etc., and this now took its toll.
The 1972 upsurge halted when the dockers were released. The 1974 upsurge was halted by Wilson.
What was missing was a leadership which would have been able to take the movement forward, to bring down Heath in the first case, to hammer Wilson and establish a workers' government in the second.
Shop floor leaders had no answers to the arguments of Murray and Wilson that wages cause inflation, that this was the reason why the economy was in trouble, that an incomes policy could help, and so on. Leastwise, their arguments were not strong enough to carry their members with them and stop the official leadership going with Wilson.
The election of the Thatcher government opened up the use of mass unemployment to undermine shop floor strength. Building on the work of Wilson and Callaghan, the bosses have victimised steward after steward, pushed back or intimidated one workplace organisation after another.
We have to provide the answers. We have to provide them urgently.
We must base ourselves on, and learn the lessons from, the hopeful signs amid "The ability...to go the union leaders reinforced the limitations that no adequate altern the general retreat.
We have shop stewards in more workplaces than ever before. We have got to get them moving again - this time on a clear-cut basis of independence and socialist policies.
We have to build a movement that can do everything that the movement to free the Pentonville Five did - and more. We have to answer the central questions of viability, unemployment and union democracy.
We are in no position to declare a national rank and file movement now. But we have to do everything possible to develop existing groupings, which are the seeds of such a movement.
We have to do this with our feet firmly planted in the workplaces, and our heads working for a rethink and transformation in the wider labour movement. We have to make sure that this time, a militant upturn means more than just more militancy
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The stewards in the Seventies
the workplace leaders' political tradition, to ens
political leadership thrown up"