Strikes aren't out of date
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-11-11Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 14 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 14
Smaller workplaces, weaker unions? employers.' (Brown, 1986, 165).
The resilience of shop steward organisation is striking. Whether workplace organisation has grown less powerful is difficult to estimate within any framework, but our estimations will be influenced by our conceptions of trade union purpose.
If we place importance on employee solidarity, the idea of a wider movement, the workplace organisation as an instrument for workers' control, then we will view these tendencies as weakening trade unionism. If we focus only, or primarily on money, we may view matters differently."
The unions are weaker. But they have not : been crushed; and with fighting policies the lost ground can be regained.
Remember: after 10 years of Tory government attacks and the five years of wage-cutting Labour governments before that, organisationally the unions are far stronger today than before the last great employer's offensive, the attacks that began in 1920 and led up to decisive defeat in the General Strike of 1926.
The unions also cover a far wider range of workers, with far superior organisation and a far greater potential stranglehold over production and the whole functioning of society than they did then.
Many of the figures in this article are taken from "Trade unions in Britain Today' by Iohn Mellroy, Manchaster University Prass.
Many writers have pointed to a link between workplace size and union density with worrying implications.
The smaller the workplace, the less likely it is to be unionised. 12 per cent of workers in large enterprises employing more than 1,000 workers are unionised, but only 26% of workers in small workshops with between 25 and 49 workers. Marxists used to think that workplaces would always, on average, get bigger and bigger; but, since the "70s at least, in manufacturing the ararage workplace has been getting smoller.
Does this doom trade unionian? No.
In the USA the long-term trand towards smaller manufacturing workplaces goes back to the 1930s - to precisely the samo timo as tha US industrial unions began to expand creimousy and break down old craft estantam.
12 Now Frotlema Working class combativity, • strength and organisation can be very crudely measured by the strike rate.
The stronger the class, the more strikes there are. This is a crude measure, sometimes well-organised workers win with small, localised and short actions that never show up in the statistics. On the other hand, long set piece battles do show up on the statistics and can often be evidence of the working class movement on the run.
Nevertheless strike statistics do something.
John Mcllroy in his book "Trade Unions in Britain Today' has sum ned up the underlying pattern that these figures illustrate.
Secondly, even if averago size in manufacturing is falling, the now factories that are being built are hardly too small to unionise. 300 workers is smaller than 5,000, but quite big anough for strong union organisation. Indeed, many workers who work mostly on their own, such as telecom engineers, are heavily unionted.
Small workplace size doesn't maen nonunionism in the strongty organized print industry where 96% of ontarfiles, employ less than 100 people.
And if manufacturing workplace size is falling, in other sectors, like retailing, the average size is on the increaso. For in stance, the average size of salnabury's establishments is over 200 workers: two. thinds of Tesco's stores amploy more than 100 and a third more than Z00. As John Mellroy puts it: "many supermarkets are, in reality, small factaries".
•There has been a downward trend in strike activity since 1979, if we exclude the miners' strike, which accounted for 83% of working days lost in 1984.
There is a clear distinction between the aggressive militancy of the 1960s and 1970s and the years of Thatcherism. In 1974 there were nearly 3,000 stoppages. During the 1970s there were never less than 2,000 annually. In 1985 and 1986, there were just under and just above 1,000 and only in 1982 did the figure reach 1,500. The figure of 1.9 million days lost in 1986 was the lowest since 1963.
And since 1979 almost all the big battles have resulted in defeat for the unions.
These statistics underestimate the number of small stoppages. There has undoubtedly been a growth of forms of industrial action short of a strike. The 1980s figures reflect a declining work-force. But there can be little doubt that they reflect first and foremost the influence of economic recession and the political force of a government willing to face down the unions and determined to see out strikes even, if, as in the case of the miners, it takes almost 12 months."
Mcllroy comments:
"If these figures appear to illustrate a loss in union confidence and an ebbing of power, they should also direct us to the limts of this process. Whilst the unions have suffered important reverses compared with the previous two decades, we are still witnessing national industrial action - absent in the dog-days of the twenties and thirties."
In fact, the level of industrial resistance in the Thatcher decade especially when the level of unemployment is taken into account had been much higher than many defeatists are prepared to admit.
Mcllroy also commented in Socialist: Organiser:
"Despite its eventual failure, the [1982] NHS dispute illustrated the deep reservoir of anger and aggression that exists amongst workers new to trade unionism and inexperienced in large scale industrial
Scan page 15
class in the 1990s -lass in the I! struggle. It also preached solidarity action unparalled since 1926, overshadowing in the depths of recession the action against the Industrial Relations Act in 1972' It is clear from looking at the statistics that the defeat of the miners in 1984'85 accelerated the downward trend in strike levels. But that downward trend levelled out and then went into reverse a lot quicker than many professional pundits expected.
This is in part a product of the underlying position of union organisation; a tightening labour market, especially tor skilled workers; and now in 1989 the increase in the inflation rate.
But there is an important political factor involved as well. The defeat of the miners was the best kind of defeat to suffer. It was a defeat after a hard and seriously fought battle, not the kind of numbing surrender without a serious fight represented in its classic form by the betrayal of the 1926 General Strike.
In the expanding sectors like telecom, where the number of workers and unionisation is on the increase, even serious defeats like the 1983 Mercury battle do not lead to a prolonged collapse, as witnessed by the strength of the national dispute in 1987.
Today there are clearly grounds for guarded optimism. The 1989 strike total is bound to exceed the 1988 figure. The NALGO strike alone amounted to the same number of strike days as last year's total.
The Tories' unofficial 7% pay norm has been torn to pieces and many attempts at strings defeated for now. A breakthrough in the ambulance dispute would spur on other NHS workers. And the Confed's 35 hour week campaign could just escalate out of the control of Bros Jordan and Laird in an ironic replay of the '79 dispute which found the equally right wing Duffy and Boyd leading a fight they didn't quite expect.
This revival in combativity and confidence can only be welcomed by socialists. The other side know full well the conclusions workers are drawing. As the Financial Times put it:
•Taken together, the settlement [of this summer's strike] are likely to encourage a growing confidence amongst British workers that carefully planned industrial action can achieve results"
NUR TICKET LINE Martin Thomas looks at a debate which is of more than just academic interest The trade union movement has taken a battering over the last ten years. The debate about "post-Fordism', in essence, is a debate about whether or not that battering has been an inevitable result of modern technology.
According to the magazine Marxism Today, "At the heart of New Times is the shift from the old mass-production Fordist economy to a new, more flexible, post-Fordist order based on computers intormation technology and robotics.' New methods of production, and new sales methods, based on diverse products for diverse "niches" in the market, break up working class identity and organisation so, "although some of the features of [class] struggle remain, they are now overlain by a variety of alternative bases of organisation, of new social movements."
The language of Marxism Today is often battling and obscure, but the gist is fairly clear. Class struggle is out. Diverse citizens' protest groups are in.
The trade unions must adapt, "marketing" themselves to different groups in the same way that clothes retailers target varieties of customers, and scrapping appeals to old-style class solidarity. They must adapt or die.
facts give some plausibility to these ideas. strength has declined in the '80s in many advanced capitalist some, like France and the USA, much worse than in Britain.
Electoral scores of Labour, Social-Democratic and Communist Parties have also generally declined, though much less markedly and uniformly. And, quite markedly and uniformly, the core support for the traditional ideologies of those parties - nationalisation and heavy state control of the economy - has declined more drastically.
Major industries from the 1950s and 1960s,. which were at the core of trade unionism and of state seciors, have dwindled — coal, steel, shipbuilding, cars. The new-technology industries generally have a low level of union organisation.
But closer analysis demolishes the idea that these facts can be strung together into a scenario of technology dispersing class struggle.
Neither the diversities of consumer society nor the technology of microelectronics dispel class struggle.
The writers of Marxism Today often seem to have a patronising idea of the working class of yesterday as a uniform grey mass, all wearing cloth caps, eating fish and chips, watching football on Saturdays, and joining trade unions ano going on strike as a natural extension of that grey uniformity But then as now, some workers were old, some were young; some were black, some were white; some were religious, others atheist, and so on. They had diverse interests, habits, hobbies and customs. None of that stopped them being aware of their common interests as workers.
In South Africa and Brazil in the 1980s, mass militant trade union movements have emerged from working classes of a cultural diversity far outstripping anything all the niche retailers in the business can generate in Britain.
Labour movements do not emerge from a sense of grey uniformity and sameness. They emerge from workers asserting themselves as individuals, demanding their rights, and becoming aware that they must act together with their fellow workers to stop the bosses reducing us to grey uniformity.
And 'high-tech' workplaces are not inherently more difficult to unionise than 'Neither the diversities of consumer society nor the technology of microelectronics struggle"
any others. Sweden, with a relatively high level of technology, has maintained union organisation better than more backward Britain.
New workplaces, on green-field sites, are often hard to organise. But the car factories, now declining traditional bastions of trade unionism, were once hardto-organise new workplaces. It took decades of hard struggle to unionise them. It may take a long time to organise new microelectronic factories, too, but they can be made bastions just as the car factories were.
A clear warning against overgeneralising from the trends of the last few years, and imagining that they represent the unalterable shape of the future, is given by the history of the ideas of 'Fordism' and 'post-Fordism' The idea that 'Fordism' (based on the assembly-line technology pioneered by Henry Ford) is being replaced by a new era dates back at least to the mid-'70s. The French economist Michel Aglietta, writing then, had much the same idea about the technology of "post-Fordism' or 'neo-Fordism' as Marxism Ioday now. Only he argued that the change in technology would transform capitalism towards a more unified working class, more intense class struggle, and more state from the trends visible in the mid. ibs. And Marxism Today generalises too glibly from the trends visible in the late '80s.
The whole argument about a new 'postFordist' era in technology is in any case too simplistic. 'High-technology'
Scan page 16
workplaces, microelectronics factories and the like, are still a tiny proportion of total employment. Much bigger shifts in employment are from manufacturing to services, and from blue-collar to white-collar.
The shift from manufacturing to services is more complicated, too. Employment in consumer and distributive services has increased slowly, or decreased. Procapitalism by something better, nor made it work.
The left became demoralised; the right seized the initiative, sometimes even winning , the soul of parties like Spain's Socialists for ruthless free-trade policies; and the trade unions wilted under the impact of mass unemployment, huge structural change, and lack of visible political alternatives.
The working class is still groping for new political answers. Finding them will not be easy. But that is what is needed, not surrender to the status quo.