Will Germany
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-09-28Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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* ince the large-scale flight from East to West Germany began, Western commentators have been speculating about whether East Germany (the GDR) can survive, even in the short-term, and how soon the question of German reunification will again become an immediate issue.
Editorials in Europe mix gleeful prediction about the collapse of another Eastern bloc state with fears about the economic and military strength of a united Germany.
Anyone waiting for the status quo to change radically in the foreseeable future had better not hold their breath. The flow of refugees will not go on on the scale or in the way it has recently. This would not be in the interests of East Germany, Hungary - through which the immigrants pass, the Soviet Union or West Germany.
For it to make so much difference to East Germany economically that it would collapse presupposes a scale of departure that the Federal Republic would be unable to deal with. It is also highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would just let the GDR, its strategically most important ally, collapse into the hands of the West.
Before the Soviet Union would contemplate any fundamental change in the status of the two Germanies - such as neutralisation -there would have to be further major shifts in general political relations between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. And it is far from clear that West German political parties want a radical change in the relationship between the two German states.
Since 1945 that relationship has gone through a number of phases. The setting up of the two states in 1949 marked definite acceptance that the Cold War division of Germany would remain for some time. In its constitution West Germany enshrined the aim of reunification and gave any German the right to citizenship of the Federal Republic.
Similar East German claims to represent the whole German people were dropped after the GDR joined the Warsaw Pact in 1955. The Federal Republic refused to recognise the GDR and also refused to accept other post-1945 borders with Poland and the USSR.
That stance was changed by a Social Democrat-led coalition in the early '70s, which pursued a so-called "ostpolitik" which involved de facto recognition of the GDR and normalisation of relationships between the two states.
The SDP hoped to use closer economic and political relations to bring pressure for gradual change which would in turn lessen the gap between the states.
Although the Conservative Christian Democrats denounced this policy in opposition, they have quietly continued it since they came to power in 1982. Economically there have been large subsidies from West to East, either through gifts from private West Germans, institutions such as an inflated compulsory exchange of currency for visitors, or through payments for direct services such as roads across the GDR to West Berlin. There is no way that the Federal Republic could cut off the economic subsidies, as some right-wingers have suggested without legal restrictions on the money sent across and a major political crisis over Berlin.
In return, the GDR has eased a whole range of restrictions, for example, on visits in both directions and a growing legal flow of people allowed to leave the GDR - in exchange for the GDR making a lot of money out of it.
Recent events have led to some embarrassment about this policy in West Germany. The GDR has also cancelled a visit by SPD leaders.
But the policy is likely to continue possibly with more pressure from West Germany for change in the hope that a new more reforn minded leadership will emerge i the GDR with whom they can dr business.
Der Spiegel describes the polic of the Federal Republic: "Will thi GDR fall into the hands of the Federal Republic like a ripe fruit? Despite all their reunification speeches the rulers in Bonn conside such dramatic scenarios improbable for the foreseeable future and now less desirable than ever...Thi Chancellor painstakingly avoidi calling the existence of the GDR in to question. He certainly calls for reforms, but at the same tim assures them that it cannot be the aim of a reasonable policy on Ger many to call on our compatriots in the GDR to come here in the larges possible numbers."
This is not least • because resources, particularly for housing are already increasingly needed to deal with the immigrants. Equally the CDU, if it wants to win the nex election has to head off the growt! of the neo-Fascist Republican who, for now at least, are antiimmigrant first and German na tionalists second.
According to polls, 46% of Wes Germans are against further im migration from the GDR. Thi seems to have overtaken racisn against non-German asylum seekers, possibly because the GDR settiers are in more direct econom competition with them.
The East German Stalinists clea ly have even more interest maintenance of the status quo. Th reaction of the SED (CP) leadership to the exodus has been repetition o its stock response that wishing to leave have been astray by imperialists. Yet they hav been very careful not to shut th door on normal relations with Wes Germany.
This is partly econom reasons, and partly because the have no real alternative. If the removed the rights of travel to th West or of receiving money fro the West, "however ineffective T valve