6 FRENCH REVOLUTION How the capitalists remember their revolutions
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-09-14Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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This article by the George Plekhanov was written for the 100th anniversary of the French Revolution in 1889. He takes issue with a bourgeois historian of the time, Paul Janet, who supported the Revolution but regretted and denounced its most radical phase, in 1793-4. This year, on the 200th anniversary of the Revolution, some bourgeois historians, like Simon Schama, have been denouncing the whole revolution, even its most moderate phase in 1789-90. Others, like Francois Furet, have advanced arguments parallel to Janet's. Plekhanov shows why these attempts by the bourgeoisie to lay ghost of its revolutionary past distort the real historyEngland passed through her revolutionary storms in the 17th century, and there were then two revolutions: the first led, among other things, to the execution of Charles I, while the second ended with an animated banquet and the rise of a new dynasty.
But the English bourgeoisie, in the evolution of these revolutions, manifests very divergent views: while the first, in its eyes, does not even deserve the name "revolution" and is simply referred to as "the great rebellion" , the second is given a more euphonious appellation; it is called "the glorious revolution". The secret of this differentiation in the evaluation of the two revolutions has already been revealed by Augustin Thierry in his theses about the English revolutions.
In the first revolution, the people played an important role, while in the second the people participated hardly at all. When, however, a people mounts the stage of history and begins to decide the destinies of its country, according to its power and best understanding, then the higher classes (in this case the bourgeoisie) get out of humour. Because the people is always "raw" and, if the revolutionary devil begins to pervade it, also becomes "coarse", the higher classes have a way of always insisting upon politeness and gentle manners — at least they demand these of the peo ple. This is the reason why the higher classes are always inclined to out upon revolutionary movements f prominently participated in by the people, the stamp "rebellions"
The history of France is particularly rich in "great rebellions" as well as in "glorious revolutions". Only in France, SO far as thẻ historic sequence of events is concerned, matters happened in a manner opposite to the one that prevailed in the England of the 17th cenEury. Bellion, preceded the tury. In England, for instance, "the glorious revolution" while in France "the glorious revolutions" usually had to give way to "the great rebellions" This fact repeated itself in the entire course of the 19th century.
Upon the heels of "the glorious revolution" of 1830 in Paris followed the rather sizeable "great rebellion" of the weavers in Lyon, which gave the whole bourgeoisie such a great fright; upon *the glorious revolution" of February 1848, glorified even by Lamartine, followed *the great June rebellion which prompted the bourgeoisie to seek refuge in the arms of a military dictatorship; and upon the "most glorious" September revolution of 1870 followed, finally, in March of the subsequent year, the "greatest of all French rebellions' The bourgeoisie now claims that the "great rebellions" have always injured the cause of "the glorious revolutions". We cannot here consider the correctness of this claim in its application to the 19th century, but must yield the floor to the bourgeois philosophers about the events of the 18th century.
Toward the end of that century there took place in France a "great rebellion and a "glorious revolution" of 1789: "the great rebellion" played its part largely in 1793. After what has already been said, the reader will now be able to predict with certainty what the bourgeois philosopher, Paul Janet, thinks of those revolutionary movements.
In the final chapter of his book, Janet says: "In order to arrive at an objective evaluation of the French Revolution, one must in regard to it differentiate three things: the purpose, the means, and the results ob tained. The purpose of the revolu tion - to gain civic equality and political freedom - was the most sublime, the most legitimate a people has ever striven to attain." But the means were bad: "only too frequently they were forcible, terrible.
So far as the results are concerned, civic equality, according to Janet, has been fully attained and leaves nothing to be wished for; "political freedom" however, "obtains in France since the revolution only sporadically and to this day is more or less endangered." It will be secure only when the French people shall dispense with all forcible, unlawtul methods and shall learn once for all to look upon their revolution as finished, and, finally, when the revolution itself has pass ed into the historic past as irrevocably as has already been the case with the revolutions in England and in the United States. "The attainments of the revolution should be held fast, but there must be renunciation of the revolutionary spirit and of forcible and unlawful means."
Very good. But let us not forget that revolutionary means had been employed since 1789, that is, not rebellion", but alo during "the only at time of the great glorious revolution" Is "the glorious revolution" to be condemned by Paul Janet because of its forcible means? But no - on the contrary. In his description, the acts of force practiced during "the glorious revolution" appear fully justified, highly useful, and thoroughly efficacious. He speaks very commendingly of the popular insurrections directed against royalty, aye, he seeks to prove that, without these uprisings, the government would have smothered all the reforms of the national assembly in embryo, and that the great aims of the revolution would then have remained unattainable.
The storming of the Bastille he hails as "the first victorious appearance of the people of Paris on the revolutionary stage"; and in the same approving manner he expresses himself about the second appearance of the same people on the same stage, about the events of October 5 and 6, and also about the storming of the Tuileries. Arrived there, nota bene, after Janet has proved the inevitable necessity of eliminating a king who was negotiating with the enemy at the very outset of the war, he adds in a melancholy vein: "France became gradually accustomed to solving political questions with such sorry means." But he does not tell us with what other means the given and unpostponable task might have been accomplished.
Only after the storming of the Tuileries, that is, after this last necessary uprising, according to Janet, do the people of Paris, under the pen of our historian, gradually hecome transformed into a mob governed by the lowest passions Now it becomes clear a "rebellion" is quite acceptable, only one must not permit oneself to be led astray by low passions - does the bourgeois historian want to be understood in that sense? Not at all. We are at once informed that now, "the glorious revolution" being over, all insurrections lack both sense and justification. Now we have it at last. The king has fallen, the nobility has been destroyed, the bourgeoisie has been lifted on the shield - what more does the heart wish for? Now be quiet, after you have on this earth done all that belongs to the earth. Who, unless it be the common mob, would think of insurrection?
Next! As could have been expected, Paul Janet extends his sympathy to all the parties that successively stood at the head of the movement, except the party of the Mountain. Upon the latter he pours the whole vial of his wrath; for this party he reserves all his strong anguage and epithets.
Between these miscreants and the "manly, generous Gironde" Janet draws this interesting parallel: *The ones, like the others, The Giron- wanted the republic". But while dists aimed at a free, lawful, mild republic, the Montagnards strove for despotic, cruel republic. Without attention to liberty, the latter prized only equality. True, both parties favoured the sovereignty of the people, but with the difference that the Girondists righteously wanted to include among 'the people' all the citizens, while for the Montagnards, in keeping with the perversity still current today, the people consisted only of members of the working class, of persons living by their own labour. Consequently, according to the Monprerogative of this class alone the tagnards, to rule should be the The political programme of the Girondists, therefore, differed assentially from that of the Montagnards. Whence this difference? Paul Janet himself gives us sufficient information about that. The difference proceeded from the fact that the Mountain party, as we have seen, conceived of the mutual relations of the then existing social classes in a way different from that of the Gironde. The latter "would have it understood that the people included all the citizens", while the former considered only the working class as "the people"; the other classes, according to the Montagnards, were no part of "the people", because the interests of these classes were contrary to those of the working class.
And, strictly speaking, the Girondists themselves did not include in "the people" all the citizens, ie. the entire French nation of the time, but only the third estate. Did they include in *the people" the aristocracy and the higher clergy? Not at all. Did not Abbé Sieyès himself, who never went so far as the Girondists, in his brochure 'Qu'est-ce que le Tiers Etat?* "What is the Third Estate?' set "the people", , that is, the third estate, without compunction against the small aggregation of the privileged, ie. the nobility and the higher clergy?
The Girondists, who fought the "privileged" far more decisively, no doubt agree with Sieyès about than of "the leople, heis so dipferent from that of the Montagnards, this may be explained only by the fact that the Mountain party had gone one step further, in that it classed as "privileged" also such social institutions as appeared to the Girondists sacrosanct and necessary. It was a contested question which classes really should be regarded as "privileged" . But that shows — and Paul Janet's explanations leave room for no other interpretation that according to the Montagnards all persons and classes that live by "labour", but labour of others and not their own, belong in that category of the "privileged"
We must now seek to clear up the point of why the defenders of the cause of the working class inclined towards a "despotic and cruel republic. Why did they not rather appear as adherents of a "lawful. free, and mild" republic? This circumstance must be traced back to two causes, one external, the other internal. Let us turn, first, to the external cause, that is, to the relations then existing between revolutionary France and the other European states.
The condition of France, at the time the Mountain party seized power, was most desperate, aye, it was hopeless. Janet says: «Enemy troops invaded French territory from four sides: from the north. the English and Austrians; in Alsatia, The French royal family 1789 the Prussians; in the Dauphine, proceeding as far as the city of Lyon, the Piedmontese; and I in Roussillon, the Spaniards. And all this at a time when civil war raged on four sides: in Normandy, in the Vendee, in Lyon, and in Toulon." Aside from these open foes there were the secret adherents of the old regime scattered all over France, who were ready surreptitiously to aid the enemy.
The government, which had taken up the struggle against these innumerable inner and outer foes, had neither money nor sufficient troops — it could count on notning but a boundless energy, the active support of the revolutionary elements of the country, and the colossal courage to shrink from no measure, however arbitrary, illegal or ruthless, so long as it was necessary for the defence of the country.
After the Montagnards had called to arms the entire French youth, without being able to supply the newly formed armies even partially with arms and food out of the slender means flowing to them from taxation, they resorted to requisitions, confiscations, forces loans, decreed rates of exchange for the assignats - in short and in fine, they forced upon the sacred possessing classes money sacrifices, all in the interest of an imperiled country for which the people were sacrificing blood.
These forcible measures were absolutely necessary if France were to be saved. There was no depending. upon voluntary money contributions - Janet himself admits that The iron determination and er ergy
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of the government were also necessary to spur to the limit of ef'fort all the fresh forces of France — Janet admits that, too. But he, Paul Janet, would rather have seen the dictatorship in the hands of the *noble and magnanimous Gironde than in those of the abominable Montagnards. Had the Girondists emerged victorious from the struggle with the Mountain, then they too, according to the author, "they too would have been forced to quell the royalist insurrections, beat down the opposition party, repel the invasions, and it may be doubted whether, without the dictatorship, they would have been able to cope with all these levils. But their dictatorship would have been less bloodthirsty and would have given more scope to law and libertyBut upon which layers of the population would the gentle Girondists have been able to lean? When, after their defeat in Paris, they sought help in the provinces, they found there only the passive help of — to use Janet's expression - "the dilatory and lukewarm" middle class and the malignant support of the royalists, which they themselves had to reject. And could they reckon with a more effective support on the part of their adherents in the struggle with the foreign foes? The Gironde never did and never would find favour with the lowest, the most revolutionary layer of the population, least of all in Paris. That part of the population evidently entertained views about "the people" and its interests quite different from those of the Gironde, so vastly admired by Janet because of its magnanimity.
It was just this circumstance which brought about the fall of the Gironde and the victory of the Mountain. The former was almost exclusively confined to the forces of *the dilatory and lukewarm middle class". Could anything substantial be accomplished with such allies? No, the moderate and liberal Gironde never would have been able to rescue France from the critical condition in which she found herself enmeshed in 1793.
It was the external situation of France that made the dictatorship, the one of the Montagnards, a necessity. And once a dictatorship was needed, all the talk about a "free, lawful, and mild" republic became simply ridiculous. The revolutionary dictatorship necessarily had to be as rigid and as ruthless as the external foes who had called it into being; just like the manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, and like the threats of a reactionary Europe against France.
Let us now proceed to the internal causes which made it impossible for the Montagnards to find a "free, lawful, and mild" republic to their taste. Here we must first of all direct the attention of the reader to the famous rights of man and of the citizen. Among these we find many rights which conform to the interests of the lowest class of the population; but we also find among them one toward which this class, from the very outset, was compelled to maintain a peculiar and contradictory attitude. We refer to the right of property.
How would, for instance, a Paris "sansculotte" (literally) man The Jacobin leader Maximilien Robespierre without pants_[culottes], nickname resembling the English word "ragamuffin") conceive of this right, when his very name showes that he himself is bare of all property? How could he proceed to exercise this wonderful right conceded to him? There was no lack of examples lying near to his hand. The bourgeoisie had taken unto itself many a piece of aristocratic church property — why should h e not now do the same with bourgeois. property!
The sansculotte at that time had to pass through many hard, albeit many merry days. Often he had to endure hunger in the most literal sense of the term, and hunger, as is well known, is a bad counsellor. Thereupon our has-nothing began to exhibit a great nonchalance toward bourgeois property. The bourgeoisie resisted that as well as it knew how.
How this social struggle was bovidus The the politiered in is obvious. athered in : party of its own and raised the Montagnards upon the shield. The "mob" of that day knew how to fight and soon obtained control. And then there was obviously nothing left for it to do but to use the political power just attained to call into being social institutions under which the right to property would no longer sound like bitter mockery. But for the proletariat of that day, as well as for the modern proletariat, this was possible only under one condition - the total abolition of private property in the means of production and the social organisation of production.
But the latter, under thei FRENCH REV tions then prevailing, was simply unthinkable for two closely connected reasons: the proletariat of that day did not possess the requisite capacity, nor did the means of production of that day meet even the elementary requirements for socialisation. Therefore, neither the proletariat of that time nor its most advanced representatives could even conceive of the idea. It is true that in prerevolutionary French literature we find a few communist utopias, but these, for the reasons stated, could find neither currency nor recognition.
Under these circumstances, what was left for the momentarily victorious "mob" to do? If socialisation of the means of production was not to be thought of, then private property therein necessarily must continue, and the indigent populace was limited to casual and forcible encroachments upon its realm. And because of such encroachments the "mob" is being blamed by all bourgeois historians to this very day. Forcible encroachments upon the realm of private property made a "lawful" republic an impossibility, because the law was framed to protect just that private property.
No more could the republic be "mild" , because the possessing classes naturally did not tolerate, with their hands in their laps, such interference with their property, but, on the contrary, eagerly sought for an opportunity to put an end to such nonchalent "mob rule". . The struggle between the proletariat of that day and the possessing classes, fatedly and inevitably, had to be fought with terroristic weapons. By means of terror alone, in a condi-l tion replete with insoluble economic contradictions, could the proletariat then maintain its rule. Had the proletariat attained a higher stage of development and, on the other hand, had economic conditions been sufficiently advanced to secure its welfare, then there would have been no need for it to resort to measures of terror.
Let us have a look at the bourgeoisie, praised so highly by the historians because of its penchant for "lawfulness". By no means did it leave its enemies in peace, nor in critical moments did it shrink from decisive measures; but its cause stood then upon such firm footing that it had no need to fear an opponent. Come to power during its "glorious" revolution, the bourgeoisie introduced the social order suited to its needs, and did it with such thoroughness that even the most stubborn reactionaries could thereafter scarcely think of abolishing it. If the latter had essayed an attempt in that direction, they would soon have become convinced of its utter facility.
Under such circumstances it was easy for the bourgeoisie to talk about "lawfulness"; when your cause has won and your enemies are hopelessly defeated, then the order of things most suitable to your interests becomes "lawful" — would you then still resort to unlawful means? You are certain that henceforth your privileges will be amply protected by law. The bourgeoisie strove for lawfulness in politics, because historic evolution had fully secured its triumph in economics.
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8 FRENCH REVOLUTION