Nicaragua ten years after
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-08-17Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 9 →
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The FSLN retains mass support, but its policies have conrecently returned fro Nicaragua, surveys the situation there. Since the Sandinista revolution overthrew the dictatorship of the Somoza family in July 1979, this desperately poor country has faced an economic blockade by the US and military attacks by the US-sponsorec 'contras'. The "contras' have been defeated, for now -both the opposition within Nicaragua, ar all the Central American governments, have called for them to disband - but the economic effects o the war and blocka remain ruinous.
• 19 July in Managua, there were huge celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the triumph of the Nicaraguan revolution.
Despite claims that these public demonstrations were stage-managed by the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front), they actually reveal that the Sandinistas -have retained the support sizeable sections of the population.
That a government which has presided over a massive collapse of wages maintains any public sympathy is remarkable. Under economic circumstances such as Nicaragua's, most regimes would be tacing rots in the streets, not celebrations. How this situation has arisen, and how much longer it can be expected to last, are the crucial issues now.
The FSLN was founded in 1961 by dissidents of the pro-Moscow Nicaragua Socialist Party (PSN) and others who advocated a Fidelista strategy of rural guerrilla warfare. Its ideology was an eclectic mix of Marxist and non-Marxist socialism, nationalism, anti-imperialism and Guevarism.
The 1969 'Historic Programme of the FSLN' outlined its aims -expropriation of the clique around the dictator somoza, renunciatior of foreign loans, nationalisation of all foreign firms, veneration of the martyrs of the revolution, establishment of a standing people's army, reincorporation of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast area, initiation of agrarian reform and the defence of religious tolerance.
While the programme included increased workers' control in industry, it was in no way an exercise in Marxist political economy. The statement by the original leader of the FSLN, Carlos Fonseca, that "I am not a Marxist-Leninist" should be taken at face value, and applies to most - but not all - of the leaders emerging after Fonseca was killed by Somoza's National Guard in 1976.1 The task of focusing the enormous popular opposition to the rule of the Somoza dynasty was shared by many groups in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the FSLN was not the most prominent. In 1972 an earthquake destroyed half of Managua, and Somoza's channelling of relief funds into his own pocket increased public discontent.
While the deal which Somoza concocted to ensure that most of the profits to be made from the post-earthquake reconstruction went to him was not his most outrageous - compared, for examblood-products factory where corp- to his involvement with a ses drained of blood were discovered and photographed for the opposition newspapers it outraged the Nicaraguan capitalist class because unfair business competition was involved.
Bourgeois opposition groups. developed - most importantly the: Democratic Liberation Movement; and The Twelve, which later merged with similar groups to form the Broad Opposition Front (FAO). The FSLN was initiating increasingty effective military actions, culminating in the raid on Congress in August 1978 during which 1500 hostages, including members of Somoza's family, were taken.
Strikes against Somoza's rule increased, and trade unions, leftist political parties and student and youth groups came together as the United People's Movement (MPU). This organisation was broadly sympathetic to the Sandinistas, whilst FAO Was negotiating with Washington for the peaceful removal of Somoza.
'The final offensive by the FSLN and its supporters started in May 1979. The US attempted to push the Organisation of American States OAS, an association of Latin American governments and the US), to intervene with a "peacekeeping' force, the task-of which was clearly to save Nicaragua for the yankees, but in a unique act of defiance the OAS refused. On 19 July Managua fell to the Sandinistas.
At the time of the insurrection the FSLN was at the head of a large popular front. The Sandinistas had the implicit support of countries such as West Germany, Costa Rica and Mexico, and their triumph was helped by the reduction in arms sales to Somoza initiated by US president Jimmy Carter. The regime established after the victory on 19 July was not the "totalitarian communist dictatorship" of the later US propaganda.
What followed was essentially revolution by stealth. A month before the triumph a five person Junta of National Reconstruction was named, including Daniel Ortega of the FSLN, two representatives of the business class (including Violeta Chamorro, now fion newspaper Lahreris, Sergi. Ramirez from the Twelve now vice-president), and the leftist Moises Hassan.
Many "mass organisations" were initiated during the struggle against Somoza Rural i Workers' Association (ATC), Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC), Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS), Sandinista Workers' Federation (CST), National Union of Farmers and Stockmen (UNAG) - among others. The FSLN was and remains a small elite group, but these larger organisations were sympathetic to the Sandinistas.!
The first Council of State, which had co-legislative powers with the Junta, contained many representatives of the bourgeoisie, but the Council was developed in such a way as to increase the influence of the FSLN in the guise of the "mass organisations".
The original business representatives quit the Junta in April 1980 in protest at the increasing domination of the FSLN. Their replacements lasted no longer. In tributed to a collapse of wages 1981 Moises Hassan resigned, and has since become a vocal critic of supposed corruption within the Sandinistas.| The Junta and Council of State continued to govern until the 1984 elections - probably the fairest ever held in Nicaragua - gave the FSLN 67% of the vote, and 63% of the parliamentary representation.
Expropriation of the Somozistas* industrial and agricultural holdings followed the insurrection, but no further large nationalisations were carried out. Welfare ministries were established, the Sandinista army consolidated, and plans for a national literacy campaign developed.
Post-revolutionary policy development was not a one-way process. In the field of health, for example, the initial model was of a progressive but still doctordominated service. Pressure from traditional healers and midwives and non-professional health workers (brigadistas) led to a more community-based approach. Local health councils represent community interests, and there has been much popular involvement in preventive health campaigns, such as those targetting vaccination and malaria eradication.
Only 20% of the land had been taken over or redistributed by the state by 1980. Demonstrations by the ATC, with FSLN support, protested against this and agrarian reform legislation was advanced. This made allowances for expropriation of inetficient large farms, the land resulting from which was collectivised or given to "heroes of the revolution"
The Sandinistas wanted to speed up development by avoiding a return of the nascent working class to individual peasant smallholdings. However, there was continued pressure for the granting of individual land holdings.] This was highlighted by the 1984 election, in which the FSLN did badly in areas with landless peasants. The population displacement consequent on the Contra war increased demand for land, and from mid-1985 on, individual plots were granted to peasant families.
The policies implemented after the revolution demonstrated the adaptability of the Sandinistas. Within many spheres the basic direction of policy would be established centrally, but would then by modified in response to popular demands.
The outcome was often impressive — illiteracy rates fell from 40% to around 15%, infant mortality rates declined rapidly, polio was eradicated, availability of health and education services improved, landlessness and homelessness decreased, and progressive social legislation was enacted.
The economy, however, faired less well, and the decline in production and export earnings paved the way towards the future economic problems.
Within months taken power, the Junta joined Nicaragua to the Non-Aligned Movement, in the hope of avoiding the close identification with the Eastern bloc and the resulting diplomatic and economic isolation which befell Cuba in the 1960s.
The closest relations Nicaragua maintained were with Cuba, which provided nearly $300 million in aid in the first three years of the revolution. Many Cuban economic, agricultural and military advisors and medical personnel served in Nicaragua, while Nicaraguans received Cuban scholarships.
Despite such close ties, Nicaragua remains independent, and in the United Nations its voting record is closer to Mexico than to Cuba.
The Soviet Union recognises both the Moscow-line 'CP' , the PSN, and the FSLN as legitimate heirs of the Nicaraguan revolution, whereas Cuba recognises only the FSLN. In the Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (the Comecon) Nicaragua has only observer status.| Soviet aid to Nicaragua has never been at the level of its support to Cuba, though it has been important, especially in the military domain, and in the provision of oil. Scandinavian and EEC (especially Holland) countries have provided large amounts of material and human resources for the reconstruction of Nicaragua.
Continued