[broken series of had suffered. So the survival…]
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broken series of had suffered.
So the survival of Stalinism after the end of the war isn't so hard to understand. Trotsky thought the class would be strong enough to win power. It was strong, but not strong enough, without the confidence and the leadership it needed. Its failure then, together with capitalism in handing over the buffer states in Eastern Europe, has allowed Stalinism to survive - permanently in crisis - since the war.
In a way there is a parallel todayMany Marxists have "predicted' that the changes in the Soviet and Chinese Stalinists right now could produce the conditions for a revolution. A glance at reality will show that the revolution hasn't happened.
But it also shows how close it was. Two months ago the Chinese workers and students could have made a political revolution - they could have taken power for themselves. They did not. I think they will at some point.
But because the 'predictions' of some Marxists were wrong does it prove their theory wrong - no. Rather the strength and clarity of the movement was not great enough.
Trotsky said if there was no working class explosion, if Stalin could survive, there would be a need to examine and re-evaluate. If we do that, we can see that the basic dynamic of the USSR is still the same. Stalinism has survived through the weakness of our class, not by a magical power of its own.
Otherwise, why has it exploded so many times? Why has Stalinism split and split again? Because it is the same contradictory mass it was. Those are the facts. No amount of staring at the clock can change it.
The 'failed' revolutions are the revolutions that actually happened. They are not part of the past but part of the dynamic flow that -1s history. Derer weighs up Trotsky's 'mistakes' but isn't bothered to provide a solid alternative. Derer does Marxists no favours.
The existence of the Stalinist states for so long is loathsome, not just to us, but to the bosses also. In the late '80s, the pressure on our movement to capitulate to the bosses, the reformists and the Stalinophobes is a real pressure. The only guarantee against that is through building the mass and the theory needed for a mass Marxist party.
That means the defence and regeneration of the Marxist programme — not just on the nature of Stalinism - by an international tendency that fights for workers? liberty, East and West. risks By lan McCalma The articles Martin in issue no.409 of SO are welcome contributions to the discussion on the current situation in Poland.
Martin's statement as to the increasing complexity of politics in Eastern Europe and the dangers of British socialists being dogmatic as to the way forward in Poland is especially welcome.
After the long nightmare of Communist tyranny in Eastern Europe, we are entering a period when politics in a meaningful sense of the word has been resumed. But this takes place in conditions which are not analogous to those prevailing in parliamentary democracies like Britain.
In many ways, it could be contended, the politics of Poland and Hungary are more similar to those of some Latin American states high international debts, high inflation, political parties of a very fluid nature, a corrupt gangster-like regime and an army with a taste for power waiting in the wings.
Within that context, tactical considerations become increasingly significant, within the overall strategy of the struggle to break up entrenched bureaucratic power.
Without having unwarranted illusions, we cannot underestimate the significance of Gorbachev's reversal of the Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' which justified Warsaw Pact military intervention into the states of Eastern Europe when they threatened change in a democratic direction. That removes one of the main constraints upon Solidarity's capacity to challenge the regime, and of the main determinant of the 'self-limiting revolution' of 1980/81.
What it does not remove is the Polish army which established martial law in 1981 with relative ease and may well be prepared to step ir again if the generals and their co. thinkers in the leadership of the PUWP (the Polish ruling party) think that change is proceeding too fast and too far.
Given these conditions, it would be foolhardy to reject tactical means to split the PUP by offering a programme for change which the reformist wing of that party could identify with.
There are, as Martin indicates, many dangers in proceeding along that road - the dangers of becoming tied into a coalition-type situation with no challenge to bureaucratic power and a 'national programme of economic recovery at the expense of the working class.
Any such tactical move must be linked to a specific programme of dismantling the bureaucracy, beginning with an end to the nomenklatura system (*jobs for the girls and boys'), and a programme for radical economic reconstruction which ensures that, as centralised state control of the economy is ended, so the market is brought under democratic and socialised control. Such a programme must avoid becoming more deeply indebted to the forces of international finance as personified by the visit of George Bush. (The fact that Polish shipyard workers fervently cheer Bush is simply a reminder of how awful Stalinism is in comparison to systems of representative democracy, however limited by property-owning relationships.)
Even with such provisos, any tactical moves of this nature are high risk but the situation is unprecedented and the stakes considerable. An abstentionist response is always appealing but rarely effec tual.