Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Who's fighting for what?

Socialist Organiser no. 408, 29 June 1989 · scan pp. 9–10 · David Finkel · about 1,154 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 9 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 9

Chris Hobson's contribution raises exactly the right question about The central question is: if there is going to be a viable social struggle for women's rights and other elementary democratic goals in Afghanistan, where will the forces for that struggle come from? I will explain why I don't have much confidence in the answer that Hobson offers with such great certainty.

For Hobson, the answer is clear: such forces can come only from one camp in the existing conflict, "from inside the inevitable, progressive and democratic struggle for national independence" being waged by the anti-PDPA Mujahedeen. It follows then that "what revolutionaries in Afghanistan should have been doing since 1979 was building a secular, democratic, socialist force in the national resistance."

I see three immediate problems with this policy. First, while I don't feel competent to tell Afghan revolutionaries what they should have been doing since 1979, I am not aware of any force that has emerged in the resistance that is at all secular or democratic or socialist - by even the loosest definitions of these terms - let alone all three.

Second, the Hobson and LaBotz formula excludes the possibility that any forces in the camp of the current regime might themselves be authentic supporters of Afghan national independence and capable of learning the lessons of the PDPA's catastrophic experiment in helicopter-gunship 'socialism' It seems to me that such forces, particularly educated urban women and perhaps sectors of the working class organised in pro-PDPA unions, are quite likely to be defenders of the existing PDPA government on the grounds of sheer physical and social survival - that the resistance if it came to power would exterminate or enslave them. Hobson indeed recognises that "a catastrophe for women [is] a real possibility."

This possibility is all the more grave if, as seems to be the case, the resistance factions are unable to agree on a programme for postPDPA Afghanistan — a large-scale slaughter of ordinary people in the government camp might be a short-term expedient to delay their own internal conflict.

Further, the hideous character of the war in the countryside - for which I agree the PDPA bears enormous responsibility - is likely to have generated a deep peasant hatred of the urban society, similar to that of the Kampuchean peasantry that gave some social base to the Pol Pot catastrophe.

A government based on such understandable but ultimately reactionary peasant hatred would likely not limit its reprisals to the PDPA officials but would victimise ordinary urban civilians in a murderous way. For these reasons, my guess is that the potential forces for an independent and democratic Afghanistan are not in one camp, but in both, trapped in a brutal war against each other.

Third, while all of us in this discussion are revolutionary internationalists, our politics must be conducted in a certain time and place. For democratic activists and socialists in the Soviet bloc, the main enemy must be their own bureaucratic rulers. For us in the United States - even if one agrees with Hobson that the Mujahedeen were justified in taking US assistance — it is imperative to emphasise the deep political-military involvement of our own imperialist government in the Afghan conflict, an involvement that is at least as deep as that of the Soviet Union now tht the Soviet troops are gone.

For us to support the Mujahedeen in this context is difficult to distinguish — "in practice, not in words" , to borrow Hobson's phrase - from supporting our rulers' imperialist machinations.

I want to be clear: in my opinion the Afghan events have been a disaster for socialism. This is not because the Soviet Union was defeated and driven out of Afghanistan. Indeed, that defeat is just about the only positive thing that has happened in this conflict since 1979 (I would add also the demise of Pakistani dictator Zia ulHaq, if indeed that happy event was somehow occasioned by the Afghan war.)

The Soviet rulers' military and political debacle in Afghanistan certainly weakened their options in Poland in 1980-1 and accelerated the political ferment that has opened up important space for the democratic movement from below in the Soviet Union.

The disaster, rather, is the identification of the Soviet Union in the public mind (and in the mistaken view of most of the international left) with "socialism'. Such identification has naturally reinforced the image of socialism as something that is rammed down people's throats by foreign armies. The left fail y in its responsibility to el cat what the Soviet army was aying to ram down the Afghan people's throats was not, and could not possibly be, socialism in any way, shape or form.

At the same time, while the PDPA is not in my view a socialist force (and I explicitly rejected political solidarity with it), it is quite wrong to label it as 'quisling' or to think that simply saying "the [PDPA's] real programme, in reallty, not on paper, is to stay in power by any means necessary" exhausts the subject.

There is much more to it, and Jonathan Neale's article, cited by Dan LaBotz, indicates what it is:

"It would be different for the PDPA] if they were time-servers, Brezhnevs and Kosygins. They are not.

*They are enormously brave men and women, the flower of their generation. They worked publicly and underground for years against Feudalism, reaction, corruption and the oppression of women.

"They and they alone daring the seize the time, roll back the forces inertia, forces of inertia, backwardness, bigotry and ignorance. They fought one of the most repulsive regimes in the world under some of the most difficult conditions revolutionaries have faced. And it has come to this.

*Now they stand up to their mouths in the blood of their people, helpless prisoners of helicopter gunship 'socialism' ', seen as traitors by the very people from whom they came."

Any view of the PDPA as a party concerned only with hanging on to power therefore misses half the point. The Soviet Union's defeat in Afghanistan was purely of its own making, but for the PDPA, the Afghan tragedy was a function both of its deeply flawed politics and the overwhelmingly difficult conditions that would confront any revolutionary force in such a society. In any case, in the Afghan civil war as it stands today, there is nothing to indicate that the PDPA is any less nationalist, or more entangled in imperialist connections, than the leadership of the Mujahedeen.

The hegemony of the PDPA is not the solution for Afghanistan. Neither is the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism. My argument, against which Hobson presented no specific information, is that those sectors that might spearhead a struggle for an independent and democratic Afghanistan will have more room to breathe if the current regime survives at least in the cities, than if the mullahs and the Hekmatyars take over.

Scan page 10

Co nfused?

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 408

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →