Hillsborough Sunningdale
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-06-13Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 24 →
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If they think they can bargain with the 26 Counties for an end to their neutrality, they'll do so. There's already been moves towards that; Fitzgerald is already talking about it.
When I said Britain wouldn't allow a civil war, I meant at present, within the partitionist state. If the troops are removed, some people say there would be a civil war. We would like to believe - and maybe it is an illusory belief. but we'll have to wait and see - that it the troops are withdrawn, Britain declares its intention to withdraw, withdraws its military presence and hopefully eventually its economic presence, this will force the Protestant working class to open dialogue with Republicans. That is our belief.
The veto gives Protestant supremacy, whether you like it or not, or you think that they're not supreme. They're not in the sense that they are unemployed, as Republicans are, though not to the same extent. You just have to look at Harland and Wolff, and Short Brothers, which employ a total majority of Protestant working class people. Republicans don't have that input into the job scene.
You can see that from the majority of the trade unions, from the NICICTU committee in the North, which is totally controlled by the Protestants. That's because they're in work. Not full employment, but in any case whether they're in employment or not, they still believe they have that supremacy. Whether or not reality says otherwise, they still believe that. While they do, and while their veto enshrines that belief, as it does, there's no way they will talk to Sinn Fein or Republicans. They won't even talk with the SDLP.
To suggest that this is what we should be doing is cuckooland stuff. Come over to Ireland and try it for yourselves. It's not going to happen.
I'm not saying that Ideally he Socialis rkers' comparison of the Hillsborough agreement with the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 reveals both the factors of continuity in London and Dublin policy, and the shift in tactics represented by Hillsborough.
At Sunningdale in December 1973, a conference of representatives of the British and Irish governments, the SDLP, and the propower-sharing Unionists of Brian Faulkner, worked out a 'new departure' for Northern Ireland. There would be institutionalised power-sharing for all future provincial governments, and there would be a 'Council of Ireland' to link the Six and 26 Counties. Both London and Dublin made declarations about their own basic positions and committed themselves to respect the traditions and interests of the other side.
According to the 'Sunningdale CommuniTaoiseach Liam Cosgrave continued tes uphold the aspiration towards a United Ireland. The only unity they wanted to see was a unity established by consent."
The formal text put the 26 Counties' position like this: 'The Irish government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Notthern Ireland desired a change in that status."
For its part the British goverment committed itself to a united Ireland if a majority in the Six Counties wanted it. . "The British government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, its policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that is is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future, the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a United Ireland, the British government would support that wish."
A referendum had been held in March 1973. With most Catholics abstaining, only 6,463 electors voted for a united Ireland outside the UK, while 591,820 voted for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK.
Sunningdale too was to have led to a "formal agreement incorporating the declaration of the British and Irish governments [which] would be...registered at the UN" , but it was killed off by the Orange general strike of May 1974 before the Council come into existence.
The Council of Ireland planned at Sunningdale was to have been a substantial affair, approximating to a conference of Northern and Southern Ireland.
"[The] Council of Ireland would be confined to representatives of the two parts of Ireland, with appropriate safeguards for the British government's financial and other interests. It would comprise a council of ministers with executive and harmonising functions and a consultative role and a consultative assembly with advisory and review functions. The council of ministers would act by unanimity, and would comprise a core of seven members of the Irish government and an equal number of members of the Northern Ireland executive, with provision for the participation of other non-voting members of the Irish government and the Northern Ireland executive or administration when matters within their departmental competence were discussed.
•The council of ministers would control the functions of the council. The chairmanship would rotate on an agreed basis between representatives of the Irish Government and of the Northern Ireland executive.
•The consultative assembly would consist of 60 members, 30 members from Dail Eireann chosen by the Dail on the basis of proportional representation by the single transferable vote, and 30 members from the Northern Ireland assembly, chosen by that assembly and also on that basis. There would be a secretariat to the council, which would be kept as small as might be commensurate with efficiency in the operation of the council.
•The secretariat would service the institutions of the council and would, under the council of ministers, supervise the carrying out of the executive and harmonising functions and the consultative role of the council. The secretariat would be headed by a secretary general.
"Following the appointment of a Northern Ireland executive, the Irish government and the Northern Ireland executive would nominate their representatives to a council of ministers. The council of ministers would then appoint a secretary general and decide upon the location of its permanent headquarters. The secretary general would be
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directed to proceed with the plans for such headquarters...
'In the context of its harmonising functions and consultative role, the Council of Ireland would undertake the important work relating, for instance, to the impact of EEC membership." (Britain and Ireland joined the EEC on 1 January 1973).
What role would Britain have? "It would be for the (Dublin government] and the Northern Ireland assembly to legislate from time to time as to the extent of functions to be devolved to the Council of Ireland. Where necessary, the British government will cooperate in this devolution of functions..."
The Council of Ireland never came into being because the majority vote at Stormont in May 1974 by supporters of the power-sharing executive to activate the Council of Ireland part of the agreement triggered a Protestant general strike which wrecked the whole agreement.
Sunningdale was designed to build upwards from ground-level NationalistUnionist agreement in Belfast towards a Council of Ireland; Hillsborough aims to get government acceptable to both communities going again in Belfast, but it does not wait for it. Sunningdale depended on agreement between two Irish governments; Hillsborough depends on agreement between Dublin and London. The Council of Ireland was a rather tentative framework which might have had certain functions devolved to it; the intergovernmental conference has all the power in Northern Ireland that Britain has and it is a government in Belfast which might have certain powers devolved to it. Sunningdale looked to an all-Ireland framework and was scuttled by the Unionist refusal to work it; Hillsborough depends on a British/Irish framework. Sunningdale provided for the setting up of a Parliamentary tier of deputies delegated from Dublin and Belfast; Hillsborough provides for a parliamentary tier made up of Dail deputies and Westminster MPs.
If the Unionists can be persuaded to share power with the SDLP, much of the power being shared by Dublin will devolve to a Belfast home rule government. But that may not happen, or not for a long time yet.
The essential feature of the Anglo-Irish deal, compared with the approach tried at Sunningdale and embodied in the powersharing executive of January-May 1974, is that it does not depend on agreement between the Northern Ireland communities, nor on any agreement between a representative elected body in Northern Ireland and the Dublin government. The big two in Dublin and London have dealt directly with each other, acting 'in loco parentis' for the two Northern Ireland communities. In a sense they have repartitioned Northern Ireland, recognising each other's spheres of com20 Yoars he Sociali:
munal - which is also territorial - influence.
Power-sharing has now come to mean power-sharing between Dublin and London because it has been shown to be impossible between the communities in Belfast. If it is eventually paralleled by power-sharing 'on the ground', well and good. But it does not need to be, for now. The deal does not depend on it. It will not collapse without it. Anglo-Irish power-sharing can survive without Protestant-Catholic power-sharing. It is by no means to be taken for granted that a common British/26 Counties approach will collapse even if the Protestants do make Northern Ireland 'ungovernable' for a while.