5. 1973-4: Britain's moves for reform shattered by the Protestants
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-06-13Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 10 →
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Led three British soldiers and things began to move towards a military-style confrontation. But it was still limited. The decisive turn came on August 9 1971, with the introduction of internment. Few IRA men were rounded up, but various political opponents of the Faulkner Stormont government were, like PD leader Michael Farrell. If they had wanted to give the allegiance of the Catholic community to the two IRAs, then Faulkner and Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath could not have made a better job of it. Now it became a full-scale Catholic insurrection, with the Provisional IRA gaining more support. Bombings and killings escalated enormously. So did the Protestant backlash.
The Protestant UDA was founded in late '71 and became a mass movement of Ikers' Britain now moved energetically • to re-erect a self-governing system in Northern Ireland, calling on the aid of the Southern Irish government. A series of talks, with Unionist and Catholic politicians and with the Southern Irish government, culminated in the 'Sunningdale Agreement' on a new system in Northern Ireland. The new system would have institutionalised power-sharing in the Six Counties and a loose and rather powerless "Council of Ireland' would take account of Northern Ireland Catholics' desire for Irish unity. Britain promised a referendum to determine whether the Northern Ireland majority wanted Irish unity. (The referendum was held in March 1973: of course, the majority did not want unity.)
The old Unionist Party, for 50 years Northern Ireland's monolithic ruling party, had broken up in 1972. Now the Unionists fragmented further. The Paisleyites — now very much more than a fringe group — and William Craig's 'Vanguard' were marching and drilling and making blood-curdling threats, while some of their followers were slaughtering individual Catholics at random. The Unionists divided into those willing to work the new system Britain wanted and those who were either against it or thought it could not be carried with the Protestant masses. On the Catholic side, the pro-power-sharing SDLP had the electoral support of the mass of Catholics: Sinn Fein was not allowed to stand in the elections for the new Assembly.
On 1 January 1974 the new powersharing executive came into being. It was a coalition of a Unionist minority, led by Brian Faulkner; the SDLP; and some tiny parties like the non-sectarian liberal Unionists, Alliance, and the no less Unionist Northern Ireland Labour Party. The Paisleyites and other die-hard bigots were ghettoised, accounting for about one-third of the Assembly. They
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KEEP REMEMBER ULSTER 1690 PROTESTANT shouted, rioted and disrupted the work of the Assembly. To no avail. Though the Faulknerites were under tremendous pressure and had broken election pledges against power-sharing, the SDLP-Faulknerite alliance held and began to get a grip on Northern Ireland.
A dramatic shift had occurred, for the stable mainstay of this regime was the SDLP. Britain had shifted its weight heavily onto the middle-class Catholic party. The die-hard Orangemen appeared isolated and impotent. There was reason to think that massive government patronage and a vigorous reform policy - for which Britain had the resources and the will to pay - would gradually rally a sizeable Protestant support around the Faulknerites. The powersharing executive seemed to have years of life ahead of it. The IRA was still active but it seemed to be in decline.
But now the British class struggle intervened. In February 1974 the British Tory government called an election on the issue, 'Who rules, the unions or the government?', hoping thereby to gain the political and moral authority they needed to defeat the British miners. Heath lost the election. In Northern Ireland what was lost was the entire government strategy.
The Westminster election took the die-hard Orange politicians out of the Stormont ghetto in which they had been confined; it forced Brian Faulkner's party to face the Orange electorate they had tricked in the Northern Ireland election six months before. The result was a catastrophe for power-sharing. Of 12 Northern Ireland Westminster seats, no less than 11 were won by opponents of power-sharing (the other was Gerry Fitt's). The moral authority of the power-sharing executive was underminea. It staggered on until May 1974, when a majority vote in favour of activating the Council of Ireland provision triggered a powerful general strike.
The Unionists had already used their industrial muscle on a number of occasions. In early 1971 thousands of Harland and Wolff shipyard workers had marched to demand that internment for suspected Republicans be introduced. In March 1972 a quarter of a million struck when Stormont was abolished. (To get an equivalent British figure you would have to multiply by either 60 or 40 - depending on whether you take the strikers as a proportion of the Protestant population or of the whole Six County population - to get 15 or 10 million!)
Now, in May 1974, there was a full-scale general strike. Intimidation by the UDA was used to get it going — but it soon became clear that it had real support. It was a revolutionary general strike - for utterly reactionary objectives. The strikers were against the power-sharing executive and the Council of Ireland and for a restoration of 'majority rule in the Six Counties - that is, Protestant rule. The official Northern Ireland trade unions attempted to fight the reactionary strike, and, protected by the Army, organised a march back to work. Only a handful of people turned up, taking their lives in their hands to walk behind TUC secretary Len Murray and local trade union leaders. It was a fiasco. Nobody who knew the Northern Ireland labour movement would have expected anything else when the official unions came into conflict with their Protestant rank and file. The British Army was powerless and, maybe, the officers did not want to act against the strike. After two weeks the Faulknerites resigned and the power-sharing executive collapsed.
20 Years t was the decisive turning point for the period which opened with the abolition of the old Protestant home rule Parliament in March 1972. The British government had proved unable to face down the Protestants and had allowed its entire strategy of political reconstruction to be shattered. What now?
The Labour government refused to admit that this strategy was in ruins. It announced that there would be new elections for a Northern Ireland assembly. This time its function would be to work out a political system for the province acceptable to both Catholics and Protestants on the basis of some sort of power-sharing.
Elections were duly held, and the Faulknerites, the moderate compromising Unionists willing to work the system Britain wanted, were massacred. There followed a full year of discussion, bargaining, demonstrating, posturing and manoeuvring in the Convention. Spectacular shifts took place, for example when William Craig - the man scapegoated by O'Neill for the batoning of peaceful demonstrators in October 1969, the founder of 'Vanguard' and associate of the Protestant paramilitaries - came out for a variant of powersharing. He was immediately disowned by his supporters. No deal was possible. The canny politicians who might be willing to try didn't dare — and had they dared then they like Craig would have been repudiated.
The Protestants had won victory in May 1974 — and they wanted victory in the Convention. There was widespread fear in the Catholic community that the Protestant majority would organise some sort of political coup, declaring a new government and set a train of events in motion which would trigger sectarian civil war. For most of 1975 the Provisional IRA observed a ceasefire. Finally, early in 1976, the Convention sent a report to London which demanded majority rule, not power-sharing, and the British government dissolved the Convention.
The British government was stuck with direct rule. The only political strucWorkers' Ireland 9
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20 Years ture that could be set up in Northern Ireland would correspond with the nature of Northern Ireland - with its in-built artificial Protestant majority. This put Britain in the absurd position of justifying the Northern Ireland entity ande Partition in terms of defending the democratic rights of the Protestant majority while it was forced to deny the Protestant majority the exercise of its majority rights in that Northern Ireland unit! But logic didn't come into it. The British government sought the line of least resistance and after the Orange general strike that meant leaning heavily against the Catholics. The IRA was badly affected by the truces of 1975 — but it was still a force to be reckoned with, and now it began to reorganise.
Britain's policy now was signalled early in 1976 when the Labour minister responsible for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, announced that from now on, convicted Republican and Loyalist activists would no longer have special status or prison regime that they had had since 1972. This was the 'criminalisation' policy. Inevitably it bore down far more heavily on the Catholics than the Protestants.
At the same time the war against the IRA became an intensive war against the people ot the Catholic ghettoes of Derry and Belfast. Thousands of Catholic homes were repeatedly searched and wrecked by the British army. Mason's policy was to sit tight, beat down the Catholics, and make neither attempi nor pretence at any new political initiative. Northern Ireland would be forced to "sweat out' its sickness. For quite a while it seemed to be working. The IRA was in serious decline; the flesh fell off Protestant organisations like the UDA and they shrivelled into not much more than racketeering gangs. Bombings and killings became somewhat less frequent.
When in 1977 an attempt was made by Ian Paisley to get a new Orange general strike over "security' it flopped. The majority of Protestant workers no longer felt under immediate and intense threat. They didn't respond and since not enough of them could be coerced, the second Orange 'general' strike was fiasco. It had more to do with jockeying for position among Loyalist politicians than with anything else. the processes were just hidden from But the convulsions were not over — view. The Provisional IRA reorganised itself on a tighter cell structure and geared itself towards what its strategists talked of as a • 20-year war.
irkers' Developments were germinating in the prison camps and jails that would allow the IRA to gain an unprecedented position of political dominance in the Catholic community.
For the Republicans did not accept Mason's criminalisation policy. Those convicted after the new rules came into force in early 1976 refused to comply with prison regulations. They refused to wear prison uniform, wearing blankets instead. Mason's criminalisation policy DrIL The turning point came with the hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981. The hunger strike of 1980 was called off before anyone died, the Republicans thinking that they had been promised changes. They hadn't. A new hunger strike started in Spring 1981, led the Provisional IRA prisoners at Long Kesh. While on hunger strike Sands was elected MP for Fermanagh-S. Tyrone, and it was Bobby Sands MP whom Mrs Thatcher allowed to starve to death in Long Kesh.
World-wide attention was now on Long Kesh. Support for the hunger strikers grew rapidly in the Northern Ireland Catholic community. It was a sign of the times that the SDLP did not dare stand against Sands and, by splitting the Catholic vote, deprive the Provisional IRA of a great propaganda boost. Sands was the first to die and nine others followed him. Like the execution of the 15 captured leaders of the 1916 rising, the slow and terrible deaths of the ten young Republicans in 1981 had a profound effect on Catholic Ireland.
As coffin after coffin came out of the gates of Long Kesh, the Provisionals gained massive support. They easily won the by-election caused by Bobby Sands' death, in mid-1981. On the other side of the Northern Ireland divide, Protestants reacted with great hostility to the giant Catholic funeral marches and to the very opened one of the most terrible battles ever fought for their own dignity and political principles by political prisoners confronting a brutal and soulless prison system designed to degrade and demoralise them. Republican prisoners spent years 'on the blanket'. Some served out entire sentences and were released without ever wearing prison clothes. Slowly support built up outside, but it was never enough to have any effect.
NEWRY YOUTH SAY TURY THE BLANKET MEN RY YOUT 16Fsuccessful propaganda campaign mounted by the Republicans and their supporters. Communal tensions became drum-tight.
The hunger strike ended in defeat. Would the support that the sacrifice of the hunger strikers had won for the Provisional IRA survive the end of the hunger strikes? They had had such support before. They had never been able to consolidate it or put it to any use. By now, however, they had learned some important lessons. Things had changed in the Republican movement.
The right-wing Provisional IRA had been steadily radicalised throughout the 1970s. The working-class Republicans in Belfast and Derry were always more radical than the typical petty-bourgeois Sinn Fein supporters in the South. Steadily their influence grew. They talked of socialism with some conviction -though, unfortunately, without much clear definition, and, worse, as if it could be an affair of the Catholic community alone. One 'lesson' the left-wing Republicans in the Northern cities learned in the '70s was to give up on the Protestant workers. Side by side with their radicalisation went a more and more clear sectarianism - though in implication rather than intention - towards the Protestants.
Arguably much that they did was always sectarian. But the old guard paid at least lip service to the ideas and goals
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of traditional Irish Republicanism, which proudly insisted that the whole people of Ireland were the Irish nation, whatever their origins or creed. The 1972 Provisional IRA policy for a federal Ireland with a nine county Ulster -adopted when it looked like they would soon win — was preposterous in some of its details but it contained the core idea of conciliating the Protestants. The most clear-cut expression of the sectarianism entwined with, the radicalisation of the Northern Provisionals was their hostility to 'federalism', which they removed from Sinn Fein's constitution in 1981-2.
The Protestants must either be conciliated, or you try to conquer them: and without federalism and the possibility of autonomy, all that the Provos now offered the Protestants was incorporation as a minority in a heavily Catholic Ireland.
The dilemma of the Provisionals parallels that of the Republican socialists in 1968-70: they are a one-community movement, cut off from the majority of the Northern Ireland working class. They know it is the opposition of the Protestants - and specifically of the Protestant working class - that mainly stands in their way. Whereas the socialists of 1968-70 abjured, ignored or renounced the national question, the Provo radicals start from it and noW they have an ill-defined socialism which abjures the majority of the Northern Ireland working class. The Provos of today, like the socialists of 1968-70, are therefore impotent to change Northern Ireland, or Ireland.
But the Provisionals are a powerful force in the Catholic community. They learned from the hunger strike the value of politics, and have systematically turned to electioneering. Since 1982 they have consolidated a seemingly stable Catholic vote of not too far short of 40%. They define their new strategy as a combination of the ballot box and the gun — 'the Armalite in one hand, a ballot paper in the other'. They aim to make politics, and social agitation, serve the armed struggle. The SDLP was helped mightily by British favour in the early and mid '70s; it has wasted and cracked in the political wilderness since 1976, shedding its odd socialists and Protestants, to become little more than a green nationalist party.
What is happening politically in the Catholic community now parallels the political polarisation and differentiation that occurred within Unionism at the beginning of the '70s. The Provos' enforced or voluntary abstention from political action slowed down that process in the Catholic community and allowed the SDLP a virtual monopoly of Catholic politics for a time. No more -the weakening of the SDLP, put out to starve in the no-politics wilderness after 1976, and the Provisionals' own turn to politics, has put an end to that. It is unlikely, however, that the Provisionals will politically annihilate the SDLP, and there is probably still much opposition inside the Provisionals to 'politics' Overall, the results of the years of from a working-class point of view. A chasm deep and wide divides the Protestant and Catholic workers. Bitterness which will in the best circumstances take a generation or two to heal has built up.
Despite severe crises in the South, since the '60s industry there has grown relatively fast, so that the social contrast between North and South - which at the time of Partition was a start division between a relatively advanced industrial North and an impoverished mostly agricultural South — is greatly diminished. All this, however, has not generated a common feeling of working-class identity across the communal divide. It would be a miracle if it did.
Northern Ireland continues in a state of latent civil war. The British Army keeps the communities apart, but within a strategic British framework of maintaining the artificial sectarian state which keeps the Catholic-Protestant antagonism at near boiling point. Fundamentally the British Army is not a peace-keeper, but the military scaffolding erected to shore up the Six County state when it began to collapse into sectarian chaos in 1969 — in other words, to shore up the framework for the chronic communal antagonism. It keeps the communities apart by beating down the rebellious Catholics.
Britain's policy of holding the ring in Northern Ireland, tinkering occasionally with the political structures and beating down the Catholics as the staple activity, is stoking the fires of latent civil war. It maintains, just below boiling point, the conditions that could well develop into a Lebanese-style civil war in Northern Ireland, with mass communal slaughter and bloody repartition at the end of it.
The only way out of this situation is to recast the entire framework. The sectarian Northern Ireland state must be replaced by a broader framework within which the Catholic and Protestant communities can learn to live together. The Labour Party should commit itself to abolish the Six County sectarian state and to work for a federal united Ireland that will offer the fullest rights, guarantees and autonomy for the Protestant population that are compatible with the rights of the majority of the Irish people.
Ireland
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Years I. What is the Anglo-Irish agreement?
The Anglo-Irish agreement sets up an inter-governmental conference — backed up by a permanent secretariat stationed in Belfast — between the London and Dublin governments which will jointly run Northern Ireland. The executive power stays exclusively in British hands, but the political control of the executive is normally to reside in the intergovernmental conference.
The Anglo-Irish agreement is an international treaty registered with the UN, according to which the British government obligates itself to run Northern Ireland in agreement with the 26 County government and when disagreements emerge earnestly to seek agreement and a common policy.
Britain declared itself to have to opposition to a united Ireland if the Six County majority wanted it, and promised to legislate for a united Ireland it a Six County majority decided for it; the 26 County government promised to respect the separateness of the Six Counties so long as a majority there wanted to be separate.
This is power-sharing between Dublin and London. Because it proved impossibie to establish power-sharing between Northern Ireland political forces in Belfast, the two governments have established a radically new framework over their heads. power-marior in o mast is agreed, then most of the powers of the intergovernmental conference will devolve to the Belfast government.
The agreement contrasts with the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 in not being dependent on any local agreement. Sunningdale started with agreement for power-sharing in Belfast, and proposed to build upwards on this towards a Council of Ireland. Hillsborough starts with a Council of Britain and Ireland and wants to build downwards. The Sunningdale agreement was vulnerable to the Orange general strike of 1974 because that strike could bring down the power-sharing executive. No local action in Northern Ireland can bring down Hillsborough, if the nerves of the London and Dublin governments hold.
The Orangeists are — from their own point of view - quite right that the DIS? Anglo-Irish agreement marks a bi involvement of the 26 Counties i administration of Northern Irelan Z. Why the Hillsborough agreement Northern Ireland broke down as a political entity in August 1969. Catholic revolt against their second-class citizenship and a Protestant backlash against the Catholics led to the British Army being put on the streets to stop sectarian fighting (after over 500 Catholic families had been burned out in Belfast).
That Northern Ireland had indeed broken down was recognised by Britain in March 1972 when the IRA military campaign forced Britain to abolish the Protestant-controlled Belfast home-rule government. Britain attempted radically to restructure Northern Ireland politics by replacing majority - Protestantsectarian — rule with institutionalised power-sharing.
It won the majority of Catholics to support the power-sharing, but only a minority of Protestants. When an executive based on the Catholic majority and a Protestant minority was nevertheless set up, a powerful Orange general strike brought it down in May 1974.
After that British direct rule became semi-permanent and the chief task Britain set itself was to defeat the insurgent Catholic IRA. But the IRA remained in the field and after ten Republicans died on hunger strike in 1981 the Republican movement achieved a degree of Catholic political support that convinced the rulers of London and Dublin that things were getting out of their control.
The Southern Irish nationalist parties and the Six County constitutional nationalist party, the SDLP - which had been the mainstay of the power-sharing experiment in 1974 — spent a year in the 'New Ireland Forum' discussing constitutional rearrangements in Ireland that would end the IRA's revolt and bring about reconciliation between Catholic and Protestant.
They prepared a number of possible options, all of which were immediately reiected by Mrs Thatcher. One of these options was joint rule in the Six Counties by Dublin and London, London representing the Protestants and Dublin the Catholics. That was rejected in 1984 by Mrs Thatcher.
But after over a year of negotiations, what the London and Dublin governments came up with was a variant of power-sharing - political powersharing while the executive power remained in British hands. As well as that, it is proposed to create a strong DublinWestminster joint parliamentary committee, thus drawing Britain and the 26 Counties closer together than they have been since Southern Ireland seceded agreen which evolve for 65 The UK in 1922. The Anglo. Irish ent is thus a framework w ithin British/Irish collaboration can and develop on a closer level than years - if it holds.
3. The Anglo-Irish agreement and a united Ireland Most of the left, following the Republicans, denounces the Anglo-Irish deal for 'copper-fastening' partition. But this is false. Every 26 County government since 1922 has in fact recognised partition and some have declared that there can be no united Ireland without the consent of a sizeable section of the Six County Protestants.
The Anglo-Irish deal would only copper-fasten partition if there was some way of removing partition that the deal hinders. There is no way to remove partition unless the Northern Ireland majority wants it. To try to conquer the Protestants would not bring Irish unity. Almost certainly it would lead to sectarian civil war and bloody repartition. In fact the alternative to the Anglo Irish agreement was the status quo - ie. deepening integration with the UK under prolonged direct rule.
If the Anglo-Irish agreement works against a united Ireland, it will be by way of the embitterment it has caused.
4. Socialists and the Anglo-Irish deal Anything that would bring about reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland, and thus create the preconditions for working class unity, should be welcomed by socialists. But the Anglo-Irish agreement does nothing of the sort.
While alienating the Protestants more profoundly than they have ever been alienated from Britain, it gives little to the Catholics other than the participation of the Dublin government as their champion. It is a profoundly undemocratic agreement, made over the heads of all the people in the Six Counties and resulting in structures that fall a great deal short of democracy.
The Anglo-Irish agreement does not solve the problem that has to be solved in Ireland; it exacerbates and inflames it.
The basic problem is that there is a natural Irish minority — the Protestants which, according to democratic norms, would have every right to special treatment as a minority by way of having autonomy in its own heartland areas. But Ireland as a whole was ruled by Britain, and the minority - partly for reasons of protecting itself against the Irish majority — allied with a powerful section of the British ruling class against the Irish majority. As a result of that alliance Ireland was partitioned, with the Protestants having their own home-rule state within which there was a Catholic minority bigger as a proportion of the Protestant state's population than the Protestants of all Ireland would have been in a united Ireland.
The Catholic minority
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was some 35%, and they were in the majority in a sizeable part of the Six Counties — so they were felt to be a permanent threat to the Protestant majority. They were treated as second-class citizens, discrminated against and rigorously excluded from any say in ruling the Six Counties, even in local government where they were the local majority (eg. Derry).
They suffered for decades and then revolted with a strength and determination that the British govenrment has found impossible to quell.
The problem is to find a democratic framework which (a) takes account of the legitimate concerns of the two communities in Northern Ireland, of the wish of the Protestants not to be incorporated as an oppressed majority in a Catholic-majority Ireland as well as the wish of the Six County Catholics not to be an artificial minority in the Six County state, and, (b) allows for reconciliation and the development of norma class politics in Ireland.
That framework can only be a federal united Ireland - in which the minority areas will have autonomy - combined with the closes link between Ireland and Britain acceptable to the Irish majority.
The fundamental criticism of the Anglo-Irish agreement from this point of view is that though it provokes the Orangeists about as much as a united Ireland would, it does not move any way towards providing a workable democratic framework.
The majority of the Orange population want a restoration of Orange majority rule. They will resist anything short of that and anything other than it. There would be resistance to any attempt to create a democratic federal structure. But resistance to structures that actually do take account of Orange interests could eventually dissipate. By contrast the Anglo-Irish agreement does not offer structures within which the Orangeists can be reconciled.
It puts them forever under the joint ultimate control of Britain and Britain's inter-governmental conference partner, the Fenian government which they believe schemes and plots endlessly to take out the Six Counties and incorporate its people as a helpless minority in the Catholic state.
5. Prospects The Orangeists seemed almost unanimous in their opposition to the Anglo-Irish agreement. Their unity has begun to shatter in face of the intransigence of Thatcher.
As a section of the Orangeists go all the way to outright illegality, the process of differentiation within the Orange ranks will accelerate. Already the Official Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux has said 'Never again' after the violence of the 3 March strike, and the OUP officially kept away from the illegal demonstration at Portadown on 31 March.
A two-way separation will occur. A section of the Orange politicians will probably try to reach accommodation with Britain, as Paisley and Molyneaux did in late February. Others will go into militarist occupation. The creation of a 'Protestant IRA' is most likely - an organisation striking at the South.
The majority of Catholics have been shown in opinion polls to favour the Hillsborough agreement, and the SDLP has been boosted at the expense of Sinn Fein. But the Catholics have in practical terms gained little, and the Orange backlash now threatens them with the sort of campaign of sectarian assassinations that swept across Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1976. The consequence of the Orange backlash in the Catholic community is that the IRA will be boosted as a defensive force.
In the months ahead the prospect is for a series of fierce clashes between the police and the Army and the Orange militants. The RUC will probably be eroded by the campaign against them in the Orange community (though this may provoke a revulsion which will be part of the process of polarisation in the Protestant community). In any case the RUC could hardly cope with the level of conflict that looms in the marching season ahead.
Therefore the British Army will be drawn more and more into 'police' work against the Protestants. The experience in 1969 and after when the Army did police work in the Catholic areas where the RUC had ceased to be acceptable suggests that this will further poison the already very bitter relations between the British government and the Protestant community.
The chances that Britain, caught between the two communities, will just pull out, are probably very small. The consequences, including the very likely spread of Catholic/Protestant conflict to British cities like Glasgow, are far too grave for any British withdrawal in response to the new situation. Britain will try to tough it out.
6. The Republicans If any benefit to the Catholics can be claimed from the Anglo-Irish agreement, then to the Republicans' military campaign belongs the credit.
The tragedy is that the cost of that campaign in terms of the deepening of the ancient gulf between the two communities is immense — and it has not yet been paid.
The revolt of the Catholics was a just revolt, its channelling into this sort of military campaign the product of the domination of a particular political tradition. Today the dilemma of the IRA lies in this, that if the military campaign were to stop then the pressure for change would stop; and if it goes on now then it is the pyromaniacal activity of pouring petrol on a fire that may anyway be uncontrollable.
The temptation to 'detonate the Protestants' and use them against Thatcher must be great. After all it was the Protestants who wrecked power-sharing in 1974. But no good can come of it.
Years Out of the sectarian civil war that is a clear possibility in this situation can come neither a united, nor a democratic, and still less a socialist Ireland.
7. Civil war The fundamental threat in Northern Ireland is of sectarian civil war - which would lead to a bloody repartition, complete and fix the division in the Irish people for perpetuity, and probably boost clericalist reaction on both sides of the new border. Compared with that, the carnival of reaction which accompanied the 1920 partition would seem mild and moderate.
One consequence of the vicarious Irish nationalism so widespread on what might be called the organisationally inchoate but ideologically Mandelite left is that the danger of sectarian civil war is not properly appreciated. It filters through the ideological spectacles as 'the socialist revolution' which the good guys would win.
We must fight this irresponsible and light-minded attitude. In the period ahead it will otherwise isolate the left from serious and sober-minded labour movement militants who will rightly recoil from the prospect of sectarian civil war.
Most of the so-called Marxist left is politically subservient to Sinn Fein. They relate to Ireland through romantic populist spectacles which allow them to avoid seeing the horrifying spectre of communal civil war that looms behind events there.
In their reaction to the Anglo-Irish agreement most of the left have surpassed themselves, focusing on the alleged surrender of Irish sovereignty and failing almost entirely to see anything new. The writers and readers of publications like Socialist Action and Labour and Ireland must be mightily surprised by the recent events in Northern Ireland.
On Ireland the left needs urgently to rearm itself with working-class Marxist Troops Out The single isolated slogan Troops Out' has come to be the mark of a sizeable part of the left in the last decade. It has become something of a fetish, isolated from the rest of a socialist or democratic programme on Workers' Ireland
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20 Years Ireland.
We are for Irish self-determination, therefore for troops out. But Socialist Organiser has repeatedly criticised the slogan-mongering use of troops out as if it were a self-sufficient programme. Right now troops out without a political settlement means — for a certainty -sectarian civil war and repartition. It means not self-determination of the Irish people as a whole, but the dog-eatdog destruction of any chance of unity of the Irish people as a whole.
Troops out is not a political programme, but only part of one - and it can be part of more than programme. Plain troops out tomorrow means sectarian civil war - troops out with a political settlement means something radically different.
We are in favour of British withdrawal but as part of a political solution which actually allows Irish self-determination: and that can only mean a solution which leads to some form of federal Ireland within which Protestant and Catholics will not, immediately Britain goes, have to set about determining how they relate to each other by sectarian civil war, perhaps even on the pattern of Lebanon.
We do not say 'we support troops out only after a federal Ireland has been agreed'; we say 'a serious movement for troops out among the Irish working class, let alone the British working class, can only be built as part of a programme for actually realising Irish selfdetermination.' In a sense this is conditional support for British withdrawal -but withdrawal is not a fetish. And it does not mean that we take any responsibility for the British troops. They buttress an untenable status quo and they serve British governments — Labour and Tory alike - which over the last 17 years (and now again with the Anglo-Irish agreement) could not have acted very differently if they had - been deliberately trying to make sectarian civil war inevitable.
As the Orange mobilisation develops, sections of the soft left will probably start supporting British troops against the Orangeists or advocating their use. We do not back the Orange bigots; but we do not back the troops either. We remain the party of irreconcilable opposition.
10. The Catholics The Northern Ireland Catholics main the chief victims of partition. TI ley are likely now to be victims of re tivated Orange murder gangs. In the event of sectarian civil war they will be 'orkers' the most vulnerable, Belfast.
While we advocate a democratic solution to the Protestant Catholic conflict, and reconciliation and working class unity as a basic immediate policy for Northern Ireland, in face of sectarian conflict we must stand with and defend the Catholics.
1l. Socialism The unspeakably bitter spectacle of the workers who live in the run-down Shankhill area of Belfast in murderous conflict with their Catholic working-class neighbours in the run-down Falls area sums up what capitalism, British rule and the activities of the Irish Socialist t is very useful for us to get a feedback of what the British left are thinking about Ireland and about the issues that concern us in Ireland -and obviously also concern you in Britain.
First, I'll deal with the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Judging by the actions it has triggered; this agreement signed by Thatcher and Fitzgerald on November 15, 1985, could be deemed a momentous step forward. However, our attitude is that it is nothing of the sort.
Acclaimed internationally, approved by Irish establishment parties, and opposed with growing vehemence by the Northern Unionists — surely the Agreement cannot be that bad? But it is.
The Agreement is a setback for all socialist forces in Ireland, and their supporters in Britain who have been working for Britain's disengagement from Ireland, and for Ireland's right to self-determination as a whole.
The Agreement does not offer anything new. In it, Dublin recognises that the Northern Unionists have a right to veto Irish unification. And the two governments announced the setting up of an inter-government conference in which Dublin's role will be consultative, and which will look at ways of improving Dublin's cooperation on the security front, as well as reforming the Northern state, prior to devolving some sort of power back to an acceptable administration there. bourgeois and petty-bourgeois cians have done to Ireland.
The massive 25% unemployment rate among people who often lack the means of life above the bare necessities is a further indictment of that system.
The Irish working class, Protestant and Catholic alike, needs socialism -that the workers should join together and take power from the capitalists.
We do not counterpose future socialism to the just struggle of the Catholics now, nor pretend that a divided Irish working class can miraculously make a sudden leap from the terrible reality of today to socialism.
But we need socialism, and a movement that fights for socialism as well as for a democratic solution to the Catholic/Protestant conflict.
So what exactly are the objectives of the Agreement? One of its prime aims has been widely and accurately described as the defeat of the IRA. It proposes to achieve this by a mixture of reforms in the North, supposed to erode the support of the IRA and Sinn Fein, and increased collaboration by armed forces both sides of the border.
This was seen specifically when Dublin ratified the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Until then, only four other EEC countries, including Britain, had done so.
This will further reduce the already frayed right to political asylum in the 26 Counties. At the moment, as some of you are probably aware, there are great moves going on to renegotiate the extradition treaty between the United States and Britain.
The Ulster Defence Regiment remains - whose members have time and time again been found guilty of assassinating innocent Catholics. Only recently, four UDR men were convicted although they were not given a specific sentence.
The Royal Ulster Constabulary, whose members have been involved in 'shoot-to-kill' tactics against nationalists, beating in detention centres and recruiting of paid perjurers for mass trials, will not be disbanded. Non-jury courts are here to stay despite mentioning that they might do away with them in the future.
The so-called reforms
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told to expect have not happened - except one. I am not sure if you are aware of this, but in the North, if you were born in the 26 Counties, you have no right to vote in any election apart from a Westminster election. The one concession that has now been given to us is that those who were born in the 26 Counties can now vote in any election in the Six Counties.
It is intended that these reforms be presented as a result of the agreement, and a victory for the SDLP, in the hope of wooing nationalist voters away from Sinn Fein.
However, the thinking that underlines this part of the agreement is that the IRA and Sinn Fein thrive on the misery of Northern nationalists - as is often said by the SDLP, the Catholic hierarchy and the Dublin politicians.
Unemployment breeds violence, they say. Hence the recently agreed US financial input, and the possible financial back-up from the EEC which will presumably be used to create jobs. Sinn Fein says that unemployment breeds demoralisation, apathy, lll-health, alcoholism, domestic violence against women and children, drug taking. But it does not breed political activism.
Far from thriving on misery and deprivation, Sinn Fein works hard through its advice centres, trades unions and local campaigns to help bring about change.
In the meantime, while Dublin waits for an auspicious moment to pass some reforms, the Dublin government will be expected to carry out its duties, as spelt out by the agreement. Consulted about the North, it will share responsibility, but not power, with Britain. And it will be expected to shoulder a great burden of the massive military and judicial operations aimed at containing republican resistance.
Already the cost to the tax-payer in the 26 Counties of maintaining partition is f53 per person per year, while the equivalent tax to the British tax-payer is a mere £9.
Thatcher has the Dublin government over a barrel. She has got the Fitzgerald government to accept responsibility for part of Ireland over which it has no power. She will make them pay for every crumb of reform that may be brought about by increasing their collaboration with the British Army, the RUC and the Northern judiciary. Furthermore, the Unionist veto has been recognised in a legally-binding agreement.
Why then has this Dublin government, which calls itself a nationalist government, signed such an agreement? Indeed, why is it supported by Northern middle-class nationalists like the SDLP leader John Hume?
The first reason is that they feel threatened by the emergence of Sinn Fein as a credible political force since the 1981 H-Block hunger strike. The second is that the constitutional parties in the 26 Counties have no urgent desire to achieve Ireland's reunification, and self-determination, as this would radically change the balance of power and the conservative nature of Irish politics.
As for the SDLP being the 'respectable' middle-class nationalist alternative to the IRA, it will always be assured of a little place in a devolved administration at Stormont. In fact, our belief is that if it had not been that the Assembly was dissolved there recently, the SDLP were actually preparing to reenter Stormont.
Why are the Unionists opposed to the Agreement? After all, the aim is defeating the IRA, and it plans to enroll Dublin's help for that purpose.
At the turn of the century, Unionism distrial ed to But since the aSe ind World War, especially, things have changed. The linen milis are no more. Most of the heavy engineering industry has been nationalised and needs large subsidies to survive. Unionists with their naked bigotry and their decaying ecoriomic muscle are no longer an important partner for Britain's policy in İreland. They are, however, a sizeable minority in Ireland as a whole, and heavily armed.
Unionists presently feel jilted by Britain, deliberately kept away from the London-Dublin talks. They were told on November 15 that Dublin's opinion would be listened to before London decides how to administer the Six Counties. That was enough.
Assurances that Britain's sovereignty over the North was intact were not listened to. Reaffirmation of their constitutional guarantee was ignored.
Any move in the direction of Dublin was seen by the Unionists, not so much as a slippery slope to a united Ireland, but rather as yet another sign that their bargaining power was on the wane. But the days of unchallenged Unionist rule in the Six Counties are no more.
In 1986 the interests of Unionism are narrower than the interests of Britain. Unionism today is not so much about the Union as about partition. It is partition that has secured a permanent Unionist majority in the Northern State tor 64 years. It is partition which has kept the benefits of industrial development away from nationalist areas, with the result that many Unionist areas of the North enjoy a lower unemployment rate than in Britain, while in nationalist areas 40-80% unemployed are not uncommon.
It is those marginal privileges that working class Unionists want to preserve, more than the Union Jack or the link with Britain.
The idea of an independent Ulster comes from working class loyalist groups, like the paramilitary UDA. Even repartition has been mentioned -anything rather than lose this corner of Ireland where they rule supreme.
Furthermore, unemployment and other figures show that 14 years of British direct rule have failed to erode Unionist domination significantly. Only Irish independence could hope to end Unionist power.
All this talk of reconciling the two traditions - Unionist and Nationalist Years traditions — within the Six Counties, is therefore a smokescreen. Unionism and nationalism are two diametrically opposed political viewpoints. And the people who hold this can only be reconciled within partition if one side, or both, abandons its ground.
It is obvious that both London and the Dublin government will be expecting Northern nationalists once again to knuckle under. Crumbs of reforms will be thrown at them. Republican "troublemakers' will be interned, proscribed, censored or otherwise disposed of. And British interests in keeping Ireland under control will have suffered not one bit.
This is why the present British government is trying to stabilise the Six Counties, and normalise North/South relations, while establishing closer links with Dublin. Like its predecessors in 1971 and 1973 it would prefer a 32 County statelet, rather than the present powderkeg. For this it must seduce the İrish nationalist middle class, appease the Unionist monster, and eliminate Republican resistance. The first objective has been reached. To achieve the second it hopes to deliver the third: the defeat of the IRA and Sinn Fein.
But Unionist opposition is not just caused by IRA actions and Sinn Fein's presence in the councils. It is mostly about losing their supremacy. This could be Thatcher's first miscalculation. The second is about defeating Republican resistance.
Whatever its future holds, it remains that this Agreement is a step backwards for Irish nationalists — and for all those that want to see the development of a free, independent, united and socialist Ireland. Socialists and progressive people everywhere must oppose the Agreement as another attempt by Britain to consolidate its hold on Ireland under cover of peace and reconciliation.
They should not be confused by the support given by the Irish nationalist middle class to the Unionist veto.
In the final analysis, Britain's colonial stranglehold on Ireland can only broken by a process of decolonisation. Peace and stability can only be established within a framework of Irish national self-determination.
The inherent weakness of the Hillsborough process is that it is not geared to these objectives. On the contrary, it is geared towards thwarting the attainment of these objectives. And for this reason, as for many of the other imponderables, it is doomed in the longterm to failure.
Workers' Ireland
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Year John O'Mahony (Si have a somewhat different viewpoint from that of Sinn Fein. I do not start out with the idea that Irish nationalism is a fixed star. I have a different standpoint in judging this agreement and everything else about Northern Ireland: what best serves the interests of the Irish working class? What will help create the possibility of working class unity and therefore of a socialist solution in Ireland, North and So I start with that different perspective and I also have a somewhat different What I want to do today is deal with four different things: why the Anglo-Irish Agreement has come into being; what it is; what its prospects are and, finally, what is wrong with the Anglo-Irish Agreement from a socialist - as distinct from a nationalist - point of view.
For like Sinn Fein I also conclude that we should reject the Anglo-Irish Agreement and oppose it, but for reasons different from those of Sinn Fein.
Why the deal? Because the Six County state broke down in 1969. It had existed for 50 years as a Protestant-ruled state, a state dominated by a Protestant community making up about two-thirds of the Six County population. For fifty years that had one-party rule.
The Protestant community lorded it tyrannically over the Catholic one-third of the Six County population, reducing them to second-class citizenship, keeping them down because they felt threatened by them. That system broke down in 1969.
It broke down initially when the Catholics began to demand an end to the various forms of oppression and discrimination against them and that in turn created a big Protestant backlash. In turn the Protestant backlash quickly escalated to the point. where, in mid-1969 there were serious attempts at pogroms in Belfast and Derry.
There were pogroms in Belfast where some 500 houses were burned down in August 1969. That led to the British Army having to go into the streets — 'having to' from the point of view of the ruling class, to stop the situation becoming uncontrollable.
IPS' Now that meant that the Six County state had broken down. But Britain did not admit that the state had • broken down. The troops were put out to control the streets and they formed a sort of tight scaffolding to keep the state from collapsing. Britain allowed the Protestant Home Rule government to continue in Belfast until March 1972. But in fact from the point where the troops took over control of the streets in 1969, Northern Ministers had senior British civil servants assigned to understudy them and act as commissars over them.
So to an important extent Britain took a very big share of direct rulership as early as the middle of 1969.
But that did not solve anything. True, Britain began to push through serious reforms. Against it is important to understand what happened.
If you look at how Northern Ireland was destabilised after 50 years it was in the beginning the result of the British government giving insistent signals to the Northern Protestant regime that it wanted reforms. Britain wanted reforms because in the 1960s Britain had long ceased to look to partition for any benefits. On the contrary, Britain was moving closer to the 26 Counties which had been growing in importance as an economic partner of Britain.
Britain and the 26 Counties signed a Free Trade agreement in 1965. Both Britain and the 26 Counties were preparing to enter the EEC, which they finally did in 1972. Britain wanted to get rid of the embarrassing backyard police state that Northern Ireland had been for most of the previous 50 years.
That led to the pressures on the Northern liberal Unionists - such as they were, and there were not too many of them and they were not very good as political leaders. And it encouraged the development of the Catholic Civil Rights movement. The unprecedentedly vigorous campaigning of that movement led to the sequence of events which I have already described, culminating in the British Army taking over in 1969, with the job of creating a scaffolding within which Britain could remodel the Six Counties.
But Britain taking control in 1969 did not stop anything. Lots of Catholics remained fundamentally unsatistied, especially the youth in Derry and Belfast. The Catholics may have marched in 1968-9 for one man, one vote; one man, one house; one man, one job and basic civil rights. But in reality the root civil right they lacked was self-determination. Their troubles grew out of the fact that they were an artificially carved-out minority in an artificial state.
It is important to keep in mind that the Six Counties and its majority and minority are artificial. But it is also important to be aware that even if the existing untenable Six County entity had not been carved out, there was still a powerful and compact Protestantties. The point is that the Six County entity made the problem of how the Irish: majority and minority relate to each other more intractable and in no sense was it a democratic resolution of the conflict.
From the Catholics' lack of self-determination came the Catholic revolt - and that revolt has to this day remained unquellable. The IRA had been vitr tually non-existent in 1969, during the pogroms, and what did exist calling itself: the IRA had disgraced itself. But with ari astonishing speed a new IRA was created. Initially it was very right-wing! an avowed right-wing split off from the old IRA. The Provisional movement: was to be quickly radicalised in the early: 1970s.
The new IRA initiated and developed a military campaign within a matter of 18 months after the British Army took to the streets in mid-1969. The Catholic. revolt became unquellable — it took the form of a series of bombings in the centres of towns and killings of soldiers and personnel of the Six County state.
This in turn led to an intensification of the Protestant-Catholic polarisation. The result of the Provo campaign was that in March 1972 Britain abolished the Stormont regime.
Now it is important to keep in mind that Britain - through all the zig-zags of policy since 1969 - has always had the intention of politically restructuring Northern Ireland. If you see it simply as old-fashioned, bone-headed immovable British imperialism or British colonialism, I think you miss the point of what has been going on, you misunders. tand the dynamics of what's been going Since 1972 Britain has always had the objective of reforming Northern Ireland from above, to stop things getting completely out of hand below. This, of: course, is a central pattern in Irish history, things being done from above to stop the revolt from below. That has been Britain's goal.
When they abolished the Protestant Home Rule parliament in March 1972 there was an enormous Protestant backlash against that. The UDA, a mass Protestant militia, was formed and at its peak in 1972 it had between 30,000 and 40,000 members. There are about a million Protestants, so to get a British equivalent you would have to multiply that figure by about 60!
It was an immensely powerful Protestant-Unionist mobilisation.
Britain tried to replace the home rule of the Protestants by power-sharing, in which the Catholic middle class, through the SDLP, was co-opted into the system.. And Britain succeeded for a period in doing that. In 1973 and the beginning of 1974 they set up the power-sharing ex ecutive.
The real strength of that executive lay in the SDLP, the Catholic constitutional nationalist party. They were the
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bedrock, the real power in that administration through which, in partnership with minority Protestant politicians led by Brian Faulkner they ruled for the first five months of 1974.
Their power-sharing executive was destroyed by a Protestant general strike in May 1974. The general strike was got going to some extent by coercion at the beginning, but it became a genuine expression of the Protestant dissatisifaction and bitter anger at the whole situation.
That general strike was an immensely ¡ powerful demonstration of the latent power of the Protestant working class. Unfortunately it was the use of revolutionary methods for a reactionary goal, because their fundamental demand was that they be put back in control of the Catholics by way of "majority rule" in the artificial state. Nevertheless, it was one of the most powerful and successful examples of a general strike in European history. They smashed the powersharing executive.
After that, Britain tried a number of experiments to get a new power-sharing executive and then gave up.
The form their giving up took was that the British Labour government thereafter swung round to a policy of defeating the IRA, and this quickly became an intense repression of the entire Catholic community.
It was the Labour government which withdrew political status from convicted republican prisoners conceded by the Tories in 1972. That led to the protests round the prisons which culminated in the hunger strikes of 1981. By the end of this whole process in the early 1980s you had the powerful Catholic build-up behind the republican organisation, Sinn Fein.
In 1983 Sinn Fein got 12% of the whole vote, about 42% of the Northern Irish Catholic vote. That meant that Britain had failed — and failed dangerously. Britain's policy after 1976 of beating down the Catholics had quietened the Protestants for a long time: since the British state was doing it, the Protestants felt that they didn't have to do much themselves, and they were relativety quiet.
An attempt by lan Paisley and the UDA to get an Orange general strike in 1977 failed resoundingly.
The political rise of Sinn Fein -threatened to eliminate the constituional nationalists who had been the mainstay of the power-sharing attempt Sof the mid-1970s.
But of course Britain hadn't abandonad-1970s that it had to let the thing weat itself out for a period of time. Now the political rise of Sinn Fein areatened to close the door on all sorts if deals for the forseeable period ahead.
As a result of that threat, various cople began to act — not only were the tritish very alarmed, the Southern ourgeoisie were alarmed too and they ganised a get together of all Irish constitutional nationalist parties North and South of the border. For a year they deliberated in the so-called 'New Ireland Forum' , and finally they produced a series of proposals for a settlement with Britain. They presented their ideas as a series of options, listed in declining order of preference. Their first preference was for an immediate move towards a unitary Irish 32 County state. Their second option was an Irish federation, or a confederation, which is even looser than a federation. Their third preference was some form of joint IrishBritish rule in the Six Counties.
The immediate response of Mrs Thatcher was made during a notorious press conference where she banged the table, ticked off the various proposals and dismissed them: "That's out, that's out, that's out." But not long after Thatcher's "out, out, out" speech serious negotiations began between Britain and the Southern government which after a year produced the Anglo-Irish deal.
So the fundamental reason for the Anglo-Irish Agreement was that the breakdown of the Northern Irish state threatened the stability of the whole island and of parts of Britain too. From that stemmed the vigorous activities of the constitutional nationalists around the New Ireland Forum. The immediate goal was to save the SDLP from political oblivion or at least from being marginalised; fundamentally the goal was to find a basic solution that would allow the IRA to be quelled and to have its base of support gradually undermined and removed.
So that's the why. What is the agreement? I think it is rather more substantial than comrade Mules says. I think it is a sort of political powersharing agreement between Dublin and London. And it is enshrined in an international treaty which is binding, solemnly binding.
International treaties, of course, have limited force. If you have a dispute in Britain under the British law you have recourse to the courts and ultimately to the power of the state to enforce your legal rights. In international treaties there is no such state power to appeal to and such international treaties as the Years Anglo-Irish Agreement break down.
But nevertheless, as it stands, what it is is an international treaty whereby Britain has agreed with Dublin that they will jointly set up an inter-government conference to oversee the running of the Six Counties and Britain has bound itself, wherever there is disagreement on how to run Northern Ireland, to earnestly seek agreement before acting. In other words, it amounts to an international power-sharing agreement with the 26 Counties sharing with Britain a serious degree of political control of the Six Counties. It seems to me that's a very important development.
It's not exactly full power-sharing, it's not what the New Ireland Forum asked for, because the Executive is entirely in the hands of Britain. Nevertheless, in real terms it is a high degree of powersharing.
There are a number of parallels to this sort of development. I think that what the British and Irish bourgeoisie are doing is trying to set up a framework that can evolve and allow the creation of new structures.
Both governments claim sovereignty in Northern Ireland. If you look at what they have done in the Anglo-Irish deal, they have agreed to leave the question of sovereignty alone. They haven't formally left it alone, there are various forms of words floating about, but in practice they've decided to leave the whole business alone.
The procedure reminds me of two things and I am going to make two parallels. Firstly • with the way the English natural scientists of the 17th century dealt with the religious dogma that was still formally very much part of the English state and to which they were nominally obliged to conform. The way they dealt with the fact that England was still a state where you had to believe in the established church and all its doctrines, the way they freed themselves to really explore nature was by declaring that of everything in nature God is the first cause, but there were then many second causes. By paying lip service to God as the first cause, they managed to leave God alone on the sidelines and get on with the empirical exploration of reality.
I think that the British and Irish bourgeoisies have done something like this in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They have pushed the question of sovereignty tureping their groping their way towards new strucaside and they are trying to get on with tures.
The second parallel is with the EEC.
Inland
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20 Years Twice this century Europe has been convulsed by wars, world wars which were fundamentally rooted in the fact that the nation states of the advanced European countries were a fetter on the needs of production, the need to unify the European economy. On two occasions Germany tried to unify the European economy by simply conquering Europe, but that failed. Germany was defeated and at the end of World War 2 Russia was able to threaten to dominate Europe.
How did the bourgeoisie proceed? After the war they very urgently needed to unify the European economy but they were stopped by all the various nationalisms. So what they did was to begin in 1951 by creating something called the Iron and Steel Community which allowed the steel and coal industry, both German and French, to be unified and to escape from the normal fetters of the nation state. This led to the creation of the EEC in 1958. The EEC has largely eliminated the economic boundaries separating the European states, which are now more thoroughly integrated economically than the 50 states of the USA.
I think that what is being done in the Anglo-Irish deal is to attempt to develop in the same way, to grope towards new structures, leaving insoluble questions of sovereignty alone.
One final thing aboui this that we should note is that they have made provision for a joint Southern Irish and British, and probably eventually Northern Irish, parliamentary committee, which could actually develop into a powerful intra-parliamentary link between Britain and Ireland, by far the closest political links since the 26 Counties seceded from the old UK in 1922.
The prospects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement so far seem to be quite bright from the ruling class's point of view. Thatcher and company show themselves to be pretty firmly committed to the deal. So far they've stood up for it with impressive determination. From the point of view of the two ruling classes, the real weakness of the deal if you examine the two pillars on which the deal must stand or fall - the British bourgeoisie and the Southern Irish bourgeoiesie - is in the South of Ireland. Fianna Fail will most likely be the new government there in a year or so and it is not at all clear what Fianna Fail will do about the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It may try to renegotiate it, it may even scrap it.
Fianna Fail is not an honest bourgeois The irkers' nationalist party. It will not act on principle, it will act opportunistically and it may act in a way that will destroy the new Anglo-Irish treaty.
What's wrong with the deal? From a socialist as distinct from an Irish nationalist point of view? Even if you hope (as the ruling class, I think, do) that it can eventually lead to the evolution of new structures which will supersede the old structure and the old relationships, even if you can hope for that, it's still a very long-term prospect.
Meanwhile the grinding poverty and the built-in sectarianism in the North continues. Meanwhile the various repressions continue. Meanwhile mass unemployment is starting to bleed the South once again, after a 15 year interruption.
Apart from that, it is an undemocratic way of dealing with the problem, particularly with the Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland. It seems to me therefore, that is is not a solution that socialists can support.
However, I think it is very important that we should understand it for what it is — a series of quite subtle moves by the ruling class which, if it sticks, can perhaps evolve and create new relations between Ireland as a whole and Britain.
Now that, if it survived in the long, long, long term, can bring some benefits but I don't think we can support it in the hope of benefits in the distant or medium distant future.
John Bloxam Recently an editorial in Republican News warned of the danger of sectarian civil war. The result of such a war, the editorial concluded, would not be a united Ireland, but bloody repartition. Daisy in her contribution suggested that the idea of repartition exists in the Loyalist community, but in the cold light of day they would drop it very quickly. If that is her view I think it is under-estimating it, and the Republican News editorial was more accurate. Could she explain in more detail Sinn Fein's attitude?
Martin Thomas t's quite common on the Left in Britain to hear people describe the Northern Ireland Protestants as 'paper tigers'; to say that the Anglo-Irish deal is entirely in their interests, and they just don't understand what's going on. The analysis that Daisy gave is a lot more realistic.
That raises a question. If the Protestant backlash is a response to a serious shift in the policy of the ruling class, that same backlash is going to exist against any movement towards a united Ireland. How should socialists and republicans deal with that?
There are two theoretically possible answers. First is that you look to conquering the Protestants by physical force: the other is that you look towards winning sectil over, of them.
Whether or not conquest is desirabl it seems to us that, given the relationsi of forces, it is not possible. The Pi testants could hold at least a part of t north-east of Ireland — throu pogroms against Catholics living ther and so on. Therefore you have to lo towards winning over a section of tl Protestants, particularly the worki class, politically. I'd like to ask wh Sinn Fein's ideas are about that task?
Daisy Mules When Paisley made his ve aggressive statements abo civil war, we analysed that a result of the power struggle going ‹ among the Loyalists. Peter Robinson being seen by the harder line Loyalists a potential leader, so somehow Paise had to regain ground. Also Paisl wanted to scare people.
After the divorce referendum, he ir mediately backtracked. He said th now there was no need for a civil w because the 26 Counties had shown | their denial of divorce as a civil right th Irish unity was not possible.
There's been a lot of publicity Loyalist attacks on the RUC and UDR — mostly the RUC — houses al homes. But they've also been attackil Catholic homes, especially in places lil East Belfast. These attacks are ve similar to the pogroms of the ear seventies.
In new buildings near Derry, Cathol families have had to move out becau of Loyalist attacks on their homes.
So that possibility of civil war always there. But in our analysis it ce tainly isn't going to happen at the mo ment. And Britain won't allow it to hal pen.
Paisley and the other Unionist leade! are very well aware that the Anglo-Iris Agreement does not erode their right In fact it entrenches their rights in man ways. It actually states that the Loyali veto will always be upheld.
Repartition isn't a real possibility, i our view.
What are we going to do to win ove Protestants politically? There's no wa that Sinn Fein is going to win ove Loyalists by political argument whil their supremacy is guaranteed to ther by the British government. So long a their supremacy is guaranteed, the won't listen to any discussion or talk: They won't even talk to John Hume.
We think a basic requirement for an talks to develop is that the Unioni guarantee is taken away. Then they wil engage in discussion. But until then, wh should they talk to us?
Tony Dale P does highlight aisley talking about civil wl the danger ofi Paisley is softe ling up com] yare to many others in tl = Loyalist c am) With people like Rot nson taking COl
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Pol of mobilisations idanger.
It's not a question of crystal ball gaz-g. — will there or won't there be a securian cIVil war! lo recognise the ossibility, as sinn Fein do, is more kirious than many on the British Left. In the British Left much of the response me, or threatening the link with Britain' Where's a tendency to see the Protestants $ puppets, just as dupes, and not cognise that their reaction to the Deal hows the extent to which they are an in#pendent force.
Daisy said that the Anglo-Irish Deal rengthens the Loyalist veto. Yes, it's byalists want themselves alone to -cide what happens in the North. The eal takes that away; it says that what's Ding to count is what we think in Lonan, and what our counterparts think in ublin. It's taken away 'Protestant self"termination', and that is an important Lange.
Hete Keenlyside t worries me when people describe the relationship between Britain and Ireland as 'the last vestiges of colonHism', "imperialism', , etc. To me that -st doesn't make sense. i Britain derives very little benetit trom he maintenance of its rule in Northern Heland. I don't know the exact figures, Lat I suspect that more money goes into leland than comes out of it. Most inInstries are heavily subsidised. In a glarxist sense, it's a strange imperialism. • Britain got out of colonies where it Pas in a better position to extract profit. don't know what it gets out of Ireland. The situation can't be explained with the Stassic analysis of imperialism. If you try ts explain it like that, you miss a lot of pints.
I The Protestants have got every reason i be wary of deals like the Anglo-irish tereement. At the end of it, the project for Britain to establish a relationship ith Irish capitalism like that it has with y other capitalist country: an interitalist relationship.
he project for both the British and h ruling classes is to normalise the uation. That does mean doing away ich this 'odd' situation in the North. At the end of the day, it's in the interests of titish capitalism to have a united •Hand • That's not to say that the project will *oceed. It will fail because it's a soluon imposed from above.
Daisy said - and it struck me as very Tange - that there isn't much telihood of a sectarian civil war. And couldn't allow it. Now, whatever the de reason she gave is that Britain ghts and wrongs of using the slogan -roops out', on its own, we're all agreed ¡at Britain's involvement in Ireland ust end. What if we're successful -morrow? Then the thing that will prevent cir il war will strange for people f perialisn I to look to war.
moved $ Britis preven Liam Conway Daisy said there wouldn't be a civil war. I think it's true that the Anglo-Irish Deal won't lead to civil war, because it doesn't threaten the union between Northern Ireland and Britain. But if you look at history, civil war has been most likely when the Union was threatened.
On the question of Protestant supremacy, I think it's wrong to deal with the Protestants as a whole unit in a supremacist sense, or to talk about them as if they were only the Protestant leaders and not ordinary Protestant people as well. Socialists have got to cut through Protestant - and indeed all -leaders and look at the root of the Protestants' fears.
And of course there are plenty of Protestants suffering unemployment as well as Catholics. We have to look not just at their social concerns, but other concerns too.
The Protestant minority in the whole terest, that they feel a separate identity. It's not just a concern of their leaders who are duping the Protestant workers. Looking across the border at the South reinforces their ideas.
I'd like to ask why Sinn Fein dropped their commitment to federalism, which goes some way towards creating a framework in which the working class of both communities can have their identity satisfied. It would create the possibility of the unity of the working class to create a socialist Ireland.
Niall Power First, on civil war. Nobody would underestimate the very real danger of civil war. But I do detect a certain double standards when some people on the British Left discuss this question.
We call for an end to apartheid and one person, one vote in South Africa. There is the distinct possibility that the granting of those things would lead to civil war — not just between whites and blacks, but between blacks and blacks: a distinct possibility. But that doesn't lead us to water down our support for the ending of apartheid, or for one person, one vote.
I fail to see why we should water down our support for one person, one vote in Ireland, either.
Second, on the sincere - I presume — call for workers' unity in the North. Comrades, as much as you may wish for that to happen, I can assure you it simply won't happen while Britain remains in Ireland. If you doubt that, I suggest you go to Ireland, get more informed of the mentality and the material privileges of 20 Years the Protestants - workers included.
You won't break through to any form of working class unity while Britain remains there.
A majority — a majority — of the Irish working class wants to see Britain out of Ireland. Why don't you support that majority clearly and unambiguously, without wanting provisos about particular forms of unity with one significant minority in a particular part of the country?
Third, I would like to ask SO for more information about federalism. John O'Mahony mentioned that federalism was one of the proposals coming out of the Irish Forum Report. Is that a form of federalism that you would support?
I think Britain would like to leave Ireland, but it also needs to protect its interests. It does have financial interests, it does have industry, not only in the North but also in the South. The British taxpayer may be losing from it, but the British capitalist isn't.
And the military interests need to be protected, in the sense of American bases in the north of Ireland. A united Ireland - and certainly a militarily independent one - would threaten those quite seriously.
And ideologically, Britain isn't going to be forced out, like Vietnam was forced out of Vietnam.
Martin Thomas don't think any us are saying that it's an easy, straightforward task for socialists or republicans to address themselves to Protestant workers. We're not saying, like Militant, that if you talk about working class unity enough the Protestant workers will flock round and everything will be lovely. We understand that it is difficult almost to the point of impossibility even to get a hearing, let alone to get them to agree with you.
Nevertheless, if you analyse the situation realistically, you come to the conclusion that that difficult task if the key task. To say that it's difficult is to say that progress in Ireland is difficult.
It's not just a because we're fantastically concerned with the rights of the Protestants, though I think we should be to a certain extent. It's also a question of realistic calculation. Even if we said that the Protestants don't have any rights at all, they nevertheless have force. As Daisy put it, they're a substantial minority, concentrated and heavily armed. They have the force to prevent Workers' Ireland
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10 Yesse Ireland being united.
Even on those grounds address the problem.
Daisy's answer is a sort of two-stage theory. At one stage there's nothing you can do, politically, in relation to the Protestants. Your efforts should concentrate on putting pressure on the British government so that it will repeal the acts of the British Parliament that say' that the Northern Ireland Protestants can maintain the Northern Ireland unit as long as they wish. Once that has been done it will be possible to talk to the Protestants and create unity.
There are two problems with that sort of two-stages theory. First, the Protestants have two vetoes. They have one veto written into legal Acts of Parliament; and they have another veto secured by their own force.
Part of the legal veto has been taken away, Direct Rule has been imposed. A veto on relations with the South has been taken away.
How have the Protestants reacted? By becoming more willing to talk to their fellow workers? No, on the contrary, you've seen a hardening of the Protestant sectarianism over the past 14 years.
Taking away the legal veto won't automatically make the creation of class unity easier. In fact, the immediate result might be to make it more difficult. That doesn't mean we should oppose taking away the legal veto; it means that we have to couple it with other political demands.
But how do you get the veto by force taken away? I can't see any reason why the British government should be able to actually take that veto away. It seems to me you need some degree of class unity. I'm not saying we're not interested in a united Ireland unless it is created by a united working class, I'm saying that practically, it won't happen.
Niall said: you won't get a united working class until you have a united Ireland. You'll get a united working class after a united Ireland. You can see the force in that argument. But if you analyse the situation the opposite also holds: you don't get a united İreland until you've got a united working class.
Does that mean the whole situation is impossible? It means it's very difficult. It means you can't rely on the two-stage theory. You have to be trying to create a united working class, or at least a partially united working class — you're not going to win over the entire Protestant working class — at the same time as you fight for a united Ireland.
Workerg' Pat Murphy That's happening in the Loyalist community? What are the prospects for its opposition? It seems to me that if Ian Paisley is being forced into posturing — like his call for action on the streets and so on - it's an indication of the strength of the Loyalist opposition. Paisley has dominated the Protestants since 1970 and his party has been increasingly dominant since 1979 or so. If he's forced to posture, it shows the strength of the Loyalist opposition.
Civil war isn't just morally bad because people start butchering each other. The point is that the political settlement that would come out of it would be repartition. So there are political reasons as well as moral ones to recoil from the prospect of civil war.
It's not a question, as Niall said, that we don't recognise the right of the Irish people to determine their own future. But there's a difference between recognising that right and realising it. To put it starkly: the political force that can create a united Ireland doesn't exist at the moment; it has yet to be created. That's one of the reasons why a united Ireland seems so distant.
Sinn Fein's struggle, justified as it is, is limited. It's limited geographically, and also physically to 10% of the entire Irish people. It's also politically limited, but that's another discussion. Its continued struggle at best can defend the Catholic community. But all it can do is maintain the stalemate, and push and prod the British government into attempted reforms.
Support amongst constitutional nationalists for the Accord is partly, as Daisy said, due to their fear of Sinn Fein. But it also concedes something to them that's new. It concedes that the Southern Irish government has got a say in the affairs of the North.
But also the Republican movement is vulnerable to that kind of strategy. The idea of reforming the Northern Ireland state continues to have some weight. The alternative — a united Ireland - seems remote and distant. That's a problem we have to confront.
The British and Irish governments are trying to create a framework that will break the stalemate — in their interests. That's exactly what we have to do. We have to create the force that can achieve a united Ireland.
We have to break from conventional and return tr traditional Republicanism - uniting the Irish people.
John Bloxam Niall complained of double standards. But there's a difference between the kind of civil war you might see in South Africa on the one hand, and Ireland on the other. It's a difference for example of a situation like the Lebanon - two working class communities slaughtering each other, with no progress coming out of it; and a situation perhaps like Spain.
Civil war in South Africa might be a necessary to unite the whole country and allow the working class to fight for its own demands. Civil war in Ireland would be different. And that's what the discussion is about. Everyone retand. But if therets a civilorar, which would mean repartition, that would certainly not be an advance on the situation, and could well be a stęp backwards.
That's our concern in talking about civil war and repartition. Daisy said she doesn't think there would be repartition. I'm not quite sure why she thinks that. There are two arguments, I think. One is that the Protestants aren't strong enough to organise their own state outside of Britain. I just don't think this is the case. They're strong enough numerically and armed enough to do it.
The second is that a Protestant state wouldn't be economically viable. But it doesn't depend upon cold economic calculations. I can't assess that. It depends upon a political drive, which would be very strong.
Comrades have pointed quite rightly to the problems of creating working class unity. But they're missing the point - it's a problem, it's been tried before and failed so it'll have to wait for a united Ireland...this just ignores the points that have been made here.
We're not saying that we've got all the answers. We're trying to address the problem. That's important. The comrades haven't explained how a united Ireland is going to happen outside of some kind of unity.
John O'Mahony You can't measure the threat of sectarian civil war by Paisley. What comrade Mules said about his motivation - the infighting in Unionist ranks — is quite right. But then it is an old joke that Ian Paisley is a bit of a 'fake right'. He's a demagogue. You can't measure the threat of civil war by Paisley's manoeuvrings.
The basic thing is that even today, even with the Deal, the Protestants think they can rely on the British state - it's their state, they identify with it. So long as it's there, they don't have the motivation to organise themselves for sectarian civil war, or rather for a war to carve out their own area of Ireland, to create their own state.
But given their heavy concentration, particularly in Antrim and Down, ! don't see any reason to doubt that if they feel fundamentally threatened they will resist, and sectarian civil war will be a real part of the situation.
We should beware of logic chopping. It's fine to point out the contradiction in comrade Mules' argument - that Britain prevents civil war, etc. But it's also absolutely irrefutably true. It's true that
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'Address Please sen € SI Box 823. if Britain left without a political settlement the Protestants would try to sort it out in their own way.
In Britain we have to insist all the time that the Six County state is an artificial entity, and shouldn't exist. But that idea also contains a potential lie that Leftists can tell themselves: the lie that no Protestant majority state is viable or conceivable. In reality there is such a conceivable state — smaller than the present one - that could emerge out of a sectarian clash.
It is inconceivable that the Catholics çould win. I don't think that subjugating Protestants is desirable, but in any case it wouldn't happen.
I agree that in the current situation, Working class unity is not possible. "However, the idea that you will only get It after a united Ireland is simply nonsensical. You will not get a united Ireland unless you find some way of uniting the Irish people; you will most likely get a repartitioned Ireland as a result of the Provo war. So it's a vicious circle.
You won't get a united Ireland by Catholic conquest of the Protestants. The Catholic half-million in the north could not conceivably conquer the Protestant million. It's inconceivable that the Catholic population in the South would mobilise to try to do it. It's just not possible.
Out of that we derive the notion of combining our propaganda for a socialist Ireland and for British withdrawal with some sort of democratic solution - a democratic version of Socialist Organiser stands for workers' liberty East and West. We aim to help organise the left wing in the Labour Party and trade unions to fight to replace capitalism with working class socialism.
We want public ownership of the major enterprises and a planned economy under workers' control. We want democracy much fuller than the present Westminster system - a workers' democracy, with elected you six id me 6/12 months sub. enc and to: Socialist Organis London SE15 4NA federalism. On that basis you could at least talk to some of the Protestants. You could create small groups of united workers on that democratic basis.
In reality that's one of our differences with Sinn Fein. We would accept that the Protestants are a legitimate Irish minority. They are not just a political minority that can be said to be pro-imperialist or 'unionist' - though they are unionists. I'm not too sure of the precise definition though I wouldn't balk too much at calling them a national minority.
Ireland's problem is that there's a national minority, but instead of that minority relating rationally and democratically to the Irish majority, the whole thing was snarled up by the intervention of the British ruling class in the artificial form of an artificial partition - which created a bigger Catholic minority than the Protestants would have been in the whole of Ireland.
We've got to look at that rationally, as socialists, and also as Republicans.
One of the problems with Sinn Fein is that to a considerable extent it's come to reflect the northern Catholic minority and to a serious extent to break with fundamental aspects of republicanism, for example in its abandonment of federalism, which it advocated for a decade.
Federalism isn't something SO has just thought up. As long ago as 1921 the political leader of the Republicans who were soon to be in arms against the Free State government, De Valera, adopted representatives recallable at any time, and an end to bureaucrats' and managers' privileges.
Socialism can never be built in one country alone. The workers in every country have more in common with workers in other countries than with their own capitalist or Stalinist rulers. We support national liberation struggles and workers' struggles worldwide, including the struggle of workers and oppressed nationalities in Utaser capri did shoor 1o s0 hometes. TOr Years some notion of federalism, recognising that there had to be an attempt to accommodate the Protestant minority.
It was very late in the story. History might have gone differently if that proposal had been part of the original Home Rule Bill of the 1880s. It wasn't. 1921 was very late in the affair, and there have never been many Protestant takers for the idea as far as I know.
But the point is to have a basic democratic programme that will allow workers to talk to workers and allow sacialists from either community to assure people from the other community that they respect their identity and do not propose any form of sectarian or national oppression.
I dọn't think that just because we're in Britain we can accept a self-denying ordinance that we have no right to do or say anything but simply reflect straightforward Provo Irish nationalism. I think it's far too complex for that. the Stalinist states against their anti-socialist bureaucracies.
We stand:
For full equality for women, and social provision to free women from the burden of housework. For a mass working class-based women's movement.
Against racism, and against deportations and all immigration controls.
For equality for lesbians and gays.
For a united and free Ireland, with some federal system to protect the rights of the Protestant minority.
For left unity in action; clarity in debate and discussion.
For a labour movement accessible to the most oppressed, accountable to its rank and file, and militant against capitalism.
We want Labour Party and trade union members who support our basic ideas to become supporters of the paper — to take a bundle of papers to sell each week and pay a small contribution to help meet the paper's deficit. Our policy is democratically controlled by our supporters through Annual General Meetings and an elected National Editorial Board.
Ireland
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Years Daisy Mules That hasn't really been touched on is why Britain wants to stay in Ireland. It is an economic reason, which no-one has touched upon.
Seamus Mallon and Fitzgerald, when the Anglo-Irish Agreement came out, actually touched on it. Mallon indicated that he would be willing to negotiate an end to Free State neutrality if he felt that would end the Northern Irish political deadlock. So Britain is there for strategic reasons tied up with NATO. that's what we would want. Some of us try it through trade union work, where we're meeting Protestant working class people. But most of the unions have clauses in their constitutions disallowing any discussion of political matters — by which they mean things to do with Ireland; they don't mean talking about the war in South Africa or Nicaragua. They simply mean talking about the war in Northern Ireland.
Until the ICTU removes that constitutional bar on discussing politics, there will be no discussion. But in unions and trades councils where we do raise these issues.
Federalism. When Sinn Fein did have a policy of federalism, it certainly didn't encourge unionists to talk to us, or encourage the Protestant working class to do so. I don't think federalism would create more discussion.
Sinn Fein dropped it because we saw it as a sop to the Loyalists and we felt it was weakening our positions. We also felt strongly that it wouldn't in the long run create a socialist Ireland and that's what we are trying to do.
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