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Socialist Organiser1989 1989-05-24Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 5 →
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page bureaucrats, China's rulers had no time and no thought for the best alternative to rigid state control:
conscious democratic planning of the economy by the proletarians and working farmers.
Compared with the old command economy, this system at least allowed the people to have some choice and gave them some method of expressing preferences, but it is nevertheless a method which is both wasteful and brutal.
In China it has led to chaos:
bounding inflation; an unevenness which means, for example, that many factories are now idle because of a chronic shortage of energy;
massive unemployment, as workers are shaken out of industries where before they had some sort of security in deference to the new god of profitability.
It has led to tensions between regions, some of which are comparatively thriving while others lag behind.
In short, the changes unleashed the "war of all against all" characteristic of capitalism - but within, and as part of, a system still heavily weighted down and shaped by the gigantically inflated bureaucratic state.
The state retains final control, and has power to snuff out the capitalist growths springing up in the areas it controls. The all-powerful Chinese state licensed capitalists in the '50s and then snuffed them out, though it is unlikely to find it as easy now to stamp out the elements of capitalism that have come into existence in the last decade.
In the USSR Gorbachev first tried, three years ago, to shake up the economy, intending to use limited free-market mechanisms. He met with great bureaucratic inertia and resistance. Such resistance had stifled attempts at change in the '60s. So. Gorbachev decided to purge elements of the bureaucracy and renew it. He called for "glasnost' - openness - and political reforms which move a bit away from the old rigid Stalinist structures.
No political reforms In China economic reform was introduced without any political reforms, and has had ten years to work away, destabilising and destructuring the old formations of the Chinese Stalinist polity. There has been no Chinese glasnost.
Today the Chinese students, hailing Gorbachev as a hero, demand glasnost and democracy from below — or at least under pressure from below.
Two parallel but interconnected crises have come together to give China's political and social life its peculiarly explosive character: the economic crisis and the crisis of political leadership.
streets as a warning to onlookers.
Even South Africa is moderate by comparison, with only about 500 legal killings a year.
Corruption has eaten away at the bureaucracy like a virus. For example, the son of Deng Xiaoping, the present leader of the Chinese Stalinists, is widely believed to have sent large sums of money to a foreign bank account out of funds collected to help disabled people.
(He himself is in a wheelchair, having been thrown out of a window by *Red Guard' during the Cultural Revolution). Many officials have become rich through participation in "market-socialist" enterprises.
Corruption
The issue of corruption links the economic and political crises of China. Corruption and nepotism in China take their present form because of the monopoly of power and patronage held by the so-called Chinese Communist Party. That monopoly used to be linked to the organising function of the party in the economy and life of the country. Now it begins to seem more and more arbitrary and restrictive, both to the organisers of "market socialism" and to the students and others who see that access to jobs is linked to patronage and family position in the top bureaucracy. They are against hereditary privileges for the bureaucracy.
The present student movement began in April, using as cover the funeral of a reputedly liberal party leader sacked two years ago after the student demonstrations of December 1986 and January 1987. The students raised seven demands. The key ones were for free speech, a free press, and an end to corruption.
The students seem to have had a central leadership in Beijing which coordinated their campaign. Denouncing corruption, they went on the streets to talk to the citizens and explain their point of view. The success of their agitation has been shown by the great demonstrations over the last month, and the paralysis it has induced in the government.
The paralysis does not just come from the problem of how to control the students. This may very well be the key turning point in the postMao history of China.
The economic reform - "market socialism" — has created serious economic dislocation, which will get worse and worse in the period ahead. The regime faces a fundamental choice: continue on the "market socialist" course, despite the chaos, or try to reimpose some sort of command economy.
Six months ago they decided to reimpose central control; but their OR GIVE MED efforts have been half-hearted and indecisive, in any case ineffective. People committed to "market socialism" were still in control, like Deng and party secretary Zhao Zilang (who is his designated successor, due, for example, to take over from Deng as head of the Armed Forces Commission later this year).
Prime Minister Li Peng and others seem to have been the ones committed to solving the crisis by a serious attempt to recreate a level of detailed state control over the economy which has not existed for a decade.
The student demonstrations for free speech and against corruption erupted into this debate. Their explicit target has been Li Peng; they have praised Zhao. But it would be wrong to conclude that the students, and still less their working-class supporters, favour the "market socialists" • They are outspokenly against Deng, Zhao's patron, but an advocate of hardline repression.
The hardliners won in the leading circles and sent the army to clear Tiananmen Square - but the army didn't have a cutting edge against the people. Soldiers agreed with the outrage against . corruption and growing inequality agitating the demonstrators. Even soldiers kept away from radio and TV for ten days before being sent to Beijing were quickly enlightened.
Behind the scenes, it looks like the commanders of the army (three million strong, half conscripts) were involved in the leadership factionfighting. Zhao is their man. They may have baulked at unleashing a civil war that would start by a sizeable part of the army going over to the people.
The army knows it is the iron centre-piece of the Stalinist dictatorship, as it proved when it controlled the chaos unleashed in the late '60s.
The army was stopped by the people, and now it has retreated. In Hungary at the end of October 1956 a Russian army was withdrawn from Budapest after being similarly affected by a mass popular movement; three days later another Russian army launched a full-scale bid to conquer Budapest and drown the Hungarian revolution in blood, which it did.
We cannot judge whether that possibility exists for China's leaders; on the whole it seems unlikely in the immediate period ahead.
The students and the workers of China have so far done earthshaking things. The students have organised an independent student union; there are reports that workers have organised an independent trade union.
Their experience of struggle and partial victory will give great encouragement to the Chinese masses in the battles they face against the effects of the economic chaos created by the combination of bureaucratic tyranny and market economics.
In Poland a mass independent trade union, Solidarnosc, emerged in 1980 in a mass strike movement; it was the result not alone of the immediate conflicts between workers and rulers in the strikes of summer 1980, but also of a long experience - the semi-revolution of 1956, the strike movements of 1970 and 1976. In those struggles the women and men who built Solidarnose in 1980 and after gained experience and clarity.
We cannot know how long such a process will take in China, but we can be certain that it is already underway. The economic chaos of China may act as a forcing house for it.
There is, however, a negative side to the tremendously encouraging result in Beijing. The army wavered, but the army remains intact. It has not been split apart or broken up. It might have been, had it come to open clashes with the demonstrators.
The state remains We rejoice in the lack of bloodshed; but it is a tragedy that the Chinese state remains intact and able to inflict bloodshed in the future. There is no getting away from the fact that what is necessary in China is a revolution of the workers and working farmers, and that that can never happen without the destruction of the state apparatus through which the increasingly decrepit once-totalitarian Chinese bureaucracy exercises its dictatorship.
The economic chaos, and the class struggles that will go with it, make it probable that whichever bureaucratic clique has control at the end of the present intrabureaucratic conflict, they will have to try to clamp down heavily on the working class, imposing the austerity policy they decided at the end of Last year.
It will be far better for the Chinese working class if this present conflict - when the rulers are so plainly divided - had begun to break up the bureaucrats' chief weapon of repression.
China shows what may well happen in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Gorbachev saw the revolutionary upsurge. He has probably gone home thinking that if what he saw in China shows the future for market-oriented economic reforms, then it must be avoided at all costs. He may not be able to avoid it. The reforming Stalinists have unleashed and are unleashing forces they cannot control.
The inspiring events in China point to an important lesson for Marxists: if there had been in China a revolutionary Marxist party, a party whose militants had been educated in the history of working-class revolutions, a disciplined party fighting for a programme of revolution against the bureaucrats and for working-class power - then in the last weeks we would have seen the beginning of workers' power in In the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as China, only such organisations can prevent the ferment unleashed by the decay of the old Stalinist command economy dispersing in confusion and chaos and ending in terrible new defeats for the working class in the statemonopoly societies.