Why 'Communism' in China has meant a police state
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-05-11Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 9 →
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"They're not Communists, but feudal old guys"
Chinese worker was recently reported as about China's ruling Yet men like Deng Xiaoping were revolutionaries in their own way. They spent nearly 30 years in battle against the imperialist powers which dominated China and against China's landlords and top capitalists. They led a huge revolution, based on:
the struggles of millions of peasants, in 1949.
Their present position is not just the result of old age and the privileges of power. The totalitarian regime, the stifling of free political life, against which China's students and workers are now protesting, was initiated straight away after the revolution in 1949.
Why? The decisive
transformation of the outlook, social affiliation, The peasant movement has ritories, and has installed its own institutions. In the event of further successes - and all of us, of course, passionately desire such successes - the movement will become linked up with the urban and industrial centres and, through that very fact, it will come face to face with the working class. What will be the nature of this encounter? Is it certain that its character will be peaceful and friendly?
At first glance une question might appear to be superfluous. The peasant movement is headed by Communists or sympathisers. Isn't it self-evident that in the event of their coming together the workers and the peasants must unanimously unite under the Communist banner?
Among the Communist leaders of Red detachments there indubitably are many declassed intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who have not gone through the school of proletarian stuggle. For two or three years they live the lives of partisan commanders and commissars; they wage battles, sieze territories etc. They absorb the spirit of their environment. Meanwhile the majority of the rank-and-file Communists in the Red detachments unquestionably consist of peasants, who assume the name Communist in all honesty and sincerity but who in actuality remain revolutionary paupers revolutionary petty proprietors. In politics he who judges by denominations and labels and not by social facts is lost. All the more so when the politics concerned is carried out arms in hand.
The true Communist party is the organisation of the proletarian vanguard. But we must not forget that the working class of China has been kept in an oppressed and amorphous condition during the ast to years, and only recently has it evinced signs of revival. It is one thing when a Communist party, firmly resting on the flower of the urban proletariat, strives through and political character of the Chinese Communist Party leadership took place between the 1920s and the 1940s.
In 1927-8 the Chinese workers' movement was crushed. False policies by the Chinese Communist Party, imposed on it by Stalin, contributed to this defeat. A revolutionary opportunity was missed.
The Communist leaders fled the cities and establised themselves in the countryside. There was no real central state power in China at that time. By mobilising the peasants for rent reductions or land reforms, the Communist Party was able to win local power in sizeable areas and build up a formidable military machine.
That was the start of the process which led to the revolution of 1949. It also transformed the revolutionaries. Divorced from the working class, placed at the head of big military the workers to lead a peasant war.
It is an altogether different thing when a few thousand or even tens of thousands of revolutionists, who are truly Communists or only take the name, assume the leadership of a peasant war without having serious support from the proletariat. This is precisely the situation in China. This acts to augment to an extreme the danger of conflicts between the workers and the armed peasants. In any event, one may rest assured there will be no dearth of bourgeois provocateurs.
In Russia, in the period of civil war, the proletariat was already in power in the greater part of the country, the leadership of the strug gle was in the hands of a strong and tempered party, the entire commanding apparatus of the centralised Red Army was in the hands of the workers. Notwithstanding all this, the peasant detachments, incomparably weaker than the Red Army; often came into conflict with it after it victoriously moved into peasant guerrilla sectors.
In China the situation is radically different and moreover completely to the disadvantage of the workers. In the most important regions of China the power is in the hands of bourgeois militarists; in other regions, in the hands of leaders of armed peasants. Nowhere is there any proletarian power as yet. The trade unions are weak. The influence of the party among the workers is insignificant. The peasant detachments, flushed with victories they have achieved, stand under the wing of the Comintern. They call themselves *the Red Army" ie, they identify themselves with the armed forces of the Soviets. What results consequently is that the revolutionary peasantry of China, in the person of its ruling stratum, seems to have appropriated to itself beforehand the political and moral capital which should by the nature of things belong to the Chinese workers. Isn't it possible that things may turn out so that all this capital will be directed at a certain moment against the workers?
Naturally the peasant poor, and in China they constitute the overwhelming majority, to the extent they think politically, and these comprise a small minority, sincerely and passionately desire alliance and friendship with the workers. But the peasantry, even when armed, is inand administrative machines, and educated the ideas of Stalinism, which were increasingly the ideas of an exploitative bureaucratic ruling class, these "Communists" moved very far from the ideas of workers' liberty.
In the article from which we publish extracts here - "Peasant War in China and the Proletariat"
written in 1932 - Leon Trotsky commented on this transformation at an early stage.
Trotsky did not anticipate that the Maoists would take full power in China, crush the old capitalist class, and establish their own totalitarian state. Another 17 years of great changes in world politics were to pass before that could happen. Yet as early and 1932 Trotsky was able to highlight some of the factors and processes that would later prove decisive.
capable of conducting dent policy.
Occupying in daily life an intermediate, indeterminate, and vacillating position, the peasantry at decisive moments can follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The peasantry does not find the road to the proletariat easily but only after a series of mistakes and defeats. The bridge between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie is provided by the urban petty bourgeoisie, chiefly by the intellectuals, who commonly come forward under the banner of socialism and even communism.
The commanding stratum of the Chinese 'Red Army' has no doubt succeeded in inculcating itself with the habit of issuing commands. The absence of a strong revolutionary party, and of mass organisations of the proletariat renders control over the commanding stratum virtually impossible. The commanders and commissars appear in the guise of absolute masters of the situation and upon occupying cities will be rather apt to look down from above upon the workers. The demands of the workers might often appear to them either inopportune or illadvised, Nor should one forget such trifles' as the fact that within cities the staff and offices of the victorious armies are established not in the proletarian huts but in the finest city buildings, in the houses and apartments of the bourgeoisie; and all this facilitates the inclination of the upper stratum of the peasant armies to feel itself part of the 'cultured' and 'educated' classes, in no way part of the proletariat.
Thus in China the causes and grounds for conflicts between the army, which is peasant in composition and petty bourgeois in leadership, and the workers not only are not eliminated but, on the contrary, all the circumstances are such as to greatly increase the possibility and even the inevitability of such conflicts; and in addition the chances of the proletariat are far less favourable to begin with than was the case in Russia.
The Russian Narodniks used to accuse the Russian Marxists of "ignoring' the peasantry, of not carrying on work in the villages, etc. To this the Marxists replied: «We will arouse and organise the advanced workers and through the workers we shall arouse "the peasants." Such in general is the only conceivable road for the proletarian party.
The Chinese Stalinists have acted otherwise. During the revolution of 1925-27 they subordinated directly and immediately the interests of the workers and the peasants to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In the years of the counterrevolution they passed over from the proletariat to the peasantry, ie, they undertook that role which was fulfilled in our country by the SRs when they were still a revolutionary party. Had the Chinese Communist Party concentrated its efforts for the last few years in the cities, in industry, on the railroads; had it sustained the trade unions, the educational clubs and circles; had it, without breaking off from the workers, taught them to understand what was occurring in the villages — the share of the proletariat in the general correlation of forces would have been incomparably more favourable today.
The party actually tore itself away from the class. Thereby in the last analysis it can cause injury in the peasantry as well. For should the proletariat continue to remain on the sidelines, without organisation, without leadership, then the peasant war even if fully victorious will inevitably arrive in a blind alley.
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created its own armies, has seized great ter-