Is the intifada socialist?
Socialist Organiser1989 1989-05-04Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 6
T Organisation's firm he Palestine Liberation declaration that it now favours a 'two state' solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict has put the issue of a Palestinian state securely on the world's agenda. But has it opened up socialist possibilities? What is the relationship between the PLO's diplomatic strategy, and socialism?
For many on the left, there is a clear negative relationship. The PLO, in recognising Israel and renouncing the 'secular democratic state" except as a very long-term aim, has capitulated to Zionism, to imperialism and at least indirectly to racism. November's Palestine National Council adopted, according to Socialist Worker, for example, a programme akin to Buthelezistyle acceptance of South African Bantustans. The new PLO policy is betrayal.
It is a betrayal, the argument runs, not only of general principles, but also of the intifada, the uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.
Weight is added to it by the attitudes of the most radical Palestinian groups, which range from reluctant acceptance to outright rejection. George Habbash's view, which is effectively "we'll give it a go, but if it hasn't worked in tw years, that's it" , expresses the more moderate line; the SWP and others go with the real ultra-nationalists who see the entire project as treason.
The simple answer to the sellout' analysis is precisely to compare what has happened to South Africa. Do Yasser Arafat's left-wing critics really believe he is no different to Gatsha Buthelezi? If so, why is the Israeli government so irremediably stupid as to have failed to have realised it?
As Israeli socialist Adam Keller pointed out during his British tour in February, if the South African parallel was apt, it would be the Israeli government that wanted 'two states' , and the PLO that rejected it. So either both the Israeli government and the PLO are out of their minds, or it is a different situation.
SOCIALIST lederation of the Mid.
Right so a state of thair die East with the right tor all nations, in- cluding the israel MREANISER Two.
nations, Two states!
The condit INSIDE Yet don't socialist critics have a point? Arafat's strategy is plainly to win imperialist (including Russian) support tor the two-state project. Its implementation is envisaged not via mass struggle, although that has its uses, but via superpower will, A US/USSR sponsored peace plan might help create a Palestinian state; but at what cost? The inevitable result of the current course ot action is the establishment, at best, of a Palestinian state subordinated to, allied with and dependent upon imperialism. It is a strategy guaranteed to militate against independent mass activity, and in particular against any such activity that might have a socialist character.
Given the reality of Arafat's policy, is it not completely mad -not to say unprincipled - for socialists to identify with it, or support it?
This line of argument is logically separable from arguments about 'two states' in principle. Nevertheless, the thrust of the argument is generally that 'two states' is in practice inseparable from a reactionary, pro-imperialist policy. You cannot have one without the other.
There is a real problem here that needs to be addressed. The clearest way to do so is to examine the 'socialist alternative' to Arafat's line.
According to Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, or anyway according to the version of it that most Trotskyists accept, the solution to the national question is the workers' revolution. This is its only solution. Without socialist revolution, there will be no lasting solution to any of the problems of the bourgeois-democratic struggle.
The only solution to Palestinian national oppression, therefore, is socialism. The alternative to Arafat's policy is socialist revolution.
For some Trotskyists (Militant for example, Jewish-Arab workers' unity is necessary for this revolution. For others (SWP) it is irrelevant. But that there should be a socialist revolution is common ground. More precisely, it is common ground that socialist revolution is the immediate, practical alternative to Arafat's policy.
In this way, would-be Trotskyists reduce the entire programme of socialist revolution to the most miserably abstract propagandism. For it is obviously not the case that Two Nations!
Two States!
Special Socialist Organiser supplement on the 20 pence plus 13 post from PO Box 123, London SE15 4NA socialist revolution is an immediate practical alternative. If workers' power is ever to be put on the agenda, the socialist programme must be made far more concrete.
And concretely, what are the material forces at work in the conflict? What possibilities, and what limitations are there, to socialist struggle? -The current Palestinian struggle is of an almost exclusively nationalist character. The objectives of the intifada are of course nationalist ones, and so militantly nationalist that they severely limit the potential of a socialist, working class movement.
So far, there is practically no Palestinian workers' movement. There are some trade unions, which are organisationally feeble and very PLO-dominated. Enterprises tend to be small, and the national question creates a sense of solidarity that tends (obviously only tends to blur class differences. A very large part of the Palestinian working class is the migrant labour force that works in Israel, which is very difficult to organise.
More than this, the economic demands of the intifada are for disengagement from Israel. This aspect has proved very powerful. Its social effect, of course, is to strengthen the Palestinian bourgeoisie.
It is difficult to see how, in the actual situation, an independent working class movement will emerge. It is certainly difficult to see how it can emerge as the dominant social and political force within the intifada.
Plainly, the number one task of socialists is precisely to help such a movement develop.
But to pose something which has yet to be created as an alternative to the national movement's dominant politics -is deeply sectarian. Socialists need a programme for the existing mass movement, and the demand that it convert itself into.a completely different - socialist movement is not only sectarian, it is absurd, So the PLO's diplomatic strategy needs to be approached from this point of view. If a mass revolutionary socialist movement existed and if the question of power was being posed, Arafat's wheelings and dealings would have an entirely different significance.
If the intifada, through it own propulsion, could drive the Israelis out, also it would be a different question. Arafat's deals would be in a context of demobilisation of the masses, negotiating over the masses' heads and so on.
It is not at all clear that the effect or intention of the diplomatic offensive has been demobilisation. For Arafat the mobilisation secondary but that is a different matter.
Various questions should be central for socialists in such a situation but denouncing diplomacy as such should not be one of them. Demobilsation should be resisted An International Peace Conference should not be trusted, and organisation developed through the uprising should be maintained. Socialists should stress the need for democracy in all current organisations and in future institutions of the state.
At the same time, socialists should focus on building working class organisations, and putting for*The objects of the i ward working class d links to the questior unity, of course, b broader subject.
Does this mean 1 nothing is possible bourgeois states? Yes But that does not m "two stage' policy. ! vocate a capitalist sta recognise the ob cumstances. We mak for socialism, and do a bourgeois state is i n of workers' ut that is a that for noW except tWO lean a classical We don't adite, we simply jective cire propaganda n't argue that in principle a This necessary precondition socialism in the future. We recognise that we, and the workin class, cannot at will bypass the ar tual historical processes.
A socialist movement that able to intervene in the intifada a in Israel effectively could of ca radically alter the material cumstances. A socialist mova that had earned respect for its 1 in the national struggle woul well-placed to develop specia
Scan page 7
of Leban working class forms of struggle. And so on.
So solidarity with the small socialist forces that already exist is very important.
But nothing is served by an ultraleft denunciation of diplomacy as such. Whilst making it clear that it is not our strategy, and we trust none of the governments involved in it, we should welcome whatever advances are made in the direction of Palestinian statehood. What happens then will depend upon the organisations on the ground", and political intervention at that level.
So it is wrong to focus on the danger of an 'imperialist solution'. In any successful national independence struggle, imperialists do what they can to protect their own interests. Our response is to prepare the workers' movement to fight under whatever new conditions, not to denounce the whole process of negotiation in the name of an extremely abstract socialism. By Sam Eaton The little country of Lebanon is like a defiant slap in the face for socialism. Most communal conflicts have some rationality about them: we may regret the bitter fighting between Irish Catholics and Protestants, but at least we understand why they are fighting each other.
Yet in Lebanon, Maronite Christians, Sunni muslims, Shi'a muslims, Druze (to name only the most important groups) slaughter one another in an apparently endless cycle of communal violence that seems no longer to have any rational cause whatsoever.
Over the last few weeks, the Lebanese Christian and occupying Syrian armies have been locked in combat. Before that, different Shi'ite militias tried to wipe each other out; before that, Lebanese Shi'ites were wiping out Palestinian refugees. There seems to be no end, and no rhyme or reason.
Lebanon has witnessed the triumph of irrational hatred on a scale rare even for late twentieth century capitalism. Young kids, born into a world of endlessly dropping bombs, foreign invasions, atrocities and counter-atrocities, join in the shoot-outs because that's all they, or those around them, have ever done.
Islamic fundamentalism has a grip over many of them (in various shades of extremism; but fundamentalism is only an expression of the total destruction of society that has taken place. One of the bigger Islamic militias is called Hope (Amal). But amal is one thing Lebanese don't have.
The immediate background to the last few weeks' fighting was the end of the presidential term of Amin Gemayel last September. Muslims and Christians in parliament couldn't agree a new president, so each decided on their own.
Muslims therefore recognise Salim al-Hoss as president, Christians look to Michael Aoun, head of the (small) Lebanese army, who rather vaingloriously attempted to kick the 25,000 or so Syrian troops out of Lebanon who have been there for 13 years. As a first act, he organised a blockade of mainly Muslim Lebanese ports. the total destruction of society Aoun dreams of reuniting Lebanon, long since a country divided into numerous enclaves and fiefdoms with Syrian and Israeli overlords keeping watchful eyes. In ract, the fighting with Syria, which has left over 300 dead, is the first fight across the basic ChristianMuslim divide in many years, beforehand, most outbreaks had been within different camps, for dominance.
Commentators had been speculating (incredibly) that Aoun might be the man to pull Lebanon together. But there's no chance of that now. Indeed, it seems that Muslims have now been driven into Syrian arms. President Asad of Syria can present himself as Muslim protector. Initially, Aoun's call might have had some appeal for them, as it is mainly Muslims who live in Syrian-controlled areas. But several weeks of missile bombardment have put paid to that.
Lebanon's ordeal began in earnest in the mid 1970s. There were three main causes, which increasingly overlapped.
First, the Lebanese economy, which was heavily based on banking and commerce, had produced a grossly unequal class structure. Alongside the pleasure-beaches were "belts of misery where the country's poor lived in typical third world conditions.
Second, Lebanon had from the beginning been pieced together from disparate social elements -not only religious groups, but 'ethnic' ones too (Kurds, Armenians, as well as Arabs). The political system bequeathed by French colonialism institutionalised the divisions, thus reproducing them.
Moreover, the political system put Christians, mainly Maronites, firmly on top - the president had legally to be Christian, and the majority of parliamentary seats were allotted to Christians (although by the 1970s, Muslims were a majority in society.) To a large extent, though by no means entirely, Christians were also better off; Shi'ites were at the bottom.
Third, large numbers of Palestinían refugees lived in Lebanon. Especially after Jordan's civil war in 1970, Lebanon became the base of the guerilla organisation. That in turn led to Israeli attacks — which after 1969 drove thousands of Lebanese north, swelling still further the "belts of misery'. and social structure was strained to the point of collapse.
Initially, the tocus of the civil war - which claimed 50,000 lives by 1976 — was a legitimate demand for equality for the Muslims, a secular state and basic demacracy. But very quickly the conflict decayed into a sectarian one, on both (Muslim and Christian) sides.
It was for a while given some secular-political dynamic by the alliance formed between the Lebanese National Movement, which saw itself as leftist-Arab nationalist, and the left of the PLO. This, too, soon disintegrated, and was probably-destroyed by Syrian: military intervention in 1976. The Syrian intervention was motivated by Asad's dread of a LNM victory, which looked likely in the spring of 1976 and would have threatened Syrian interests.
The Lebanese left dropped its secular programme and threw itself into the communal slaughter.
The left then declined, although the Palestinian groups remained strong, until Israel's full-scale invasion in June 1982. Hostility to the PLO, Israeli bombardment, declining economic conditions and the secular left's failure led to a growth in (mainly Shi"ite) fundamentalismwhich predated but was, of course, given extra inspiration by the Iranian revolution of 1979.
Amal and later the Hizbollahis proved effective in fighting the Israeli occupation of the south, to the extent of forcing an Israeli withdrawal (although Israel still controls Southern Lebanon in practice).
A US-led multinational force sent in after 1982, if anything, had made the situation worse.
The Lebanon of 1989 is barely recognisable as the same 'consociational democracy much lauded by Western pundits before 1974. Many: of the old political actors count for little now, even including the Phalange party that dominated the Maronite community during the early and middle stages of the war (and which carried out the Sabra and Chatilla massacres of Palestinians in 1982).
So is there hope for Lebanon? Three years ago, there was a general strike by workers demanding an end to the bloodshed, but it would be facile to pretend that a workers" solution is on the immediate agenda.
External changes, like the fall of Asad or, most vitally, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, would ease Lebanon's agony. But what internal rearrangement might help?
Lebanon needs an secular, non-sectarian state. Religious divisions are now so entrenched that such a programme seems a bit far-fetched. But there is no alternative. It is not a situation like Palestine, with two clearly distinct nations It is arguable that the Maronites constitute a separate nation, but unless someone wants to argue that Sunnis, Shi'as, Druze, etc. are all also national groups, there is little to be gained along those lines. Certainly, division is the source of Lebanon's problems, and further division ouldn't help.
regional answer, linking democratic Lebanon to a socialist middle east needs to be looked towards. It may seem a long way off, but right now so does peace of any sort.
----- pull-quotes -----
LEBANON 7 on So by 1974'5 the whole political