Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

For Jewish and Arab workers 'unit Why the PLO went for "two states

Socialist Organiser no. 388, 9 February 1989 · scan p. 15 · about 1,052 words

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Clive Bradley lool

at the developments behind the PLO's declaration of an independent Palestinian state.

In November 1988 the Palestine Liberation Organisation and its leader Yasser Arafat came out clearly for two states in Palestine - a Palestinian Arab state alongside This shift came after a year of the intifada. This uprising in the West Bank and Gaza (the Arab territories under Israeli military occupation) has been the most powerful mobilisation by the Palestinians since 1948, indeed since the late '30s.

A movement had been developing in the occupied territories since the mid-1970s. By the end of 1987, the movement was strong enough to undertake an uprising. The initiative came within the occupied territories, where PLO groups forged an alliance with a young Islamicist movement. But immediately co-ordination began with the external leadership.

The intifada put Israel on the defensive - both politically and diplomatically. Politically, the Israeli army found itself plunged into a repressive policing operation that broad layers of Israeli society could not approve of. Internationally, Israel was seen as a South African-style repressive state.

The PLO would have been fantastically ultimatistic and ultra-left if it had not seized on the opportunities this situation presented by declaring a Palestinian state. This entailed recognising Israel but the question for the PLO leadership was not whether they should recognise Israel, but whether they could persuade harder-line nationalists to go along with it. They succeeded in doing so, with a compromise in which a government-in-exile was not formally proclaimed.

In Israel, the intifada is a nightmare come to life. Israel was always supposed to be the Middle East's democratic trailblazer, founded on democratic and even socialist principles. Israel was supposed to have an army that fought only defensive wars, and only killed anyone if it really had to. And here Israel was, bashing children's skulls.

The effect this has had within Israeli society, provoking a moral as well as a political debate, should not be underestimated. Indeed much of Israeli opposition to repression remains, for now, on moral grounds, and on the sentiment that this sort of behaviour is bad for Israel's soul.

Israeli brutality is not in reality new. But this is the first time Israelis have acted so brutally so close to home for such an extended period — and in such international view. The Israeli army itself believes the intifada will not die down for years to come. And so the moral and political dilemmas will only become sharper.

There is a profound move to the right in Israel— which is not to say it is irreversible. There is an element of political logic to it — getting rid of the Arabs is a logical way to maintain Israel's Jewishness. There is the deepening social and poltical (and economic) crisis - which typically produces a growth of right-wing forces out of desperation. And there is social change.

Israel is a percularly stratified societyThe old establishment is European Jewish Labour Zionist; 'Oriental Jews' were always at the bottom of the social pile (although above the Arabs), and excluded from the centres of power. Thus they gravitated to the oppositional right who knew how to appeal demagogically to them. Oriental Jews nowadays outnumber Europeans. Likud has incorporated Orientals far more than Labour has (one of Likud's most fearsome leaders and Yasser Arafat likely successor to Shamir is an Oriental), has adopted social programmes designed to help them and so on. When Labour lost the 1977 election to Begin it was partly due to ignoring this demographic, as well as political, shift.

It is more complex than that, of course, and Orientals should not be regarded as "naturally' with the right. But the big problem for the Israeli left is how to win the Orientals — that is, largely working class — Jews. Plainly a social programme is necessary; and traditional left Zionism, which is very kibbutz based, is totally unable to develop such a programme.

The left remains based on sections of the European middle class, and the Israeli Arabs. The Communist Party, which is thoroughly Stalinist, remains by far the strongest section of the left, also drawing its support largely from Arab voters.

Social change also underlies developments among the Palestinians. The ola pro-Jordanian rural notables who dominated Palestinian society into the 1970s have literally died out, although Jordan's recent "disengagement' from West Bank is still an economic shock.

Many of the militants in the occupied territories were not even born when the resistance was at its most self-assured in the late 1960s. Even older ones will barely remember, for example the 1973 war. Social contact with refugees outside the territories is minimal.

Both the West Bank and Gaza have been incorporated into the Israeli economy to a high degree, particularly as suppliers of cheap migrant labour (although unlike in South Africa this labour force constitutes a minority sub-proletariat in Israel). Ultimately and in theory this process of incorporation could lead to the demand for independence being rendered obsolete; Israel could evolve into a new South Africa. So far this has not happened: rather, the process has led to a sharpening of the demand for a state in the West Bank and Gaza. This is partly because a big element in the conflict is over land. Jewish settlement, which has grown enormously since the late '70s focusses nationalist anger — both against the seizure of land and the imperialistic arrogance of the settlers.

The essential aim of the intifada has been to demonstrate the impossibility of continued Israeli rule. An entire population is in revolt. Deeply-rooted political structures have been formed, which potentially at least have a greater weight than the exile leadership.

All Israel's attempts to form quislings to 'negotiate' with have flopped; and now there is obviously little point in trying again. If israel wants 'legitimate' leaders to negotiate with, they are there — and in open support of the PLO.

So how will the crisis resolve itself? The rise of the Israeli right is unsustainable in the long term without Israel ceasing to be a democracy (which it is, for Jews). Voices favouring a settlement are growing louder all the time.

So far an explicitly working class voice has yet to be heard. But Palestine's turmoil can and must increase the openings for such a voice.

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