Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

Why Trotsky predicted wrong

Socialist Organiser no. 384, 12 January 1989 · scan pp. 8–9 · about 2,940 words

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In this second part of his discussion article, Vladimir Derer argues that Trots! was misled by his view that the Kremlin bureaucracy was an unstable, hybrid, composite group rather than a cohesive class. Trotsky had argued - as the first part of this article set out to demonstrate - that a 'degenerated workers' state' must be acutely unstable. His mistaken prediction that Stalinism could not possibly survive World War 2 followed logically. Ho torical anal tee aving made certain of historical analogies, Trotsky, now describing the Soviet regime as "Bonapartist', continues on the same theme of it being a regime of crisis:

*Bonapartism by its very essence, cannot long maintain itself; a sphere balanced on the point of a pyramid must inevitably roll down on one side or the other. But it is precisely at this point...that the historical analogy runs up against its limits. Napoleon's downfall did not leave untouched the relations between the classes; but in its essence the social pyramid of France retained its bourgeois character. The inevitable collapse of Stalinist Bonapartism would immediately call into question the character of the ÜSSR as a workers' state..."

(The Workers' State, Thermidor and Bonapartism, 1.2.1935;

Writings 1934-35, Pp.181-2)

With the danger of bourgeois counter-revolution from the coun tryside becoming less acute, Trotsky turned to the increased danger of the USSR's involvement in a war, as a catalyst which would unleash the suppressed contradictins of the Soviet society. The setting has changed, but the underlying forces making for the disintegration of the regime have remained.

*But precisely the protracted nature of the war will inevitably reveal the contradictions of the transitional economy of the USSR with its bureaucratic planning...The rule of the uncontrolled bureaucracy will be transformed into a war dictatorship...In the heated atmosphere of war, one can expect sharp turns PAMPHLET 80 PENCI towards individualistic principles in agriculture, and in handicraft industry, toward the attraction of foreign and 'allied' capital, breaks in the monopoly of foreign trade...etc.| "In the political sphere, these processes may mean the completion of Bonapartism with the corresponding change or a number of changes in property relations. In other words, in case of a protracted war accompanied by the passivity of the world proletariat, the internal social contradictions in the USSR not only might lead but also would have to lead (my italics) to a bourgeoisBonapartist counterrevolution. The political conclusions flowing from this are obvious: only the proletarian revolution in the west can save the USSR as the workers' state in case of a long protracted war. (War and the Fourth International, 10.6.1934; Writings 1933-34, p.316 *Military danger is only one expression of the dependence of the Soviet Union upon the rest of the world, and conseluently one argument against the Utopian idea of an isolatec socialist society.

...the Soviet Union still remains a backward country. The low productivity of labour, the inadequate quality of products...(etc.)...are only to a certain degree compensated by space and natural riches and the numbers or the population. In times of peace the measuring of economic might between the two hostile systems can be postponed...During the war the test is made directly upon the field of battle. Hence the danger.

"Military defeats, although they customarily entail great political changes, do not Organiser pamphlet.

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always of themselves lead to a disturbance of the economic foundations of society. A social regime which guarantees a higher development of riches and culture cannot be overthrown by bayonets..it is hardly to be doubted that a military defeat would also prove fatal not only for the Soviet ruling stratum but also for the social bases of the Soviet Union....The instability of the Soviet regime..is due to the fact that its productive forces lave far from grown up to the forms of socialist property. A military defeat threatens the social bases of the Soviet Union for the same reason that these bases require in peaceful times a bureaucracy and a monopoly of foreign trade that is, because of their weakness.

*Can we, however, expect that the Soviet Union will come out of the coming great war without defeat? To this frankly posed question we will answe rankly: If the war should re main only a war, the defeat of the Soviet Union would be inevitable...if it is not paralysed by revolution in the West, imperialism will sweep away the regime which issued from the October revolution." (The Revolution Betrayed, pp.215-6)/ with the outbreak of the war Trotsky becomes even more definite in s predictions of the immediate te of the USSR. He restates his s position regarding the Bonapartist" nature of the alinist regime: 'A totalitarian regime, whether of Stalinist or fascist type, by its very essence can be only a temorary transitional regime. Naked lictatorship in history has generally been the product and the ymptom of an especially severe social crisis and not at all of a stable regime. Severe crisis cannot be a permanent condition of sociely. A totalitarian state is capable of suppressing social contradicions during a certain period, but it is incapable of perpetuating itself. The monstrous purges in the USSR are most convincing testimony of the fact that Soviet society organically tends toward ejection of the bureaucracy. ...Tsarism also permitted itself rather large-scale measures in purges and moreover precisely in the period when it was nearing its doom." In Defence of Marxism, p. 13-14 The USSR in War, 25.9.1939 With reference to the arguments, dvanced by his critics, that the ureaucracy has already constituted self as a class, Trotsky sticks to the gic of his position. death agony, fraudulence *Symptomatic of his oncoming monstruous of his purge, Stalin testifies to nothing else but the incapacity of the bureaucracy to transform itself into a stable ruling class. Might we not place ourselves in a ludicrous position if we affixed to the Bonapartist oligarch the nomenclature of a new ruling class just a few years or even a few months (my italics) prior to its inglorious downfall?" Ibid., p.14 ...Marxists never believed that an isolated workers' state in Russia could maintain itself indefinitely. True enough we expected the wrecking of the Soviet state, rather than its degeneration; to put it more correctly, we did not sharply differentiate between those two possibilities. But they do not at all contradict each other. Degeneration must inescapably end at a certain stage in downfall". Ibid., p.13 nd Trotsky concludes: "If this war provokes... a proletarian revolution, it must inevitably lead to the overthrow of the bureaucracy in the USSR and regeneration of Soviet democracy... To every single person it will become clear that in the process of the development of the world revolution the Soviet bureaucracy was only an episodic relapse" Ibid., p.9 At this stage, however, Trotsky begins to allow for the possibility that some of the assumptions on which he was basing his analysis may not be valid: *If, however, it is concluded that the present war will not provoke revolution... The inability of the proletariat to take into its hands the leadership of society could actually lead under these conditions to the growth of a new exploiting class from the Bonapartist fascist bureaucracy." *Then it would be necessary • in retrospect to establish that in its fundamental traits the present USSR was the precursor for a new exploiting regime..." Ibid. *If... the October Revolution fails during the course of the present war, or immediately thereafter, to find its continuation in any of the advanced coun tries... then we should doubtlessly have to pose the question of revising our conception of the present epoch and its driving forces. In that case it would be a question not of slapping a copybook label on the USSR or the Stalinist gang (reference to the critics' insistence on calling the Soviet bureaucracy a 'class' rather than a 'caste') but of re-evaluating the world historical perspective for the next decades if not centuries..." Ibid., pp.14-15.

The importance we attach to the fact that Trotsky's two main predictions (let alone the third about the Fourth International) were falsified by events, i.e. World War II was not followed by a proletarian revolution and the Soviet regime did not collapse, will depend not only on our assessment of Trotsky as a Marxist thinker, but also on our attitude towards Marxism as a valid method of interpreting social phenomena.

If we regard Trotsky as little more than a picturesque figure, possibly heroic, possibly pathetic, producing a sort of anti-Stalinist Journalistic commentary on world events, then his numerous false prophesies need not disturb us. But to dismiss him in these terms one would have to show that Trotsky's writings between 1923-40, one, lacked internal consistency, and two, represented a departure from Marxism. None of Trotsky's innumerable critics have ever been able to establish either of these two propositions.

If on the other hand we regard Trotsky as a serious thinker, who over a long period, almost alone, tried to produce a Marxist analysis of contemporary events with his band of followers and - perhaps with less success - to formulate Marxist policies for his small band of followers, then an explanation of why his predictions failed becomes important. And an attempt to trace the origins of these erroneous predictions to the (false) assumptions he made becomes thwhile intellectual exercise.

I am adopting the second view, namely Trotsky as serious thinker. In this article I limit myself - as far as possible — to discussion of the "transitional regime, even though the area for a critical evaluation of Trotsky's position is clearly wider.

As was amply documented at the beginning, Trotsky's predictions concerning the future of the Soviet regime derived from the Marxist premise about the material base needed for socialism, and his diagnosis of the contradictory nature of the 'transitional' regime which stemmed from it. An explanation of why the Stalinist "Bonapartist' regime did not collapse must be sought in the falseness of either or both of the two assumptions on which his prediction regarding the collapse was based.

The first assumption relates to the level of the material base which was thought to be indispensable for a socialist regime. If this assumption is invalid, then contrary to what Trotsky (and Marx) have asserted socialism can be built on a material base much lower than that of advanced capitalism.

If this is so, then not only was Trotsky wrong in opposing theory of 'socialism in one country', but so also was Marx in emphasising the importance of the material base for the character of the superstructure arising upon it. For if socialism can be imposed on a predominantly pre-industrial society then politics takes precedence over economics, a point bourgeois sociologists have never ceased to labour.

Further, if contrary to traditional Marxist assumptions class contradictions are not generated by a generally low level of development of the productive forces, then socialism can be built under conditions of relative poverty, i.e. relative to capitalism, and Stalin was right.

If, on the other hand, the original Marxist proposition about the determining character of the material base is upheld, then Trotsky's false predictions in relation to the Bonapartist nature of Stalinist regime must be due to thefalseness of the second assumption on which his diagnosis of the Soviet regime was based. This assumption concerned the nature of the class. character of the Soviet regime which Trotsky assumed to be basically a proletarian one.

Trotsky and Lenin correctly concluded that a proletarian regime established in an industrially underdeveloped country, surrounded by capitalist states, would inevitably have to be of relatively short duration. Hence, after the initial heroic' period, it would show, given the obiective conditions generating class differentiation, signs of increasing degeneration, the growth of "dual power' and ultimately of impending collapse. Absence of these features and trends points to the conclusion that Trotsky was mistaken in his characterisation of the class nature of the regime.

Faced with ultra-left" claimed that counter-revolution had already taken place, Trotsky repeatedly argued that a 'gradual' bourgeois counterrevolution was inconceivable.

*Until now, in any case, feudal as well as bourgeois counter-revolutions have never taken place

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'organically' but they have invariably required the intervention of military surgery" The Class Nature of the Soviet State, 1.10.33. Writings 1933-4, p.102.

"He who asserts that the Soviet government has been gradually changed from proletarian to bourgeois is only, so to speak, turning backwards the film of reformism" *Critics who consider themselves Marxists must demonstrate in what manner the bourgeoisie that has lost power in a three years struggle could resume the power without any battles". (Ibid, p.103).

Here Trotsky's argument rests on he assumption that the class nature of the counter-revolution must be sourgeois in character. *The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries would bloc with the praetorian centrism... "In the opposing camp, a nó less decisive regrouping of forces would take place under the banner of the struggle for October. The revolutionary elements of the Soviets, the trade unions... Not only the centrist faction but also the right wing of the party would produce not a few revolutionists who would defend the October Revolution with arms in hand... Under these decisive circumstances, the faction of the Bolshevik-Leninists, sharply marked out by its past and steeled by difficult tests, would serve as the element for a crystallisation within the party... and the rebirth of the true Communist Party" (Problems of the Development of the USSR' ' 4.4.1931; Writings 1930-1, p.222).— Trotsky returns to the same theme in the Transitional Programme. *The public utterances of former foreign representatives of the Kremlin, who refused to return to Moscow, irrefutably confirm in their own way that all shades of political thought are to be found among the bureaucracy: from genuine Bolshevism (Ignace Reiss) to complete fascism (F. Butenko). The revolutionary elements within the bureaucracy, only a small minority, reflect, passively it is true, the socialist interests of the proletariat. The fascist counterrevolutionary elements, growing uninterruptedly, express with ever greater consistency the interests of world imperialism. These candidates for the role of compradors consider, not without reason, that the new ruling layer can insure their positions of privilege only through rejection of nationalisation, collectivisation and monpoly of foreign trade in the name of the assimilation of 'Western civilisation' ie capitalism". The Transistional Programme, 1938;

Documents of the Fourth International p.210-211.

The importance Trotsky attributed to the tensions within the bureaucracy, illustrated by the exaggerated symptomatic significance given by him to the views of the defectors from the Soviet diplomatic service, assumes an even more grotesque form in Trotsky's earlier comments about the trial of he 'Industrial Party' and The Mensheviks in 1931. "The indictment in the case of the (saboteurs' centre (the 'Industrial Party') is of exceptional interest...

from the point of view of the struggle of the tendencies within the Communist Party of the SU.? *Thus it was pointed out by Ramzin, that the most important measure of the saboteurs in relation to all the basic branches of industry was 'the slowing down of the tempo of development, which is particularly evident in the old five-year plan worked out under the influence of the centre' (that is the centre of the saboteurs).

"In other words, during 1923-28, that 1S, in the or Period of the development the struggle against the Left opposition, the Central Committee was the unconscious instrument of the specialist-sabateurs who, in turn were the hired agents of the foreign imperialists and the Russian emigrant compradors...But haven't we always asserted that in the struggle against the Left Opposition Stalin was fulfilling the dictates of the world bourgeoisie...? What had been sociological generalisations are now reinforced by the irrefutable juridical proof of the indictment". What is to be Learned from the Saboteurs' Trial?

30.11.1930; Writings 1930-31, p. 66-67.

1 connection with the trial of lesheviks Trotsky writes:

•The Mensheviks served the industrial centre abroad. In his struggle against the opposition, Stalin was the mouthpiece for the two parties: The Menshevik Party and the Industrial Party. Beginning in 1928, according to the confessions of Ramzin and the others, legal sabotage, in the form of artificial slowing down of the rate of industrialisation, became impossible because of the too-abrupt turn in the Menshevik methods of struggle against Soviet power. The bureau drew closer in this work to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and specialists and the emigrant ""Thus the centrists did unconsciously what the Mensheviks did consciously that is, they carried out the tasks of the capitalist general staff abroad."

It is, however, beyond doubt that the next trial will...show that if the Menshevik economists in the years 1923-28 saw, and with reason, the path to the bourgeois.

degeneration of the Soviet system in the retardation of industrialisation, many of them beginning in 1928 became veritable superindustrialisers so as to prepare, by means of economic adventurism, the political downfall of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The Real Disposition of the Pieces 1.3.1931; Writings 1930-31 pp.

200-201.

The 'trials' of the Industrial Parcourse frame-ups, «the irrefutable ty and of the Mensheviks were, of sions which juridical was based were honey. The point here is not tha Trotsky was gullible in having mistaken the rehearsed performances of actors in the Soviet ''Courts of law" for genuine judicial proceedings. (A mistake he did not make when it came to the trials of Old Bolsheviks a few years later). His misjudgement of reality was directly linked with diagnosis of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus as consisting of elements of both classes, of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Direct involvement of such "open agents of the bourgeoisie" must have seemed therefore quite plausible.

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