Socialist Organiser

Socialist Organiser, 1987 to 1992: the second part of the Socialist Organiser archive

PLO declares

Socialist Organiser no. 380, 17 November 1988 · scan p. 6 · about 1,536 words

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As an act of solidarity with Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, Adam Keller will be coming to Britain to speak about the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

Adam Keller is the editor of The Other Israel, produced by the Adam's speaking tour is being organised by the Adam Keller Tour Committee - a body open to all individuals and organisations conContact: The Secretary, The Adam Keller Tour Committee, Flat 24, Rye Court, Peckham Rye, London SE22. Please send cheques to he Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinians' parliament exile, last weekend (12-13 November) both declared an independent Palestinian state and recognised the right of Israel to exist.

This reflects the support of the vast majority of Palestinians for the "two states' solution to their conflict with Israel, at least as an immediate step.

The decision by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) is not a surprise. Indeed, PLO leader Yasser Arafat first put his foot on the path he is now treading in 1974. Ever since then, the PLO has favoured an independent state in "any part of Palestine' - that is, in the West Bank and Gaza - and international diplomacy.

The 'rejectionists' on the Palestinian side, who reject any recognition of Israel, are now fairly isolated minority. A few hard-line (pro-Syrian) groups did not attend the PNC; mainstream rejectionists were muted in their opposition to the PNC decision. The Popular Front led by George Habbash, explicitly recognised the need to preserve the unity established in the PLO since last year.

Unfortunately Israel has just elected its rejectionists overnment of government, with religious fundamentalist parties as Junior partners to the secular right-wing Likud party, will be heavier in its treatment of the Palestinians, not more acommodating.

The immediate background to the PNC's decision is the Palestinian intifada or uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, now entering its twelth month. But its origins are much older.

The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza came, in June 1967, as a result of a big Israeli Arab war that left the pretensions of the Arab ruling classes in tatters. Egypt's President Nasser, the foremost radical Arab nationalist leader of that era, was humiliated (and part of his country occupied). The Arab states were proven to be completely unable to free the Palestinians from the "Zionist entity' that oppressed them.

There were a number of consequences of this Arab defeat. Nasserite or quasi-Nasserite nationalism became, gradually, a thing of the past, as the assertive nationalist states moved to the right (including today's 'radical', Syria). Eventually, Egypt itself was to be propelled by its President Sadat back into the Western fold.

But among Palestinians, both in the occupied (territories and scattered around the Arab world, there was a profound growth of Israeli Council for Israel-Palestine Peace.

cerned to help with this initiative.

Contact: The Secretary, The Adam Rye Court, Peckham Rye, London the same address. same address. nationalism. Previously — since 1948 — the Palestinians had been passive, looking for redress to the greater forces of Arab nationalism. Now a distinct Palestinian nationalism emerged whose focus was on the efforts of the Palestinians themselves.

They thought they would free their country by means of an "armed struggle' modelled on Third World guerilla movements in China, Algeria or Vietnam.

Different tendencies existed within this Palestinian nationalism. The dominant group, Yasser Arafat's Fatah, was rivalled by self-proclaimed Marxists like Habbash who had evolved from the Nasserite tradition.

The 'Marxists' were more explicitly pro-Russian or pro-Chinese and spoke of 'imperialism' and so on; but all sections of the new Palestinian resistance shared a basic framework for understanding their situation.

The root cause of Palestinian oppression was identified as the creation of the Zionist state (with imperialist support). The Palestinians had lost their land, and the chance to form their own state. Liberatton would therefore mean the restoration of Palestine to the Palestinians.

The question of land was (and remains) at the heart of Palestinian nationalism. The framework for Palestinian independence was conceived as the 'land of Palestine' - ie, all of Palestine.

Arab nationalism understood Palestine to be 'Arab land', and the narrower nationalism of the Palestinian organisations never directly challenged this wider definition.

Palestine was always understood to be part of a broader Arab national question, though the post-1967 Palestinian nationalist groups who took over the PLO did pose the issue much more sharply in terms of Palestinian land rather than just Arab land.

The formula employed to express this idea of Palestinian independence was the 'democratic secular state'. This did represent a break from the old Arab nationalist slogan to 'drive the Jews into the sea'.

Jews would be allowed to live in the new Palestine (although there was ambiguity as to exactly which Jews). But it was to be a "democratic secular' Arab state in Palestine. What did this mean?

A distinction was drawn between the Zionist state and the Jewish people in Palestine. Zionism was understood as a colonial, external power structure imposed on the Palestinian people, comparable to French colonial rule of Algeria. The Jews were defined as a religious group; and the new Palestinian nationalists insisted that they would be uncompromisingly hostile to the Zionist . polity while offering friendship to the Jewish religious group.

Thus they explicity rejected the idea that Israeli Jews might constitute a nation. Israel's colonial- type origins were considered enough to define the whole of society as 'settletcolonial'. The complete destruction of the Zionist state was the minimum basis for Palestinian freedom. Armed struggle was the way to destroy it.

The 'democratic secular state' slogan represented particular stage in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism. Both the formula and the strategy to get it have progressively been abandoned as unviable in the face of reality.

In Algeria for example, it could reasonably be supposed that a sufficiently aggressive guerilla war could force the French authorities to abandon the country. It was always highly improbable that Israel would ever give itself up as a result of 'armed struggle'.

The Israeli Jews are a nation whatever you think of the process that created that nation. And increasingly, the Palestinian resistance has come to accept this fact.

The early phase of militant nationalism came to an end in Jordan, where the guerrilla groups had grown too strong for the comfort of Jordan's rule King Hussein. 'Black September' in 1970, saw the destruction of the PLO bases in Jordan, and shifted the centre of PLO operations, with tragic consequences, to Lebanon.

The Arafat leadership opted for a negotiation strately, le a strategy of negotiation. you aim to negotiate with Israel, then you must recognise it. You must abandon the "secular democratic state' in favour of some formula that allows Israel to continue to exist, in however modified or curtailed a form.

The fact that 'two states' was apparently linked both to diplomacy (as against revolutionary 'armed struggle) and defeat (Black September': later the defeat in Lebanon in 1982) confused both the Palestinian and the international left. "Two states' was seen as a right wing' programme, accommodating to imperialism, racism and so on.

Undoubtedly, the PLO's groping towards a 'two states' position has been a bit-by-bit adaptation to changing situations rather than a fundamental reassesment of the nature of the conflict. But to see this simply as a right wing drift would be to misunderstand what has happened, and in particualr to misunderstand what has happened recently.

Because the Israel-Palestine conflict is not a classic colonial/anti-colonial stuggle, the Palestinian struggle has evolved in the way it has. Precisely at the moment the Palestinian struggle has reached its level of greatest intensity, with the broadest mass participation - and suggesting the greatest chance of success - Ine movement most explicitly opts for "two states"

This is not the dynamic of demoralised and defeated movement. Rather it is the dynamic of a militant nationalist movement aiming rationally for independence from Israel, but not its destruction. It is the result of a conflict between two nations rather than a struggle of one nation against an essentially external colonial power.

The declaration of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, which follows Jordan's renunciation of its past claim over the West Bank, is the culmination of this process. It will mean an aggressive attempt by the PLO. to get international recognition for a 'government-in-exile' , further isolating Israel.

And it will mean an intensification of the intifada itself. The new Shamir government's immediate response will be more repression. But will it be possible to sustain this in the longer term? As will the Palestinian resilience (which is acknowledged by the Israeli army) ultimately undermine the currently ascendant Israeli right?

For certain the 'two states' policy stands a bigger chance of undermining the right than any other because it directly answers the allegation that the PLO does not recognise the right of Israel to exist. Moreover, an unconquerable uprising could sap the will of the authorities in the occupied territories.

As other internal factors cause problems for the right (such as a new law limiting immigration to orthodox Jews), the Israeli 'hard left' which also favours two states, could grow The link between the Israeli left

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